Filed 8/21/26 Manzo v. Newrez, LLC CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
SIDNEY L. MANZO, B351820
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25NNCV00767)
v.
NEWREZ, LLC et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment and postjudgment order of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ian C. Fusselman, Judge. Appeal
from judgment dismissed; postjudgment order affirmed.
Sidney L. Manzo, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Klinedinst, Ian A. Rambarran, Brandon J. Mika and Robert M.
Shaughnessy for Defendants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
We have no jurisdiction to hear untimely appeals. We conclude that
Plaintiff Sidney L. Manzo’s appeal of a judgment is untimely. We cannot
hear it.1
Manzo also appeals a postjudgment order awarding attorneys’ fees and
costs. Manzo’s appeal of that order is timely. But Manzo’s only argument for
reversing that order is his assertion that the underlying judgment was
improper. Since we cannot review the underlying judgment, we cannot
reverse the order awarding fees and costs.
Thus, we dismiss the appeal of the judgment. We affirm the trial
court’s order awarding fees and costs.
BACKGROUND
This appeal hinges on whether a notice of appeal was timely filed. Our
discussion of the record is accordingly limited.
The dispute involves a home owned by Manzo in Pasadena, California.
The home was subject to a loan, secured by deed of trust.2 As alleged in
Manzo’s pleading, the deed of trust was assigned several times between
several entities, including a 2018 assignment between Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) and Ditech Financial LLC (Ditech).
Defendant Newrez is a loan servicing company. Newrez was
responsible for collecting payments on the loan on Manzo’s Pasadena
1 Defendant Newrez filed a motion for partial dismissal of appeal on
March 6, 2026, seeking dismissal of the appeal of the judgment. We now
grant that motion.
2 Because this appeal comes to us following the trial court’s sustaining of
a demurrer without leave to amend, this discussion assumes the truth of the
factual allegations in Manzo’s pleading.
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property. Manzo alleged that Newrez lacked authority to service the loan on
his property. This was so, according to Manzo, because the 2018 assignment
from MERS to Ditech was void.
Manzo brought causes of action against Newrez and related Defendants
for violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and its
California equivalent, for quiet title, and for declaratory relief. All of Manzo’s
claims were based on his argument that the 2018 assignment was void.
Manzo filed a second amended complaint, and Newrez demurred to it.
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. It
found that Manzo’s FDCPA and related California causes of action failed
because Newrez was not a debt collector within the meaning of these
statutes. It further found that those causes of action failed because Manzo
lacked standing to challenge the validity of the assignment of the deed of
trust. It found that the quiet title cause of action could not be asserted
because Manzo had not paid the outstanding debt on the mortgage or deed of
trust. And it found that the declaratory relief cause of action failed along
with the other causes of action.
The trial court heard and sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend on August 29, 2025. It entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of
Newrez on September 16, 2025. Notice of entry of that judgment of dismissal
was served on Manzo on September 18, 2025.
Manzo did not file the notice of appeal of that judgment until December
11, 2025, more than 80 days later.
Meanwhile, Newrez moved to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs,
based on a clause in the deed of trust and Civil Code section 1717. The trial
court granted that motion in Newrez’s favor on November 21, 2025. The trial
court awarded $62,738.46 in fees and costs and ordered that amount to be
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added to Manzo’s outstanding loan balance. Notice of entry of order for the
award of fees and costs was served on December 10, 2025. Manzo’s December
11, 2025 notice of appeal also appealed from the November 21, 2025 order
awarding fees and costs.
Later, on March 2, 2026, the trial court entered an “Amended
Judgment of Dismissal.” That amended judgment simply restates and
combines the September 18, 2025 judgment dismissing the underlying action
and the November 21, 2025 order awarding attorneys’ fees and costs,
combining the two into a single document.
DISCUSSION
A. We Cannot Hear the Untimely Appeal
“The time for appealing a judgment is jurisdictional; once the deadline
expires, the appellate court has no power to entertain the appeal.” (Van
Beurden Ins. Services v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency (1997)
15 Cal.4th 51, 56.) A notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days of service
of notice of entry of the appealable judgment for which review is sought.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1), (2).) Here, Manzo was served with
notice of entry of judgment of dismissal on September 18, 2025. The notice of
appeal was filed on December 11, 2025. That is more than 60 days. Thus, on
its face, the appeal of the judgment is untimely.
Manzo argues that the appeal is timely because of the March 2, 2026
“Amended Judgment of Dismissal.” As noted, that amended judgment
restates the September 18, 2025 judgment dismissing the underlying action
and the November 21, 2025 order awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, and
combines them into one document. Manzo argues that “This amended
judgment did not merely add costs to an existing judgment; it merged the fee
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determination into a single, final adjudicatory document.” Although Manzo’s
notice of appeal was not from the March 2, 2026 Amended Judgment (nor
could it have been, since the Notice of Appeal was filed in Dec. 2025) Manzo
argues that the March 2, 2026 judgment constituted a separately appealable
judgment, making his appeal ultimately timely.
Manzo cites no authority that has found an appeal to be timely in
similar circumstances. We are aware of none. Rather, the law in this area is
clear. As one court has explained: “ ‘The effect of an amended judgment on
the appeal time period depends on whether the amendment substantially
changes the judgment.... ‘When the trial court amends a nonfinal judgment
in a manner amounting to a substantial modification of the judgment (e.g., on
motion for new trial or motion to vacate and enter different judgment), the
amended judgment supersedes the original and becomes the appealable
judgment (there can only be one “final judgment” in an action ...). Therefore,
a new appeal period starts to run from notice of entry or entry of the
amended judgment.’ .... It is well settled, however, that ‘[w]here the
judgment is modified merely to add costs, attorney fees and interest, the
original judgment is not substantially changed and the time to appeal it is
therefore not affected.’ ” (Torres v. City of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th
214, 222, quoting Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals & Writs
(The Rutter Group 2006) ¶¶ 3:56, 3:56.1, 3:56.1a, 3:56:3, pp. 3–24 to 3–26.)
Put differently, to determine whether a second judgment restarts the
clock for an appeal, the key is whether the second judgment worked a
“substantial modification” on the first judgment. (Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235
Cal.App.4th 837, 842.) Generally, a “substantial modification” will be found
only when there has been a “substantial change in the rights of the parties,”
such that an appeal from the first judgment alone would mean that the
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parties would not be able to “contest [an] issue” in the second judgment in the
Court of Appeal. (Ibid.) “In other words, if ‘a party can obtain the desired
relief from a judgment before it is amended, he must act—appeal therefrom—
within the time allowed after its entry.’ ” (Id. at p. 843.)
Here, the March 2, 2026 amended judgment was not a substantial
modification of the September 18, 2025 judgment. The March 2026 amended
judgment restated the original September 2025 judgment. It did not alter it,
at all. The March judgment did combine the original September 18, 2025
judgment with the December, 2025 award of fees and costs and merge the
two into a single judgment document. But, as noted above, it is well-
established that a post-judgment award of fees and costs is not a substantial
modification of the judgment. (Torres v. City of San Diego, supra, 154
Cal.App.4th at p. 222.) Therefore, Manzo’s time to appeal ran from the
September 2025 judgment, and his notice of appeal was untimely.
Beyond his argument about the March 2, 2026 amended judgment,
Manzo offers no justification for his untimely filing of the notice of appeal.3
Accordingly, we conclude that Manzo’s notice of appeal was untimely. We
lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the judgment. Therefore, we grant
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal of the judgment.
3 Manzo also asserts (1) that “[s]trong public policy favors resolution of
this appeal on the merits” and (2) that he is proceeding in pro se. Neither
assertion is germane. “The time for appealing a judgment is jurisdictional;
once the deadline expires, the appellate court has no power to entertain the
appeal.” (Van Beurden Ins. Services v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins.
Agency, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 56.) This court has no discretion to hear an
untimely appeal regardless of the reason for the untimeliness. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.60(d).)
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B. Manzo Has Provided No Basis For Overturning the Fee Award
As defendants concede, Manzo’s appeal from the trial court’s award of
attorneys’ fees and costs is timely. However, Manzo’s only argument as to
why the award of attorneys’ fees was improper is that “[t]he court awarded
fees without standing” because of the “void assignment.” In other words,
Manzo’s argument is that, because of the allegedly void assignment between
MERS and Ditech—the same issue at the core of Manzo’s second amended
complaint—the trial court lacked the power to award contractual attorneys’
fees.4 Other than this collateral attack on the underlying judgment, Manzo
asserts no basis for overturning the trial court’s award of fees and costs.
But, as we just explained, Manzo cannot appeal the underlying
judgment. He cannot use the appeal of the order of attorneys’ fees and costs
as a means of attacking the underlying judgment when that judgment is no
longer properly appealable. “[A party] cannot … challenge the underlying
judgment through the guise of appealing the order awarding attorney fees.”
(Duff v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 491,
499, fn. 4 [rejecting use of an appeal of a fee award as a “collateral challenge
to the underlying judgment”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 906 [explaining that the
Court of Appeal’s general powers of review of one order “do not authorize the
reviewing court to review any decision or order from which an appeal might
have been taken”].) For that reason alone, the Court cannot reverse the
award of fees and costs, and must affirm it.
Moreover, an appellant has the burden of providing an adequate
appellate record. (Rossiter v. Benoit (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 706, 711–712.)
4 It is not entirely clear what Manzo was referring to as the “void
assignment,” but the only logical inference is to construe the reference as
being to the allegedly invalid assignment of the deed of trust in 2018 from
MERS to Ditech, discussed ante.
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Here, Manzo failed to include in the appellate record the moving papers,
declarations, and supporting exhibits in support of the motion for attorneys’
fees. He also failed to provide a reporter’s transcript of the trial court’s
hearing on the motion, or any sufficient substitute for a reporter’s transcript
(e.g., a settled statement). We simply do not have enough information to
evaluate the trial court’s attorney’s fees award. So, for that reason as well,
we must affirm it. (Id. at p. 712 [no reporter’s transcript fatal to appeal from
demurrer]; Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
181, 186–187 [collecting cases].)
DISPOSITION
The appeal from the judgment is dismissed. The postjudgment order
awarding attorney fees and costs is affirmed. Respondent NewRez, LLC shall
recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
DAUM, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
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