Filed 7/29/26 Cal. Highway Patrol v. Cal. State Personnel Bd. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, B336135
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. 22STCP03433)
CALIFORNIA STATE PERSONNEL
BOARD,
Defendant and Respondent;
NATHANIEL PARTRIDGE,
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Curtis A. Kin, Judge. Affirmed.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Jones and Jaclyn V. Younger,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
Mastagni Holstedt, Jason M. Ewert and Melissa M. Thom
for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
_______________________
The California Highway Patrol (CHP) dismissed officer
Nathaniel Partridge from employment for claiming unearned
overtime compensation and failing to properly complete records.
Partridge appealed his dismissal to the California State
Personnel Board (SPB), which reduced the penalty to a one-year
suspension. The CHP filed a petition for writ of mandate, asking
the superior court to vacate the suspension and impose the
penalty of dismissal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) The trial court
denied the petition, finding the SPB did not abuse its discretion
in imposing the one-year suspension. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are largely undisputed, and the only
issue on appeal is the appropriateness of the penalty imposed.
I. Factual Background
In the Maintenance Zone Enhanced Enforcement Program
(MAZEEP), the CHP provides the California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans) with traffic enforcement, monitoring,
and other safety services for highway maintenance projects.
Caltrans reimburses the CHP for the actual cost incurred at the
time of the services.1
Prior to 2011, the East Los Angeles CHP office (ELA)
implemented a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for
scheduling overtime for uniformed personnel, and the Highway
1 Under the CHP’s collective bargaining agreement, officers
on a MAZEEP overtime assignment who work less than four
hours are paid for a minimum of four hours. Officers who work
over four hours receive compensation for the hours worked. That
provision is not relevant to this appeal.
2
Patrol Manual (HPM) required the officer to record the start and
finish time of the actual overtime worked. In 2011, Sergeant
Kelley Moore, the Administrative Sergeant in the ELA office from
approximately October 2010 until 2016, learned officers who had
been released from MAZEEP overtime assignments earlier than
the scheduled end times were going home when released but still
collecting compensation for the entire overtime detail period.
Moore believed this violated overtime policies, but other
sergeants believed officers should receive compensation for the
full scheduled MAZEEP overtime even if they were released early
by Caltrans.
The SOP was modified in 2012 to permit officers to receive
full overtime compensation if a MAZEEP overtime detail ended
early as long as they returned to and remained at the ELA
station for the duration of their overtime shift. The policy,
drafted by Moore at the direction of Administrative Lieutenant
Cesar Murillo, provided, “Officers working overtime such
as . . . MAZEEP details shall remain available during the
duration of the reimbursable contract. If Caltrans ends a detail
early due to unforeseen circumstances but continues to pay the
officer the duration of the contract, the officer shall remain
available to Caltrans by standing by at the office.” Sergeants
notified officers of the policy change during daily briefings, and
the SOP was posted on the bulletin board where overtime
opportunities were posted.
After the revision of this policy, there were several
instances of officers leaving for home or other personal
destinations instead of remaining at the ELA office after early
release from a MAZEEP detail. Murillo and other sergeants were
aware of the practice and did not take any immediate measures
3
to correct the policy violations. Murillo, who retired in 2016,
believed it was acceptable for officers to go home as long as they
could return to the office within a reasonable time. Lieutenant
Derek Moulton, the Administrative Lieutenant for the ELA office
from 2016 to 2018, was unaware of the SOP requirements.
Captain Paul Medeiros, who supervised both Murillo and
Moulton, was aware of the SOP but was unaware that some
officers were not following it. Lieutenant Melissa Hammond,
who was responsible for overseeing overtime policy and
compliance at the ELA office from September 2016 to August
2018, was unaware of the MAZEEP SOP.
CHP officers record their time worked and the activities
performed during their shift on Daily Field Records (Form 415).
There is an overtime box on the form in which the officers are
expected to enter the start and end of the actual time worked. In
submitting the Form 415, the officer certifies the information
recorded is true and correct. Form 415 is used to calculate
officers’ pay, and officers must fill it out in order to be paid.
Each time an officer uses a patrol vehicle, they are expected
to fill out by hand the required information on the Driver’s
Equipment Check form (Form 33). The form includes boxes for
the officer to write their name, the date, when the vehicle was
checked out and returned, the odometer readings at checkout and
return, total miles driven, and gasoline added, if any. These
forms are for automative maintenance purposes, and not
reviewed by ELA management.
Officers working MAZEEP assignments were also expected
to complete a MAZEEP Daily Report Form following the
completion of the assignment. On this form, a Caltrans crew
leader or a supervisor in charge of the Caltrans crew recorded the
4
date, Caltrans report number, project location and description,
and a description of the maintenance work performed. The CHP
officer working the assignment was required to record their
name; ID number; rank; patrol car number; the patrol car’s
starting mileage, ending mileage, and total mileage; and the start
time, end time, and total time of the detail. At the end of the
MAZEEP detail, the CHP officer initialed the form to certify the
information they entered on the form was true and accurate, and
the Caltrans crew leader or supervisor signed to approve the
form.
CHP officers are expected to fill out documents honestly
and accurately.
Partridge, hired as a CHP patrol officer in 2006, worked at
the ELA office. In his 2015–2016 performance appraisal, he
received excellent or proficient marks in all categories. His rater
described him as conscientious, polite, courteous, outstanding in
communication skills, able to prioritize and complete tasks in a
timely manner, dependable, consistent, well-organized, efficient,
and accurate. Partridge “continually demonstrate[d] a thorough
and comprehensive understanding of departmental policies and
procedures,” had an excellent attitude, took his role seriously,
was willing to assist whenever needed, and did a “thorough and
comprehensive job” as a school bus officer. Partridge was
awaiting a promotion, and his rater believed him ready for a
supervisory role, as Partridge possessed “maturity, good
judgment, and leadership skills,” and was “a true leader.”
Partridge worked MAZEEP overtime details. He knew the
SOP required officers to remain at the ELA office if a MAZEEP
assignment ended before the scheduled time, and he had been
advised by a sergeant that if a MAZEEP overtime assignment
5
ended earlier than scheduled, the officer was required to remain
on standby at the ELA office for the duration of the originally
scheduled assignment. Partridge believed officers commonly
went home after being released early from MAZEEP details and
returning their patrol vehicles, and he thought it was acceptable
to ELA managers for officers to go home under those
circumstances but to claim overtime for the full scheduled
assignment, as long as they could respond back to the ELA office
if needed before the end of the scheduled MAZEEP assignment.
He often observed civilian vehicles leaving the ELA parking lot
and assumed officers were returning home after early release
from a MAZEEP overtime detail.
On September 17, 2017, Partridge’s MAZEEP assignment
ended early at 10:20 a.m. Officer Doris Peniche, who worked the
same detail as Partridge, completed a MAZEEP Daily Report for
both of them. She entered a 4:30 a.m. start time and a 2:30 p.m.
end time on the form. A Caltrans employee signed and approved
the form.
Partridge returned to the ELA office and refueled his patrol
vehicle at approximately 10:22 a.m. He completed the Form 33,
entering 11:00 a.m. as the time he returned the vehicle to the
ELA office. He changed out of his uniform, got in his personal
vehicle, and left the ELA office for his home, 35 miles away.
Cellular phone data showed Partridge was already on his way
home around 10:45 a.m., 15 minutes earlier than the time he
reported returning the patrol vehicle.
The Form 415s Partridge submitted for his MAZEEP
overtime assignment on September 17, 2017,2 indicate he started
2 Due to CHP timekeeping methods and shift times,
Partridge completed two Form 415s for the relevant MAZEEP
6
his shift at 4:30 a.m. and ended his shift at 2:30 p.m. He had
only worked six hours and 15 minutes, and was then at home for
the remainder of the detail. Based on Partridge’s Form 415s, he
was compensated for 10 hours of overtime for September 17,
2017, even though he left the ELA station before the end of the
MAZEEP assignment.
In 2019, Partridge was investigated and interrogated in
connection with an audit of the MAZEEP program. Partridge
admitted that on September 17, 2017, he left the ELA office and
went home before the stated end of the overtime detail.
Partridge acknowledged he was familiar with the ELA SOPs as
they related to remaining available at the office through the end
time of overtime detail, and he had not followed policy and
procedures in that regard. Partridge stated, “I took the chance to
go home and would fall on the consequence if I was called back.”
He also admitted that on two or three occasions he may have
gone home early but had been paid for full overtime hours.
The CHP determined Partridge had dishonestly reported
his time on September 17, 2017, and was fraudulently
compensated $288.98 for approximately three hours, 45 minutes
of overtime to which he was not entitled. Additionally, the CHP
found he violated policy on eight occasions in 2017 and 2018
when he failed to properly report the time he returned his patrol
vehicle on the Form 33. On seven of those occasions, Partridge
worked a MAZEEP overtime assignment, checked out a patrol
vehicle, entered on the Form 33 the time he checked out the
overtime detail: the first hour was considered part of the previous
day’s graveyard shift, while the rest of the detail was considered
part of September 17, 2017.
7
vehicle, but either did not enter the time he checked the vehicle
back in or drew a right-pointing arrow in the box for the time the
vehicle was checked in, indicating he had the vehicle for the
entire scheduled assignment. On an eighth occasion, Partridge
worked a MAZEEP overtime assignment with another officer,
who entered the time they checked out the patrol vehicle and
drew a right-pointing arrow in the box for the time the vehicle
was returned to indicate they had the vehicle for the full
scheduled shift; Partridge did not correct the form.
On February 7, 2020, the CHP served Partridge with a
Notice of Adverse Action dismissing him from his position as a
CHP officer for inexcusable neglect of duty, dishonesty, misuse of
state property, violation of the prohibitions set forth in
Government Code section 19990, and other failure of good
behavior (Gov. Code,3 § 19572, subds. (d), (f), (p), (r), (t)).
II. Administrative History
Partridge appealed his dismissal to the SPB, and an
evidentiary hearing was held in 2021. On August 18, 2021, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued his proposed decision.
The ALJ found Partridge’s failure to comply with the
overtime SOP and his failure to properly complete Form 33s
constituted cause for discipline under section 19572, subdivision
(t), other failure of good behavior. Additionally, Partridge
violated his known duty when he repeatedly omitted the time he
returned patrol vehicles from the otherwise complete Form 33s.
While this appeared to be careless and was not proven to be
3 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.
8
intentional, it was nonetheless a pattern over six months.
Because of the repetition and the potential harm resulting from
the failure to properly record times on Form 33, the ALJ found
Partridge’s conduct was grossly negligent and an inexcusable
neglect of duty. (§ 19572, subd. (d)).
The ALJ dismissed all other charges. While the ALJ found
Partridge intentionally violated his known duty to remain at the
ELA office by going home after being released early from the
MAZEEP overtime shift, the ALJ concluded it was not an
inexcusable neglect of duty (§ 19572, subd. (d)) because the
evidence did not show the CHP intended to enforce the SOP.
With respect to the claim of dishonesty (§ 19572, subd. (f)),
the ALJ believed Partridge’s denial of any intent to deceive when
he claimed overtime compensation for his full scheduled shift
despite returning home rather than remaining at the ELA office.
The ALJ noted that while the Highway Patrol Manual required
officers to record the start and finish time of actual overtime
worked, the ELA overtime SOP explicitly provided Caltrans could
continue to pay officers for the rest of their scheduled shift if
Caltrans ended the assignment early. Although the overtime
SOP directed that officers were to remain standing by at the
office, there was no option to forego claiming compensation for
the full scheduled assignment and elect to go home after
dismissal by Caltrans. The ALJ observed a Caltrans employee
had signed the form approving the 10 overtime hours for
Partridge, and found that because Caltrans authorized payment
for the entire scheduled assignment even though it ended early,
Partridge’s claim of the full overtime for September 17, 2017 did
not by itself indicate he intended to deceive the CHP when he
entered 10 hours on his Form 415s.
9
Nor did Partridge’s other conduct on September 17, 2017,
convince the ALJ that he had attempted to deceive the CHP.
Partridge did not try to conceal that he returned his patrol
vehicle before the end of the scheduled overtime shift; he entered
11:00 a.m. on his Form 33, a time reasonably close to when he left
the ELA office.
It was significant to the ALJ that this was not a case in
which an employee claimed compensation for time they were not
working during a time they were supposed to work. Partridge
was not expected to perform any tasks after being released by
Caltrans, yet he was permitted by the overtime procedures to be
compensated for the remainder of the scheduled assignment.
Also, Caltrans had never called Partridge back to complete an
overtime assignment after releasing him early, and other
witnesses could not remember any occasion in which Caltrans
recalled an officer after early release. “Under those
circumstances,” the ALJ concluded, Partridge’s “leaving to go
home on one occasion, though violating paragraph 9 of the
Overtime SOP, did not indicate an intention to deceive.”
The ALJ found Partridge’s testimony credible: he testified
clearly, consistently, and in a straightforward manner, and he
readily admitted he left the ELA office to go home before the end
of the scheduled overtime shift but claimed the full 10 hours of
overtime compensation. This was essentially consistent with his
admissions and other statements during his internal affairs
investigation. Therefore, the ALJ credited Partridge’s denial of
an intention to deceive. Because the ALJ did not find Partridge
intended to deceive, he dismissed the charge of dishonesty
(§ 19572, subd. (f)).
10
The ALJ dismissed the charge of misuse of state property
(§ 19572, subd. (p)) because Partridge was not intentionally
misusing state time by going home. He was not required to
perform any duties while remaining at the ELA office after early
release from a MAZEEP detail, and it was not unreasonable for
Partridge to believe ELA management allowed him to go home
instead of waiting at the ELA office as long as he could return
within a reasonable time if needed, given that Murillo, an
administrative lieutenant, shared that understanding.
Finally, the ALJ dismissed the charge under section 19572,
subdivision (r) that Partridge had violated the prohibitions in
section 19990, the incompatible activity statute. Although
Partridge claimed full overtime pay despite departing early for
home after early release from a MAZEEP detail, he was not
required to be doing any work during that time period, and he did
not perform transactions for a personal side business or
otherwise engage in any activity clearly prohibited by the CHP’s
incompatible activities policy.
Finding dismissal too harsh a penalty for an officer with no
prior adverse actions who admitted his errors and had not been
proven to be dishonest, the ALJ modified the dismissal to a one-
month suspension.
III. SPB Determination
The SPB rejected the ALJ’s proposed decision. On June 20,
2022, after briefing and oral argument, the SPB issued its
decision.
Like the ALJ, the SPB found Partridge violated his duty to
complete required forms accurately and completely when he
routinely omitted the time he returned patrol vehicles to the
station. The SPB agreed with the ALJ that failing to fully
11
complete the Form 33 on eight separate occasions over a six-
month period constituted inexcusable neglect of duty and other
failure of good behavior (§ 19572, subds. (d), (t)).
The SPB, however, disagreed with the ALJ’s remaining
conclusions and found Partridge’s claim of unearned overtime for
September 17, 2017, constituted an inexcusable neglect of duty,
dishonesty, misuse of state property, a violation of section 19990
prohibitions, and other failure of good behavior (§ 19572, subds.
(d), (f), (p), (r) & (t)). As the ALJ found the evidence established
the SOP clearly required officers working MAZEEP details to
remain at the ELA office for the remainder of the detail if
released early by Caltrans, and Partridge knew about this policy,
the SPB concluded Partridge, “as a peace officer, knew his action
violated the expressed overtime policy when he chose not to
remain at the ELA office after an early release from a MAZEEP
detail and yet claimed full overtime hours on his Form 415. He
knew doing so would result in him receiving public funds for time
he was not otherwise entitled to claim.”
Unlike the ALJ, the SPB found the fact that ELA officers
routinely ignored the SOP without adverse consequences did not
excuse Partridge’s conduct: “Management’s neglect in overseeing
its personnel does not necessarily excuse wrongful behavior
engaged in by their officers. Viewed differently, if management
turns a blind eye to a particular scheme or pattern of misconduct,
such does not legitimize the scheme or misconduct. For example,
management that routinely ignores sexually inappropriate
behavior that violates the employer’s no-sexual-harassment
policy does not then make it permissible for other employees to
engage in the same offensive conduct without consequences.
After all, peace officers are held to a higher standard of behavior
12
than other civil servants. [Citation.] CHP officers swear to a
Code of Honor that holds in part, ‘My personal conduct shall, at
all times, be above reproach and I will never knowingly commit
any acts that will in any way bring discredit upon the California
Highway Patrol or any member thereof.’ That high standard of
behavior minimally includes observing and following CHP
policies especially under circumstances where convenient skirting
of those polices would result in self-enrichment at the expense of
the public’s trust.”
The SPB found Partridge’s submission of false information
on his September 17, 2017 Form 415s was an inexcusable neglect
of duty (§ 19572, subd. (d)). Policy clearly required officers to
record the start and finish time of all overtime worked, and
Partridge knew how to complete Form 415. Partridge left the
office early, and although he knew he was not permitted to claim
the hours he was not present at the office, he did it anyway. The
SPB rejected Partridge’s claim he could not be disciplined for
failing to follow the SOP because the evidence showed the CHP
did not intend to enforce it. The written policy governing
overtime compensation on MAZEEP details was clear. While
there was evidence some officers impermissibly claimed overtime
even though they did not follow the policy, the SPB concluded the
evidence showed ELA’s turnstile leadership was either unaware
of the requirements or was not aware of personnel violating the
SOP. Moreover, even if management may not have been
enforcing the SOP, Partridge, “as a peace officer, should have
known that receiving compensation for time not worked is
reasonably viewed as misappropriation of public funds.”
The SPB found Partridge engaged in dishonesty by
claiming unearned overtime pay: Partridge “knew what was
13
required of him under the SOP. He knew he must remain on
standby at the office if he wanted to claim compensation for the
entire detail. He acknowledged that violating the policy could
result in him being removed from future overtime assignments
and subject to discipline. Nonetheless, he entered work hours on
Form 415 for which he knew he could not lawfully claim. His
deliberate entry of a false end time for the purpose of claiming
full overtime compensation is, by its very act, dishonest.
Regardless of the prevalence of any illicit scheme for which ELA
management were unintentionally or intentionally ignorant of,
[Partridge] could not have reasonably believed his Form 415 was
accurate for September 17, 2017. His conduct, therefore,
constitutes cause for discipline under . . . section 19572,
subdivision (f), dishonesty.”
The SPB was not persuaded by the facts that had convinced
the ALJ that Partridge did not intend to deceive the CHP.
Although the ALJ considered Partridge’s relatively accurate
report on his Form 33 of the time he returned his patrol vehicle
on September 17, 2017, to indicate an absence of deceptive intent,
the SPB concluded the ALJ gave that too much credence because
“entering the actual time the patrol vehicle is returned to the
station on Form 33 is not determinative of whether an officer
would be entitled to claim the full overtime compensation for the
shift. What is determinative is the information entered on Form
415,” which in Partridge’s case was false.
The SPB also concluded the ALJ placed too much
significance on the facts that officers did not have to do any work
if they are released early from a MAZEEP assignment and that
officers who chose not to remain at the ELA office were rarely, if
ever, called back to the office. The SPB noted the purpose of the
14
SOP is not to address whether an officer was actively working
after early release from a MAZEEP detail; it is “to ensure the
officer’s availability for service if called upon and not to gift
public funds to an officer who decides to end their day and head
home.” Moreover, Partridge knew he lived too far away to be
considered readily available if called upon to return.
The SPB found Partridge’s submission of false information
to receive unearned compensation constituted deceptive behavior
to acquire state funds for personal gain, a misuse of state
property (§ 19572, subd. (p)). Claiming time for hours he had not
worked was inimical to his duties as a public servant and peace
officer, because the public was entitled to trust that law
enforcement officers were not engaging in deceptive practices or
violating laws or policies for their own gain; this violated section
19572, subdivision (r). Finally, because Partridge’s misconduct in
claiming compensation to which he was not entitled was directly
related to his job, reflected poorly on himself and the CHP, and
presented a public concern regarding failure to properly
administer taxes, it was cause for discipline under section 19572,
subdivision (t), other failure of good behavior.
In determining the appropriate penalty, the SPB identified
the relevant factors set forth in Skelly v. State Personnel Bd.
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 218 (Skelly): the extent to which the
employee’s conduct resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result in
harm to the public service, the circumstances surrounding the
misconduct, and the likelihood of its recurrence. The SPB
concluded Partridge harmed public service when he knowingly
violated written policy to claim compensation for hours he did not
work and was not legally entitled to claim. His actions could
easily cause members of the public to question the integrity of the
15
CHP and its officers. Dishonest conduct such as Partridge’s is
highly injurious to their employer because peace officers are held
to higher standards of conduct than civilian employees.
Notwithstanding this high standard of conduct, however, the SPB
noted each individual case of alleged wrongdoing and the
appropriate discipline must be assessed based upon the totality of
the circumstances.
While Partridge had engaged in dishonest conduct by
seeking overtime pay for the full MAZEEP detail on September
17, 2017, the SPB was not convinced this incident demonstrated
he had a disposition toward dishonesty or deception. Partridge
did not demonstrate a pattern or practice of claiming unearned
overtime compensation, unlike most officers dismissed for
claiming unearned MAZEEP overtime pay. Rather, “the evidence
here showed a singular charged occasion where [Partridge] made
a poor choice to claim three-plus hours of unearned overtime
compensation. This isolated charged event does not necessarily
suggest [he] has a propensity or disposition to lie, cheat, or
deceive.” Indeed, Partridge, a CHP officer since 2006, was a good
employee who had never suffered any prior disciplinary actions
and had received excellent or proficient performance ratings in
recent years, and this “lengthy, disciplinary-free tenure is
deserving of serious consideration especially in light of the
singular occasion of claiming unearned overtime and a minor
transgression in his haphazard completion of CHP forms.”
The SPB found dismissal to be a punishment out of
proportion with Partridge’s wrongdoing. The SPB did not believe
there was a tremendous likelihood the conduct would recur
considering the limited nature of the offense, the CHP’s
disciplinary actions against officers who abuse the public trust in
16
failing to adhere to policies, and “the stern discipline” it was
imposing. The SPB found a one-year suspension resulting in the
loss of a year’s salary was “just and proper under the
circumstances of this case. The lengthy suspension would
necessarily impart upon [Partridge] that dishonest behavior by a
peace officer is condemnable and will always be deserving of
severe penalty up to and including dismissal. The Board is
hopeful that [Partridge] would take heed of this lengthy
suspension and ensure that his continued employment with CHP
would be guided by strict adherence to CHP’s policy and to do
what is right regardless of what others may do.”
IV. Petition for Writ of Mandate
The CHP filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the
trial court to direct the SPB to vacate its penalty decision and
uphold the CHP’s decision to dismiss Partridge. The CHP alleged
the SPB abused its discretion by “imposing a one-year suspension
for a sustained charge of dishonesty by a peace officer.
Dishonesty alone warrants dismissal, but Partridge was also
found to have engaged in inexcusable neglect of duty, misuse of
state property, incompatible activities, and other failure of good
behavior. Such conduct is not consistent with law enforcement
purposes and philosophy and violates the public trust.”
The trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate. As
Partridge’s discipline was based on a single incident of claiming
three hours 45 minutes of unearned pay, the court found it was
within reason for the SPB to find Partridge’s conduct did not
necessarily indicate a propensity to cheat, deceive, or defraud.
Indeed, the SPB noted Partridge’s lack of prior discipline and his
positive evaluations. The court concluded it was not outside the
bounds of reason for the SPB to determine that under the
17
circumstances presented, dismissal would be a disproportionate
penalty and a one-year suspension would be appropriate.
Although the CHP argued that Partridge’s eight instances
of omitting the time he returned his patrol vehicle to the station
from the Form 33 made it difficult for CHP management to detect
an early return, the court noted the SPB’s finding that the Form
33 return time is not determinative of whether an officer would
be entitled to claim full overtime compensation for a shift.
Therefore, while Partridge did not comply with policy in
completing the forms, the court found it was not unreasonable to
conclude Partridge’s failure to enter the time he returned his
patrol vehicle was not indicative of an intent to conceal his lack of
entitlement to overtime pay or probative of his honesty
concerning overtime claims.
The trial court found the CHP’s argument that Partridge
admitted he may have gone home early two or three times not
fully accurate: he said he had “possibly” left the East Los Angeles
area two or three times. Also, the CHP did not charge him with
more than one false claim of overtime. Accordingly, the court did
not find Partridge’s “vague concession” sufficient to punish him
for purportedly engaging in additional acts of dishonesty beyond
the one with which he was charged.
The court acknowledged Partridge’s misconduct in claiming
unearned overtime was serious and warranted significant
discipline but concluded it could not say that a “one-year
suspension without pay [wa]s unreasonable, considering the
proportionality of the discipline to the single offense and
Partridge’s lack of prior discipline in his 16 years of employment
with CHP. Even though Partridge did not enter his return time
18
on the [Form 33] on eight occasions, none of those occasions was
meaningfully linked to a false claim for overtime.”
The court acknowledged the cases in which officers’
dishonesty warranted discharge but observed the fact that
dismissal is often appropriate does not mean “termination is the
only appropriate penalty for every single act of dishonesty
irrespective of the circumstances.” While in certain
circumstances a single episode of dishonesty may be sufficient to
merit dismissal, such as in Cate v. State Personnel Bd. (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 270 (Cate), that case involved more egregious
misconduct than Partridge’s misconduct here—not only
dishonesty but also encouraging a mentally ill patient to commit
suicide, intimidating a witness, and abuse of power.
The trial court acknowledged Partridge’s dishonesty would
need to be disclosed to counsel for criminal defendants under
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 for the rest of his career,
but concluded that because this single incident did not
necessarily suggest a propensity to lie, cheat or deceive, Partridge
could possibly be found credible in the future despite the false
overtime claim. Therefore, the court concluded it was not
unreasonable for the SPB to conclude Partridge’s conduct was not
likely to result in harm to the public because it did not
necessarily render him unable to credibly testify.
Accordingly, the court concluded the SPB’s reduction of
discipline to a one-year suspension was not a manifest abuse of
discretion. The CHP appeals.
DISCUSSION
“ ‘[In] a mandamus proceeding to review an administrative
order, the determination of the penalty by the administrative
body will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of its
19
discretion.’ ” (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 217.) “Neither an
appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion
for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of
punishment imposed.” (Barber v. State Personnel Bd. (1976)
18 Cal.3d 395, 404.) “ ‘Only in an exceptional case will an abuse
of discretion be shown because reasonable minds cannot differ on
the appropriate penalty.’ ” (Pasos v. Los Angeles County Civil
Service Com. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 690, 700.) “ ‘The fact that
reasonable minds may differ as to the propriety of the penalty
imposed fortifies the conclusion that the administrative body
acted within the area of its discretion.’ ” (Cate, supra,
204 Cal.App.4th at p. 284.)
“In considering whether [an] abuse [of discretion] occurred
in the context of public employee discipline, we note that the
overriding consideration in these cases is the extent to which the
employee’s conduct resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result in,
‘[harm] to the public service.’ [Citations.] Other relevant factors
include the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the
likelihood of its recurrence.” (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 218.)
The CHP contends because Partridge was dishonest, he is
likely to be dishonest again, and dismissal is the only appropriate
penalty. However, dismissal is not required in every case of
dishonesty. (County of Siskiyou v. State Personnel Bd. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1606, 1617 (Siskiyou).) The CHP cites Wilson v.
State Personnel Bd. (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 865, 882 for the
principle that “[n]o employer, including the state, is to be
condemned for terminating one who has willfully defrauded his
employer,” but the question here is not whether the CHP is to be
“condemned” for terminating Partridge but whether we can say
no reasonable decisionmaker weighing the evidence and the
20
Skelly factors could possibly have decided that a one-year
suspension without pay was the appropriate consequence for
Partridge’s wrongdoing.
We cannot say this is the exceptional case in which
reasonable minds cannot differ as to the appropriate penalty.
Partridge knowingly claimed several hours of unearned overtime
pay on one occasion, a dishonest act and serious error in
judgment that harmed the public and could cause the public to
question the integrity of the CHP and its officers. His failure to
enter the time he returned his patrol car on eight occasions was a
violation of policy, but it did not necessarily signify wrongdoing
as opposed to carelessness. When considering the misconduct
and the surrounding circumstances, the SPB could reasonably
conclude the evidence did not demonstrate Partridge had a
propensity to lie, cheat, or deceive, and that what was at issue
here was an isolated incident of very poor judgment, and
occasional poor record completion, by an officer whose integrity
and performance had not previously been called into question
over many years with the CHP. In light of these conclusions, the
SPB could reasonably believe the disciplinary proceedings and a
one-year unpaid suspension would adequately deter Partridge
from making any further claims for overtime pay to which he was
not entitled or failing to keep accurate patrol car return time
records.
We understand the strength and depth of the CHP’s
conviction that Partridge’s conduct violated the public trust and
the high standard of behavior expected of law enforcement
officers. We agree that Patridge’s conduct violated the public
trust and CHP’s high expectations for the conduct of its officers.
Nevertheless, this does not establish that the SPB abused its
21
discretion with regard to penalty. CHP relies on Kolender v. San
Diego Civil Service Com. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 716, 721
(Kolender), which states, “Dishonesty is not an isolated act; it is
more a continuing trait of character. False statements,
misrepresentations and omissions of material facts in internal
investigations, if repeated, would result in continued harm to the
public service.” Kolender, however, involved an officer who lied to
protect another officer who physically and verbally abused an
inmate, and the officer did not admit the truth until investigators
had discovered its falsity; this was not only dishonesty but
complicity in covering up the abuse of an inmate. (Id. at pp. 719,
721–722.) Kolender’s pronouncements about dishonesty and
character must be understood in that factual context. Without
diminishing the seriousness of Partridge’s misconduct, it was not
comparable to Kolender’s complicity in inmate abuse and lies to
protect deputies who harmed inmates.
Kolender does not require the SPB to conclude Partridge’s
dishonesty was indicative of a character trait rather than a single
instance of terrible judgment, nor does it mandate termination of
employment anytime an employee is dishonest. (Siskiyou, supra,
188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1617 [Kolender “do[es] not compel
discharge from employment as a penalty for dishonesty in every
circumstance”].)
Emphasizing the seriousness of Partridge’s misconduct and
the injury it inflicted on law enforcement and the public, the CHP
contends the SPB abused its discretion by “disregarding the
overriding concern and looking at a totality of circumstances that
included the length of [Partridge’s] employment, the fact that he
was only charged with one instance of dishonesty, and the
relative ‘minor’ act of dishonesty in comparison with others who
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stole more money.” It argues Partridge’s “dishonesty must
override” his employment history in determining the appropriate
penalty.
Skelly counsels otherwise. While the most significant
consideration is the extent to which the employee’s conduct
resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result in, harm to the public
service, the SPB is also charged with considering other relevant
factors, including the circumstances surrounding the misconduct
and the likelihood of its recurrence. (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at
p. 218.) It is not a “disregard[ of] the overriding concern” for the
SPB to consider the larger circumstances in which the
misconduct occurred and to evaluate the likelihood it will recur—
it is the SPB’s obligation.
The CHP argues the SPB’s totality of the circumstances
assessment placed “undue emphasis” on Partridge’s length of
employment, lack of prior discipline, and performance ratings,
but CHP’s disagreement with how the SPB weighed the
circumstances does not establish that it acted arbitrarily,
capriciously, or beyond the bounds of reason. (Fisher v. State
Personnel Bd. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1, 21 [“ ‘once the SPB
renders a decision, its determination regarding . . . what the
appropriate penalty should be, will not be disturbed in a
mandamus proceeding unless the SPB patently abused its
exercise of discretion by acting arbitrarily, capricious, or beyond
the bounds of reason’ ”].) The CHP also takes out of context the
SPB’s description of Partridge’s failure to fully complete Form
33’s as a “minor transgression in his haphazard completion of
CHP forms” and inaccurately intimates the SPB considered
Partridge’s claim to unearned overtime pay a minor
transgression (“Theft of public funds and falsifying official forms,
23
even once, is not a minor transgression for a sworn peace
officer.”). The SPB recognized Partridge’s misconduct in claiming
pay to which he was not entitled was extremely serious and
highly injurious to the CHP and the public service, and at no
time characterized it as a minor transgression.
The CHP contends the SPB “minimiz[ed] the gravity of
Partridge’s conduct” when it pointed out he did not engage in a
pattern or practice of making false MAZEEP overtime claims,
unlike other officers who had been dismissed. It asserts that
“[c]omparing Partridge to other officers should not control the
outcome in this case.” This distorts the SPB’s analysis. The SPB
did not say other officers’ cases controlled the outcome here or
that Partridge could not be dismissed because other officers
dismissed for false MAZEEP overtime claims had made multiple
claims. Rather, the SPB referred to other officers’ cases to
contrast their systematic or extensive overtime fraud, which
unmistakably evidenced a disposition toward dishonesty and a
lack of integrity, with Partridge’s one instance of poor judgment,
an isolated event that in the SPB’s opinion did not necessarily
indicate he had a propensity to lie, cheat, or deceive.
The CHP argues upholding the SPB’s decision “would only
encourage dishonest officers to limit the amount and frequency of
theft relative to others, not to avoid it altogether. In contrast,
upholding the primacy of honesty in officers will deter even minor
transgressions.” Not only does the CHP not demonstrate why a
yearlong unpaid suspension would lack deterrent effect, but also
its policy argument does not establish an abuse of discretion in
the penalty the SPB selected for Partridge’s misconduct—a
determination to which we must defer unless it is arbitrary,
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capricious, or patently abusive. (Griego v. City of Barstow (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 133, 139 (Griego).)
Finally, the CHP complains the SPB interpreted
Partridge’s misconduct as a singular event when it was actually
more extensive (“claiming overtime he did not work, and
falsifying time records to cover up his false claim”). The CHP
considers Partridge’s failure to record the time his patrol vehicle
was returned on eight Form 33s as demonstrating “a deliberate
decision to conceal his dishonesty and mislead by omission”
because the omission of return time on the forms made it difficult
for CHP to detect an early departure for home. While Partridge
obviously did not comply with policy in executing these forms, it
was not unreasonable for the SPB to conclude that his failure to
enter the time he returned his patrol vehicle was not indicative of
an intent to conceal a lack of entitlement to overtime or probative
of his honesty concerning overtime claims because officer
overtime pay was not based on Form 33 entries and none of his
Form 33 omissions was meaningfully linked to a false overtime
claim.
The CHP argues progressive discipline is unnecessary in
serious willful misconduct cases and asserts the “mitigating
factors do not outweigh the considerable discredit Partridge
brought upon himself, the CHP, and the CHP’s reputation.” This
argument, again, indicates the CHP’s disagreement with how the
SPB weighed the relevant factors, but it does not establish the
SPB’s penalty choice “exceed[ed] the bounds of reason.”
(Kolender, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 721.) The CHP asserts
the SPB “abused its discretion when it suggested that the length
of Partridge’s employment and his satisfactory performance
25
somehow counterbalanced his dishonesty.” This characterization
of the SPB’s ruling oversimplifies it to the point of inaccuracy.
“Although termination is an acceptable penalty for
dishonesty by a public employee [citation], it does not ineluctably
follow that dismissal is required in all cases of dishonesty.”
(Siskiyou, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1617.) A reasonable
decisionmaker could have dismissed Partridge, and a reasonable
decisionmaker could have—and did—impose a one-year
suspension without pay. “If reasonable minds may differ, there is
no abuse of discretion.” (Griego, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their
costs, if any, on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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