Filed 8/10/26 In re Charlotte R. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re CHARLOTTE R., A Person B348539
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01711A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ROSEANN D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. Affirmed in part and dismissed in
part.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Courtney Fisher, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Roseann D. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b)(1),1 and disposition orders declaring her
daughter Charlotte R., who is now eight years old, a dependent
child of the court and removing Charlotte from Roseann under
section 361, subdivision (c). Roseann argues that substantial
evidence did not support the court’s jurisdiction findings and that
the court erred in removing Charlotte. We affirm the jurisdiction
findings and dismiss Roseann’s appeal from the removal order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Roseann Attacks Charlotte’s Father; The Department
Investigates the Family and Files a Petition Under
Section 300
On May 3, 2025 Roseann became angry with Charlotte and
pulled her “from her hair.” Charlotte’s father Robert R. tried to
intervene, but Roseann bit him in the torso and hit him in the
head. Charlotte was crying and shaking, and Robert called the
police.
When the police arrived, Charlotte told an officer that her
parents were fighting, that Roseann pulled her by the hair and
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
pinched her arms and hands, and that Roseann “often” abused
her. The officer saw Robert had “a severe bite mark on his rib
area” and was bleeding from a laceration on his head. Robert
said Roseann had hit him on two prior occasions. The officer
observed Roseann was “highly intoxicated” and arrested her for
violating Penal Code sections 273.5, subdivision (a), and 273a,
subdivision (b).2
A social worker from the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services interviewed Robert, who stated
that Roseann had been drinking, that the couple began to argue,
and that Roseann attacked him, hit him, and bit him on the
chest. Robert said that Charlotte was in another bedroom when
Roseann attacked him and that he called law enforcement
because he needed help “de-escalating the situation” after
Roseann became “out of control.” Robert reported there was “at
least one previous physical incident” between him and Roseann
where Roseann had also been drinking.
Charlotte told the social worker that on May 3, 2025 she
was on the bed when she saw Roseann hit Robert on the head;
Charlotte later clarified that part of the incident occurred in the
living room and part of it in the bedroom. Charlotte also told the
2 Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), prescribes the
punishment for a person who willfully inflicts corporal injury
resulting in a traumatic condition upon, as relevant to this
appeal, the mother or father of the offender’s child. Penal Code
section 273a, subdivision (b), prescribes the punishment for a
person who willfully causes or permits a child to be placed in a
situation where, among other things, the child’s person or health
is endangered. After the police arrested Roseann the criminal
court issued a criminal protective order requiring Roseann to stay
away from Robert and Charlotte.
3
social worker that her parents’ arguments sometimes “escalate
and become physical.” Charlotte said she usually did not go into
the room where her parents fought because she was “‘too scared’”
to look, though she once saw Roseann hit Robert with a closed
fist. Charlotte reported that, when her parents fight, she cries
and her body starts “shaking” and “sweating.” Charlotte stated
that Roseann sometimes slapped her on her cheek “‘for no
reason’” and that Roseann once kicked her in the chest while
Roseann was fighting with Robert. Charlotte also recounted an
incident where Roseann was angry and either “kicked or
punched” her. During this incident, Charlotte explained, Robert
was locked out of the room, but when he was able to get into the
room, he asked Roseann to stop. Charlotte stated that Roseann
drinks wine “every night” and that, after “a couple minutes” of
drinking, Roseann “‘will go crazy,’” at which point Robert tells
Roseann to stop and “protects” Charlotte.
Roseann admitted to the social worker that on May 3, 2025
she had been drinking, but said that she did not remember
hitting Robert or whether he had any physical injuries. Roseann
denied physically disciplining Charlotte and claimed Charlotte
was not present during any physical altercations between her
and Robert.
The Department filed a petition under section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (c). The Department alleged:
(1) Roseann and Robert had a history of engaging in violent
physical altercations in Charlotte’s presence, which endangered
Charlotte’s physical health and safety, created a detrimental
home environment, and placed her at risk of serious physical
harm and danger; (2) Robert failed to protect Charlotte from the
domestic violence; (3) Roseann abused alcohol on a daily basis,
4
which rendered her incapable of regularly caring for and
supervising Charlotte, and Robert failed to protect Charlotte
from Roseann; and (4) Roseann emotionally abused Charlotte by
engaging in “violent and assaultive behavior” toward Robert in
Charlotte’s presence, which placed Charlotte at substantial risk
of suffering serious emotional damage.
B. The Court Sustains an Amended Petition and
Removes Charlotte from Roseann
Three weeks before the combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, a Department investigator interviewed
Charlotte, who stated that, when Roseann drank, she pulled
Charlotte’s hair, slapped her, pinched her, and gave Robert
“a black eye when he yanked” Roseann off her. When asked how
she would feel if Roseann returned home, Charlotte said, “‘No,
I’m scare[d] of her.’” Robert stated that Roseann drinks “a lot”
and gets “very violent” when she drinks and “‘for no reason’” goes
“‘on attack mode.’” During these times, Robert explained,
Roseann has pulled Charlotte’s hair (“like ripping it”), broken
glass, and walked around “drizzling wine.” Robert said he has
tried to “block” Roseann to protect Charlotte, but in the process
Roseann has bitten his chest, “inflicted bruises on him,” and
given him a black eye.
Roseann told the investigator she felt “extremely
remorseful” and took responsibility for her actions; she stated she
had been attending court-ordered classes in parenting, domestic
violence for batterers, and substance abuse. When asked about
the allegations in the petition, Roseann denied she hit Charlotte
or pulled Charlotte’s hair (other than when combing her hair).
5
Charlotte also described for the Department investigator
the incident where Roseann punched Robert in Charlotte’s
presence, leaving him with a black eye, as well as incidents
where Roseann became angry, shouted, and pulled Charlotte’s
hair until Robert stopped Roseann and where Roseann threw a
speaker at Robert. Robert told the investigator that Roseann
attacks him when she gets drunk and that on May 3, 2025 he
called the police because “this was the final straw” and he
“needed to protect Charlotte.” Robert also described the incident
where Roseann gave him a black eye and the incident where
Roseann hit him with a speaker and a “car track.” When asked
about the allegations of domestic violence, Roseann admitted she
had inflicted injuries on Robert, but added, “‘That’s what they
say’” and “it is what is in the report.” When asked about the
May 3, 2025 incident, Roseann said only that she “had a little too
much” wine before she and Robert started to argue.
For the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
August 2025, Roseann submitted proof she had attended seven
of 52 sessions of a domestic violence program, remained sober for
90 days, enrolled in a substance abuse treatment program, and
completed five of 15 parenting classes. Counsel for Roseann
argued that the Department had not shown Charlotte had
suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical
harm “nonaccidentally,” as required under section 300,
subdivision (a); that the petition alleged only domestic violence
between Roseann and Robert; and that, even if Roseann had
pinched Charlotte’s arm or pulled her hair, such conduct was, “at
most, inappropriate physical discipline” under section 300,
subdivision (b). Counsel explained that Roseann had expressed
remorse, enrolled in court-ordered programs, and done
6
“everything” she could “to ameliorate the risk related to any
issues with the sobriety.” Counsel told the court that Roseann
took “full accountability for what occurred” and asked the court to
release Charlotte to Roseann because the Department failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence Charlotte was at
substantial risk of harm if returned to Roseann.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition,
as amended by interlineation. The court found: (1) Roseann and
Robert had a history of engaging in violent physical altercations
in Charlotte’s presence, and Roseann’s “violent conduct” against
Robert placed Charlotte at risk of serious physical harm and
danger (§ 300, subds. (a), (b)(1)); and (2) Roseann’s “recent” abuse
of alcohol rendered her incapable of providing regular care for
and supervision of Charlotte and placed Charlotte at risk of
serious physical harm and danger (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)). The court
ordered Charlotte to remain placed with Robert, finding that
releasing Charlotte to Roseann was “premature” because there
was “a potential risk to the emotional health of the child.”
Roseann timely appealed. While Roseann’s appeal was pending,
the juvenile court returned Charlotte to Roseann.3
3 We grant Roseann’s request for judicial notice of the
juvenile court’s order dated February 17, 2026. (See Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
7
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 300, subdivision (a), authorizes the juvenile court to
assume jurisdiction over a child “if the child has suffered, or there
is a substantial risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm
inflicted nonaccidentally by the child’s parent or guardian.”4
(In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601; see § 300, subd. (a);
In re Miguel J. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 635, 645; In re Nathan E.
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114, 121.) “Section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
allows a child to be adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court
when ‘[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that
the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result
of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to
adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or
negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately
supervise or protect the child from the conduct of a custodian
with whom the child has been left.’ A jurisdiction finding
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires the Department to
prove three elements: (1) the parent’s or guardian’s neglectful
conduct or failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation;
and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of
serious physical harm or illness.” (Cole L., at p. 601; see § 300,
subd. (b)(1); Miguel J., at p. 645; Nathan E., at p. 122.)
“Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to
the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing
[citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously
4 “‘Nonaccidental’ generally means a parent or guardian
‘acted intentionally or willfully.’” (In re Cole L. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601; see In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629.)
8
abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary
to protect the child. [Citations.] The court may consider past
events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s
protection. [Citations.] A parent’s ‘“[p]ast conduct may be
probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that
the conduct will continue.’ [Citations.] ‘To establish a defined
risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there “must be some
reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct
will recur.”’” (In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 601-602;
accord, In re O.M. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 489, 507; In re
Miguel J., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 645.)
“We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence.
[Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of
the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” (In re
Miguel J., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 645, internal quotation
marks omitted; see In re Gilberto G. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 52,
62; In re Nathan E., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 122-123.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Jurisdiction
Findings Under Section 300, Subdivision (a)
“Under certain circumstances incidents of domestic violence
between a child’s parents, if they occur in the child’s immediate
presence, may support a jurisdiction finding under section 300,
subdivision (a). [Citation.] For example, if a father strikes an
infant’s mother while she is holding the child or an older child
intervenes during a fight to protect her mother from her father’s
9
abuse, the risk of harm to the child may be properly viewed as
nonaccidental.” (In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 603;
see In re Miguel J., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 646-647; In re
M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 720.)
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
there was a substantial risk Charlotte will suffer serious physical
harm “inflicted nonaccidentally” (§ 300, subd. (a)) by Roseann.
The May 3, 2025 incident began when Roseann became angry
with Charlotte and pulled her hair; when Robert intervened,
Roseann attacked him. These facts supported the reasonable
inference Charlotte was in the “immediate presence” (In re
Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 603) of the domestic violence.
Indeed, Charlotte was so close to the altercation she was crying,
shaking, and sweating; she was not a mere bystander to the
violence. (Cf. ibid. [“[a]n unintended injury to a bystander child
that results from an intentional act directed at another—for
example, due to an object thrown by one parent at another during
an argument—does not satisfy” section 300, subdivision (a)].)
She was the initial target of Roseann’s anger, which Roseann
redirected at Robert when he tried to protect Charlotte.5 In
5 Though Robert told the social worker Charlotte was in
another room when Roseann attacked him on May 3, 2025,
Charlotte said that Robert “yanked” Roseann off her and that she
was “on the bed” when Roseann hit Robert in the head, which
supported the reasonable inference Charlotte was in the
immediate vicinity of her parents for at least some of the violent
altercation between the couple. We do not reweigh the evidence
or review how the juvenile court resolved conflicts in the
evidence. (See Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 996
[reviewing courts must “give due deference to how the trier of fact
10
addition, Robert and Charlotte both described at least one other
incident that occurred in Charlotte’s immediate presence, where
Robert attempted to “block” Roseann from Charlotte, and
Roseann hit Robert and gave him a black eye. Contrary to
Roseann’s assertion, the violence she inflicted on her family fell
well within the scope of section 300, subdivision (a). (See In re
Nathan E., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 117-118, 123
[substantial evidence supported the court’s jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (a), where the child was present when
his father “scratched and clawed at [his mother’s] neck”].)
Though counsel for Roseann represented that Roseann took
full responsibility for her conduct, the Department’s reports
showed that, until two days before the jurisdiction hearing,
Roseann was still minimizing her violent conduct. For example,
when asked about the allegations in the petition, Roseann
admitted that on one occasion she hit and bit Robert and that on
another one she hit him in the eye, but she qualified her
admission by saying, essentially, she was admitting she injured
Robert because the Department’s reports stated she did. Given
that Roseann had completed only 13 percent of her domestic
violence prevention program (seven of 52 classes) and one-third of
her parenting program (five of 15), the juvenile court could
reasonably conclude that Roseann’s evasive answers reflected
limited insight into how her conduct endangered Charlotte and
that Charlotte remained at substantial risk of physical harm.
(See In re O.M., supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 507 [“When
may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts
in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the
evidence”]; In re Miguel J., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 647
[same].)
11
evaluating the potential of future risk, the juvenile court may
consider a parent’s insight (or lack thereof) into the problems
that led to the child welfare agency’s intervention.”].)6
C. Substantial Evidence Supported the Jurisdiction
Findings Under Section 300, Subdivision (b)(1)
The same evidence that supported the juvenile court’s
finding Roseann’s history of domestic violence placed Charlotte at
substantial risk of serious physical harm under section 300,
subdivision (a), also supported the court’s finding under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Robert not only described specific
instances where he tried to protect Charlotte from Roseann and
suffered physical injuries, but the words he used to describe his
response to Roseann’s violence (for example, he called the police
because the most recent incident was “the final straw”) indicated
Roseann frequently assaulted him, which in turn endangered
Charlotte’s physical safety. Though Roseann sought treatment to
address her violent behavior toward her family, she had only just
begun to learn how to refrain from resorting to violence when
angered. (See In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 416 [“In the
domestic violence context, past violence is highly probative of the
risk that violence may recur.”]; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
568, 576 [same], disapproved on another ground in
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) As
6 The record does not support Roseann’s assertion “the
evidence showed a single, isolated incident on May 3, 2025.”
Robert described at least two other times when Roseann attacked
him, and Charlotte reported that Roseann once hit Robert with a
closed fist, leaving him with a black eye, and that on another
occasion Roseann threw a speaker at Robert.
12
discussed, Roseann’s limited insight into her violent conduct,
along with the fact she had a considerable way to go before
completing her court-ordered programs, supported the court’s
finding Charlotte remained at substantial risk of serious physical
harm.
Substantial evidence also supported the juvenile court’s
finding Roseann’s abuse of alcohol placed Charlotte at
substantial risk of serious physical harm. Charlotte and Robert
stated Roseann frequently abused alcohol, to the point of (in
Charlotte’s words) going “out of her mind,” which Charlotte
explained was “when somebody can’t control themselves with the
wine.” Charlotte said that when Roseann became intoxicated
Robert had to protect Charlotte from Roseann, and Robert said
Roseann became belligerent when under the influence of alcohol.
As with Roseann’s participation in the programs to address her
history of domestic violence, Roseann’s relatively short period of
sobriety marked only the initial stage of recovery. (See In re H.B.
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 219, 242 [“while father made promising
recent developments in his recovery [four and a half months of
sobriety], the fact remains he was still in the early stages of
recovery”]; In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531, fn. 9
[“It is the nature of addiction that one must be ‘clean’ for a much
longer period than 120 days to show real reform.”].) Contrary to
Roseann’s assertion, she had not “ameliorated” the conduct that
harmed Charlotte. In fact, two days before the jurisdiction
hearing, when asked about the May 3, 2025 incident, Roseann
still minimized her level of intoxication that night. That
Roseann’s alcohol abuse fueled her violent outbursts against
Robert further supported the court’s finding Charlotte remained
at substantial risk of serious physical harm. (See In re A.F.
13
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 778, 785 [court could rely on the father’s
history of substance abuse and the family’s history of domestic
violence “when finding the children had suffered or were
at risk of suffering physical harm” under section 300,
subdivision (b)].)
D. Roseann’s Appeal from the Order Removing Charlotte
Is Moot
“‘A court is tasked with the duty “‘to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.’” [Citation.] A case
becomes moot when events “‘render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if
it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any
effect[ive] relief.’” [Citation.] For relief to be “effective,” two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.’”
(In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042, 1051; see In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 277 (D.P.) [“a case is not moot where a court can
provide the plaintiff with ‘“effect[ive] relief.”’”]; In re Jayden A.
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1334, 1343 [same].)
“A reviewing court must “‘decide on a case-by-case basis
whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter
make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the
outcome in a subsequent proceeding.’”” (In re S.R., supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 1051; see D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276; In re
Miguel J., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.) “‘[W]hen
a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or practical
14
consequence that will be averted upon reversal, the case is
not moot, and merits review is required. When a parent has not
made such a showing, the case is moot, but the court has
discretion to decide the merits nevertheless.’” (S.R., at p. 1052;
see D.P., at p. 283; In re Jayden A., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1344.)
Factors a court may consider when exercising discretion to
decide the merits of a moot case include whether the
challenged finding “‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or could
potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings’
or ‘“could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond
jurisdiction,”’” “whether the jurisdictional finding is based on
particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct,” and “why the
appeal became moot,” for example, “[p]rinciples of fairness may
thus favor discretionary review of cases rendered moot by the
prompt compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent
challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 285-286; accord, In re Landon M. (2026)
121 Cal.App.5th 686, 688; In re Jayden A., supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1344, fn. 3.) “The factors above are not
exhaustive, and no single factor is necessarily dispositive of
whether a court should exercise discretionary review of a moot
appeal.” (D.P., at p. 286; accord, Jayden A., at p. 1345.)
Because the juvenile court has returned Charlotte to
Roseann, Roseann’s appeal from the court’s order removing
Charlotte is moot. We cannot grant Roseann any effective relief
because she has already obtained the relief she seeks in
appealing from the removal order. (See In re Jayden A., supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1347 [“The court’s orders returning [the
child] to [the father’s] custody and terminating jurisdiction
15
rendered [the] appeal moot.”].) Roseann asserts the removal
order “remains part of the record and continues to have concrete
legal consequences” for her, but she does not identify those
consequences with any degree of specificity.7
We decline to exercise our discretion to review the merits of
Roseann’s moot appeal from the juvenile court’s removal order.
On the one hand, Roseann complied with her case plan, and her
progress was part of the reason the court found returning
Charlotte to her would not create a substantial risk to Charlotte’s
safety. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286 [“discretionary
review may be especially appropriate” where the parent
completes court-ordered programs “in a timely fashion”].) On the
other hand, the finding Charlotte remained at substantial risk of
physical harm (due to Roseann’s history of domestic violence and
recent substance abuse) was not based on “particularly pernicious
or stigmatizing conduct.” (D.P., at pp. 285-286; cf. In re A.T.
(2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 1284, 1290 [exercising discretion to
review a moot appeal where the jurisdiction finding under
section 300, subdivision (e), that the guardian “intentionally
withheld food from [the child] for a long period of time to the
point that he was . . . severely malnourished,” was “‘based on
particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct’”]; In re
M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452 [exercising discretion to
review a moot appeal where the findings the mother “exposed her
7 As Roseann concedes, an assertion of “associated stigma,”
without more, does not make a moot case appropriate for review.
(See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277 [“complaining of ‘stigma’
alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal” because the stigma
“must be paired with some effect on the plaintiff’s legal status
that is capable of being redressed by a favorable court decision”].)
16
children to a substantial risk of physical and sexual abuse are
pernicious”]; but see In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 237-
238 [“Findings that [the father] ‘knowingly or negligently’
harmed the child or exposed him to a substantial risk of physical
harm are ‘pernicious’”].)8 The final factor under D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th 266 weighs against discretionary review of Roseann’s
moot appeal. Roseann has not stated how the removal order
could impact the current or future dependency proceedings or
have consequences for her beyond this case. (See id. at p. 285.)
Roseann simply alludes to the “ongoing” dependency proceedings
and argues the findings at disposition “remain available for
reuse,” but she does not specify how or why the court would use
the now-superseded removal order against her. (See id. at p. 278
[“speculative future harm” is insufficient “to avoid mootness”].)
Roseann has not shown how the superseded removal order will
result in any adverse consequences. Even if we reversed the
removal order, the jurisdiction findings (which were based on the
same conduct that supported the removal order and which we are
affirming) will remain.
8 In In re L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th 227 the juvenile court
found the father placed his child at risk of physical harm based
on his history of “engaging in domestic violence,” which consisted
of frequent physical altercations in the child’s presence with the
child’s mother (at times during custody exchanges) and with the
mother’s boyfriend. (Id. at pp. 236, 238-239.) Without reaching
whether L.O. was correctly decided, we observe that the history
of domestic violence in Roseann’s case was not as extensive as
that in L.O. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 287 [“reviewing
court must decide on a case-by-case basis whether it is
appropriate to exercise discretionary review to reach the merits of
a moot appeal”].)
17
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings are affirmed.
Roseann’s appeal from the court’s order removing Charlotte is
dismissed as moot.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
18