Filed 8/4/26 In re V.M. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
In re V.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C104648
Law.
(Super. Ct. No. JDSQ2500041)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
V.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Following the minor V.M.’s admission to assault with a deadly weapon and a
great bodily injury enhancement, the juvenile court committed him to a secure youth
treatment facility (SYTF). On appeal, V.M. contends the juvenile court abused its
discretion because substantial evidence does not support its determination that a less
restrictive placement was unsuitable. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I
Factual Basis
The parties stipulated to the People’s recitation of the police report as the factual
basis: “On the 20th of July, 2024, at around 7:00 in the evening, this minor, [V.M.],
confronted a group of three young men for an unknown reason. During this quarrel,
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threats were exchanged, and at some point during the quarrel [V.M.] pulled out a knife
and threatened the group with it. [¶] This set in motion a chain of events, which
ultimately resulted in the victim being stabbed in the chest. That stabbing resulted in that
victim ultimately perishing within an hour or two after the stabbing. [¶] The basis of the
[assault] is [V.M.] confronting those three young men with that knife and the great bodily
injury is the result of the series of events started by [V.M.], ultimately resulting in the
loss of the victim’s life.”
II
The Charges
The People filed a juvenile wardship petition charging V.M. with willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and alleged the murder
was committed by lying in wait (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). Following a
detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered V.M. detained.
After a contested transfer hearing, the juvenile court retained jurisdiction.
The People amended the petition to add count 2, assault with a deadly weapon
(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and a great bodily injury enhancement (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.7). V.M. admitted the assault with a deadly weapon charge and great bodily
injury enhancement.1
The matter was transferred from Sutter County to Yuba County, and a disposition
hearing was scheduled.
1 It appears the remaining count and enhancement were dismissed, though the record
does not explicitly reflect as such.
2
III
Disposition Hearing
A. Probation Reports
The probation department recommended V.M. be committed to the Tri County
Youth Development Center in the SYTF for the baseline term of three years. The
probation report explained that V.M. had been accepted into the Maxine Singer Youth
Guidance Center program (MSYGC) and that an assessment determined the SYTF would
be able to provide services to meet V.M.’s needs. It noted that V.M. “has an opportunity
to lessen his term by displaying good behavior and transitioning to a lesser restrictive
environment” and “has already been determined as an appropriate candidate for the
MSYGC program which can be used as a lesser restrictive option in the future.”
The report included V.M.’s statement in which he said he acted in self-defense and
the district attorney was “[l]ucky” that he admitted to assault because he “could have
fought it and won.” He expressed remorse and stated it “suck[ed]” that he killed the
victim but claimed he “kind of had to” and there was “nothing he can do about it now.”
The report also outlined V.M.’s school disciplinary history, including that he “received a
referral for stabbing another student in the back with a pencil.”
The report assessed V.M. as a moderate risk to reoffend and included an
evaluation and case plan. The evaluation summarized the offense, noting that V.M. had
charged the victim and his friends several times while holding a large folding knife.
Surveillance footage of the incident showed that both parties had multiple chances to
disengage, and V.M. had four such opportunities. The report then stated: “At the same
time, [V.M.] has not acknowledged his role in the incident. Probation has considered the
progress [V.M.] has made and the programs in which he has participated. However, it is
difficult to conclude that rehabilitation has been achieved when [V.M.] is not
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forthcoming in therapy.[2] In addition, probation must take into consideration community
safety concerns, as there remains a risk of similar behavior recurring should the minor be
challenged by another individual given [V.M.’s] lack of acknowledgment of his role in
the incident.” It also stated it was “unfortunate that the circumstances which led to the
offense are unclear after reviewing witness statements and questioning [V.M.]” With
regard to V.M.’s role in the offense for purposes of determining the appropriateness of an
SYTF commitment, the report acknowledged either party could have a colorable claim of
self-defense, but V.M. stabbed the victim, killing him, after V.M. “initiat[ed] the
interaction with a knife in a threatening manner.” Accordingly, the report recommended
commitment to the SYTF.
The report and an amended probation report contained case plans identifying three
areas to address V.M.’s delinquent conduct, including criminal thinking, schooling, and
adult living. To address his criminal thinking with the goal of understanding how his
behavior impacts others, V.M. would “attend, participate in, and successfully complete
What Got Me Here, Victim Awareness, and Responsible Thinking programs.” To
address his schooling with the goal of graduating from high school or a vocational
program, V.M. would complete all of his assignments and obtain passing grades in all of
his classes. To address his adult living with the goal of developing the necessary skills to
live self-sufficiently, V.M. would “attend, participate in, and successfully complete an
Independent Living program.”
2 At the disposition hearing, the probation officer stated, “[W]e are aware of the therapy
and that [V.M.] is fully engaged in the therapy right now, but the recommendation
remains the same.”
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B. The Hearing
The juvenile court held a dispositional hearing. The court heard victim impact
statements from various family members of the victim, in which they expressed grief and
requested the maximum sentence.
V.M.’s counsel then noted that each party had admitted a psychologist report into
evidence at the transfer hearing. In response to the probation report’s assertion that V.M.
had not acknowledged his role in the offense, counsel argued the People’s psychologist
did not believe V.M. intended “to kill or even severely injure the victim” but had stabbed
the victim as a warning and to protect himself.
The probation officer noted the recommendation was based not only on
community safety but also on V.M.’s role after the stabbing.
Counsel sought to admit as exhibit A Dr. Amir Ramezani’s neuropsychological
evaluation of V.M., prepared for the transfer hearing. In so doing, counsel directed the
court to page 11, which summarized V.M.’s personality and psychopathology inventory.
The report indicated that V.M. showed symptoms of various mental health disorders.
V.M. reported that “illegal behaviors and stimulus seeking would occur when he was
with his peers.” The report suggested that V.M. was “motivated for treatment and
acknowledges his problems and the need for help” and had “a positive attitude towards
the possibility of personal change, the value of therapy, and the importance of personal
responsibility.” Based on this evaluation, V.M.’s lack of record, his family support, and
participation in counseling, counsel argued “that there is a less restrictive program that
can be instituted with my client out of custody, out of the juvenile hall.” Counsel further
noted that with regard to the severity of the offense, V.M. had originally been charged
with murder but ultimately pled to assault with a deadly weapon and a great bodily injury
enhancement. Counsel asserted V.M. acted in self-defense, and the video showed him
running away from three individuals with “big” rocks. Counsel asserted commitment to
the SYTF was excessive in this case.
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The People argued in response that self-defense did not apply to this case because
V.M. assaulted the victim with a knife and did not withdraw, nor did he call for or seek
help or otherwise show fear for his life. The People further noted that while V.M. turned
himself in to law enforcement, he did not do so until two days later. The People
disagreed that V.M. had shown any remorse based on the totality of his statements to the
probation officer. The People submitted on probation’s recommendation for commitment
to the SYTF for three years based on the seriousness of the charge and enhancement.
V.M.’s counsel had no further argument.
The court explained it had considered page 11 of Dr. Ramezani’s report, the
probation report and attachments, and the parties’ arguments. The court adjudged V.M. a
ward of the court and ordered him committed to the SYTF, finding “a less restrictive
alternative disposition [wa]s unsuitable.” In so finding, the trial court explained it had
“considered a number of factors, including the severity of the offense, including the
youth’s role in the offense, the youth’s behavior, the harm done to the victims, the
youth’s previous delinquent history, including the adequacy and success of previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the youth; whether the programming,
treatment, education offered and provided in a secured youth treatment facility is
appropriate to meet the treatment and security needs of the youth; whether the goals of
rehabilitation and community safety can be met by assigning the youth to an alternative,
less-restrictive disposition available to the court; the youth’s age, developmental
maturity, mental and emotional health.” The court further found “return of the youth to
the home would be contrary to his welfare” and that “[r]easonable efforts have been made
to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the youth from his home or make it
possible for the youth to return home.” The court then exercised discretion to deem the
offense a felony.
Having “considered the individual facts and circumstances of the case,” the trial
court ordered the maximum term of six years.
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V.M. timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
V.M. contends that commitment to the SYTF constituted an abuse of discretion
because the record does not contain sufficient evidence that the commitment would
benefit him or that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. We
are not persuaded.
Until recently, the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) was “the state’s most
restrictive placement for its most severe juvenile offenders.” (In re Miguel C. (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 899, 902.) DJJ was previously known as the California Youth Authority.
(Id. at p. 906, fn. 4.) In 2020, the Legislature enacted juvenile justice realignment by
passing Senate Bill No. 823 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 337). Implementing
the Legislature’s juvenile justice realignment program required the eventual closure of
DJJ and the transfer of its responsibilities to California counties. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 736.5, subd. (a).)3 The county-level equivalent of DJJ is a secure track commitment,
also known as an SYTF. (§§ 875, 875.5.)
“ ‘ “We review a juvenile court’s commitment decision for abuse of discretion,
indulging all reasonable inferences to support its decision.” [Citation.] “ ‘[D]iscretion is
abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of all reason, all of the circumstances
being considered.’ ” [Citation.] We will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings when
there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citation.] “ ‘In determining whether there
was substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must examine the record
presented at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court
Law.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical
to its decision find no support in the evidence.’ ” (In re Khalid B. (2015)
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288.) “The purpose of the juvenile court is to protect both the
minor under its jurisdiction and the public, and to preserve and strengthen the minor’s
family ties whenever possible.” (In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 99;
see § 202, subd. (a).) “Central to the juvenile court’s mission are the care, treatment,
guidance, and rehabilitation of the delinquent juvenile.” (In re Walter P., at p. 99;
see § 202, subd. (b).)
A juvenile court may order that a minor be committed to an SYTF for a period of
confinement if, among other things, the “court has made a finding on the record that a
less restrictive, alternative disposition for the ward is unsuitable.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3).)
In making such a commitment determination, the juvenile court must consider: “(A) The
severity of the offense or offenses for which the ward has been most recently adjudicated,
including the ward’s role in the offense, the ward’s behavior, and harm done to victims.
[¶] (B) The ward’s previous delinquent history, including the adequacy and success of
previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the ward. [¶] (C) Whether the
programming, treatment, and education offered and provided in a secure youth treatment
facility is appropriate to meet the treatment and security needs of the ward. [¶]
(D) Whether the goals of rehabilitation and community safety can be met by assigning
the ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition that is available to the court. [¶]
(E) The ward’s age, developmental maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual
orientation, gender identity and expression, and any disabilities or special needs affecting
the safety or suitability of committing the ward to a term of confinement in a secure
youth treatment facility.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
Section 734 states: “No ward of the juvenile court shall be committed to the
Youth Authority unless the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and
physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he
will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by
the Youth Authority.” Thus, to support an SYTF commitment, “it is required that there
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be evidence in the record demonstrating probable benefit to the minor, and evidence
supporting a determination that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or
inappropriate.” (In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576.) But it is not
necessary that less restrictive alternatives be attempted before an SYTF commitment is
ordered. (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507.) In this regard, the seriousness of
the offense may be considered. (In re Abdul Y. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 847, 869.)
I
Probable Benefit
Without elaborating, V.M. argues no substantial evidence supports a finding that
he would receive a probable benefit from an SYTF commitment. The record does not
support this contention.
The probation report and amended probation report identified three criminogenic
needs to address V.M.’s “delinquent conduct in the community,” including criminal
thinking, schooling, and adult living. To address his criminal thinking, V.M. would take
what got me here, victim awareness, and responsible thinking programs. To address his
schooling, V.M. would complete all of his assignments and obtain passing grades in all of
his classes. To address his adult living, V.M. would take an independent living program.
Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implicit determination that V.M.
would benefit from commitment to the SYTF. (In re Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1,
10 [no substantial evidence of probable benefit where record did not contain evidence of
programs at secure facility expected to benefit minor].)
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II
Least Restrictive Alternative
V.M. also asserts no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
“determination that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate,” and “the
court failed to utilize or even seriously consider an available less restrictive placement—
MSYGC.” We reject these contentions.
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s determination that a less
restrictive alternative disposition was unsuitable. The record contains substantial
evidence of the severity of V.M.’s offense. (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A).) V.M. initiated the
offense and stabbed the victim, killing him. The probation report summarized the video
surveillance footage of the incident, which showed V.M. approaching a group of
individuals while holding a large folding knife and charging several times. In his
statement to probation, V.M. expressed remorse and that it “suck[ed]” that the victim
died, but also said he “kind of had to” and there was “nothing he can do about it now.”
He also stated his actions were a “last resort” response. Given V.M.’s failure to
acknowledge his role in the offense, the probation report expressed concern for
community safety that V.M. might engage in the same actions if “challenged by another
individual.” Based on V.M.’s actions and his failure to acknowledge his role as the
initiator in the offense, and with consideration for community safety, the probation report
recommended placement in an SYTF. “A juvenile court may properly consider ‘a
restrictive commitment as a means of protecting the public safety.’ ” (Carlos J., supra,
22 Cal.App.5th at p. 6.)
V.M. argues his claim of self-defense “mitigate[es] the severity of [his] role and
behavior, despite the ultimate harm done to the victim.” The record contains V.M.’s
statement that he acted in self-defense. However, it also contains evidence that V.M.
initiated the confrontation by charging the victim and his friends with a large folding
knife, and despite multiple chances to disengage, ultimately stabbed the victim. In
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essence, V.M. asks us to reweigh the evidence that was before the juvenile court. But
that is not our undertaking when reviewing for substantial evidence. Under this standard,
“a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be
upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the
contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it
believed other evidence.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.)
The record reveals that V.M. did not have a lengthy delinquent history. (§ 875,
subd. (a)(3)(B).) V.M. had a previous adjudication for burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and
vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)), which was subsequently terminated upon
successful completion of deferred entry of judgment. V.M. argues his “previous
delinquent history was minimal” and his previous adjudication “was dismissed after [he]
successfully terminated” deferred entry of judgment, all of which “militates in favor of a
less restrictive alternative.” But as the People correctly note, this is one of five factors,
and SYTF placement can still be appropriate in the absence of a lengthy delinquent
history. (In re Abdul Y., supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 869 [“Although appellant is a first-
time offender, this in itself does not indicate that CYA commitment is inappropriate”].)
As we previously concluded, the record contains substantial evidence to support
the court’s determination that available “programming, treatment, and education” at the
SYTF was appropriate to meet the treatment and security needs of the ward.” (§ 875,
subd. (a)(3)(C).) V.M. asserts that “[t]he record does not support a finding that a less
restrictive program, such as MSYGC, would not be effective for [V.M.]” He asserts “the
record is devoid of the programming available through MSYGC” such that it does not
show the same or similar programs available at the SYTF would not also be available at
MSYGC. This is not the issue we must decide on appeal. The test is not whether another
program would have benefited V.M. or whether he, or this court, might believe that a
different disposition would have been preferable. We are tasked with deciding whether
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the disposition the juvenile court actually chose was within that court’s discretion. Put
differently, we must decide whether substantial evidence supports the court’s
determination. (In re Khalid B., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288.) We conclude it
does.
The record contains substantial evidence to support the court’s determination that
rehabilitation and community safety could not be met by committing V.M. “to an
alternative, less restrictive disposition that [wa]s available to the court.” (§ 875, subd.
(a)(3)(D).) As discussed, V.M. killed the victim and failed to take accountability for his
role in initiating the offense, which suggests V.M. might repeat this behavior if
confronted with similar circumstances. This is substantial evidence that the goals of
rehabilitation and community safety could not be met with a less restrictive disposition
based on the danger V.M. poses to public safety. (See In re Abdul Y., supra,
130 Cal.App.3d at pp. 869-870.) V.M. asserts the record does not demonstrate he was at
risk for committing similar behavior because “there simply was no evidence that [he]
would commit another violent offense.” V.M. asserts this is his first sustained petition,
he was successful during detention pending disposition of this offense, he expressed
remorse, and the district attorney had allowed him to admit to assault. All of this
evidence was before the juvenile court, and V.M.’s contentions ask us to reweigh the
evidence. We will not. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
The record contains substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
determination considered V.M.’s “age, developmental maturity, mental and emotional
health, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and any disabilities or special
needs affecting the safety or suitability of committing [him] to a term of confinement in a
secure youth treatment facility.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(E).) The probation report detailed
V.M.’s age and his mental health diagnoses and related medication. Page 11 of Dr.
Ramezani’s report also contained a detailed description of the same. V.M. correctly
notes the court indicated it had not read the entire report, just page 11. V.M. details the
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report’s contents and argues, without elaborating, “[h]ad the court reviewed the entire
report, the court would have had a full picture of [his] developmental maturity, mental
and emotional health, and the disabilities or special needs that led to this offense,” all of
which “was highly relevant to whether a less restrictive alternative was suitable.” While
the report contained more details, it does not follow that the juvenile court did not
consider this factor in light of the information contained in the probation report. Further,
this is only one of five factors under section 875, subdivision (a)(3).
Accordingly, indulging all reasonable inferences to support its decision (In re
Khalid B., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288), we conclude there was substantial
evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination that a less restrictive alternative
disposition was unsuitable.
Further challenging the court’s determination, V.M. argues the juvenile court’s
order committing him to the SYTF “was solely for the purposes of retribution, rather than
stemming from a full and reasoned consideration of both ‘protection and safety of the
public’ as well as [V.M.’s] ‘best interests.’ ” He claims the court did not conduct an
analysis of his needs and the SYTF’s services but instead “seemed to be swayed by the
‘frustration’ and ‘palpable grief’ of the victim’s family.” He further asserts “[t]he court
essentially said its hands were tied as to the outcome of the transfer hearing” and the
petition amendment to include the assault charge but could follow probation’s
recommendation for a SYTF commitment, “which would be the most restrictive
punishment.” To that end, V.M. asserts “the court’s disposition decision was solely for
the purposes of retribution.”
We disagree with V.M.’s characterization of the record. The victim impact
statements collectively focused on the fact that V.M. murdered the victim but only
admitted to an assault charge, and the statements requested the maximum punishment
available. It was in response to this that the court made statements that it was bound by
the assault admission and jurisdictional hearing outcome. We do not read these
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statements to mean that the court committed V.M. to SYTF “solely for the purposes of
retribution.” Further, we reject the contention that the court failed to consider the
SYTF’s services and V.M.’s needs. As we have already concluded, the court considered
the programs available to V.M. and substantial evidence supports the determination that
they would be of probable benefit to V.M.
V.M. further maintains that no evidence supports “the court’s implied
determination that it ‘sub silentio considered and rejected’ the less restrictive disposition
alternative of MSYGC.” The record does not support this contention. “[T]here is no rule
that [an SYTF] placement cannot be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been
attempted, and there is no requirement that the juvenile court expressly state on the
record the reasons for rejecting less restrictive placements.” (In re Nicole H. (2016)
244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1159.) “Rather, ‘if there is evidence in the record to show a
consideration of less restrictive placements was before the court, the fact the judge does
not state on the record his consideration of those alternatives and reasons for rejecting
them will not result in a reversal.’ ” (Ibid.) However, “ ‘there must be some evidence to
support the judge’s implied determination that he sub silentio considered and rejected
reasonable alternative dispositions.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court stated that it had read and considered the probation report.
The probation report detailed that V.M. had been accepted into MSYGC. The report
further stated that while an SYTF would be able to provide services to meet V.M.’s
needs, MSYGC could be a less restrictive option in the future if V.M. displays good
behavior in the SYTF. This evidence supports the court’s implied determination that it
considered and rejected placement at MSYGC. (In re Nicole H., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1159.)
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Accordingly, “ ‘ “indulging all reasonable inferences to support [the juvenile
court’s] decision” ’ ” (In re Khalid B., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288), we conclude
substantial evidence supports the court’s order committing V.M. to the SYTF.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
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