Filed 7/30/26 In re Silavong CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re B349335
ALIYATHAM SILAVONG (Super. Ct. No.
XNEGA014273-02)
on
Habeas Corpus.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Superior Court of Los Angeles, Kerry L. White, Judge.
Petition granted.
Michael Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Petitioner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Christopher G. Sanchez, John Yang,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2021, the Legislature declared “legally invalid” all prior-
prison-term sentencing enhancements imposed pursuant to Penal
Code section 667.5, subdivision (b)1 before January 1, 2020,
except in cases involving terms for sexually violent offenses.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Section 1172.75 established a procedure
for resentencing individuals serving a term for a judgment that
includes such enhancements. Three years later, the Legislature
amended the statute to preclude resentencing for an “individual
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined in
subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code and sentenced to death or a life term without the possibility
of parole [(LWOP)].” (§ 1172.75, subd. (f).)
Petitioner Aliyatham Silavong, who was sentenced to
LWOP but has not been convicted of a sexually violent offense,
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing the trial court
erred when it denied his petition, which had sought relief under,
among others, section 1172.75. In an informal response, the
Attorney General argued petitioner was no longer eligible for
resentencing under section 1172.75 due to the Legislature’s
enactment of section 1172.75, subdivision (f), effective January 1,
2025. According to the Attorney General, section 1172.75,
subdivision (f) excludes from resentencing individuals who were
convicted of a sexually violent offense or sentenced to death or
LWOP. Having examined the text and the legislative history of
section 1172.75, subdivision (f), we conclude the Legislature
1 Unless otherwise specified, all further statutory references
are to the Penal Code.
2
intended to exclude from resentencing only those individuals who
were convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to
death or LWOP. We therefore grant the petition.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1993, a jury convicted petitioner of kidnapping for
ransom (§ 209, subd. (a)), kidnapping to commit robbery (§ 209,
subd. (b)), first degree robbery (§ 211), and attempted
premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664). As to each count,
the jury found true the allegation that petitioner suffered a prior
conviction for robbery, for which he served a prior prison term
within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The
sentencing court sentenced petitioner to LWOP plus 4 years on
count 1, and to multiple concurrent life terms on the remaining
kidnapping counts. It also imposed a single one-year
enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). We
affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal. (People v.
Hong (Oct. 20, 1995, B082096) [nonpub. opn.].)
Over 30 years later, petitioner filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and attached a July 20, 2023, letter from counsel
informing him that he was eligible for resentencing under Senate
Bill No. 483 (SB 483). Effective January 1, 2022, SB 483 enacted
section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, which declared invalid all
one-year prison prior enhancements alleged under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), except those imposed for a sexually violent
offense. The statute contemplated that all inmates serving a
term that included a now invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancement would have their sentences recalled and be
resentenced by December 31, 2023. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(2).)
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Petitioner alleged no resentencing hearing had been held in his
case as of October 2025. We issued an order to show cause why
relief should not be granted.
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1172.75 invalidated all sentencing enhancements
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5,
subdivision (b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior
conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in Welfare and
Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b). (§ 1172.75, subd.
(a).) This law was proposed and enacted upon recommendation of
the Committee on Revision of the Penal Code. (Sen. Bill Third
Reading Analysis of SB 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended
July 15, 2021, p. 4.) Its purpose was to eliminate “‘ineffective’”
sentencing enhancements that produce long prison sentences
with “‘no positive impact on public safety, but are demonstrably
injurious to families and communities—particularly Black,
Latino, and Native Americans… .’” (Id., at p. 2.)
As enacted in 2021, this provision required courts to recall
and resentence, by no later than December 31, 2023, all inmates
serving a prison term that included an enhancement declared
invalid by section 1172.75. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(2).) Despite this
statutory deadline, there were “at least a thousand eligible
persons … still awaiting resentencing” under section 1172.75 as
of mid-2024. (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 285 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 4, 2024, p. 5
(SB 285).)
In 2024, the Legislature enacted SB 285, which amended
section 1172.75 to clarify the categories of inmates eligible for
4
resentencing. It did so by adding subdivision (f), which provides:
“Commencing on January 1, 2025, an individual who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision
(b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and
sentenced to death or a life term without the possibility of parole,
who, as of January 1, 2025, has not had their judgment reviewed
and verified by the sentencing court as provided in subdivision
(c), is not eligible for recall and resentencing under this section.
This subdivision does not apply retroactively.” (§ 1172.75, subd.
(f).)
The Attorney General contends petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing under subdivision (f) even though he has not been
convicted of a sexually violent offense. According to the Attorney
General, subdivision (f) should be interpreted to exclude from
resentencing inmates who were convicted of a sexually violent
offense or sentenced to LWOP or death. Petitioner counters that
subdivision (f) does not affect his eligibility for resentencing
because he is not “an individual who has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section
6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and sentenced to death
or a life term without the possibility of parole.” (§ 1172.75, subd.
(f), italics added.)
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
(People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265.) “‘“When
interpreting any statute, our goal is to determine the
Legislature’s intent and give effect to the statute’s purpose.”’
(Iloff v. LaPaille (2025) 18 Cal.5th 551, 560.) ‘“We begin by
examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and
commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider
the statutory language ‘in isolation.’ ... [W]e construe the words
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in question ‘“in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious
purpose of the statute ... .”’” [Citation.] We also “construe every
statute with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a
part, so that all may be harmonized and anomalies avoided.”’
(Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 330.)
‘“‘[T]he statute’s plain meaning controls the court’s interpretation
unless its words are ambiguous.’”’ (People v. Rhodius (2025) 17
Cal.5th 1050, 1057.) ‘“If the statutory language is unclear, we
may look to legislative history and public policy as aids in
determining how best to give effect to Legislative intent.”’ (Iloff
v. LaPaille, [supra, 18 Cal.5th] at pp. 560–561.)” (People v.
Robinson (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 516, 522, review granted
July 15, 2026, S297048 (Robinson).)
Our colleagues in the Fifth District Court of Appeal in
Robinson, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th 516 recently considered how to
interpret section 1172.75, subdivision (f). The court first
observed that the “‘“ordinary and usual usage of ‘and’ is as a
conjunctive, meaning ‘“an additional thing,”’ ‘also’ or ‘plus.’”’” (Id.
at p. 524.) Further, the Legislature had used the term “and” and
“or” in different parts of subdivision (f), which suggested that “the
Legislature ‘understood the difference between the typically
conjunctive “and” and the typically disjunctive “or.”’” (Id. at
p. 525.) “It therefore appear[ed] the challenged portion of
subdivision (f) was intended to be construed conjunctively to
exclude an individual who ‘has been convicted of a sexually
violent offense ... and sentenced to death or a life term without
the possibility of parole.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (f), italics added.)”
(Ibid.)
The Robinson court further noted that even if it were to
assume the plain language of section 1172,75, subdivision (f) was
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ambiguous as to whether it should be read conjunctively or
disjunctively, the legislative history supported a conjunctive
interpretation. (Robinson, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 526.)
“Throughout its legislative history, [SB] 285 is described as
excluding, conjunctively, individuals who have been sentenced to
death or a term of life without the possibility of parole [LWOP]
and convicted of a sexually violent offense. (E.g., Assem. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of [SB] 285, as amended June 4, 2024,
p. 1 [describing the bill as excluding ‘an individual sentenced to
death or [LWOP], and who has been convicted of a sexually
violent offense, as defined, and who, as of January 1, 2025, has
not had their judgment reviewed and verified by a sentencing
court to determine that the individual is serving a term that
includes a legally invalid sentence enhancement for a specified
prior drug conviction or prior prison or felony jail term’ (italics
added)]; Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of [SB] 285, as
amended July 3, 2024, p. 1 [describing the bill as specifying that
‘a person sentenced to death or [LWOP] who has a conviction for
a sexually violent offense is not eligible for resentencing relief
relating to specified sentencing enhancements’]; Sen. Rules Com.,
Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of [SB] 285, as amended
Aug. 19, 2024, p. 4 [‘This bill clarifies that persons convicted of
the most serious of offenses are not eligible for resentencing
under [SB] 483. Specifically, it states that an individual:
(1) sentenced to death or LWOP; (2) who has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense; and (3) who, as of January 1, 2025, has
not had their judgment reviewed and verified by a sentencing
court ... is not eligible for recall and resentencing under [SB]
483’].)” (Robinson, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 526.) The court
further observed that the legislative history demonstrated that
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SB 285 “was motivated by the resentencing petition of a specific
individual who was both convicted of a sexually violent offense
and sentenced to death.” (Id. at p. 527.)
The Attorney General urges us to disagree with Robinson,
arguing SB 285 was intended to “prevent clogging of the courts”
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of SB 285 (2023–2024
Reg. Sess.), as amended June 4, 2024, p. 3) and pointing to
language in the legislative history stating the “‘bill would make
[section 1172.75’s resentencing] provisions inapplicable to any
inmate currently sentenced to death, to a term of [LWOP], or to
an indeterminate life sentence, or to any person currently serving
a sentence for a sexually violent offense.’” (Assem. Floor,
Analysis of SB 285 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), as amended July 3,
2024, p. 1).
The legislative history, however, demonstrates that the
statements cited by the Attorney General were directed toward
an earlier draft of the provision, which was significantly broader
in scope than the enacted version, and unambiguously excluded
from resentencing not only inmates sentenced to death or LWOP,
but also inmates sentenced to any indeterminate life sentence.
(SB 285 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 4, 2024.)
During the Legislative process, the provision’s language was
narrowed to conform more closely to the bill’s stated purpose,
which was to “prevent clogging of the courts” by making clear
that inmates such as the one who inspired the bill—a “convicted
murderer and sexually violent offender serving a death penalty
sentence” who nonetheless sought resentencing under section
1172.75—are ineligible for resentencing. (Assem. Com. on Public
Safety, Analysis of SB 285 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), as amended
June 4, 2024, pp. 3, 5.) Thus, while some language in the
8
legislative history pointed toward an earlier, disjunctive version
of section 1172.75, subdivision (f), the Legislature ultimately
enacted the narrower, conjunctive version.
As the plain meaning of the text and the legislative history
both support a narrow reading of section 1172.75, subdivision (f),
we agree with the court’s holding in Robinson and find that
section 1172.75, subdivision (f) applies only to individuals serving
a sentence of death or LWOP who are also convicted of a sexually
violent offense as defined by Welfare and Institutions Code
section 6600, subdivision (b). Because petitioner was not
convicted of a sexually violent offense, he is eligible for recall and
resentencing under section 1172.75.
IV. DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The trial
court is directed to recall petitioner’s sentence and resentence
him in accordance with section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) through
(e).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
I concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
9
In re Aliyatham Silavong
B349335
BAKER, J., Concurring
I agree we should grant defendant and appellant’s petition
for habeas corpus. I write separately to clarify that I reach that
conclusion as a matter of the plain text of Penal Code section
1172.75 without any need to consider the statute’s legislative
history. (In re Ja.O. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 271, 283 [“If the statutory
‘text is unambiguous and provides a clear answer, we need go no
further’”].)
BAKER, J.