Filed 8/6/26 In re G.G. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re G.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
TULARE COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN F091399
SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. JJV074225A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. OPINION
S.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Frank Anthony
Ruiz, Judge.
S. Lynne Klein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Jennifer M. Flores, County Counsel, and Marit Erickson, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and DeSantos, J.
INTRODUCTION
S.G. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders made at a Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing terminating parental rights as to his minor child
G.G. He contends the court erred by finding the Tulare County Child Welfare Services
Agency (agency) adequately complied with inquiry provisions of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA)2 and the California Indian Child
Welfare Act (§ 224 et seq.) (Cal-ICWA). The agency concedes prejudicial error.
We accept the agency’s concession. We conditionally reverse the order
terminating parental rights and remand for further proceedings to ensure compliance with
ICWA and Cal-ICWA.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 2, 2022, the agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of then
four-month-old G.G. alleging she came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). At
the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing on July 1, 2022, the juvenile court found
G.G. came within its jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and adjudged her a
dependent of the court.
Because the sole issue on appeal is ICWA inquiry compliance, we need not set
forth the complex procedural and factual details of the subsequent four years of G.G.’s
dependency. Eventually, services for father and G.G.’s mother, J.G. (mother), were
terminated, and on August 25, 2025, the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing for
G.G. The contested section 366.26 hearing was conducted on February 23, 2026, at
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
2.
which parental rights were terminated, and adoption was selected as G.G.’s permanent
plan. What follows are the details of the agency’s documentation regarding ICWA
inquiry and the court’s relevant findings.
During the initial investigation, the social worker asked father if he had Indian
ancestry. He said he might have remote Indian ancestry but did not know the name of the
tribe. He stated he would contact family members to find out and signed a “PARENTAL
NOTIFICATION OF INDIAN STATUS” (ICWA-020) form indicating none of the
indicia tending to show that G.G. is an Indian child applied. Father further reported
mother may have Sioux and Cherokee ancestry and provided the contact information of
the maternal aunt who would have more information.
The social worker contacted the maternal aunt, Raymie G., who confirmed her
family had Indian ancestry through the Sioux and Cherokee tribes and advised the social
worker to contact the maternal grandmother for more information.
The social worker contacted the maternal grandmother, Ronda G., who informed
the social worker the maternal great-great-great-grandmother, “Granny P[.]” resided on a
reservation but did not know the name of the reservation and was not in possession of the
registry. She gave the social worker the names of the maternal great-great-grandparents
(Merle C. and Judith H.), and maternal great-grandparents (Patricia H. and Jim H.) and
advised all were deceased. The maternal grandmother told the social worker that the
maternal great-aunt, Laurieann B., may have more information and that she would
provide the maternal great-aunt’s contact information to the social worker at a later date.
No subsequent attempts to contact the maternal great-aunt were documented.
The social worker prepared a “NOTICE OF CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
FOR INDIAN CHILD” (ICWA-030) form, indicating G.G. might be eligible for
membership in Cherokee or Sioux tribes. The form included the parents’ names and birth
dates and other maternal biographical information. The information provided was
somewhat inconsistent with the information contained in the agency’s report. Judith H.
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and “Granny P[.]” were listed as maternal great-grandmothers rather than maternal great-
great-grandmother and maternal great-great-great-grandmother, respectively. Jim H. was
listed as maternal great-grandfather as reported, but Merle C. was also listed as a great-
grandfather, rather than maternal great-great-grandfather. Information on the maternal
great-grandmother, Patricia H., was not included. Under “[o]ther relative information,”
the names of the maternal aunt, Raymie G., and maternal great-aunt, Lauriann B., were
listed.
The ICWA-030 form was mailed to several Sioux and Cherokee tribes, and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
At the initial hearing conducted on June 3, 2022, the juvenile court made ICWA
inquiry with father on the record. When asked if he had any reason to believe he had any
Indian ancestry, father responded, “Down the line. It’s very small.” Father denied that he
or G.G. were registered tribal members and indicated he did not believe any of his
relatives were registered tribal members. He did not know what tribe he may have
ancestry through. He confirmed that mother had Indian ancestry through Sioux and
Cherokee tribes on the maternal grandmother’s side. The court found there was
“insufficient reason to believe” G.G. was an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA.
Counsel for the agency indicated the agency would continue to follow up with inquiry.
The agency eventually received responses from four of the tribes to which ICWA-
030 forms were sent indicating that G.G. was not an Indian child but received no
responses from six of the tribes. It appears only one response was supplied to the court,
and it indicated that based on the information provided, G.G. was not an enrolled citizen
and did not meet enrollment eligibility of the tribe.
In December 2022, the social worker asked a paternal aunt about Indian ancestry,
who replied that she would ask other family and get back to the social worker. Another
paternal aunt reported her father had Aztec descent but that no one else in her family was
enrolled or registered with a tribe.
4.
In February 2023, the agency reported that the parents were “cousins by marriage
and therefore[,] inquiries with paternal and/or maternal family members are regarding
both the mother and father.”
In May 2025, the maternal grandfather, a non-relative extended family member,
and mother were asked about and denied Indian ancestry.
In June 2025, the agency sent letters to three of G.G.’s relatives providing
information about options to be involved with the dependency case that included requests
for information regarding Indian ancestry. No responses to these letters were
documented.
Throughout the proceedings, the juvenile court made multiple findings that there
was insufficient reason to believe G.G. was or may be an Indian child within the meaning
of ICWA. Following the section 366.26 hearing, the court signed written findings and
orders, indicating in part, “The court has reviewed [ICWA-20 forms], evidence taken at
earlier hearings, and reports and evidence filed by the agency. The court finds that the
court and the agency have fulfilled their affirmative and ongoing duty of inquiry to
determine whether the child is or may be an Indian child, including interviewing
available extended family members, and that there is no reason to believe or know that
the child is or may be an Indian child.”
DISCUSSION
Under Cal-ICWA, the court and county child welfare agency “have an affirmative
and continuing duty to inquire whether a child,” who is the subject of a juvenile
dependency petition, “is or may be an Indian child,”3 in order to determine whether the
3 An “Indian child” is defined in ICWA as an unmarried individual under 18 years
of age who is either (1) a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe, or (2) is eligible
for membership in a federally recognized tribe and is the biological child of a member of
a federally recognized Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) & (8); see Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal definitions].)
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proceedings must be conducted within the provisions of ICWA. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see
In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9; Cal. Rules of Court,4 rule 5.481(a).) As relevant
here, the agency’s initial duty of inquiry includes “asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).)
When initial inquiry gives rise to a “reason to believe”5 (but not sufficient
evidence to determine there is a “reason to know”6) that an Indian child is involved in a
proceeding, “further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child” is required,
which includes gathering additional biographical information from family members and
contacting relevant tribes and the BIA. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C); see § 224.3,
subd. (a)(5) [listing the biographical information required].) Among the information
4 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
5 “There is reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child
whenever the court, social worker, or probation officer has information suggesting that
either the parent of the child or the child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for
membership or citizenship, in an Indian tribe. Information suggesting membership or
eligibility for membership includes, but is not limited to, information that indicates, but
does not establish, the existence of one or more of the grounds for reason to know
enumerated” in section 224.2, subdivision (d)(1) through (6). (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
6 These enumerated grounds for “reason to know” are: “(1) A person having an
interest in the child, including the child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an Indian
organization, a public or private agency, or a member of the child’s extended family
informs the court that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of
the child, the child’s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an Alaska
Native village …[;] [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court, Indian
tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that it has discovered information
indicating that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (4) The child who is the subject of the
proceeding gives the court reason to know that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (5) The
court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court[; and/or] [¶] (6) The
court is informed that either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating
membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (d); see 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.107(c) (2026).)
6.
required to be gathered is: “All names known of the Indian child’s biological parents,
grandparents, and great-grandparents, or Indian custodians, including maiden, married,
and former names or aliases, as well as their current and former addresses, birth dates,
places of birth and death, tribal enrollment, membership, or citizenship information of
other direct lineal ancestors of the child, and any other identifying information, if
known.” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).) “Contact with a tribe shall include sharing
information identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or
citizenship eligibility determination, as well as information on the current status of the
child and the case.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).)
When the court or agency “knows or has reason to know” an Indian child is
involved in the dependency proceeding, formal notice to the relevant tribes is required.
(§ 224.3, subd. (a).)
The agency “must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a detailed description
of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information received
pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as evidence of how and when this
information was provided to the relevant tribes.” (Rule 5.481(a)(5).)
Before finding ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court must make a finding that the
agency conducted “proper and adequate further inquiry” and exercised “due diligence” in
doing so, and that “there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
We review the juvenile court’s finding that there is no reason to know whether a
child is an Indian child for substantial evidence, and the court’s finding that the agency
has conducted a proper and adequate inquiry and due diligence for abuse of discretion.
(In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 600–601.)
Father argues there was reason to believe G.G. was an Indian child, triggering the
agency’s duty of further inquiry. Father goes on to argue the court’s finding that the
agency’s inquiry was adequate was error because (1) the agency failed to document
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whether it asked the individuals with whom it made ICWA inquiry for the biographical
information required by sections 224.2, subdivision (e)(2)(A) and 224.3, subdivision
(a)(5), particularly as to the paternal side; (2) the agency failed to communicate with the
relevant tribes appropriately under section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2)(C) because it did not
document asking the tribes what information they required in order to make membership
determinations and it communicated with them via certified mail rather than telephone,
facsimile, or e-mail; and (3) of the information the agency did provide to the tribes, much
of it was inaccurate and/or incomplete, and thus the tribes responses could not have been
viewed as determinative of G.G.’s status as an Indian child.
The agency filed a letter brief conceding error and the necessity of conditional
reversal and remand though it does not address any of father’s specific contentions.
We agree that the maternal claims of specific tribal ancestry and/or possible
affiliation and that one of G.G.’s direct lineal ancestors lived on a reservation gave the
agency and juvenile court reason to believe G.G. was an Indian child, triggering the duty
of further inquiry. We conclude that, at the very least, because the agency provided
conflicting information about the relationships between certain extended family members
and G.G., the juvenile court could not reasonably determine the biographical information
sent to the relevant tribes in the ICWA-030 forms was accurate. Because there were
multiple potential inaccuracies provided to the tribes here, and the record does not
disclose what the tribes specifically required in order to make their determinations about
whether G.G. was an Indian child, we cannot say the juvenile court could have
reasonably concluded the agency’s further inquiry was adequate. Thus, we agree the
court abused its discretion by finding the agency’s inquiry was adequate and accept
respondent’s concession.
We make no comment on father’s remaining specific assertions about what Cal-
ICWA requires, including but not limited to, documentation of attempts to gather
biographical information unrelated to the claim giving a reason to believe the child is an
8.
Indian child and communication with the tribes by telephone, facsimile, or e-mail rather
than certified mail. Given the agency’s concession, we do not believe we are in an
appropriate position to address these claims and believe they are better left to be raised
before the juvenile court for it to determine in the first instance.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. The matter is
remanded to the juvenile court for compliance with the inquiry and notice requirements
of sections 224.2 and 224.3 and the documentation provisions of rule 5.481(a)(5). If the
court thereafter finds a proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence has been
conducted and concludes ICWA does not apply (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), then the court shall
reinstate the orders terminating parental rights. If the court concludes ICWA applies, then
it shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a);
Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 224.2, subd. (i)(1), 224.3, 224.4; see also In re Dezi C. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125.)
9.