Filed 8/26/26 Aud v. RRT Enterprises CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
DEREK SKYLAR AUD, as B340727
Successor in Interest, etc.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct.
No. 22STCV21164)
v.
RRT ENTERPRISES, LP et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed.
Lanzone Morgan, Ayman R. Mourad, Elizabeth M. Kim,
and Christopher W. Petersen for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ekpebe Law Group and Vona S. Ekpebe for Defendants and
Appellants Boardwalk West Financial Services, LLC, Shlomo
Rechnitz, and Rockport Administrative Services, LLC.
Gittler & Berg, Randy A. Berg and Marvin G. Fischler for
Defendant and Appellant RRT Enterprises, LP.
INTRODUCTION
Betsy Jentz sued RRT Enterprises LP doing business under
the name Country Villa Wilshire Convalescent Center and
related entities for violating the Elder Abuse and Dependent
Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.,
the Elder Abuse Act), violating the rights of a resident or patient
(Health & Saf. Code, § 1430, subd. (b)), and negligence. The jury
found in favor of Jentz, and Jentz requested $1,205,196 in
attorneys’ fees. The trial court awarded $200,000 in attorneys’
fees under Health and Safety Code section 1430 and denied
Jentz’s request for fees under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5 and her request for costs of proof under Code of
Civil Procedure section 2033.420.1 Jentz’s grandnephew, Derek
Skylar Aud,2 argues the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding only $200,000 in attorneys’ fees under Health and
Safety Code section 1430 and in denying Jentz’s requests for fees
under sections 1021.5 and 2033.420. Aud also argues the trial
court abused its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to
tax costs by $78,256.54. We affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 Jentz died while this appeal was pending. We granted
Aud’s motion to substitute him for Jentz. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.36(a).)
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Jury Finds for Jentz
Jentz filed this action against RRT, Boardwalk West
Financial Services LLC, Rockport Administrative Services LLC,
and Shlomo Rechnitz (collectively, the defendants). A jury found
RRT violated Jentz’s rights as a resident under Health and
Safety Code section 1430, committed elder abuse or neglect under
the Elder Abuse Act, and was negligent. The jury found RRT did
not act with the recklessness, oppression, fraud or malice
required to recover enhanced remedies, including attorneys’ fees,
under the Elder Abuse Act. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.)
The jury also found that Rockport and Boardwalk were engaged
in a joint venture with RRT and that Rockport, Boardwalk, and
Rechnitz were alter egos of RRT.
The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial on the
amount of damages, alter ego liability, and joint venture liability.
We affirmed in part and reversed in part. (See Aud v. RRT
Enterprises, LP (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1231.)
B. The Trial Court Awards Jentz Attorneys’ Fees and
Costs
Before the defendants filed their posttrial motions Jentz
requested $1,205,196 in attorneys’ fees ($602,598 with a
multiplier of 2.0) under Health and Safety Code section 1430,
section 2033.420, and section 1021.5. The court awarded
$200,000 in attorneys’ fees against RRT under Health and Safety
Code section 1430 and denied Jentz’s requests under
sections 2033.420 and 1021.5.
3
Jentz filed a memorandum of costs seeking $166,096.62 in
costs. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to tax costs
by $78,256.54. Jentz timely appealed from the order awarding
fees and the order granting the defendants’ motion to tax costs.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Awarding Jentz $200,000 in Attorneys’ Fees Under
Health and Safety Code Section 1430
Jentz requested fees under Health and Safety Code
section 1430, which states a facility that “violates any rights of
the resident or patient . . . [¶] . . . shall be liable . . . for costs and
attorney’s fees.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1430, subd. (b)(1)(A)
& (B); see Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375,
381; Nevarrez v. San Marino Skilled Nursing & Wellness Centre,
LLC (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 102, 128.) Aud argues the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding only $200,000. The court did
not abuse its discretion.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The “fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with
the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended
multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v.
Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; see Perry v. Stuart (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 472, 510.) The trial court “may adjust the
lodestar figure ‘based on consideration of factors specific to the
case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal
services provided.’ [Citation.] Such factors may include “‘the
4
nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the
skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention
given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the
case.”’” (Perry, at p. 511; see Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 358.)
The trial court “has broad discretion” to reduce a fee
request “if the court determines the attorney’s work . . . is
duplicative or excessive.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 161; see Ketchum v. Moses (2001)
24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 [“trial courts must carefully review
attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form
of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to
compensation”]; Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018)
30 Cal.App.5th 24, 40-41 [trial court did not abuse its discretion
in reducing a fee request “to arrive at a reasonable fee based on
the factors specific to the case, including the excessive time spent
on the ‘not so complex case’”]; Donahue v. Donahue (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272 [“‘just as there can be too many cooks in
a kitchen, there can be too many lawyers on a case’”].)
We review an award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of
discretion. “‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the
value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and
while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be
disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly
wrong.”’” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th
480, 488; see LCPFV, LLC v. Somatdary Inc. (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 743, 759.) We review the trial court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence. (See Riskin v. Downtown
Los Angeles Property Owners Assn. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 438,
445.)
5
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Reducing the Lodestar Amount
Jentz requested a lodestar of $602,598.25 for 1,718 hours,
with multiplier of 2.0, for a total request of $1,205,196.50. Jentz
argued she could not apportion time between her cause of action
under Health and Safety Code section 1430 (which entitled her to
fees) and her causes of action for negligence and elder abuse
(which did not) because all three causes of action were based on
understaffing at Country Villa Wilshire.3 The trial court ruled
Jentz was entitled to recover fees under Health and Safety Code
section 1430 against RRT (the only defendant against whom
Jentz asserted that cause of action). The court agreed Jentz’s
three causes of action were so intertwined it would be
impracticable to separate the attorneys’ time into compensable
and non-compensable units, but stated the court could apply a
“negative multiplier”4 to account for that “partial success.”
The court stated that the hourly rates for Jentz’s attorneys
were reasonable, but that the court needed more information to
determine whether the number of hours was reasonable. The
court allowed counsel for Jentz to resubmit their summaries “in a
‘day-to-day’ format” or monthly billing statements. After
3 We refer to RRT Enterprises LP dba Country Villa Wilshire
Convalescent Center as RRT. We refer to the skilled nursing
facility as Country Villa Wilshire.
4 A multiplier that reduces the lodestar figure is not really a
“negative multiplier,” but a rational number between 0 and 1,
usually expressed or expressible as a terminating decimal, such
as 0.5 or 3/4. A “negative multiplier” technically suggests an
award of attorneys’ fees from, rather than to, the prevailing
plaintiff.
6
reviewing supplemental declarations by counsel for Jentz, the
court found Jentz’s request for $602,598 for 1,718 hours was
“clearly inflated and unreasonable.” The court found that the
case was overstaffed and that “there was excessive duplication of
tasks.” The court stated that, because Jentz’s request was
inflated, the court had discretion to adjust the fee downward or to
deny the request.
The court acted within its discretion in denying Jentz’s
request for fees charged by two paralegals because Jentz did not
provide adequate documentation. Jentz requested $79,404 in
fees for a paralegal whose declaration provided a generic
description of tasks she performed but did not show how much
time she billed for each task. Therefore, the court concluded, it
was unable to ascertain whether the time was excessive or
duplicative “or whether the tasks were secretarial or clerical in
nature.” The court also denied Jentz’s request for $12,765 in fees
for the work of another paralegal who assisted in the courtroom
during the trial because Jentz did “not provide any breakdown
regarding the specific tasks, dates, and time billed.” The court
stated that the paralegal possibly performed work that was not
legal services, but that because the time records consisted of
“block billing”5 rather than “actual billing records,” it was
“impossible to fully analyze the fees requested and determine
what is reasonable and appropriate.” (See In re Marriage of
Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 695 [trial courts have
5 “Block billing occurs when ‘a block of time [is assigned] to
multiple tasks rather than itemizing the time spent on each
task.’” (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 266, 279.)
7
discretion “‘to penalize block billing when the practice prevents
them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which
are not’”].)6 Those adjustments reduced the lodestar from
$602,598 to $500,629. ($602,598 - $79,404 - $12,765 - $9,800
= $500,629)
Next, the court acted within its discretion in reducing the
fee award to $200,000 to account for overstaffing and duplication
of work. (See Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39 [“it is appropriate for a trial court to reduce
a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine,
noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant
inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted”].) The court found the
case was overstaffed because two partners, one senior associate,
four associates, and six paralegals or legal assistants worked on
the case. The court gave the following examples of duplicative
work: three employees performed “duplicative tasks involving
medical records,” “four attorneys charged for preparing the
opening statement,” “three lawyers charged for attending the
mediation,” and there were “numerous duplicative entries for
meetings and telephone calls.”
Aud argues the “trial court offered no methodology for how
it arrived at the $200,000 figure and failed to articulate why
specific reductions were justified.” Regarding the first reduction
of $101,169 for the two paralegals’ and one lawyer’s time, the
court, as discussed, stated its methodology and reasons.
Regarding the second reduction from $500,629 to $200,000 (a
60 percent reduction), Aud is correct the court did not explain
how it arrived at $200,000. The court, however, had discretion to
6 The court also reduced Jentz’s request by $9,800.
8
reduce the lodestar to an amount that reflected the reasonable
value of the legal services provided. Where, as here, the
prevailing party submits a “‘“voluminous fee application,”’” the
court may “‘“make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the
number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure.”’”
(Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at
p. 41; accord, Morris v. Hyundai Motor America, supra,
41 Cal.App.5th at p. 40; see Karton v. Ari Design & Construction,
Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 746-748 [trial court did not abuse
its discretion in reducing the lodestar from $300,000 to $90,000
for several reasons, including that the case was simple, the
plaintiff overlitigated a small dispute, and the plaintiff’s briefing
displayed incivility].) That the trial court reduced the lodestar by
selecting the final amount, rather than by articulating a
percentage, does not indicate an abuse of discretion. (See Morris,
at p. 40 [where the trial court “could properly have made an
across-the-board reduction of 30 percent” to address overstaffing,
the court “got to the same result by cutting particular attorneys’
billings,” which was not an abuse of discretion].)
Contrary to Aud’s contention, the trial court did not have to
perform a “granular analysis of time entries.” “When confronted
with hundreds of pages of legal bills, trial courts are not required
to identify each charge they find to be reasonable or
unreasonable, necessary or unnecessary. . . . A reduced award
might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney
overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the
opposing party has stated valid objections.” (Gorman v.
Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101; see
Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 240, 250.) The trial court stated it agreed with
9
the defendants’ objections to Jentz’s fee request and gave
examples of duplicative work. That was sufficient.
Nor, as Aud contends, did the trial court have to provide a
“detailed explanation of how it arrived at a nearly 70% cut.” The
court explained its reasons for reducing the lodestar; it did not
have to provide its calculations. (See Save Our Uniquely Rural
Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1190 [“Because the record shows that the
court acted for legitimate reasons, we cannot find an abuse of
discretion simply because it failed to make its arithmetic
transparent.”]; see also Taduran v. James R. Glidewell, Dental
Ceramics, Inc. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 197, 210, fn. 3 [trial court
did not have to “explain why it chose a 0.70 multiplier instead of
another multiplier, such as a 0.75 multiplier”; “[t]here is no legal
principle to support such precision in the abuse of discretion
standard of review, which contemplates a range of permissible
behavior”]; Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 64
[“Although it might have been better for the court to provide a
separate breakdown of each of the three reductions it made” in
calculating the lodestar amount, the trial court was not “required
to do so.”].)
Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
266, cited by Aud, is distinguishable. In that case the trial court
reduced the time the plaintiffs’ attorneys claimed by 70 percent
because the trial court found 70 percent of billing entries were
flawed. (Id. at p. 280.) The court in Mountjoy held the trial court
abused its discretion because there was “no reasonable basis for
the conclusion that the total hours included in the 70 percent-
plus time entries that were flawed in one or more ways was even
reasonably close to 70 percent of the total time claimed. For
10
example, it is possible that the hours included in the flawed time
entries amounted to only 50 percent of total hours claimed.” (Id.
at p. 281.) Thus, the trial court’s ruling in Mountjoy was
arbitrary because there was no correlation between the
percentage of flawed time entries and the percentage of hours
claimed for the flawed entries. (Ibid.) The problem in Mountjoy
was not that the trial court imposed a 70 percent reduction; it
was that 70 percent was not the right percentage reduction to
accomplish what the trial court intended. Here, in contrast, the
trial court reduced the lodestar amount to $200,000 because that
was the amount the court concluded was the reasonable value of
the services Jentz’s lawyers provided. (See Laffitte v. Robert Half
Internat. Inc., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 488.)
Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., supra,
178 Cal.App.4th 44, also cited by Aud, is distinguishable too. In
Gorman the trial court “took the motion [for attorneys’ fees and
costs] under submission without asking any questions of the
parties or expressing any agreement or disagreement with any of
the points made in the motion or opposition.” (Id. at pp. 56-57.)
In a 27-word order the trial court awarded $416,581.37 in
attorneys’ fees, which was “a little under 61 percent of [the]
lodestar amount,” without explaining how the court arrived at
that amount or giving any reason for reducing the lodestar. (Id.
at p. 57, fn. 7, 99.) Though the amount awarded was “precise and
down to the penny,” the court in Gorman could not “recreate [the]
result by means of various formulas.” (Id. at p. 99.) Absent any
explanation by the trial court, the court concluded, the number
appeared “to have been snatched whimsically from thin air.” (Id.
at p. 101.)
11
Contrary to Aud’s contention, the $200,000 award in this
case was not, as in Gorman, whimsical or grabbed out of the air.
The court in Gorman stated that, had the trial court given a
reason for reducing the fee award “or cited any other factor
recognized in case law for reducing the lodestar amount,” the
court might have affirmed the order. (Gorman v. Tassajara
Development Corp., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 101.) The trial
court in this case did those things: It issued a lengthy order
explaining its reasons for reducing the award and concluding the
reasonable value of the legal services provided by Jentz’s lawyers
was $200,000.
3. The Trial Court Did Not Apply an Incorrect
Legal Standard or Misunderstand the Jury’s
Findings
Aud argues “the trial court abused its discretion by
significantly reducing [Jentz’s] requested attorneys’ fees on the
false assumption that [Jentz] ‘did not prevail on all causes of
action.’” The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
In its order granting Aud’s motion for attorneys’ fees the
court stated: “Defendants concede that [Jentz] may recover
attorney’s fees pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1430,
but only . . . for work reasonably expended on” that cause of
action. The court also stated: “[Jentz] concedes that she did not
prevail on her Elder Abuse/Neglect claim pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 15657, and that her negligence
claim cannot support an award of attorney’s fees.” Elsewhere in
the order the court stated that Jentz “only prevailed” on the
second cause of action under Health and Safety Code
section 1430 and that Jentz “did not prevail on” the other two
12
causes of action. Read literally, the court’s statements that Jentz
“only prevailed” on the cause of action under Health and Safety
Code section 1430 and that Jentz “did not prevail” on the other
causes of action was incorrect: Jentz prevailed entirely on the
negligence cause of action and partially on the elder neglect cause
of action. But that is not what the court meant; the court
undoubtedly meant Jentz prevailed on only one cause of action
that entitled her to recover attorneys’ fees.
We interpret the trial court’s order according to the same
“‘rules of construction that apply to any other writing.’” (Smith v.
Ogbuehi (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453, 473.) “Under those rules, the
entire order is taken by its four corners and construed as a whole.
[Citation.] Also, the order’s language is viewed in light of the
facts and the issues before the court, and each statement is
considered in its proper context.” (Id. at p. 474.) Construing the
trial court’s order as a whole, and in light of the issue before the
court—Jentz’s request for attorneys’ fees—we conclude that,
when the court stated Jentz “only prevailed” on the cause of
action under Health and Safety Code section 1430, the court
meant Jentz only prevailed on one fee-bearing cause of action.
The trial court was familiar with the case, having presided over
the trial. Indeed, in the same order the court correctly stated
Jentz’s “negligence claim cannot support an award of attorney’s
fees.” Reading the record as a whole, we are confident the trial
court understood that Jentz prevailed on three causes of action,
but that only one of them authorized recovery of attorneys’ fees.
4. Aud’s Remaining Arguments Lack Merit
Aud argues “the trial court used block billing as a blanket
justification to apply an arbitrary reduction without any analysis
13
of whether it actually obscured the reasonableness of the time
billed.” Aud forfeited this argument by not citing to the record.
(See Rybolt v. Riley (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 864, 868 [court may
“‘disregard any factual contention not supported by a proper
citation to the record’”]; Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services,
LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 589 [an “appellant who fails to cite
accurately to the record forfeits the issue or argument on
appeal”].) In any event, the record does not support Aud’s
argument. As discussed, the trial court denied the fee request for
two paralegals’ work because the documents Jentz submitted did
not allow the court to determine which fees were reasonable and
appropriate. That was within the court’s discretion. (See Morris
v. Hyundai Motor America, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.)
Aud also challenges the trial court’s findings that the case
was overstaffed and that Jentz’s lawyers billed for duplicative
work. He contends the trial court should have considered that
the case had lasted three years, that one of the attorneys
assigned to the case left the firm, and that two of the seven
attorneys billed only a few hours. He also argues the court
misinterpreted the time records to mean different people
performed the same tasks rather than the same type of tasks.
But the issue is whether substantial evidence supported the trial
court’s findings, not whether there was evidence to support a
contrary finding. (See In re Marriage of Nelson (2025)
115 Cal.App.5th 904, 914 [under the substantial evidence
standard of review “‘“the power of an appellate court begins and
ends with the determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will
support the finding of fact”’”]; Slone v. El Centro Regional
Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1175 [appellant
14
“cannot carry his burden on appeal by merely rearguing the
‘facts’ as he would have them and/or reasserting his position at
trial”].)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings
that the case was overstaffed and that there were charges for
duplicative work. As discussed, four attorneys charged for
preparing the opening statement, for a total of more than
50 hours, and three attorneys attended the mediation. In
addition, three attorneys billed time for discussing the case
among themselves.
Aud also argues the trial court “erred by denying fees for
legal tasks performed by paralegals, erroneously classifying them
as clerical work.” But the trial court did not deny the fee request
because the paralegals’ work was clerical; the court denied the
request for fees charged by one paralegal because the fee request
simply listed eight tasks the paralegal performed, for a total of
397 hours, without stating how many times she performed each
task or how long she spent on each task. The court stated it
could not “‘ascertain whether the time was
appropriate/reasonable or excessive; whether there was any
overlap or duplication as to such tasks . . . ,’ or whether the tasks
were secretarial or clerical in nature.”
To be sure, “paralegal fees may be awarded as attorney’s
fees if the trial court deems it appropriate.” (Roe v. Halbig (2018)
29 Cal.App.5th 286, 312; see Gorman v. Tassajara Development
Corp., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 100.) The trial court,
however, had discretion to disallow fees for clerical work. (See
Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of
San Bernardino, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1186-1187.) Some
of the tasks listed in the paralegal’s declaration appeared clerical
15
(calendaring, scheduling meetings) while others (drafting
discovery and conducting research) did not. And the court had
discretion to deny fees for any of the paralegal’s work where her
declaration did not allow the court to identify which fees were
reasonable and which were not. (See In re Marriage of Nassimi,
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 695 [the court “‘“may properly reduce
compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate
time records”’”].)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Jentz’s Request for Costs of Proof Under
Section 2033.420
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
During discovery a party may serve a written request that
another party “admit the genuineness of specified documents, or
the truth of specified matters of fact, opinion relating to fact, or
application of law to fact.” (§ 2033.010.) Such requests “‘“are
primarily aimed at setting at rest a triable issue so that it will
not have to be tried. Thus, such requests, in a most definite
manner, are aimed at expediting the trial. For this reason, the
fact that the request is for the admission of a controversial
matter, or one involving complex facts, or calls for an opinion, is
of no moment. If the litigant is able to make the admission, the
time for making it is during discovery procedures, and not at the
trial.”’” (Vargas v. Gallizzi (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 362, 370;
accord, Bloxham v. Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 729, 752;
see Orange County Water Dist. v. The Arnold Engineering Co.
(2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 96, 115 [requests for admission “‘are not
restricted to facts or documents, but apply to conclusions,
16
opinions, and even legal questions,’” and “‘serve to narrow
discovery, eliminate undisputed issues, and shift the cost of
proving certain matters’”].)
If a responding party denies a request for admission the
propounding party later proves, section 2033.420, subdivision (a),
provides for an award of costs of proof: “‘If a party fails to admit
the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when
requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting
that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that
document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the
admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to
whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses
incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s
fees.’” Section 2033.420, subdivision (b), provides: “‘The court
shall make this order unless it finds any of the following:
[¶] (1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to
it was waived under Section 2033.290. [¶] (2) The admission
sought was of no substantial importance. [¶] (3) The party
failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe
that that party would prevail on the matter. [¶] (4) There was
other good reason for the failure to admit.’” An award for costs of
proof “‘is not a penalty. Instead, it is designed to reimburse
reasonable expenses incurred by a party in proving the truth of
the requested admission.’” (Vargas v. Gallizzi, supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 370; see City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable
Associates, LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 344, 353.)
“‘The determination of whether “there were no good reasons
for the denial,” whether the requested admission was “of
substantial importance,” and the amount of expenses to be
awarded, if any, are all within the sound discretion of the trial
17
court.’” (Bloxham v. Saldinger, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 753;
accord, Vargas v. Gallizzi, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 371.) We
review an order denying costs of proof under section 2033.420 for
abuse of discretion. (Yoon v. Cam IX Trust (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
388, 391-392; see Spahn v. Richards (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 208,
217.)
2. Jentz Did Not Show the Cost of Proving the
Matters the Defendants Denied
Jentz requested costs of proof based on the defendants’
failure to admit six requests for admission. Five of the requests
asked the defendants to admit factual matters regarding Jentz’s
risk of falling, the dates she fell, and Country Villa Wilshire’s
failure to update her care plan after she fell. The sixth request
asked the defendants to authenticate the management and
operations transfer agreement for Country Villa Wilshire. In
response to that request, the defendants said they could not
authenticate the document, but at trial Rechnitz authenticated it
and identified his signature.
The trial court found that the defendants did not have a
reasonable ground to believe they would prevail and that Jentz
therefore was “entitled to request her reasonable expenses,
including attorney’s fees, incurred in making the proof at issue.”
The court continued: “Notwithstanding the above, the Court
finds . . . [Jentz] has failed to set forth in a clear and concise
manner the additional time incurred or expended in having to
prove the matters related to the requests for admission.” The
court stated that initially Jentz simply requested fees for
1,718 hours without “a breakdown of time and tasks that would
permit the Court to analyze and determine how many hours were
18
reasonably expended on proving the particular matters at issue
in the requests for admission.” Jentz later submitted “a
breakdown for each attorney’s time,” but counsel “block billed”
trial time rather than stating “what occurred during the trial
that day or who testified.” Therefore, the court ruled, Jentz did
not meet her burden under section 2033.420 to provide “sufficient
evidence that permits the Court to determine the amount of fees
that were reasonably ‘incurred in making that proof.’”
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. To recover costs
of proof under section 2033.420, the requesting party “must show
[it] spent the amounts claimed to prove the issues [the
responding party] should have admitted.” (Grace v. Mansourian
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 529; see Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs v. Macias (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1031 [trial
court has discretion “to exclude any claimed expenses to the
extent they relate to issues outside the scope of the requests for
admission”].)
Jentz did not make any attempt to specify the amount of
time her lawyers spent proving the matters the defendants
denied or the cost of that time. She simply submitted records
showing the 1,718 hours her lawyers spent on the case over a
two-year period. But Jentz was not entitled to recover the costs
of factual investigation, discovery, legal research, motion
practice, or preparing for trial. She was entitled only to the cost
of proving the matters the defendants improperly denied.
“[P]reparation for trial or arbitration is not the equivalent of
proving the truth of a matter so as to authorize an award of
attorney fees under [section 2033.420]. Expenses are recoverable
only where the party requesting the admission ‘proves . . . the
truth of that matter,’ not where that party merely prepares to do
19
so.” (Wagy v. Brown (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1, 6; see Stull v.
Sparrow (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 860, 865-866 [“Until a trier of fact
is exposed to evidence and concludes that the evidence supports a
position, it cannot be said that anything has been proved.”].)
Jentz’s submission fell far short of the required showing.
Her lawyers’ declarations made only one reference to proving one
of the matters the defendants denied: The lawyers stated they
authenticated the management and operations transfer
agreement by questioning Rechnitz during trial, but they did not
state how long that took or how much they charged for that work.
Jentz’s submission was silent on the cost of proving the other
matters—that RRT determined Jentz was at risk of falling, that
she fell on certain dates, and that Country Villa Wilshire did not
update Jentz’s care plan after she fell. Jentz did not identify the
witnesses whose testimony provided that evidence or provide an
estimate of how many days of the three-week trial her lawyers
spent proving those matters. Indeed, Jentz did not even calculate
the total number of hours her lawyers spent in trial. Because
Jentz did not identify the cost of proving the matters the
defendants denied, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying her request under section 2033.420. (See Grace v.
Mansourian, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 529 [the “requested
amounts must be segregated from costs and fees expended to
prove other issues”]; see also Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs v. Macias, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031 [the “rule is
that a party cannot recover costs of proof for other issues”].)
Aud argues for the first time in his reply brief that, because
the defendants denied “core facts of liability,” Jentz “was forced to
try the entire case,” the “cost of proof is the cost of establishing
liability,” and “[i]mpossibility of segregation is not a valid basis to
20
deny a mandatory statutory remedy.” Because in the trial court
Jentz never argued it was impossible to segregate the costs of
proof from other costs, Aud forfeited the argument. (See Jogani
v. Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 840; Ruffier v. Volcano
Hills Road Maintenance Assn. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 899, 910.)
Even if not forfeited, the argument is meritless: Some
segregation of fees was possible. At a minimum, Jentz could have
segregated trial time from the rest of the 1,718 hours. And even
at trial there were some issues unrelated to Jentz’s fall risk, falls,
and care plan, such as the defendants’ alter ego and joint venture
liability, whether Country Villa Wilshire was licensed, and
whether Rechnitz threatened Aud in a telephone conversation.
Aud also argues that, because section 2033.420 uses the
word “shall,” the statute “imposes a mandatory duty that the
trial court failed to perform, and the refusal to award any amount
was reversible error.” Had Jentz adequately documented “the
reasonable expenses incurred in making [the] proof” of the
matters improperly denied (§ 2033.420, subd. (a)), the court
would have had a mandatory duty to award costs of proof. But as
discussed, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining
Jentz did not meet her burden to show the cost of proving the
issues the defendants should have admitted. (See Grace v.
Mansourian, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.)
Aud’s reliance on Samsky v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 517 is misplaced. In Samsky the
trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for costs of proof,
incorrectly placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove that none
of the exceptions to awarding costs under section 2033.420,
subdivision (b), applied. (Samsky, at p. 519.) On appeal the
defendant argued the court should “uphold the trial court’s denial
21
of costs under the doctrine of implied findings” because the
plaintiff’s “‘block billing [made] it impossible to determine what
would be related to any one (or multiple) denied issues.’” (Id. at
pp. 527-528.) The court in Samsky rejected the defendant’s
argument, stating the “trial court made clear the basis for its
ruling, and there is no reason to believe it also denied the motion
on the additional unmentioned ground of problems with cost
itemization, particularly since [the defendant] did not raise this
argument in the trial court.” (Id. at p. 528.) Unlike this case, in
Samsky the trial court did not decide whether the plaintiff
adequately demonstrated its costs of proof, and the court did not
decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting
the plaintiff’s showing.
Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Macias,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th 1007 is likewise inapposite. In Macias the
plaintiff submitted a motion for costs of proof accompanied by a
summary listing specific billing entries counsel for the plaintiff
stated were “attributable to [the defendants’] refusal to admit
requests for admissions.” (Id. at p. 1026.) The court in Macias
held the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion for
failing to “identify ‘the specific attorney’s fees and costs incurred
to prove the matters in each, specific request for admission that
was denied . . . .’” (Id. at p. 1030.) The court stated
section 2033.420 “does not require that fees and costs must be
separately allocated to each specific request for admission,
particularly not where, as here, virtually all the requests relate
to a single issue . . . . The rule is that a party cannot recover
costs of proof for other issues.” (Macias, at pp. 1030-1031.) Thus,
under Macias the party requesting costs of proof does not need to
segregate costs among different requests for admission, but must
22
segregate costs of proving the matters improperly denied from
other costs.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Jentz’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees Under
Section 1021.5
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1021.5 is an exception to the general rule that
“‘parties in litigation pay their own attorney’s fees.’” (Grossmont
Union High School Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp. (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 552, 570; see La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood
Assn. of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
1149, 1155.) The statute provides: “‘Upon motion, a court may
award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more
opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if:
(a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has
been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons,
(b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or
of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity,
are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees
should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if
any.’” (See Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206,
1214 & fn. 2; Doe v. Atkinson (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 667, 674.)
The “‘Legislature adopted section 1021.5 as a codification of
the “private attorney general” attorney fee doctrine that had been
developed in numerous prior judicial decisions. . . . [T]he
fundamental objective of the private attorney general doctrine of
attorney fees is “‘to encourage suits effectuating a strong [public]
23
policy by awarding substantial attorney’s fees . . . to those who
successfully bring such suits and thereby bring about benefits to
a broad class of citizens.’” [Citation.] The doctrine rests upon the
recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to
the effectuation of the fundamental public policies embodied in
constitutional or statutory provisions, and that, without some
mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private
actions to enforce such important public policies will as a
practical matter frequently be infeasible.’” (Conservatorship of
Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1217-1218; see Let Them Choose
v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 953,
961 [section 1021.5 “‘acts as an incentive for the pursuit of public
interest-related litigation that might otherwise have been too
costly to bring’”].)
“[E]ligibility for section 1021.5 attorney fees is established
when ‘(1) plaintiffs’ action “has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest,” (2) “a significant
benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary has been conferred
on the general public or a large class of persons” and (3) “the
necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as
to make the award appropriate.”’” (Conservatorship of Whitley,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1214; accord, Grossmont Union High
School Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th
at p. 572.) “‘“Because the statute states the criteria in the
conjunctive, each must be satisfied to justify a fee award.”’”
(Save Agoura Cornell Knoll v. City of Agoura Hills (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 665, 708; see People v. Investco Management &
Development LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 443, 456.) “Accordingly,
we may uphold the trial court’s order denying the attorney fees
motion if we determine any one of these elements is missing.”
24
(Children & Families Com. of Fresno County v. Brown (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 45, 55.) We review a ruling on a motion for
attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5 for abuse of discretion.
(Whitley, at p. 1213; see Save Agoura Cornell Knoll, at p. 708.)
2. The Action Did Not Confer a Significant Benefit
on the General Public or a Large Class of
Persons
The trial court concluded Jentz failed to meet the second
requirement of section 1021.5, finding the case “was brought for
[Jentz’s] own benefit and did not confer a significant benefit on
the general public or for a large class of persons.” The court did
not abuse its discretion.
“A benefit need not be monetary to be significant.”
(La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. of Hollywood v. City of
Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1158; accord, Friends of
Spring Street v. Nevada City (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1108;
see Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979)
23 Cal.3d 917, 939 [“in many cases the important gains or
contributions rendered by public interest litigation will be
reflected in nonmonetary advances”].) “A significant benefit may
result from the ‘effectuation of a fundamental constitutional or
statutory policy.’” (Canyon Crest Conservancy v. County of
Los Angeles (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 398, 412; see Woodland Hills
Residents Assn., Inc., at p. 939.) “‘Of course, the public always
has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are
properly enforced and thus, in a real sense, the public always
derives a “benefit” when illegal private or public conduct is
rectified.’ [Citation.] However, not ‘every case involving a
statutory violation’ is properly the subject of fees under the
25
statute. [Citation.] Instead, the trial court must ‘determine the
significance of the benefit, as well as the size of the class
receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the
pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a
particular case.’” (Canyon Crest Conservancy, at p. 412; see
Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc., at pp. 939-940.)
Aud argues the “action resulted in a significant benefit to a
large class of persons because the enforcement of the statutory
rights of elders furthers the public policies underlying” the Elder
Abuse Act and Health and Safety Code section 1430 “as these
statutes depend on private enforcement to protect elderly rights.”
But simply enforcing a statute, even a statute designed to further
an important public policy, does not create a significant benefit
under section 1021.5. Aud does not identify a fundamental
statutory policy advanced by this case. Nor does Aud explain
how Jentz’s success in this case brought a significant benefit to
anyone other than her. Jentz sought damages for her injuries;
she did not seek injunctive relief or a declaration of the rights of
other Country Villa Wilshire residents. The possibility that, in
response to the verdict, Country Villa Wilshire might provide
better care to other residents is not sufficient to show a
significant benefit under section 1021.5. (See LaGrone v. City of
Oakland (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 932, 946 [possibility the
plaintiff’s “lawsuit may have conveyed a cautionary message to
the [defendants] about their conduct, or that it might cause them
to change their practices in the future, is insufficient to satisfy
the significant public benefit requirement”]; see also McDoniel v.
Kavry Management, LLC (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 949, 978
[“‘Section 1021.5 was not designed as a method for rewarding
litigants motivated by their own pecuniary interests who only
26
coincidentally protect the public interest.’”]; Roybal v. Governing
Bd. of Salinas City Elementary School Dist. (2008)
159 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 [“Any benefit to the public in the
District’s compliance with [statutory layoff rights] in this case
was incidental to the primary goal of the lawsuit, to obtain
reinstatement and/or damages for petitioners.”].)
Quoting selectively from Bouvia v. County of Los Angeles
(1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1075, Aud argues this case “resulted in a
significant benefit because ‘[a]ll persons are necessarily affected
by the nature and extent of the health care they receive and that
which is rendered to family and friends.’” The facts in Bouvia
were very different than those in this case. In Bouvia the
plaintiff obtained an order requiring a hospital to remove a
feeding tube inserted against her will. (Id. at p. 1080.) The court
held the litigation conferred a significant benefit on the public
because it “resulted in the enforcement of a significant right”: the
right to refuse medical treatment “independent of the reasons
which may motivate the exercise of that right.” (Id. at p. 1084.)
This case did not vindicate any comparable right.
Quoting the trial court’s order, Aud argues the trial court
improperly denied Jentz’s request for attorneys’ fees under
section 1021.5 “on the sole ground that the action was ‘brought
for [Jentz’s] own benefit.’” Aud omits the rest of the sentence.
The court stated the action “was brought for [Jentz’s] own benefit
and did not confer a significant benefit on the general public or for
a large class of persons.” (Italics added.) The court did not state
the benefit to Jentz disqualified her from recovering fees under
section 1021.5.
Similarly, Aud contends the “trial court made no findings
that the action failed to confer a significant public benefit, nor
27
that the financial burden of enforcement failed to outweigh
[Jentz’s] personal interest.” Aud is wrong on the first point: As
stated, the court found the action “did not confer a significant
benefit on the general public or for a large class of persons.” And
on the second point, because the court found Jentz did not meet
one of the statutory criteria (significant benefit), it did not have
to make findings on the remaining criteria, including the
financial burden of private enforcement. (See Millview County
Water Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 759, 773; Satrap v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 72, 81.)
D. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Granting the Defendants’ Motion To Tax Costs
Aud argues the trial court abused its discretion in taxing
costs by $24,328.10 for model enlargements and photocopies of
exhibits. Again, there was no abuse of discretion.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs. (§ 1032,
subd. (b).) Section 1033.5, subdivision (a), lists the costs a
prevailing party is entitled to recover, and section 1033.5,
subdivision (b), lists costs that are not recoverable. Costs neither
permitted under section 1033.5, subdivision (a), nor prohibited
under section 1033.5, subdivision (b), “may be allowed or denied
in the court’s discretion.” (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(4).) Allowable costs
must be “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation
rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation”
and must be “reasonable in amount.” (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(2),
& (3); see Vargas v. Gallizzi, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 375.)
28
“‘In ruling upon a motion to tax costs, the trial court’s first
determination is whether the statute expressly allows the
particular item and whether it appears proper on its face. “If so,
the burden is on the objecting party to show [the costs] to be
unnecessary or unreasonable.” [Citation.] Where costs are not
expressly allowed by the statute, the burden is on the party
claiming the costs to show that the charges were reasonable and
necessary.’” (Rozanova v. Uribe (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 392, 399;
see Berkeley Cement, Inc. v. Regents of University of California
(2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1139.) “We ‘review a trial court’s
determination on which costs are reasonably necessary and
reasonable in amount under the abuse of discretion standard.’”
(Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 860,
892; see Rozanova, at p. 399.)
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Taxing Costs for Photocopies and Binders
Jentz sought $32,328.10 in costs for enlargements and
photocopies of exhibits. The trial court taxed those costs by
$24,328.10 and awarded $8,000. The court found charges of
$20,089.80 for 167,415 photocopies and $5,385 for 300 binders
were unreasonable7 because Jentz also requested $1,303.80 for
13,038 other photocopies and “the majority of the copies and
binders were not used at trial.”
The trial court may award costs for “[m]odels, the
enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits . . . if they
were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.” (§ 1033.5,
7 $20,089.80 + $5,385 = $25,474.80. The court, however,
taxed the costs by only $24,328.10, apparently to make the final
cost award a round number of $8,000.
29
subd. (a)(13).) Photocopied exhibits not used at trial “‘may be
allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.’” (Segal v. ASICS
America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 667; see § 1033.5,
subd. (c)(4).)
The trial court acted within its discretion in awarding costs
for some, but not all, of the photocopies and binders. (See
Rozanova v. Uribe, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 405 [“the trial
court is in the best position to evaluate whether . . . exhibits were
‘reasonably helpful to aid’” the trier of fact and whether the costs
were “‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation’
[citation] and ‘reasonable in amount’”]; see also Rojas v. HSBC
Card Services Inc., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 901 [“The court
was in the best position to draw these conclusions, including the
necessity and reasonableness determinations pertinent to Code of
Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subd. (c)(4), and we presume it
considered all relevant matters in doing so.”].)
Aud argues the trial court abused its discretion in taxing
costs for exhibit photocopies because the courtroom instructions
required Jentz to produce three joint exhibit books. The court,
however, acted within its discretion in concluding Jentz could
have created three joint exhibit books using fewer than
180,000 copies and 300 binders, most of which were not used at
trial.8
8 Aud also argues the enlargements were reasonably helpful
to aid the trier of fact, but the trial court awarded Jentz the full
amount she requested for enlargements ($575.51).
30
DISPOSITION
The orders granting Jentz’s motion for attorneys’ fees and
granting the defendants’ motion to tax costs are affirmed. The
request by RRT, Boardwalk, Rockport, and Rechnitz for judicial
notice is granted. RRT, Boardwalk, Rockport, and Rechnitz are
to recover their costs on appeal.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
31