Filed 8/21/26 Nasey v. Fell Holdings LLC CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
LAURENCE F. NASEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A175452
v.
FELL HOLDINGS LLC, et al., (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. CGC-23-611378)
Defendants and Respondents.
For decades, appellant Laurence Nasey owned and operated businesses
out of two properties in San Francisco. In 2020, Nasey lost title to both
properties at a foreclosure sale, and in September of that year executed an
agreement with certain of the respondents agreeing that he could remain in
possession of the properties, would pay rent, and would repurchase them in
May of 2021 for $10.5 million. The parties executed several addenda to their
agreement, extending Nasey’s deadline to close escrow, ultimately until
September 29, 2022. Along the way two unlawful detainer cases were filed
against Nasey, cases that as best we can tell remain unresolved some four
years later.
Meanwhile, in December 2023, Nasey filed the within action alleging
one cause of action for declaratory relief, a pleading that ultimately resulted
in the operative second amended complaint alleging four causes of action. Six
of the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court
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granted and entered judgment against Nasey. He appealed. And we
affirmed. (Nasey v. Fell Holdings LLC et al. (Aug. 10 2026, A174623) ___
Cal.App.5th ___ (Nasey I).)
Since the agreement Nasey signed had an attorney fees provision, five
of the defendants filed a motion seeking attorney fees (and costs) in the
amount of $96,529. Nasey filed opposition—attacking only the amount of the
fees requested, not defendants’ right to them—contending that certain of the
fees sought were not supported and, in any event, were excessive. Following
a hearing, the trial court awarded respondents $72,441. Again Nasey
appeals. Again we affirm.
BACKGROUND1
The Parties, the Properties, and the General Setting
Appellant is Laurence Nasey who “for decades” (through entities he
controlled) owned and occupied two parcels of real property in San Francisco:
one at 1213–1215 Fell Street (the Fell property), the other at 624 Stanyan
Street (the Stanyan property) (together, the properties).
The respondents are five defendants from Nasey I: Fell Holdings LLC;
Stanyan Holdings LLC; MDF Facility LLC; 1215 Fell SF Owner LLC; and
624 Stanyan Owner LLC.2
On March 26, 2020, Nasey lost ownership of the properties through a
non-judicial foreclosure sale. And on April 8, trustee’s deeds upon sale were
1 Much of the factual background is drawn from our previous opinion in
Nasey I and the allegations in Nasey’s second amended complaint.
2 The sixth defendant in Nasey I, Willow Branch RE Holdings LLC,
acquired title to the Stanyan property from 624 Stanyan Owner LLC on or
about June 21, 2024. It did not join in the motion for attorney fees, and on
June 8, 2026, indicated that it did not intend to file a respondent’s brief in
this appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a).)
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recorded transferring title to the properties to Fell Holdings LLC and
Stanyan Holdings LLC, respectively.
Following the foreclosures, Nasey negotiated with the new owners of
the properties “to repurchase [them] and for each of his businesses, Fell
Automotive and Stanyan Automotive, to remain in possession of the
[properties], and pay rent pending close of escrow.” To that end, Nasey
executed an 18-page agreement dated September 14, 2020, and titled it
“Commercial Property Purchase Agreement and Joint Escrow Instructions”
(the agreement), and simultaneously, a first addendum to it. Nasey signed
the agreement on September 22, agreeing to purchase the properties from
sellers for $10,500,000 in cash, with a $525,000 initial deposit, and that close
of escrow would occur on or before May 31, 2021.
Nasey did not meet his promised deadline, and in May 2021, the
parties executed “Addendum #2” to the agreement, reducing Nasey’s initial
deposit to $285,000 and extending his deadline to close escrow until August
31, 2021.
Nasey did not close escrow by August 31, and on September 8, the
parties executed “Addendum #3,” extending the deadline until December 31,
2021. After that deadline passed, the parties executed “Addendum #4,”
effective January 13, 2022, again extending the deadline, this time until
March 31, 2022.
Meanwhile, along the way, two separate unlawful detainer actions
regarding the properties were brought, and on March 28, 2022, Nasey filed a
civil action regarding the parties’ disputes. The unlawful detainer actions
were brought in the name of Stanyan Holdings LLC and Fell Holdings LLC
as California limited liability companies, despite the fact that those entities
are actually Delaware limited liability companies. The actions apparently
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resulted in eviction judgments that Nasey challenged before the trial court,
arguing a lack of fundamental jurisdiction because the purported plaintiffs
did not exist. Nasey was unsuccessful and appealed, and our colleagues in
Division Four reversed and remanded to provide plaintiffs (including some of
the respondents here) the opportunity to cure the pleading defects at issue by
amendment. (See 1215 Fell SF Owner LLC v. Fell Street Automotive Clinic
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 739, 744–750.)
According to the respondents’ briefing here, and as confirmed at oral
argument in Nasey I, the unlawful detainer actions remain pending.3 In
December 2023, Nasey filed the action leading to this appeal.
The Proceedings Below
On December 29, 2023, Nasey filed the instant action in San Francisco
Superior Court, whose defendants included the respondents here. The
complaint alleged a single cause of action for declaratory relief, with two
“counts”: the first seeking a judicial declaration that he “was entitled to an
appropriate extension of the time to close escrow sufficient to obtain the
Phase II assessment and perform any follow-up reasonably required by
Nasey or his lenders”; the second that “he [was] not in breach” of the
agreement and “that his duty to perform was suspended by the refusal of
[sellers] to allow a Phase II assessment.”
Following a series of pleadings, on April 23, 2025, Nasey filed the
operative second amended complaint, now alleging four causes of action, each
for declaratory relief.
On June 11, six of the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. On August 28, the trial court granted the motion without leave to
amend. On September 5, judgment was entered for defendants and against
3 We understand that Nasey’s other civil action was settled.
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Nasey, from which Nasey filed an appeal. As noted, we affirmed. That was
Nasey I.4
Respondents Move for Attorney Fees
The agreement had an attorney fee provision, and on November 4,
2025, respondents filed a motion for attorney fees, seeking $96,529.00 in fees
and costs. The motion included a supporting memorandum and a supporting
declaration of attorney M. Ryan Pinkston, which included, as Nasey
acknowledges, “87 pages of invoices” supporting the fees incurred, including
for Mr. Pinkston himself at $755 per hour in 2024 and $810 per hour in 2025,
and for attorney Aaron Belzer at $745 and $810 per hour.
On November 19, Nasey filed opposition to the motion for attorney fees.
And on November 20—“shortly after midnight,” as Nasey’s brief puts it—
Nasey efiled a Declaration of Ann Draper in opposition to the motion.
Nasey’s memorandum in opposition was a brief 10 pages and asserted four
arguments: “the requested fees are excessive in the aggregate given the
simple nature of this case,” “the hourly rates charged are excessive,”
“numerous specific billing entries are improper or excessive,” and “the court
should substantially reduce the requested fee award to a reasonable fee.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
4 In his civil case information statement in Nasey I, filed November 12,
2025, Nasey’s counsel indicated that Nasey I was eligible for calendar
preference because Nasey “is 83 and has had 7 (minor) surgeries in the past
10 months.” And on December 2, respondents filed a motion seeking an
expedited briefing schedule and calendar preference, arguing that the parties
“have been embroiled in ‘summary’ type litigation for five years,” and alleging
that “[d]espite . . . obtaining judgment after three successful dispositive
motions,” the Fell property “remains in [Nasey]’s possession” and the
Stanyan property “sits vacant while this action is pending.” Nasey did not
oppose the motion to the extent it sought calendar preference, and on
January 8, 2026, we granted it.
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Ms. Draper’s declaration was barely over two pages, a total of six
paragraphs, the last four of which were as follows:
“3. I bill for my legal services on an hourly basis and my time is billed
at $600.00 per hour. I use a research attorney on a regular basis to assist me
in research and drafting briefs and arguments. Her time is billed at $300.00
per hour.
“4. In the course of my practice, I am familiar with the hourly rates
charged in San Francisco in connection with real estate litigation matters
and civil litigation. There are many capable experienced attorneys charging
at rates of $350-$550 per hour. I seldom see rates at or above $600 per hour
outside bankruptcy and intellectual property cases and I often see rates in
the $500 per hour range for attorneys with 20+ years experience in the San
Francisco area.
“5. This declaratory relief case involved a straightforward declaratory
relief action concerning the interpretation of the PSA, which was prepared on
a standard pre-printed form developed through the California Association of
Realtors. This form document and its various attachments are widely used
and well known among real estate practitioners. This case presented a
straightforward contract dispute involving the interpretation of a standard
form purchase agreement. There were no complex legal issues or issues of
first impression that would justify the enormous fees requested by
Defendants. In my opinion, the briefing of the motions for judgment on the
pleadings did not require the experience of a partner to do all the work, but
could and should have been researched and drafted primarily by an
associate-level attorney.
“6. Based on the time that I and my research attorney spent preparing
the oppositions to the motions in this case, it is my opinion that the
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supervising attorney should have spent no more than 2 hours directing and
reviewing each of the motions and the associate attorney should have been
able to draft the motions and replies in 7-10 hours.”
Whatever Ms. Draper did testify, one thing she did not testify to was
the total attorney fees incurred by Nasey in the two plus years of litigation
here.
The motion came on for hearing on December 4, and on December 17
the court entered its order awarding fees in the amount of “$72,441 for
reasonable hours expended by counsel at a reasonable rate of $755 and
$810/hour.” The next day, Nasey filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Introduction and Summary of Nasey’s Arguments
Nasey has filed a 46-page opening brief that asserts among other
things that the attorney fees awarded are excessive and unreasonable for this
“simple real estate contract dispute that never made it past the pleading
stage.” Or, as he puts it at another point, the case “presented
straightforward contract interpretation issues in a standard form agreement
prepared by Fee Claimants on a pre-printed California Association of
Realtors form, which is widely used in California and well-known among real
estate practitioners.” As will be seen, we see it differently.
In Nasey’s own words, his appellant’s opening brief here makes four
“points,” described in his reply brief as “the following points”: “(1) The trial
court abused its discretion in awarding $72,441 in attorneys’ fees because
there is no substantial evidence to support that amount,” “(2) The hourly
rates requested are excessive and unreasonable for this case,” “(3) Fee
Claimants failed to provide sufficient admissible evidence to support their fee
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request,” and “(4) A reasonable fee award for this case should not exceed
$15,000.”
The Standard of Review
As indicated, Nasey does not contend that attorney fees are
inappropriate, only that the fees awarded are not supported. In light of that,
we have many times described the applicable law, including, for example, in
Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 832–833: “Because
the sole issue before us . . . is the amount of fees awarded, our review is
deferential. ‘ “The ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of
professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of
course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is
convinced that it is clearly wrong’—meaning that it abused its discretion.” ’
(PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095, quoting Serrano v.
Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 . . . and citing Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell
Enterprises, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 228 [an appellate court will
interfere with a determination of reasonable attorney fees ‘only where there
has been a manifest abuse of discretion’].)” Indeed, our colleagues in Division
Four have observed that the “only proper basis of reversal of the amount of
an attorney fees award is if the amount awarded is so large or small that it
shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the
determination.” (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th
1127, 1134; accord, Calvo Fisher & Jacob LLP (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 608,
620.)
That, then, is the law that governs here, law that requires Nasey to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion—a demonstration Nasey fails to make.
It is perhaps enough to cite law holding that Nasey is foreclosed from
even asserting abuse given his failure to include any reporter’s transcript of
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the attorney fee hearing. The leading practice commentary is apt. As the
authors put it: “Transcript may be essential for appellate review:
Unless a court reporter is present, the losing party may have no effective way
of challenging the court’s ruling by writ or appeal: ‘In the absence of a
transcript the reviewing court will have no way of knowing . . . what grounds
were advanced, what arguments were made and what facts may have been
admitted, mutually assumed or judicially noticed at the hearing. In such a
case, no abuse of discretion can be found except on the basis of speculation.’
[Snell v. Sup. Ct. (Marshall Hosp.) (1984) 158 CA3d 44, 49, 204 CR 200, 203
(emphasis added; internal quotes omitted); see also Foust v. San Jose Const.
Co., Inc. (2011) 198 CA4th 181, 186–187, 129 CR3d 421, 424–425—appellate
courts have refused to reach merits of appellant’s claims because no
reporter’s transcript of pertinent proceeding or suitable substitute provided
(collecting cases)].” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure
Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2026) ¶¶ 9:49.5, 9:172.)
In his notice designating the record on appeal, Nasey checked the box
indicating that he was “choos[ing] to proceed . . . WITHOUT a record of the
oral proceedings (what was said at the hearing or trial) in the superior court.
I understand that without a record of the oral proceedings in the superior
court, the Court of Appeal will not be able to consider what was said during
those proceedings in deciding whether an error was made in the superior
court proceedings.”5
In any event, Nasey’s “points” have no merit.
Points one and three, respectively that no substantial evidence and no
“sufficient admissible evidence” support the award, are fatuous, in light of
5 While the briefing is silent on this point, the register of actions
indicates that the hearing was not reported.
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Mr. Pinkston’s testimony authenticating 87 pages of invoices supporting the
work performed, the hours spent, and the billing rates.
Points two and four both attack the fees as excessive. We disagree,
especially as Nasey’s description of the litigation ignores what went on here—
most of it, we note, caused by Nasey’s own conduct. As respondents’ brief
aptly describes: Nasey “(1) filed his original complaint; (2) successfully
opposed a demurrer on purely procedural grounds; (3) unsuccessfully opposed
a motion for judgment on the pleadings (per the trial court, the express terms
of the parties’ purchase and sale agreement defeat L.F. Nasey’s allegations);
(4) requested leave to amend and filed a first amended complaint; (5)
unsuccessfully opposed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings (the
same reasoning); (6) requested leave to amend and filed a second amended
complaint; (7) unsuccessfully opposed a third motion for judgment on the
pleadings (the same reasoning); (8) requested, but was denied, leave to
amend yet again; (9) commenced an appeal on the merits; and, finally, (10)
unsuccessfully opposed a motion for contractual attorneys’ fees and costs.”
The Supreme Court’s observation in Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d
621, 638—there, about the California Attorney General—can be said about
Nasey here: one “ ‘cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain
about the time necessarily spent by the [party] in response.’ ” (Accord, Peak-
Las Positas Partners v. Bollag (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 101, 114.)
While not listed in his reply brief as points made in his opening brief,
Nasey did make two assertions we briefly comment on. The first asserts that
this court’s deference to the trial court’s decision must be lowered because
one trial court judge entered judgment on the pleadings and a different trial
court judge, one retired from the Los Angeles Superior Court, considered the
fees motion. But Nasey fails to cite to any authority to support that
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proposition, and appellate courts recognize the expertise of “ ‘[a]n experienced
trial judge’ ” generally because they “ ‘regularly see fee applications and
develop a current and data-based sense of what is customary and
reasonable.’ ” (Perry v. Stuart (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 472, 511.) Nothing in
Nasey’s opening brief questions the judicial experience or relevant expertise
of the retired judge or his ability to review the record and adjudicate the fees
motion in his broad discretion.
The second is Nasey’s conclusory contention that some fees were
“double-billed.” As Mr. Pinkston’s declaration demonstrated, Nasey named
as co-defendants two separate client entities—1215 Fell SF Owner LLC and
624 Stanyan SF Owner LLC—that own two separate properties, and Mr.
Pinkston’s declaration testified as to how the fees were billed separately. In
short, Nasey’s speculative assertions about claimed double billing is
unsupported by any evidence.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
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RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.
We concur.
MILLER, J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A175452N)
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