Filed 8/6/26 Ball v. De Leon CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
LANGSTON BALL, B348746
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24NWCV01500)
v.
HEIDI SUE DE LEON,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Margaret Miller Bernal, Judge. Affirmed.
Langston Ball, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Heidi Sue De Leon, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Langston Ball challenges the trial
court’s order granting an anti-SLAPP motion to strike his
complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16)1 filed by defendant and
respondent Heidi Sue De Leon. Plaintiff limits his argument to
step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, i.e., the requirement that
defendant establish the allegations in the complaint arise from
protected conduct. In this regard, he claims the trial court
erroneously (1) “expanded. . . the litigation privilege” by “treating
all alleged conduct as protected activity without distinguishing
between communicative and non-communicative acts,” and (2)
determined the lawsuit arose from prefiling protected activity.
The appellate record does not include all material evidence and
arguments presented to the trial court and, for that reason, it is
fatal to plaintiff’s contentions. We affirm the trial court’s order.
BACKGROUND
On May 14, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging causes
of action for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and
constructive fraud. Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was filed on
November 7, 2024. On February 5, 2025, plaintiff filed a first
amended complaint.
The trial court heard argument on the anti-SLAPP motion
on April 15, 2025, and took the matter under submission that
same day. On April 18, 2025, the trial court issued an order
granting defendant’s request for judicial notice and her related
1 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure. “‘SLAPP’ is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against
public participation.’ [Citation.]” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1
Cal.5th 376, 381, fn. 1.)
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anti-SLAPP motion.2 Based on our review of the trial court’s
order, defendant requested the court take judicial notice of
information from previous family law proceedings concerning: (1)
a temporary restraining order obtained by defendant; (2)
competing requests for domestic violence restraining orders filed
by plaintiff and defendant as well as a related stipulation; (3)
defendant’s petition to establish a parental relationship; and (4)
one or more documents defendant filed with the Department of
Child Support Services seeking child support. The trial court
summarized step one of the order granting the anti-SLAPP
motion in the following way: “The court has reread the parties’
briefs and [d]efendant’s [r]equests for [j]udicial [n]otice, and the
court finds that the allegations on which the [c]omplaint is based
upon are indeed related to the parties’ domestic violence
restraining order proceedings and related family law proceedings.
Because the allegations of [d]efendant’s statements and conduct
were also the subject of those proceedings, they are covered by
the litigation privilege.”
On April 28, 2025, defendant filed a second anti-SLAPP
motion, this time targeting the first amended complaint.
Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 2, 2025 that included several
exhibits. The record sheds no light on the outcome of this motion
and, given the trial court’s prior order denying plaintiff’s request
2 The trial court prohibited plaintiff from amending the
complaint and elected to “assess the [m]otion as to the original
[c]omplaint.” It noted that “a plaintiff may not amend a
complaint before a hearing on an anti-SLAPP [m]otion,”citing
Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1280. Plaintiff
does not challenge that ruling.
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to file a first amended complaint, defendant’s motivation for
pursuing a second anti-SLAPP motion is not clear.
DISCUSSION
I. The Anti-SLAPP Legislation
“The anti-SLAPP statute is “designed to protect defendants
from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their
rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.
[Citations.] To that end, the statute authorizes a special motion
to strike a claim “arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)’
[Citation.]” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th
995, 1008–1009 (Bonni).)
“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step
process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e]
from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’
[Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from protected
activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal
merit.”’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the
court will strike the claim.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.)
With respect to the first step, one form of protected activity
is “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) “The
protection is not limited to statements made after the
commencement of a legal or other official proceeding. [Citation.]”
(Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1096.) Rather, it
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“includes communications made in anticipation of litigation.
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion. [Citation.] We exercise independent judgment in
determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the
challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Board
of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1067.)
II. The Procedural Bar
“[T]he burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial
court committed an error that justifies reversal of the [order or]
judgment. [Citation.]” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608–609.) “In the absence of an adequate record, the [challenged
order or] judgment is presumed correct.” (Roberson v. City of
Rialto (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1507.) The record
designated by plaintiff suffers from several material deficiencies:
1. Although defendant’s April 28, 2025 anti-SLAPP motion
filed as to the first amended complaint is included in the
record, the motion subject to our review—the motion
challenging the original complaint—is not. Similarly,
plaintiff’s opposition to the second anti-SLAPP motion is
part of the appellate record, but the opposition filed and
considered by the trial court is absent from the record.
2. Defendant’s successful motion for judicial notice included a
collection of documents relied on by the trial court in
making its ruling, but the motion is not part of the
appellate record.
3. The trial court considered the oral arguments of the
parties, but the transcript of the hearing is not part of the
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record on appeal as plaintiff elected to prosecute the appeal
without a record of the oral proceedings.
In order to effectively conduct a de novo review of an order
granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion, we are required to
examine all material evidence and arguments considered by the
trial court. (Moten v. Transworld Systems Inc. (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 691, 702 [de novo review of ruling on anti-SLAPP
motion requires the appellate court to “‘“independent[ly] review .
. . the entire record”’” before the trial court ].) Due to the
deficient record, the issues raised by plaintiff must be resolved
against him.3 (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–
3 Plaintiff’s June 2, 2025 opposition to defendant’s motion to
strike the first amended complaint included, as exhibits, what
appears to be documents related to defendant’s November 2022
request for a restraining order. This opposition was not before
the trial court when it issued its April 18, 2025 order granting
defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. Nonetheless, because the trial
court referenced prior “domestic violence restraining order
proceedings” in support of its ruling, the parallels between the
request for a restraining order attached as plaintiff’s exhibit and
the complaint are worth mentioning.
The request for a restraining order stemmed from
allegations that plaintiff (1) used sexually explicit and derogatory
language when referring to defendant, (2) participated in
pornography, (3) engaged in violent behavior, (4) “purchas[ed]
sex,” (5) cheated on defendant and infected her with a sexually
transmitted disease, and (6) threatened to make her life a “living
hell.”
The allegations in the complaint of malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, and IIED are grounded in the claim that the
request for a restraining order was improper, malicious, and/or
based on perjury. These allegations arose out of the request for
the restraining order such that the related conduct is protected
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1296; Sanders v. Walsh (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 855, 873–874;
Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 336, 348.)
by the litigation privilege. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 734–735. [malicious prosecution]; S.A. v.
Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 41–42 [abuse of process], 43
[IIED].) Similarly, the actions for slander and libel stem from
defendant’s statements to third parties regarding plaintiff’s
sexual activity and the possibility that he gave her a sexually
transmitted disease. Such statements are also associated with
the request for a restraining order and are covered by litigation
privilege. (Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 980, 997 [alleged defamatory statements are
protected by the litigation privilege if “connected with, or [have]
some logical relation to,” an anticipated litigation]; Summerfield
v. Randolph (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 127, 136 [statements to non-
parties may be covered by the litigation privilege].) Thus, to the
extent the trial court relied on the November 2022 restraining
order in granting the anti-SLAPP motion on these causes of
action, it correctly did so.
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DISPOSITION
The April 18, 2025 order granting defendant’s anti-SLAPP
motion is affirmed. Defendant is entitled to her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
KUMAR, J.*
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
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