Filed 6/18/26 Shetty v. Daluvoy CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
NIKI-ALEXANDER SHETTY B341587
et al.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No.
22VECV00379)
v.
RAO VENKEKATESWARA
DALUVOY et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Valerie Salkin, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Richard L. Antognini and Richard
L. Antognini for Plaintiffs and Appellants Niki-Alexander Shetty
and Adina Zaharescu.
Epps & Coulson, Dawn M. Coulson and Jeffrey A. Cohen
for Defendants and Respondents Arvind Doshi, Chandrika Doshi,
Tejas Doshi and Paras Doshi.
_________________
INTRODUCTION
Niki-Alexander Shetty and his wife Adina Zaharescu
appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion under the
mandatory provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
subdivision (b),1 to vacate their voluntary dismissal of their
complaint against Arvind Doshi, Paras Doshi, Tejas Doshi, and
Chandrika Doshi (the Doshi parties). Because the mandatory
provision of section 473, subdivision (b), does not apply to
voluntary dismissals, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Shetty Files Several Actions Against the Doshi Parties
and Others
Shetty and Zaharescu filed this action, which the parties
refer to as the lead case, on March 16, 2022. In their 64-page,
208-paragraph second amended complaint Shetty and Zaharescu
asserted 19 causes of action against 15 defendants, including Rao
Venkekateswara Daluvoy, the Doshi parties, and numerous other
individuals, entities, and alleged alter egos. Shetty and
Zaharescu alleged Daluvoy, the Doshi parties, and others
1 Statutory references are the Code of Civil Procedure.
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participated in an elaborate conspiracy to defraud Shetty and
Zaharescu of their money and their property.
It all began in 2018, when Shetty and Zaharescu claim
Daluvoy, who said he was a vascular surgeon, stated that he
needed a loan “to close an escrow to purchase . . . land to grow
medical marijuana,” that “he was in Spain and could not appear
in person at Shetty’s office,” and that “he would return the funds
back to Shetty as soon as he had returned from Spain within a
month.” Shetty and Zaharescu alleged Daluvoy convinced Shetty
to send $25,000 to the “purported seller” of the land, who was
actually “a money launderer transferring monies from the United
States to foreign countries through unlawful havala [sic] cash
transactions, an act forbidden under American laws.”2 Despite
2 “Hawala” is “an ‘ancient South Asian money exchange
system’ which ‘consists of an international network of non-bank
financial agents, often built on trusted family or cultural
relationships.’” (United States v. Freeman (1st Cir. 2025)
147 F.4th 1, 18, fn. 19.) “The hawala system is widely used in
Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, and is primarily used
to make international funds transfers. Though there are many
forms of hawala, in the paradigmatic hawala system, funds are
transferred from one country to another through a network of
hawala brokers (i.e., ‘hawaladars’), with one hawaladar located in
the transferor’s country and one in the transferee’s country. In
this form, a hawala works as follows: If Person A in Country A
wants to send $1,000 to Person B in Country B, Person A
contacts Hawaladar A in Country A and pays him $1,000.
Hawaladar A then contacts Hawaladar B in Country B and asks
Hawaladar B to pay $1,000 in Country B currency, minus any
fees, to Person B. The effect of this transaction is that Person A
has remitted $1,000 (minus any fees) to Person B, although no
money has actually crossed the border between Country A and
Country B. [¶] Eventually, Hawaladar B may need to send
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apparently losing this money when Daluvoy (from Spain) used it
to arrange for a loan to purchase a car dealership in Carson,
Shetty decided to go into business with Daluvoy by investing with
him in developing raw land, acquiring the car dealership, and
helping resolve Daluvoy’s “personal debt situation.” Their
business relationship was “memorialized” in an operating
agreement for an entity called Ryan Estates, LLC, which Shetty
and Daluvoy formed to acquire, develop, and sell real estate. By
February 2019 Shetty had invested in, or committed millions of
dollars to, Ryan Estates. Shetty and Zaharescu alleged:
“Unknown to Shetty at that time, was that Daluvoy had a modus
operandi by which he engaged in a pattern and practice of
borrowing monies from various individuals to the tune of millions
of dollars using his alter-ego entities since 2006 who have been
similarly duped and deprived of monies and properties and have
money to Country A on behalf of a customer in Country B; he will
then contact Hawaladar A, with whom he now has a credit due to
the previous transaction. Hawaladar A will remit the money in
Country A to the designated person there, thus clearing the debt
between the two hawaladars. Typically, Hawaladar A and
Hawaladar B would engage in many parallel transactions moving
in both directions. A number of transactions might be required
before the books are balanced between the two hawaladars. If
after some period of time their ledgers remain imbalanced, the
hawaladars may ‘settle’ via wire transfer or another, more formal
method of money transmission. The hawala system operates in
large part on trust, since, as in the example above, a hawaladar
will remit money well before he receives full payment, and he
does so without the benefit of a more formal legal structure to
protect his investment.” (United States. v. Banki (2d Cir. 2011)
685 F.3d 99, 103, fn. omitted.)
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been named as creditors for precautionary purposes in the various
Bankruptcy proceedings . . . .”
Shetty and Zaharescu alleged Arvind Doshi joined the
conspiracy in September 2018. According to them, “Arvind Doshi
is a loan shark engaged in the business of loan to own and
operates his lending enterprise using his family members namely
Paras Doshi, Chandrika Doshi, a fictitious business name Doshi
Investment, and a trust entity . . . to conduct his hard money and
usurious business . . . .” Shetty and Zaharescu alleged Daluvoy
convinced Shetty “to accept short term loans from Doshi against
Shetty and his family-owned properties with tremendous equity
located in San Diego, Riverside, Los Angeles and Ventura
counties from which the Shetty family derived rental income.”
Shetty agreed to borrow money, secured by his properties, to
invest in the property owned by Ryan Estates and in the car
dealership business. Daluvoy and Doshi, however, transferred
properties owned by Ryan Estates to entities they created.
Shetty and Zaharescu alleged: “While on one hand [the Doshi
parties] sought to foreclose [on] Shetty’s properties as the balloon
payment on the loans against [those] properties were becoming
due, the loan to own-Doshi parties made a secret deal with
Daluvoy to participate in the land transactions in furtherance of
their conspiracy.” Shetty claimed he did not uncover the “deep-
rooted conspiracy by and between” Doshi and Daluvoy until he
reviewed documents filed in Daluvoy’s involuntary bankruptcy
case.
Shetty and Zaharescu alleged causes of action against
Daluvoy for, among other things, breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of
fiduciary duty, and fraud. They alleged causes of action against
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the Doshi parties for, among other things, conspiracy to commit
fraud, breach of oral contract, cancellation of instruments, quiet
title, and wrongful foreclosure.
Meanwhile, on April 7, 2022 Shetty filed a separate action
against the Doshi parties and Ryan Estates in San Diego County
Superior Court, which the parties refer to as the San Diego case,
making some of the same claims.3 In that action Shetty alleged
that in 2019 the Doshi parties lent Daluvoy and Shetty money for
Ryan Estates and the car dealership investment and that he and
Daluvoy executed a promissory note payable to the Doshi parties
and secured by three properties owned by Shetty. Shetty alleged
that, after Daluvoy took the assets from Ryan Estates (which the
Doshi parties apparently controlled), Shetty offered to return the
loan from the Doshi parties, but that Arvind Doshi refused and
initiated foreclosure proceedings. Shetty alleged: “In or around
early July of 2020, [the Doshi parties] represented to and
promised [Shetty] that if [he] would transfer a 20% ownership
interest in each of the three properties to [the Doshi parties]
Doshi would not foreclose on any of the three properties and
would look solely to Daluvoy for repayment of the note. Around
the same time, Daluvoy represented to and promised [Shetty]
that he would satisfy the note in consideration for the transfer of
20% interests to” Doshi and Ryan Estates. In reliance on these
“misrepresentations and false promises” by Daluvoy and Doshi,
Shetty transferred a 20 percent ownership interest in the
properties to Doshi and Ryan Estates. Shetty asserted causes of
action in the San Diego case for cancellation and quiet title.
3 One of the properties at issue in this litigation is in
San Diego County.
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B. The Trial Court Consolidates the Lead Case and the
San Diego Case in Los Angeles County Superior Court
On January 18, 2023 the Doshi parties filed a motion in
Los Angeles County Superior Court to coordinate and consolidate
the lead case and the San Diego case. They argued, among other
things, the two cases “all contain claims against the same
defendants, which include substantially overlapping facts and
legal theories involving damages, cancellation of written
instruments, and quiet title.” According to counsel for the Doshi
parties, Shetty and his attorney declined to stipulate to have the
court consolidate the two cases because the court in Los Angeles
County sustained the defendants’ demurrers, while the court in
San Diego County “overruled similar demurrers.” Shetty,
however, did not oppose the motion to consolidate.
On February 28, 2023 the trial court granted the motion to
consolidate the two cases. The court found “that common issues
of fact and law predominate both the Lead and [San Diego] cases,
as in both actions there is the same alleged agreement between
Shetty and the Doshi [parties] regarding his transfer of interest
in the Subject Properties. [¶] In the [San Diego] Case, Shetty is
pursuing claims for cancellation of instrument and quiet title
regarding the Subject Properties, and the very same claims are
the subject of Shetty’s eighteenth (18th) through twenty-fourth
(24th) causes of action in the Lead Case. [¶] The Court further
finds that the legal theories underlying Shetty’s claims in either
case are identical, i.e., Shetty alleges that the Doshi [parties]
obtained an interest in the Subject Properties by way of false
promises, which is [the] basis of his claims for cancellation of
instruments and quiet title.” The court ordered the Doshi parties
“to take all necessary procedural steps to arrange for the
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complete transfer of the San Diego case” to Los Angeles County
Superior Court.
C. Shetty Voluntarily Dismisses the Complaint in the
San Diego Action
The litigation proceeded in Los Angeles County Superior
Court. The Doshi parties filed demurrers, motions to strike,
discovery motions, and motions for sanctions, and the trial court
issued orders to show cause. At a case management conference
on November 17, 2023 Shetty made an oral request to dismiss the
Doshi parties and Ryan Estates from the San Diego action.4 That
same day, the trial court signed and entered a written order
dismissing, on Shetty’s motion, the San Diego case without
prejudice against the Doshi parties.
Several months later, in February 2024, the trial court (in
the lead case) sustained demurrers and motions to strike by the
Doshi parties, rulings that eliminated all causes of action against
them. On February 13, 2024 the court, finding there were “no
other causes of action or claims asserted by [Shetty and
Zaharescu] against the Doshi Defendants in this action,” signed
and entered a written order dismissing Shetty and Zaharescu’s
4 The court’s minute order states: “The Court, pursuant to
an oral request made by Plaintiff, Niki-Alexander Shetty, orders
Paras A Doshi, Arvind J Doshi, RYAN ESTATES, LLC, A
California Limited Liability Company and Tejas A Doshi in
Complaint filed by Niki-Alexander Shetty on 06/02/2023
dismissed without prejudice.” As stated, Shetty filed the San
Diego case in San Diego County Superior Court on April 7, 2022.
June 2, 2023 is the date that, after the trial court consolidated
the two actions, the complaint in the San Diego case was filed in
Los Angeles County Superior Court.
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complaint in the lead case against the Doshi parties with
prejudice.
D. The Trial Court Denies Shetty’s Motion Under the
Mandatory Provision of Section 473, Subdivision (b)
To Vacate the Dismissal of the San Diego Case
On May 17, 2024, six months to the day after Shetty
voluntarily dismissed his complaint in the San Diego case against
the Doshi parties, he filed a motion under the mandatory
provision of section 473, subdivision (b), to vacate the dismissal.
Counsel for Shetty argued his client was entitled to relief because
he “was mistaken” in believing the lead case and the San Diego
case “were largely redundant, when in fact they are not,” and “he
did not have his clients’ consent to dismiss the action.” Counsel
argued that “relief from dismissal is mandatory where [the]
attorney admits his error” and that, “[w]hether excusable or not,
that is sufficient to trigger the mandatory provision of [section
473, subdivision (b),] to obtain relief from the dismissal without
prejudice . . . .”
The Doshi parties opposed the motion to vacate, arguing
among other things that, because the court had consolidated the
San Diego case “into the lead case,” there was “no longer a
separately pending action in any event. Because [Shetty and
Zaharescu] had already filed their Second Amended Complaint in
this Lead-Main Action, the continued maintenance of the related
action was redundant and superfluous.” The Doshi parties also
argued that the court had already dismissed the Doshi parties
from the lead case and that reinstating the San Diego case
“would ultimately result in yet another dismissal” on the same
grounds. . . . In other words, the maintenance of the related case
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is now moot (regardless of any attorney mistake or neglect) as a
result of the judgment of dismissal of [Shetty’s] claims against
the Doshi Parties.”
The trial court denied the motion to vacate the dismissal.
The court stated that, though counsel for Shetty stated his
mistake was that the lead case and the San Diego case “did not
involve common issues of fact and law,” the court had “already
determined that in fact they arise from the same transactions,
which is why they were consolidated to begin with.” The court
concluded that counsel for Shetty “cannot be ‘mistaken’ as to
matters which the Court already adjudicated and which his
clients failed to timely oppose” and that, because the court
“already determined that the [San Diego case] arises out of the
same facts and legal theories included in the [lead case], the
Court’s dismissal” of Shetty and Zaharescu’s complaint in the
lead case barred Shetty’s complaint in the San Diego case.
Shetty timely appealed from the order denying his motion to
vacate the dismissal.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“‘Section 473, subdivision (b), contains two distinct
provisions for relief: one is discretionary and is reserved for
situations of excusable neglect, while the other is mandatory and
applies even to inexcusable neglect of an attorney resulting in his
or her client’s default provided that the attorney submits an
adequate affidavit of fault.’” (Rodriguez v. WNT, Inc. (2025)
116 Cal.App.5th 791, 802.) “Mandatory relief is available
10
‘whenever an application for relief is made no more than six
months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is
accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or
her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, . . . unless the
court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by
the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.’”
(Talbott v. Ghadimi (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 967, 976-977; see
The Urban Wildlands Group, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 993, 996; Las Vegas Land & Development Co.,
LLC v. Wilkie Way, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1090.)
“‘[T]o the extent that the applicability of the mandatory
relief provision does not turn on disputed facts, but rather,
presents a pure question of law, it is subject to de novo review.
[Citation.] Where the facts are in dispute as to whether or not
the prerequisites of the mandatory relief provision of section 473,
subdivision (b), have been met, we review the record to determine
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.’”
(Talbott v. Ghadimi, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 977.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Shetty’s
Motion To Vacate the Dismissal Under the Mandatory
Provision of Section 473, Subdivision (b)
Shetty sought to set aside his voluntary dismissal of the
San Diego case under the mandatory provision of section 473,
subdivision (b). As the Doshi parties correctly argue, however,
that provision does not apply to voluntary dismissals. (See
Jackson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 166, 176 [because “the mandatory relief provision
reaches only those dismissals that are ‘procedurally equivalent to
a default’ [citation], . . . mandatory relief is unavailable to undo
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[the plaintiff’s] voluntary dismissal of her action, even assuming
the dismissal was due to her attorney’s erroneous advice”];
Nacimiento Regional Water Management Advisory Com. v.
Monterey County Water Resources Agency (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
961, 967 [“the mandatory provision [of section 473(b)] is
inapplicable to voluntary dismissals” (brackets in original)];
Gotschall v. Daley (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 479, 483 [same];
English v. IKON Business Solutions, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th
130, 146 [the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b),
“was not intended to apply to voluntary dismissals”]; Leader v.
Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 620
[the mandatory relief provision of section 473, subdivision (b), is
inapplicable to “voluntary dismissals entered pursuant to
settlement”].)
Shetty “acknowledge[s] that multiple courts of appeal have
ruled on the question of voluntary dismissal, and most cases
agree with” the Doshi parties that the mandatory provision of
section 473, subdivision (b), does not apply to such dismissals.
Shetty argues, however, that the Supreme Court in Zamora v.
Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249 (Zamora)
“held that voluntary dismissals can fall within the discretionary”
provision of section 473, subdivision (b), and that the Supreme
Court’s holding in Zamora “should apply equally to the
mandatory relief provision. There is no valid basis to allow relief
for voluntary dismissals under one sentence and not under the
other.”
The Supreme Court in Zamora, however, made clear its
decision did not apply to the mandatory provision of section 473,
subdivision (b). In Zamora the Supreme Court held a party who
makes an erroneous offer under section 998 “may obtain relief
12
pursuant to the discretionary relief provision of section 473,
subdivision (b).”5 (Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 252.) The
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention the phrase
“taken against” in the discretionary provision of section 473,
subdivision (b),6 “limits the discretionary relief provision in
involuntary judgments or dismissal.” (Zamora, at p. 256.) The
Supreme Court, however, repeatedly stated its holding applied to
the discretionary provision, not the mandatory provision, of
section 473, subdivision (b). (See, e.g., Zamora, at p. 254 [“courts
have consistently applied the discretionary relief provision of
section 473 to voluntary judgments or dismissals”]; id. at p. 255
[“courts have consistently held that parties may obtain relief
from judgments, dismissals, or stipulations voluntarily entered
into pursuant to a voluntary agreement through the
discretionary relief provision of section 473”].) Indeed, the
Supreme court stated that analysis of “the mandatory relief
provision of section 473, subdivision (b),” has “no bearing on our
interpretation of the discretionary relief provision.” (Id. at
p. 256.)
5 The error in Zamora was by counsel for the plaintiff’s legal
assistant, who prepared an offer under section 998 that
mistakenly offered to have judgment taken against the plaintiff
and for the defendant, rather than for the plaintiff and against
the defendant. (Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 252.)
6 “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a
party or the party’s legal representative from a judgment,
dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party
through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” (§ 473, subd. (b), 1st sentence.)
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The Doshi parties are to recover
their costs on appeal.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
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