Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

P. v. Mazyck CA2/3

Filed 7/7/26 P. v. Mazyck CA2/3
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 7/7/26 P. v. Mazyck CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B345753

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA082430)
v.

EDGAR MAZYCK,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Scott T. Millington, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Sunnie L. Daniels, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Nancy Lii Ladner,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In 2013, a jury found defendant Edgar Mazyck guilty of
assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1);
count 1) and forcible oral copulation (former Pen. Code, § 288a,
subd. (c)(2)(A); count 2).2 As to count 1, the jury found true the
allegation that Mazyck personally inflicted great bodily injury on
the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). As to count 2, the jury found
true allegations that Mazyck used a deadly weapon during the
commission of the crime within the meaning of section 667.61,
subdivisions (b) and (e)(3), and within the meaning of
section 12022.3, subdivision (a), and that Mazyck inflicted great
bodily injury on the victim during the commission of the crime
(§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(6)). The jury subsequently found true
that Mazyck had served six prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b))
and that he had one prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d)).
As a panel of this court described in the opinion resolving
Mazyck’s direct appeal: “At sentencing, the trial court declined to
exercise its discretion to strike the prior serious felony conviction
so as to sentence appellant without the provisions of the Three
Strikes law. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th

1 We resolve this matter by memorandum opinion, consistent
with California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
(People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 850–855.)
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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497.) The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term in
state prison of 77 years to life, consisting of a doubled,
determinate upper base term of four years, or eight years, for the
assault in count 1, enhanced by a term of three years for the
infliction of great bodily injury and by six years for the service of
the prior separate prison terms. For count 2, pursuant to the
Three Strikes and One Strike laws, it imposed a consecutive
doubled, indeterminate term of 25 years to life, or 50 years to life.
(§ 667.61, subds. (a), (c)(7) & (e)(6).) The trial court then imposed
a further 10-year fully consecutive determinate upper term for
the finding of use of a deadly and dangerous weapon in the
commission of count 2.” (People v. Mazyck (Nov. 19, 2014,
B247130) [nonpub. opn.].)
On appeal in late 2014, the reviewing court concluded the
trial court erred by using the infliction of great bodily injury
circumstance to enhance the sentence under section 667.61,
subdivision (a) on count 2 and to also enhance the sentence on
count 1 under section 12022.7, subdivision (a). The court struck
the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement imposed on
count 1 and ordered the accompanying three-year term vacated.
In 2015, the clerk of the Superior Court amended the abstract of
judgment accordingly, reducing the aggregate sentence to 74
years to life.
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.75, subdivision (a)
invalidated section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term
enhancements imposed before January 1, 2020. With exceptions
not relevant here, the statute requires that sentences that
include these invalid enhancements be recalled and the
defendant resentenced. Mazyck petitioned for resentencing
under this provision. He asked that the trial court reduce his

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sentence in multiple ways, including by dismissing his prior
strike. The People opposed any modifications to the sentence
other than striking the now invalid one-year prior prison terms
imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The trial court struck the six one-year prior prison terms
but declined to otherwise modify the sentence. However,
although this court had previously vacated the three-year term
imposed on count 1 pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (a),
in resentencing Mazyck, the trial court again imposed the
enhancement and three-year term.
The parties agree this was error, as do we. The great
bodily injury enhancement imposed as to count 1 must be
stricken and the three-year term vacated.
Mazyck further contends, and the People agree, that at
resentencing, the trial court failed to calculate Mazyck’s actual
custody credits, resulting in an incorrect abstract of judgment. In
People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29 (Buckhalter), the
California Supreme Court held that “when a prison term already
in progress is modified . . . the sentencing court must recalculate
and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the
defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison, and
whether before or since he was originally committed and
delivered to prison custody.” (See § 2900.1.) Here, the abstract of
judgment issued following the resentencing identified Mazyck’s
actual custody credits as 570 days—the custody credit he was
awarded at the original sentencing.
Mazyck was arrested on September 30, 2011. As he
indicates in his appellate briefing, as of the date of resentencing,
April 3, 2025, he was entitled to 4,935 days of actual custody

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credit.3 The abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect
these custody credits.
Finally, the People point out, and we agree, that the $240
restitution fine imposed pursuant to section 1202.4,
subdivision (b), and reimposed at resentencing, must be vacated.
As of January 1, 2025, after 10 years have elapsed following the
imposition of a section 1202.4 restitution fine, any remaining
balance is unenforceable and uncollectible. “[A]ny portion of a
judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” (§ 1465.9,
subd. (d).)
We therefore modify the judgment to: strike the
section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement imposed as to
count 1 and vacate the three-year term; reflect 4,935 days of
actual custody credit; and vacate the $240 restitution fine. The
trial court is to prepare an amended abstract of judgment
reflecting these modifications.

3 To the extent Mazyck contends that the trial court was
required to recalculate conduct credits for the period before the
original sentencing hearing or otherwise, we disagree.
Resentencing did not change the conduct credits awarded before
the original sentencing and, as explained in Buckhalter, the trial
court’s obligation to recalculate custody credits following a
resentencing is limited to actual custody credits. (Buckhalter,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 37, 40–41.) The California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation is responsible for calculating
any postsentence custody credits. (People v. Dean (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 391, 397.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to strike the section 12022.7,
subdivision (a) enhancement imposed as to count 1 and vacate
the three-year term imposed pursuant to the enhancement;
reflect a recalculated award of 4,935 days of actual custody credit;
and strike the $240 restitution fine imposed pursuant to
section 1202.4, subdivision (b). In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment reflecting these modifications. A
copy of the amended abstract of judgment is to be transmitted to
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, Acting P. J.
We concur:

HANASONO, J.

OCHOA, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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