Filed 8/28/26 Schmid v. County of Sonoma CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
FREAR STEPHEN SCHMID et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
A172601
v.
COUNTY OF SONOMA, (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. 24CV00337)
Defendant and Respondent.
By separate opinion, we have affirmed an order declaring appellant
Frear Stephen Schmid a vexatious litigant. (Schmid v. County of Sonoma
(Aug. 27, 2026, No. A172089).) Here, he and his wife Astrid Schmid timely
appeal from a judgment entered in favor of the County of Sonoma (the
County) on December 4, 2024, following the sustaining of a demurrer without
leave to amend in separate but related litigation.
The trial court sustained the demurrer on the ground that the
complaint in this case is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Schmids initiated this case on January 24, 2024, against the
County and two other defendants, Two Rock Fire Department (the Fire
Department) and the Fire Department’s insurance carrier, Glatfelter Group.
1
They allege that in 2018, the County issued an illegal, invalid use
permit allowing the Fire Department to construct a garage on a parcel
neighboring their own property, and that after completing construction of the
building in 2020, the Fire Department, “aided and abetted by the County,”
began using the building and neighboring parcel “for numerous unauthorized
activities.” They allege that they filed suit against the County, the Fire
Department “and other entities” to challenge both the issuance of the permit
and the unauthorized uses in other litigation, and that “there are several
[such] lawsuits.” Their complaint identifies nine such lawsuits in which they
“are” plaintiffs, although it does not clearly specify whether all are still
pending.1
They allege that, after more than two and a half years of litigation,
they entered into an oral, global settlement agreement on the record with the
County and the Fire Department at a mandatory settlement conference held
on November 10, 2022, with the Fire Department’s insurance carrier on
phone stand-by, to settle all pending lawsuits between them. They allege the
settlement agreement required the Schmids to dismiss with prejudice all
pending litigation in exchange for payment to them of $100,000 as well as the
County and the Fire Department making various changes to the
configuration of the garage and parking lot on the neighboring parcel and
1 They are: Sonoma County Superior Court cases SCV-266225
(including consolidated cases SCV-266731 and SCV-270339) and related
California First District Court of Appeal case A164620; Sonoma County
Superior Court cases SCV-270332; SCV270568; and SCV-270771;
United States Northern District of California case 3:21-CV 01920-TLT and
related Ninth Circuit Appeal 23-15314; Schmid v. Thompson Gas Sonoma
County Superior Court case SCV-270322; and Schmid v. Air Exchange,
Sonoma County Superior Court case SCV-270568 and Schmid v. Sonoma
County Sonoma County Superior Court case SCV-270771.
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agreeing to prohibit some activities that could take place there (i.e., meetings
and some training activities).
They allege that the County was to prepare some further
documentation to memorialize the settlement, i.e., a “more formal version” of
a plot map the parties had used in their settlement negotiations to indicate
the agreed-upon terms (referred to in the complaint as Exhibit 1)—and that
the settlement was to be consummated at the next court hearing, at which
the settlement funds were to be paid and requests for dismissals were to be
filed. At the next court hearing, however, the County allegedly breached the
settlement agreement by tendering written documentation (a parcel map)
that, in numerous ways, did not comply with the terms to which the parties
had previously agreed. They allege they rejected the document. Although
what happened next is not entirely clear from the complaint’s allegations,
they allege the Fire Department thereafter created another “schematic” that
did not comport with the settlement terms either, the County never
submitted a “formal version” of the map that complied with the settlement
terms and made an additional demand that the map prepared by the Fire
Department would have to be reviewed and approved by its Permit
Department. The Schmids allegedly submitted an engineering drawing to
the court (at an unspecified point) that accurately reflected what had been
agreed to, and ultimately they did not dismiss the litigation but instead, on
December 14, 2022, timely submitted a government tort claim to the County
for breach of contract and related claims.
They now allege six causes of action against the County: breach of
contract (first cause of action), alleging the County breached the settlement
agreement and praying for specific performance of the agreement and
$900,000 in damages; a cause of action for equitable estoppel (second cause of
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action), alleging they relied on the defendants’ promises to settle the ligation
on the promised terms, that defendants should be “estopped from depriving
plaintiffs of the benefits of the promised settlement” and praying for “specific
performance of the promises” and $900,000 in damages; a cause of action for
promissory estoppel (third cause of action) praying for the same relief and
alleging the Schmids had no knowledge the County and other defendants had
no intention of fulfilling their promises under the settlement agreement; a
cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations
(fifth cause of action), alleging a settlement agreement existed between them,
the Fire Department and Glatfelter that the County disrupted and praying
for $900,000 in damages and an injunction “directing [the] County to cease
[its] interference” with the settlement agreement; and causes of action for
negligent interference with economic advantage (sixth cause of action) and
intentional interference with economic advantage (seventh cause of action),
both praying for similar relief and both alleging the County “engaged in
wrongful conduct through its breach of its contract with [the Fire
Department] and by misrepresentation to [the Schmids] and the Court as to
the promises it would undertake to fulfill the settlement.”
What the complaint does not disclose is that courts had previously
rejected these contentions or identical causes of action, twice. The first time
was on April 18, 2023, when the superior court in three of the pending cases
that had been consolidated (case numbers SCV-266225, SCV-266731 and
SCV-270339 (consolidated cases)) denied a motion brought by the County to
enforce and enter judgment on the settlement pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 664.6 after efforts to consummate the settlement had
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unraveled.2 The County’s motion is not in the record, but the Schmids’
written response is. Contrary to the Schmids’ characterization of the record,
stating “[n]o parties to the settlement opposed the [County’s] motion,” the
Schmids did oppose the motion, at least partly if not entirely. In their
written response to the motion, the Schmids stated they “agree that a
settlement was reached” at the November 10, 2022 mandatory settlement
conference but then devoted the rest of their discussion to detailing
disagreements with the County’s positions. They explained in detail their
view of what the parties had agreed to and the ways in which documents the
County and Fire Department had prepared and submitted were inconsistent
with the terms of the settlement agreement—a description they later
incorporated nearly verbatim into their complaint in this case, asserting
breaches of the settlement agreement. They also attacked the evidence the
County submitted with the motion3 and submitted their own form of proposed
2 One of the three cases (case number SCV-266731) was a writ
proceeding brought against the County challenging the County’s issuance of
the use permit; the other two cases appear to have been brought solely
against the Fire Department.
3 For example, they characterized some statements in a declaration
about parking spots as “irrelevant and hearsay statements” about subjects
“never raised at the settlement conference.” They characterized an exhibit
submitted with the motion as “violat[ing] the agreement reached” in
numerous ways and another schematic submitted with the motion as “a
complete concoction almost completely divorce[d] from the settlement
agreement.” And although they said another map submitted with the motion
(Exhibit 4) “substantially” complied with the settlement terms, they went on
to explain that “[t]his may be accomplished on Keefer’s Ex. 4 by simply
moving the fence back to the front of each parking lot, and having the fence
follow the outer lines of parking spots 6 and 7 and extending it to the
property line, and correspondingly moving the fence enclosing the water tank
an equal distance easterly, adding the BASMAA, and repositioning the
exhaust vent, as agreed and set forth above,” and all as depicted on a
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judgment that they requested the court sign. In denying the motion, the
court ruled there was “a dispute as to the substance, scope, and intent of
disputed material terms” of the settlement and concluded “the Parties did not
reach a ‘meeting of the minds’ on material terms and consequently a
settlement agreement was not reached that would now allow for judicial
enforcement, even on equitable principles.” It repeated, “there is no
agreement between the parties sufficient to enforce settlement.”4 It also
rejected plaintiffs’ request to enter judgment in their favor because, as it had
already discussed, “there is no agreement between the parties sufficient to
enforce settlement.”
The second time occurred less than a month after denial of the motion
to enforce settlement in the consolidated cases, when the Schmids filed an
amended complaint in another pending case (Schmid v. Thompson Gas,
No. SCV-270322 (Thompson Gas)). The amended complaint in Thompson
Gas added new claims against the County alleging the same facts concerning
the settlement they had alleged in response to the motion to enforce the
settlement in the consolidated cases and the exact same six causes of action
against the County they now allege here. Six months later, the superior
court in Thompson Gas granted a motion to strike those causes of action
without leave to amend because they exceeded the scope of leave the court
different engineering drawing the Schmids had submitted “reflecting these
changes to Keefer[’s] exhibit 4” with the additional caveat that the Schmids’
drawing “ha[s] made more pronounced the distance at the intersection of
spots 6 and 7 by means of a straight diagonal line instead of a curved line.”
4 Neither party has summarized or analyzed the evidence on this
question in a complete or coherent way (much less their areas of
disagreement).
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had granted the Schmids to amend their complaint in response to a prior
demurrer.
This lawsuit was filed about three months later.
In January 2024, two days after the Schmids had filed the instant case
asserting the same causes of action as in Thompson Gas, they sought
dismissal without prejudice of those claims in Thompson Gas, which the clerk
entered.
Meanwhile, one of the three consolidated cases in which the court had
previously denied the motion to enforce the settlement agreement—the writ
proceeding the Schmids had filed against the County (SCV-266731)—had
been bifurcated from the other two and proceeded to a bench trial. On
April 18, 2024, the court issued a final statement of decision denying the
Schmid’s petition. The court ruled against the Schmids on their requests for
a writ of mandate and for declaratory relief on multiple grounds, and it
concluded by stating, it “now renders a verdict in favor of County and against
Plaintiffs on the issues outlined herein,” and “[i]t is so ordered.” On
May 2, 2024, after that decision was entered in the writ case, the County
demurred to the complaint in this case. As relevant here, it demurred on the
ground that all causes of action are barred by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel or claim preclusion, because the court in its order denying the
motion to enforce the settlement “already made a factual determination that
no contract was formed constituting a settlement agreement.” Among other
points, they argued that “[t]o the extent the Schmids claim that the prior
decision of this court denying the formation of a settlement agreement, was
not a ‘final’ decision, there is now a Final Statement of Decision in SCV-
266731 against the County” in the writ case.
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The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend in a five-
page written ruling and entered judgment in favor of the County. This timely
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo, assuming the truth
of all properly pleaded facts but not conclusions of law and considering all
properly judicially noticeable facts. (Baker v. Bay Area Toll Authority (2026)
120 Cal.App.5th 1254, 1264 (Baker).)
A. General Principles and Overview
The Schmids’ appellate brief presents some challenges. It lacks a
coherent summary of the relevant facts. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) [appellant must “provide a summary of the significant
facts limited to matters in the record”].) It includes many factual assertions
that lack citations to the record, all of which we ignore. (See Madrigal v.
Hyundai Motor America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 385, 408, fn. 14 [“ ‘Statement
of facts that are not supported by references to the record are disregarded by
the reviewing court’ ”]; East Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1226, 1240, fn. 5; see also Slone v. El Centro Regional
Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1172 [“[A]n appellant waives or
forfeits contentions that are not supported by citations to relevant portions of
the record”].) And its arguments are somewhat disorganized. We will
consider only those issues that are clearly identified in an argument heading
of the Schmids’ brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [appellate
brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading
summarizing the point”].) Any other arguments, wherever they may be
located, are forfeited. (See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC
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(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153; Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of
Sacramento (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 280, 309-310.)
“ ‘The law of preclusion helps to ensure that a dispute resolved in one
case is not relitigated in a later case.’ ” (Baker, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1265.) In particular, the doctrine of collateral estoppel “ ‘prevents
“relitigation of previously decided issues,” rather than causes of action as a
whole.’ ” (Ibid.) Although its requirements have been stated under various
formulations, it is generally understood to require five elements: “ ‘ “ ‘First,
the issue . . . must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding.
Second, this issue must have been actually litigated’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘[t]hird, it must
have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the
decision . . . must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom
preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the
former proceeding.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1266.)
Here, the Schmids argue the court erred in sustaining the demurrer
because the order declining to enforce the settlement was not final, and it
was not on the merits. They also argue that the ruling was erroneous as to
all but the first cause of action for breach of contract because “neither the
County nor Court addressed how” the other five causes of action were barred
by collateral estoppel at all.
B. Analysis
First, the Schmids have not persuaded us that the order declining to
enforce the settlement was not sufficiently final to be preclusive. They
discuss authority holding that an order denying a motion to enforce a
settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 is nonappealable.
(Doran v. Magan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292-1294.) But Doran
addressed finality for purposes of appealability, not for issue preclusion.
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They also cite authority stating that collateral estoppel requires a
“ ‘final judgment’ ” (People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 484), which the order
quite clearly was not, at least for purposes of appeal. But as the County
points out, the trial court cited authority stating the principle that “ ‘for
purposes of issue preclusion (as distinguished from merger and bar [i.e.,
claim preclusion]), “final judgment” includes any prior adjudication of an
issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be
accorded conclusive effect.’ ” (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 688 (Meridian).) Meridian suggested that while
appealability is a factor, it is not dispositive. It explained, “The Restatement
cautions that in considering whether a particular judgment is ‘sufficiently
firm to be accorded conclusive effect,’ courts should ‘determine that the
decision to be carried over was adequately deliberated and firm, even if not
final in the sense of forming a basis for a judgment already entered. Thus
preclusion should be refused if the decision was avowedly tentative. On the
other hand, that the parties were fully heard, that the court supported its
decision with a reasoned opinion, that the decision was subject to appeal or
was in fact reviewed on appeal, are factors supporting the conclusion that the
decision is final for the purpose of preclusion.’ [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘Finality’ in the
context here relevant may mean little more than that the litigation of a
particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good
reason for permitting it to be litigated again.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 688-689.)
In their opening brief the Schmids do not address this case, the legal
standard it articulates or any of the examples it discusses of rulings involving
“decisions that were never reduced to judgment or appealed” that were
nonetheless held to be sufficiently final to support the application of
collateral estoppel. (See Meridian, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 692.) In their
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reply brief, they say only that the case is factually distinguishable. But an
argument that fails to address the legal standard Meridian articulates and
apply that standard to the facts of this case, is not an adequate
demonstration of error. “ ‘It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that
the judgment appealed from is presumed correct and “ ‘ “all intendments and
presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” ’ [Citation.]”
[Citation.] An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to
support his contentions. . . . “Issues do not have a life of their own: If they
are not . . . supported by argument or citation to authority, [they are] . . .
waived.” [Citation.] It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. When
an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’ ”
(Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 799.) We apply
that waiver rule here.
Second, the Schmids’ finality argument focuses solely on the
nonappealable order declining the motion to enforce the settlement but
overlooks the fact that one of the cases in which that order was entered did
ultimately result in an appealable decision: the writ case against the County.
The court’s statement of decision fully disposed of the issues, denied a writ
and was sufficiently final that an appeal could have been taken from it. (See,
e.g., Tomra Pacific, Inc. v. Chiang (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 463, 481-482.) The
Schmids make no attempt to show this does not satisfy the finality
requirement of collateral estoppel. (See, e.g., Border Business Park, Inc. v.
City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1564-1565 [order sustaining
demurrer without leave to amend held final for purposes of issue preclusion
despite absence of final judgment].) By failing to address this point, which
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was squarely raised by the demurrer, they have failed to demonstrate the
court erred in deeming the finality element satisfied.5
Next, the Schmids’ argument that the writ ruling was not on the merits
warrants little discussion. Our review of the court’s order declining to
enforce the settlement persuades us the court determined that there was no
meeting of the minds and therefore no settlement was reached. Had the
court found instead that one of the statutory requirements for utilizing the
summary mechanism of Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 was not
satisfied, the parties would be free to file an independent lawsuit to enforce
the purported settlement they had reached, as suggested in the authority the
Schmids cite. (See Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 5,
superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Greisman v. FCA US,
LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310, 1325.) But the court’s decision did not rest
on such a procedural ground (nor was such an issue even litigated as far as
we can tell). The court’s decision was clearly on the merits as to the existence
of an enforceable agreement.
The Schmids’ arguments as to the remaining causes of action also
warrant little discussion (i.e., all but the breach of contract cause of action).
Like the first cause of action for breach of contract, all of them were premised
on the existence of valid, enforceable promises to which the parties mutually
5 Although the trial court’s ruling does not explicitly rest on this fact,
applying de novo review, we “analyze the issues independent of the trial
court’s reasoning,” and “ ‘[i]f the trial court’s decision is correct on any theory
. . . , we affirm the order regardless of the correctness of the grounds on which
the lower court reached its conclusion.’ ” (Gaynor v. Bulen (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 864, 876; see Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 957, 972 [on review of demurrer ruling, “The trial court’s
reasoning does not bind us, and we may affirm the judgment if it was correct
under any theory”].)
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agreed during settlement discussions. That issue was squarely decided on
the merits against the Schmids (and the other parties) by the court’s ruling
denying the motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. Hence, for
collateral estoppel purposes, nothing distinguishes those other causes of
action from the breach of contract cause of action for any relevant legal
reason.
Finally, and more generally, the trial court cited authority that is
practically on all fours with this case, but again the Schmids have not
addressed it in their appellate briefing: Smith v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 1371 (Smith). In that case the plaintiffs, who were spouses,
filed a personal injury action after one of them was injured in a collision, and
after settling with the driver they engaged in settlement discussions with the
remaining defendants. (Id. at p. 1373.) Like the plaintiffs in this case, the
Smiths moved under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 to enforce a
settlement purportedly reached at a settlement conference, but the trial court
denied the motion “finding that no settlement had been reached.” (Id. at
pp. 1373-1374.) The Smiths then proceeded to trial, but after the defendants
prevailed did not appeal the judgment. (Id. at p. 1374.) Instead, they
initiated a new lawsuit against the defendants alleging two causes of action:
one for breach of the settlement agreement, and the other for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, both premised on allegations
that an oral settlement agreement had been reached. (Ibid.) Affirming
summary judgment for defendants, the Court of Appeal held the second
action was barred in its entirety by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1374-1375.)
It also held alternatively that by proceeding with the personal injury case to
final judgment, the plaintiffs had waived their right to enforce the purported
settlement agreement under the doctrine of election of remedies. (Id. at
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pp. 1375-1376.) This separate and independent holding would likewise seem
to fully dispose of the case before us, since the Schmids dismissed their
claims for breach of the settlement agreement and proceeded to litigate the
merits of their writ case to conclusion.
In any event, given the Schmids’ failure to discuss the Smith case and
explain why it does not dispose of this entire appeal, including as to the
noncontract causes of action, the Schmids have failed to overcome the
presumption that the trial court did not err.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs.
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STEWART, P. J.
We concur.
RICHMAN, J.
MILLER, J.
Schmid v. County of Sonoma (A172601)
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