Filed 6/23/26 In re R.G. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re R.G. et al., Persons Coming B349359
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP04876A-B
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
TIMOTHY G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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This is an appeal from the juvenile court’s order
terminating Father Timothy G.’s parental rights as to minors
R.G. and T.G. at a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26
hearing, making it possible for the children to be adopted by their
longtime caregivers, Mr. and Mrs. B.
Father asserts the juvenile court erred in determining the
beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption in
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply. Specifically,
he contends the court (1) misapplied the law when deciding
whether he had regular visitation, and (2) abused its discretion in
“inject[ing] an improper factor into its analysis”; specifically, the
effect on the children of a hypothetical return to their parents.
Father fails to show reversible error. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
R.G. was born September 2022; his sister, T.G., was born
August 2023. Father and Mother, J.S., are the biological parents
of both children.
R.G. came to the attention of the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) at birth,
when both he and Mother tested positive for cocaine and
marijuana. R.G. remained in his parents’ care until
December 2022. However, the juvenile court ordered him
detained after his parents continued to test positive for illicit
drugs and Father drove under the influence while R.G. was a
passenger in the vehicle. At that time, R.G. was placed with
caregivers Mr. and Mrs. B. Later that month, R.G. was placed
with a paternal aunt. In January 2023, the juvenile court
sustained, against both Father and Mother, a section 300 petition
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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for R.G. At the end of February 2023, paternal aunt requested
R.G. be removed from her care because of ongoing conflict
between her and Father. R.G. was placed back with Mr. and
Mrs. B. in March 2023.
T.G. came to the attention of DCFS during Mother’s
prenatal care and was removed shortly after birth in August 2023
due to the parents’ ongoing substance abuse issues. T.G. was
placed with Mr. and Mrs. B. in September 2023.
In December 2023, the juvenile court sustained, against
both Father and Mother, a section 300 petition for T.G. Since
being placed with Mr. and Mrs. B., the children have remained in
their care. As the case progressed, Mr. and Mrs. B. expressed a
willingness to adopt the children if they were not reunited with
their parents.
Mother failed to reunify and submitted to the termination
of her parental rights as to both children in October 2025. As she
is not a party to this appeal, no further discussion of her conduct
in the proceedings is necessary.
Father failed to reunify. In December 2023, the juvenile
court terminated Father’s reunification services for R.G., in part
because Father’s visitation had been “sporadic and inconsistent.”
The court bypassed services for Father to reunify with T.G. as a
result.
At the section 366.26 hearing on October 2, 2025, the
juvenile court found the children were adoptable. Father asserted
the beneficial parental relationship exception under
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applied so as to preclude
adoption.
In support of his position, Father testified he visited with
the children as much as he could outside of periods of
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incarceration and the children called him “Dad.” He also testified
the children sometimes appeared sad when visits ended.
The record further included various reports from a DCFS
children’s social worker, and a five-page analysis addressing the
factors relevant to the beneficial parental relationship exception
as articulated In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636–637
(Caden C.). These showed Father had sporadic and inconsistent
visits with the children throughout the case. From
December 2024 through March 2025, the last four months he was
out of prison before the section 366.26 hearing, Father attended
only six of 14 possible visits. The children were not attached to or
bonded to Father given they were removed from his care shortly
after birth. As described in one report: “[The children] have been
separated from [Father] all of their lives and have not been able
to establish any form of relationship with [him] . . . .” The reports
concluded the children would not be detrimentally affected by the
termination of Father’s parental rights.
After asserting the parental-benefit exception, Father’s
counsel argued as follows: “[I]n regard[] to where the children are
currently placed, [Father] expects to be released [from prison] by
next week. [¶] He would ask the court, instead, if the court is not
willing to remove the children from the current placement, that
the court not terminate parental rights, instead order a legal
guardianship, which would ensure [Father] could have the ability
to reunify with them. [¶] [Father] expects to do additional
programs when he is released. [¶] He can also maintain regular
visits with the children. [¶] It’s not clear if parental rights are
terminated that [Mr. and Mrs. B.] are going to allow [Father] to
continue having a relationship with the children. [¶] It is in their
best interest they still have a father.”
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Counsel for DCFS responded, among other things, that
“[Father] did not exercise all of the visits that he was even
offered” and “I don’t believe these children have a bond with
him . . . .”
The juvenile court found the beneficial parental
relationship exception inapplicable and terminated Father’s
parental rights as to the children. Specifically, it found Father
failed to prove regular visitation with the children or that
terminating their relationship would be detrimental to the
children.
The juvenile court further commented: “[Father] did not
take advantage of all the visits he was given, and he never made
enough progress in his case plan to earn unmonitored visitation.
[¶] [The] children are in the only placement they have ever
known, and it would be detrimental, at this time, to remove them
and they deserve permanency. [¶] So the court finds that no
exception to adoption applies . . . .”
Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
At a hearing under section 366.26, the juvenile court must
select and implement a permanent plan intended to provide the
dependent child a “stable, permanent” home. (Id., subd. (b).)
Where there is no probability of reunification with a parent,
adoption is the preferred permanent plan. (Id., subd. (b)(1).) For
the court to select adoption as the permanent plan, it must find,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the child is likely to be
adopted if parental rights are terminated. (Id., subd. (c)(1).)
Then, in the absence of evidence that a relative guardianship
should be considered, or that the termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child under one of the enumerated
exceptions, the court “shall terminate parental rights.” (Id.,
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subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi).) These “ ‘statutory exceptions merely
permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to
choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.’ ”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
Under section 366.26, juvenile courts are not authorized to
consider reunification as an option, so return to the parent’s
custody is not at issue. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295,
298.) However, under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), the
beneficial parental relationship exception applies when the
juvenile court finds termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child because “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Ibid.)
In Caden C., our Supreme Court explained that a parent
asserting the exception must satisfy three prongs: (1) “regular
visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the
extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “that the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the
kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship”; and (3) “that terminating that
attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) As the prongs are
conjunctive, the beneficial parental relationship exception applies
only where the parent satisfies all three.
On appeal, a juvenile court’s findings as to the first
two prongs—whether the parent has maintained regular
visitation with the child and whether the child has a beneficial
relationship with the parent—are reviewed for substantial
evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) The third
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prong—whether terminating parental rights would be
detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with the
parent—is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) If the
juvenile court applies the wrong standard as to any prong, that
implicates a legal issue we review de novo. (See In re Shannon M.
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 288–289; In re A.P. (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1143.)
Since the prongs are conjunctive, it is not enough for a
parent to show the juvenile court erred in finding just one
unsatisfied. If any conclusion that a prong was unsatisfied is free
of error, we must affirm. (See In re M.V. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
486, 514 [“Our determination [of no error] on the second element
of the Caden C. test makes it unnecessary to evaluate the
third element of the test.”].)
Father fails to show error as to the third prong. The
juvenile court expressly found this prong unsatisfied stating:
“[T]erminating parental rights would not be detrimental to [the
children].” Despite acknowledging it, Father does not attempt to
show error in this finding. Instead, he contends the court
“injected an improper factor into its analysis” of the parental-
benefit exception such that remand is necessary for the court to
“apply the correct legal standard in the first instance.”
Father believes consideration of the “improper factor” is
reflected in the juvenile court’s comment that “[the] children are
in the only placement they have ever known, and it would be
detrimental, at this time, to remove them and they deserve
permanency.” Father contends this comment shows the court was
considering the consequences of returning the children to the
parents—a question “not at issue at the section 366.26 hearing.”
Father then cites In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 128 for
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the proposition that “injecting [an] improper factor . . . into [the]
parental-benefit exception weighing process” is error.
In re C.B. is inapposite. There, the juvenile court
terminated parental rights even though the mother had met the
three prongs because the court believed doing so would have little
impact on the beneficial relationship that existed between the
children and the mother. Specifically, the prospective adoptive
parents had assured the children they would be able to continue
phone calls and visits with the mother after adoption, and the
court explicitly considered this fact in analyzing the third prong
(i.e., whether terminating parental rights would be detrimental
to the children). (In re C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 126–
127.) The Court of Appeal reversed, holding as follows: “[I]f a
juvenile court determines that a parent has ‘maintained regular
visitation and contact’ [citation], that there is a ‘substantial,
positive emotional attachment’ between child and parent
benefitting the child [citation], and that the benefit from
continuing that parent-child relationship in a tenuous placement
‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to
outweigh’ the benefit that child would gain from the stability and
permanency of adoption [citation], then the parent-child
relationship exception is established. In those circumstances, the
court cannot nevertheless terminate parental rights based upon
an unenforceable expectation that the prospective adoptive
parents will voluntarily permit future contact between the child
and a biological parent . . . .” (Id. at p. 128.)
Here, the juvenile court expressly found two of the
Caden C. prongs were not satisfied before commenting that it
would be detrimental to remove the children from their current
placement. The record does not show the court weighed any
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extraneous factor in its consideration of one of the three prongs
as in In re C.B. Instead, the extraneous factor Father identifies
had no apparent bearing on the issue. The court had already
concluded “terminating parental rights would not be detrimental
to [the children].” It is beside the point that the court further
found removing them from their placement would also be
detrimental.
Indeed, rather than being a part of the juvenile court’s
Caden C. analysis, the record suggests the extraneous finding
was responsive to a request Father’s counsel made, expressly or
impliedly, in his argument shortly before the juvenile court made
its order. Counsel stated, “in regard[] to where the children are
currently placed, [Father] expects to be released [from prison] by
next week. [¶] He would ask the court, instead, if the court is not
willing to remove the children from the current placement, that
the court not terminate parental rights, instead order a legal
guardianship, which would ensure [Father] could have the ability
to reunify with them.” (Italics added.) In other words, Father’s
first choice was for the court to “remove the children from their
current placement.” Barring that, Father’s second choice was for
the court to proceed to the Caden C. analysis and apply the
parental-benefit exception to select guardianship, rather than
adoption, as the children’s permanent plan.
Finally, the juvenile court had before it a comprehensive
Caden C. analysis prepared by DCFS. The court made the legally
relevant conclusions that Father failed to satisfy two of the
requirements for the parental-benefit exception to apply. That
the court made an additional legally irrelevant finding, but one
that was related to an issue Father’s counsel made in the same
breath as his request that the court apply the exception, does not
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rebut our presumption the juvenile court knew and applied the
correct law. (See In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.)
Because Father fails to show error in the juvenile court’s
conclusion as to the third prong, we need not consider whether it
erred in its determination as to the first prong.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s parental
rights is affirmed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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