Filed 7/27/26 In re Ko.M. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re Ko.M. et al., Persons B350240
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 23CCJP00475E,
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 23CCJP00475F,
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 23CCJP00475G,
23CCJP00475H,
Plaintiff and Respondent, 23CCJP00475I
v.
B.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
Janelle B. Price, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings and dispositional order declaring her five children
dependents of the juvenile court—primarily based on mother’s
drug abuse—and removing them from her care. Mother contends
the children weren’t at risk of harm because parents had placed
them in paternal grandmother’s care and had agreed to her
becoming the children’s legal guardian. Mother also argues
the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with
their inquiry duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA;
25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law (Cal-ICWA;
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).1 We affirm.
BACKGROUND2
1. Earlier dependency
Parents’ four older children—Ko.M, B.M., Kh.M., and Z.M.
—were declared dependents of the juvenile court in 2023 due to
mother’s substance abuse resulting in Z.M. testing positive at
birth for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and marijuana.
In April 2023, they were removed from mother’s care but allowed
to remain with father. Mother was ordered to complete a drug
and alcohol treatment program with aftercare, “submit to weekly
drug program” (we assume DCFS meant to write “weekly drug
testing”), participate in parenting classes, individual counseling,
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 We state the facts relevant to the ICWA issue in the
Discussion section.
2
and mental health counseling, undergo a psychiatric evaluation,
and take all prescribed medication.
Mother had enrolled in a drug treatment program in
January 2023 but left it five or six months later in June or
July 2023. She tested positive for an unreported substance
on March 3 and May 2, 2023, and failed to show for the next
nineteen tests from May 17 through September 19, 2023.
She didn’t participate in the other court-ordered services.
The juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction on
December 7, 2023. The next day it issued juvenile custody orders
awarding father sole physical custody and parents joint legal
custody of the children. The court ordered supervised visitation
for mother. Visits were to be supervised until further order
of the court.
2. Events and investigation leading to current
dependency
In June 2025, parents voluntarily placed their four children
in paternal grandmother’s and maternal aunt’s care after they
were evicted and became homeless. Mother was pregnant with
her fifth child J.M. In August 2025, mother was induced at
32 weeks due to her high blood pressure. J.M. was placed in
the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) due to prematurity,
immature thermal regulation, and risk for hypoglycemia, feeding
difficulties, and hyperbilirubinemia. Mother hadn’t known she
was pregnant until seven weeks before J.M.’s birth. She’d had
no prenatal care and said she used methamphetamine, tobacco—
a pack of cigarettes a day, and alcohol during her pregnancy. She
last used methamphetamine a week and a half before the birth.
She also told hospital staff she had custody of her four other
children who were staying with paternal grandparents. She said
3
DCFS had been involved, but she “completed a substance abuse
class and parenting class” and “was able to get full custody” of
the children. DCFS was contacted and investigated.
The day after his birth, J.M. remained in the NICU on
oxygen and was “having some tremors,” but was “feeding well.”
Mother remained in the hospital after an emergency
hysterectomy. She asked to be discharged to an inpatient
substance abuse treatment program.
J.M.’s meconium test results were positive for
amphetamine, methamphetamine, and cannabinoids. Mother
told the hospital social worker she had been using oxycodone
for a previous injury but had run out of pills. (She began using
prescription pain medication for back pain around 2020.) She
then purchased pills off the street; they may have been laced
with methamphetamine. She denied having intentionally
used methamphetamine. She had taken one-half to one of
the street pills per week since January. After she learned she
was pregnant, she took only a one-half pill twice. Mother told
the dependency investigator (DI) she had used marijuana on
and off for the past 10 years and used it daily while pregnant,
but reduced the amount after she discovered she was pregnant.
Mother said her older children were either in school or at
paternal grandparents’ home when she was using. She admitted
she had been under the influence in the children’s presence
before.
Mother told the DI she had had “ ‘several’ ” periods of
sobriety during the five years since she started taking pills. She
said she was in a treatment program for five and a half months
during the last case. She said she’d used marijuana “ ‘off and on
for ten years’ ” and was a social drinker. She had remained clean
4
for two years after the earlier dependency case closed. Mother
said, “ ‘I didn’t know I relapsed.’ ” She said she didn’t know what
was in the pills she was taking—she was taking them to sleep.
Mother said father smoked “ ‘weed.’ ” When they were together
he smoked “ ‘[m]ultiple times a day . . . , usually at night after
work.’ ”
Mother said things were different from the last time she
was in court. She had “ ‘lots of support’ ” and “ ‘[t]herapy and
counseling [were] big’ ” for her. She said, “ ‘I’m working through
my issues. I’m very motivated. A different lifestyle.’ ” She
denied her drug use or father’s marijuana use interfered with
their ability to care for the children.
When asked, mother also said she didn’t know she still had
to have a monitor for visits. She said, “ ‘We thought six months
after the case closed we didn’t need a monitor. I never heard
back from my attorney, so I wasn’t aware. We definitely would
have gone back to family court to petition for my rights back.
We both had a misunderstanding.’ ” She said she never received
a copy of the order when the case closed.
Maternal aunt confirmed she and paternal grandmother
had been caring for the four older children since parents became
homeless about two months earlier. The children alternated
between staying at her home and the home of paternal
grandmother. The plan was for paternal grandmother to
take custody of the newborn on his discharge from the hospital.
The children had received medical and dental care, and the
school-aged children had attended school.
According to maternal aunt, while father was at work,
mother had been taking care of the children. Maternal aunt said
father was “sleeping in his car to save up money but ma[de] it
5
a point to visit the children nearly every day, providing them
with necessary supplies for school and groceries.”
Father said he and mother resumed living together after
the earlier dependency case closed. He had wanted to give
mother “another chance.” He said he wasn’t aware the juvenile
custody orders required mother to have monitored visits—mother
had told him “ ‘there was nothing to prevent her from living’ ”
with them. He said he “ ‘didn’t get any Court papers.’ ” Parents
had had an “on-and-off relationship” for 16 years and had been
married since they were 18. He didn’t know she had relapsed.
He didn’t know mother was pregnant until she was hospitalized.
However, he later told the DI he “ ‘was aware that she was on
drugs.’ ” When asked if he knew what drugs mother was using
while she was pregnant, father said “ ‘[c]rystal meth.’ ” He also
knew mother had used marijuana while pregnant. When asked
if he spoke to mother about her drug use while she was pregnant,
father said, “ ‘I just didn’t care anymore. Because I was done
with the relationship. . . .’ ” Father admitted he had failed
to protect the children from mother.
Father lacked confidence in mother’s ability to care for
the children but also said he hadn’t had any concerns with
her being around the children when they were living together.
Father said he had been “pursuing a divorce since their eviction.”
Father admitted he smoked marijuana most days after work.
He didn’t think it affected his ability to care for his children.
When the social worker first met with mother—at the
hospital on August 21, 2025—she “explored alternative options”
with mother, “such as legal guardianship.” Mother “was
receptive and agreed to discuss” it with paternal grandmother.
On August 22, during his interview with the social worker,
6
father said he and mother had agreed to place the children
under paternal grandmother’s “guardianship due to his current
homelessness and . . . mother’s drug use.” Paternal grandmother
was deeply concerned about both parents. She believed it would
be best for the children to live with her.
The social worker interviewed Kh.M.—then age eight—
at paternal grandmother’s home. (Then-two-year-old Z.M. was
in the home, as well.) Kh.M. denied having seen either parent
do drugs and said no one smoked or drank alcohol regularly. The
same day, the social worker interviewed then-15-year-old Ko.M.
and then-13-year-old B.M. at maternal aunt’s home. They
confirmed that, since the eviction, they had been living between
maternal aunt’s and paternal grandmother’s homes. Ko.M.
said father smoked marijuana—“typically outside the home.”
He didn’t know about other substances or whether mother ever
had used drugs. He knew mother had taken medication for
“previous back issues” but hadn’t seen her take medication
regularly. B.M. denied having seen any substance abuse
in the home. All three children denied domestic violence.
In later interviews, Ko.M. said parents were “ ‘smokers
and drinkers.’ ” They smoked marijuana “ ‘in the room with
the door closed,’ ” but he could smell it. Ko.M. said his youngest
sister would watch television in her playroom that “ ‘had a little
gate,’ ” while parents were in their room smoking. He never
found marijuana or related paraphernalia in the house—only
ashtrays with cigarette butts. Sometimes mother slept “too long”
in the morning, but he didn’t know if that was due to mother
drinking the night before. On those mornings, he helped take
care of his two-year-old sister when she woke up. Mother drank
“ ‘hard liquor in shot glasses.’ ” Ko.M. said mother moved into
7
the family home about two weeks after the earlier case closed.
B.M. added that he had seen parents “ ‘smoking a cigarette or
something.’ ” B.M. said mother drank alcohol but didn’t get
drunk. When asked if mother acted differently after she drank
alcohol, B.M. said, “ ‘She cleans a lot more. . . . She has OCD.’ ”
On August 27, the social worker spoke separately with
mother and father. Each confirmed they would be signing J.M.’s
birth certificate the next day, August 28, and then would go
to court to make paternal grandmother the children’s legal
guardian. (The process could not be started until they had
J.M.’s birth certificate.)3 Mother had been discharged from
the hospital and was staying with a friend. Father submitted
to an on-demand drug test on August 27. The results, received
on September 4, were positive for marijuana metabolite. When
asked about it, he told the social worker he smoked marijuana
about once a day but was “attempting to reduce his habit.”
Mother submitted to an on-demand drug test on August 28.
Her results, received on September 9, were positive for
amphetamines and methamphetamine.
On September 9, father told the social worker they still
were “in the process of doing the paperwork” to set up the legal
guardianship. The social worker told father she would “be
consulting with the Court regarding the case.” On September 10,
paternal grandmother called the social worker and told her the
petition for legal guardianship had been filed with the court.
3 At the September 19, 2025 detention hearing, however,
mother’s counsel told the court parents had an “appointment to
have the birth certificate signed” that morning, but had to miss it
due to the hearing.
8
The probate court had set hearing dates for September 17
(for temporary guardianship) and November 19 (for full
guardianship). On September 11, the social worker confirmed
the September 10 filing date and the hearing dates. In the
petition, paternal grandmother declared she had been taking
care of the four older children since June 11, 2025, when father
was evicted, the social worker had “urged” her to petition for
guardianship of all five children, and parents had agreed to
the guardianship.
On September 15, 2025, DCFS requested—and the next
day was granted—a warrant to remove all five children from
parents. J.M. still was in the hospital, and the other children
were with paternal grandmother. The application noted paternal
grandmother had filed a petition for legal guardianship on
September 10—after DCFS had informed father and paternal
grandmother that it intended to file for a removal warrant.
The application noted parents had informed the social worker
that “they were filing the legal guardianship on 8/27/25.”
According to DCFS’s assessment tools, the children were at
high risk for future abuse and neglect if left in parents’ care.
The social worker spoke to mother after obtaining the
removal order on September 16, 2025. Mother “acknowledged
her complete responsibility for her actions.” She said she
had begun therapy and had “initiated an outpatient program.”
Mother said she had “been actively participating in testing and
classes for approximately three weeks.” She was “determin[ed] to
do everything within her capability to remain on a positive path.”
Father told the social worker he was “commit[ed] to his children”
and “want[ed] to move forward with his life and his children.”
9
On September 18, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging the children were at risk under subdivisions (b)(1)
and (j). The b-1 count related to J.M. having been born with a
positive toxicology screen for drugs; the b-2 and j-1 counts related
to mother’s history of substance abuse and the circumstances of
J.M.’s birth, the four older children’s status as “prior dependents
of the Juvenile Court” due to mother’s substance abuse and
father’s failure to protect, and father’s current failure to protect
the children by allowing mother to live in the home and have
unlimited access to the children; the b-3 count related to father’s
history of substance abuse and current abuse of marijuana;
and the b-4 and j-2 counts related to father’s failure to comply
with the juvenile custody orders by allowing mother to have
unmonitored and unlimited contact with the four older children.
At the September 19 detention hearing, DCFS
recommended the court detain the children with parental
grandparents and order monitored visitation for parents.
Parents submitted on DCFS’s requests. At mother’s request,
the court ordered DCFS to assess the possibility of releasing J.M.
to mother in an inpatient program. In October, mother withdrew
her request—she didn’t want J.M. separated from his siblings.
She also hadn’t enrolled in an inpatient program. She said she
was participating in an outpatient treatment program and living
with her aunt. During October, parents had monitored visits
with the children at paternal grandparents’ home. Paternal
grandmother had no concerns about either parent’s visits.
DCFS determined the children were not safe in either
parent’s home at that time because parents had “not addressed
the concerns that brought this family to the attention of the
Department and the Court.” In DCFS’s assessment, “It [wa]s
10
clear that mother has an unresolved history of substance abuse
and continued to abuse methamphetamines, opioids, marijuana,
and alcohol while she was pregnant with [J.M.]. The father was
clearly aware of the mother’s substance abuse and admittedly
failed to protect the children.” DCFS acknowledged the four
older children were living with paternal grandparents when
J.M. was born but noted “mother reported that she had custody
of the children.” Mother had disclosed the earlier dependency
case, “but explained that she completed substance abuse class
and parenting class, therefore regained custody of the children.”
DCFS discovered, however, the custody order from the earlier
case—requiring that mother’s visits with the children be
monitored—remained in place. DCFS recommended the
children be declared dependents of the juvenile court and
ordered suitably placed in paternal grandparents’ home.
3. Jurisdiction and disposition hearing
On November 3, 2025, the court adjudicated the section 300
petition. The court admitted into evidence DCFS’s reports and
mother’s October 16, 2025 progress letter from her outpatient
treatment program with toxicology results attached. The letter
confirmed mother had been actively enrolled since September 4,
2025. She had attended three individual drug and alcohol
counseling sessions and 26 therapeutic group sessions. Mother
also had completed six toxicology tests: four were positive on
September 8 (fentanyl and cannabinoids), 11 (cannabinoids), 18
(fentanyl and cannabinoids), and 20 (alcohol and cannabinoids);
and two were negative on October 3 and 9. According to the
counselor, mother had “been open and engaged in treatment,
showing growth in self-awareness and diligence.” She was
“actively involved in treatment planning, with a focus on
11
self-management and integrating substance-free coping
strategies into daily life.”
The children’s attorney asked the court to sustain the
petition. Mother’s counsel submitted on mother’s “statements
in the [jurisdiction] report” on the b-1 count as to J.M.—mother
did not dispute her substance use “caused medical issues for
[J.M.].”4 Counsel argued there was no evidence of actual harm
to the older children, and DCFS had not shown they were at risk
of harm due to mother’s drug use, as mother stated she used
drugs only when the children were at school or with paternal
grandmother. Counsel also noted the children were unaware
of any drug use other than drinking or smoking marijuana
or cigarettes. Counsel argued, at most, mother slept too late
and Ko.M. then had to watch Z.M. Father joined in mother’s
arguments. The attorney for DCFS joined in the children’s
counsel’s arguments and asked the court to sustain the petition
as pleaded.
After hearing argument, the court sustained the petition.
The court found parents’ claim of ignorance about the terms of
the juvenile court custody order “is just not very convincing.”
The court also found mother’s progress was “aspirational”—that
“[i]t may come to fruition, but at this point in time, it has not.”
The court found the children were “aware of the drinking,
as well as the drug use and how [parents] have attempted to,
in some ways parentify and delegate responsibilities while
they’re using.”
4 When read the count, mother responded, “ ‘Very true.
I take full accountability for knowing I was pregnant.’ ”
12
Moving to disposition, the court stated the case plans for
parents “contemplate[d] removal from both parents.” Father’s
attorney asked that father be allowed to live in paternal
grandparents’ home with the children, arguing there was
“no nexus between any risk to the children in allowing” father
to live in the home and no safety risk. Mother’s attorney asked
for unmonitored visits or, alternatively, unmonitored phone calls.
The court declared the children dependents and removed them
from parental custody. The court ordered monitored visits for
parents and gave DCFS discretion to liberalize visits up to and
including overnights. The court ordered mother to complete a
full drug program, random on-demand testing, and individual
counseling with a licensed therapist. The court appointed
paternal grandparents as co-holders of educational rights for
the children. Mother appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of review and applicable law
“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the
disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this
determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017)
3 Cal.5th 622, 633; In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).)
We neither reweigh the evidence nor exercise independent
judgment but only determine if sufficient facts support the
juvenile court’s findings. (I.J., at p. 773.) Inferences that are
the result of speculation or conjecture, however, are insufficient
13
to support a jurisdictional finding. (In re B.D. (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 315, 324 (B.D.).) “ ‘The parent has the burden
on appeal of showing there is insufficient evidence to support
the juvenile court’s order.’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
402, 412 (L.B.).)
“[U]nder section 300, subdivision (b), a child may be subject
to dependency jurisdiction if the child has suffered, or there is
a substantial risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm or
illness as a result of a parent’s failure or inability to adequately
supervise the child, or as a result of a parent’s inability to provide
regular care for the child due to the parent’s substance abuse.
(§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (D).)” (B.D., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 324.)5 A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1) relating to a parent’s substance abuse requires DCFS
to prove: “(1) substance abuse (2) makes a parent or guardian
unable to provide regular care for a child and (3) this inability
has caused the child to suffer serious physical harm or illness
or creates a substantial risk of such harm or illness.” (In re N.R.
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 558.)
“The relevant inquiry under section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
is whether circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing
‘ “subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.” ’ ” (L.B., supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 411.) The juvenile court need not wait for
the child actually to be abused or neglected before it can assume
5 A child may be subject to dependency jurisdiction under
subdivision (j) if “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or
neglected, as defined in subdivision . . . (b) . . . , and there is
a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected,
as defined in [that] subdivision[ ].” (§300, subd. (j).)
14
jurisdiction, however. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) “The
court may consider past events in deciding whether a child
presently needs the court’s protection. [Citations.] A parent’s
‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there
is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’ ” (In re
Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602.) In other words, DCFS
“must establish a nexus between the parent’s past conduct and
the current risk of harm.” (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767,
775.)
“ ‘[A] reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding
of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases
for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported
by substantial evidence.’ ” (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
2. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s assertion of jurisdiction
Mother contends that, because parents made a safety plan
for paternal grandmother to care for the children, there was
no nexus between mother’s (or father’s) substance abuse and
mother’s (or father’s) inability to regularly care for the children.
We disagree. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding that the children were at substantial current risk of
harm.
First, mother clearly had been using dangerous and illicit
drugs while pregnant with J.M. The juvenile court reasonably
could conclude J.M. already had suffered serious physical harm
due to mother’s substance abuse. The baby was born positive
for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and cannabinoids and
suffered negative effects from the drug exposure. Indeed, mother
admitted the allegation that the child’s detrimental condition was
due to her drug use. Relying on In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
15
1010, mother nevertheless contends DCFS had to show J.M.
also was at risk of suffering future harm. The case is inapposite.
There, the court reversed a dependency judgment as to three
children—two of whom had been injured—who were in their
parents’ car during a drunk driving accident. (Id. at p. 1014.)
The court found the children were not at substantial risk of
future physical harm because parents’ conduct, although serious,
was an isolated incident. (Id. at pp. 1025–1026.) Parents’
conduct here was in no way isolated. The children already had
been declared dependents based on mother’s substance abuse.
Z.M. had been born positive for the same drugs as J.M. less than
two years earlier. Mother’s substance abuse continued, and
father admitted he had not been protective.
Second, the record supports the court’s finding that
the older children also were at risk of substantial harm from
mother’s substance abuse. The evidence showed mother had
been unable to control her addiction to dangerous, illegal drugs
(and marijuana) despite having gone through the earlier
dependency case. Mother admitted she had been using the
meth-laced street opioids since January—well before the children
moved in with paternal grandmother. And she continued to
use drugs after learning she was pregnant.
The children may not have seen mother do drugs—
although they did see her drink “shots” and knew she smoked
marijuana—but they were affected by her use of substances.
Mother overslept and couldn’t care for her two-year-old child,
leaving her teenaged son to do it. The toddler also was left
unsupervised, behind a gate, to watch television while parents
smoked marijuana. The court noted parents thus had delegated
their caregiving responsibilities to the children while using
16
marijuana. Moreover, the court reasonably could find mother’s
statements about never being under the influence when caring
for her children not credible. Mother had told the social worker
father’s long work hours made it “easier for her to conceal her
drug use from him.” The court also expressly found unconvincing
mother’s (and father’s) claimed ignorance that the juvenile
custody order required her visits to be monitored. And mother
had been untruthful before, telling the reporting party at the
hospital she had—in the earlier case—“completed a substance
abuse class and parenting class,” and regained “full custody”
of the older children, when she hadn’t. The juvenile court had
reason to discredit mother’s statements that she unknowingly
used methamphetamine. While still in the hospital, mother told
the social worker she knew the street pills were “laced” when
she took them during her pregnancy. Yet, when asked about the
petition’s allegations, mother denied using methamphetamine
while pregnant. She said her positive test must have been
“ ‘whatever pill I took.’ ” When asked if she ever used
methamphetamine, mother said, “ ‘Never.’ . . . ‘I don’t know
what that means. If it was in a pill form, I don’t know what I
was taking. I don’t want to deny it. I’m not denying anything.’ ”
The parents’ denials that mother abused substances were
also not credible. Father initially said he didn’t know mother
had relapsed. Yet he later said he saw mother snort “crystal
meth” during her pregnancy and that she also had used
marijuana. Moreover, after mother was discharged from
the hospital, she tested positive for amphetamines and
methamphetamine. Even after enrolling in an outpatient
treatment program, mother continued to have positive drug
tests in September 2025, including for fentanyl. As the court
17
found, mother’s progress by the time of the jurisdictional hearing
was “aspirational,” rather than established. Indeed, she had
tested positive for substances while participating in the same
treatment program during the earlier dependency case.
Mother argues any safety issues that may have existed
had parents maintained custody of the children had been
addressed by parents’ plan to have paternal grandmother care
for the children and become their guardian. Mother relies on
In re Kaylee H. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 92. It is distinguishable.
There, parents had a history of methamphetamine use and were
involved in a dependency proceeding concerning another child
when they had Kaylee. (Id. at p. 97.) Kaylee was born healthy.
(Ibid.) When she was one month old, parents placed her in
an uncle’s care, who—with the parents’ consent—had filed
for guardianship and been granted temporary guardianship
of Kaylee. The probate court referred the matter to the
child welfare agency, which declined to initiate dependency
proceedings. (Id. at p. 97.) The juvenile court overrode
that decision and directed the agency to file a petition. (Id. at
pp. 97–98.) The reviewing court found the juvenile court abused
its discretion because it didn’t consider whether a section 300
petition was necessary to protect the child when she was “in
the custody of a suitable and protective guardian,” not in the
custody of her parents. (Id. at pp. 105–106.) The court found
the evidence showed the child was not at risk of harm based on
her current circumstances: parents had placed her in the care of
another person who had been awarded temporary guardianship,
and thus had care, custody, and control of the child. (Id. at
p. 109.) Critically, the mother there had enrolled in an inpatient
substance abuse treatment program when she discovered she was
18
pregnant with the child. (Id. at p. 99.) She relapsed after signing
the child’s guardianship papers. (Ibid.) Thus, unlike J.M., the
child in Kaylee H. was born healthy and had not been harmed by
the mother’s substance use. (Id. at pp. 97, 99.) And in contrast
to the uncle in Kaylee H., paternal grandmother was not the
children’s legal guardian when DCFS became involved. Although
they had been living with her, she did not have legal custody
of them as did the uncle in Kaylee H.
Parents sent the children to live with paternal
grandmother and/or maternal aunt because they had been
evicted, not because of mother’s substance use. The record
is silent as to whether parents cared for the children without
supervision during that time. Maternal aunt, however,
apparently told the social worker that, “[w]hile father is at
work, the mother has been taking care of the children.” And as
paternal grandmother never suspected mother was using drugs,
it is reasonable to conclude she would have left mother alone
with her children. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment, the juvenile court reasonably could
infer mother cared for them. As mother indisputably had used
drugs since parents’ eviction, the court reasonably could find
the children remained at substantial risk of harm, despite living
with relatives. The court did not have to wait for the children
to be harmed before asserting its jurisdiction. (I.J., supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
Mother makes much of DCFS’s timing—it applied for
a warrant to remove the children after paternal grandmother
filed her guardianship petition. But by then DCFS had received
parents’ positive toxicology tests and confirmed mother never
had completed her drug treatment program as she had claimed.
19
Given mother’s unabated drug use, father’s previous failure to
acknowledge the risks that drug use posed to the children, and
the preliminary stage of any probate guardianship proceedings,
the juvenile court reasonably could determine that immediate
removal of the children from the parents was necessary. Nor
is it clear parents still wanted paternal grandmother to become
their children’s guardian by the time of the jurisdictional
hearing. Neither mentioned it to the dependency investigator
when interviewed about the petition’s allegations. And, as
DCFS notes, neither parent’s counsel argued the children were
not at risk of harm because they had been living with paternal
grandmother, and parents did not intend for the children to
return to their custody in the near future.
Because we conclude substantial evidence supported
the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction over the children
based on the circumstances of J.M.’s birth and mother’s
substance abuse issues, we need not consider the other counts
the court sustained. (See I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
3. DCFS’s ICWA inquiry
a. Relevant facts
In its detention and jurisdiction/disposition reports,
DCFS reported on its initial ICWA inquiry. On August 20, 2025,
the reporting party, a hospital social worker, and a registered
nurse all said they had no information that newborn J.M. is
an Indian child. That same day, maternal aunt denied having
any information about the children or mother having Native
American ancestry. The next day, August 21, mother said she
had no Indian ancestry, ICWA did not apply to her children, and
she didn’t know if father had any Native American ancestry.
On August 22, father said he had no Indian heritage and
20
ICWA did not apply to his children. He had no ICWA
information as to maternal relatives. Paternal grandmother
also denied having any information that the children or mother
had Native American ancestry. On August 25, a medical social
worker at the hospital had no information that J.M. is an Indian
child, and on September 9, the social worker for the earlier
dependency case denied having any information that the children
or mother had Native American ancestry.
On September 19, 2025, father and mother each filed with
the court a Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020)
form, checking the box to state none of the listed “Indian Status”
possibilities applied to the children.6 At the September 19
detention hearing, the juvenile court asked paternal grandmother
if she knew of any Native American ancestry in her family. She
answered, “No.” The court stated, “With respect to ICWA, the
grandmother’s indicated no Native American ancestry, mother’s
indicated no Native American ancestry, and dad has indicated
no Native American ancestry. [¶] Based hereon, the court does
not have a reason to believe ICWA applies to these children.”
The court’s minute order stated, “The court orders DCFS to
comply with its ongoing ICWA obligations.”
DCFS’s jurisdiction report stated mother again “denied
any American Indian ancestry” on October 15, 2025, as did father
and paternal grandmother on October 16. DCFS recommended
the court find ICWA did not apply.
6 DCFS’s jurisdiction/disposition report incorrectly states
mother’s ICWA-020 form noted her “ ‘mother in law’s mom’ may
have ancestry, but her name is unknown.” That notation does
not appear on mother’s ICWA-020 form.
21
At the November 3, 2025 jurisdictional hearing, the court
again questioned paternal grandmother, who denied having any
new information about Native American ancestry in her family.
The court also separately asked father and mother whether
either had any information “not previously disclosed concerning
Native American ancestry” in his or her family. Each answered,
“No.” The court reiterated its earlier finding that it had no
reason to believe ICWA applied to the children.
b. Applicable law and standard of review
ICWA was enacted “ ‘to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families and the
placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will
reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .’ ” (In re Dezi C.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1128–1129 (Dezi C.), quoting 25 U.S.C.
§ 1902.) Under Cal-ICWA, the juvenile court and DCFS “have ‘an
affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding
to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child
is or may be an Indian child.” (Dezi C., at pp. 1131–1132, quoting
§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
DCFS’s duty to inquire arises when it is first contacted
about the abuse or neglect of a child, and on DCFS’s first contact
with the child or the child’s family. (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1); see also
In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1099 (Kenneth D.).)
At first contact with each family member, including extended
family members, DCFS must ask if the child is or may be an
Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) This initial duty to inquire
“includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others
22
who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child
abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian
child.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Extended family members include
adults who are the child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother
or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first
or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)7 And
at the first hearing on a petition, the juvenile court “shall ask
each party to the proceeding and all other interested persons
present whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child, [and]
whether they know or have reason to know that the child is
an Indian child. . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (c); see also Kenneth D.,
at p. 1099, quoting former § 224.2, subd. (c).)
The juvenile court may find ICWA does not apply to a
child’s proceeding if it finds DCFS’s “inquiry and due diligence
were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the resulting record provided
no reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1134; § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) The juvenile court’s
finding that ICWA does not apply thus implies that DCFS
fulfilled its duty of inquiry. (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)
We generally review the juvenile court’s factual finding
that ICWA does not apply for substantial evidence. (§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(2) [juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply
to the proceedings is “subject to reversal based on sufficiency
of the evidence”].) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly
7 Extended family member “has the same meaning as
defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe,” if such
a law or custom exists. (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)
23
diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation]
subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) “ ‘On a well-developed record, the court
has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific
facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the
more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.’ ” (Kenneth D.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1101–1102.) Our high court thus has
held, “[i]f, upon review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry
was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are found
to be supported by sufficient evidence and record documentation
as required by California law [citation], there is no error.”
(Dezi C., at p. 1141.)
c. DCFS and the juvenile court complied with their
ICWA inquiry duties
Mother contends DCFS failed to comply with its ongoing
ICWA inquiry obligations. She argues that, although the
children were placed with paternal grandparents, nothing in
the record indicates DCFS asked paternal grandfather about
Indian heritage. We find no error.
DCFS received a copy of paternal grandmother’s
guardianship petition. The petition lists David M. as “[f]ather’s
father” and states his address is “[u]nknown in Mississippi.”
Paternal grandmother asked the probate court “to excuse notice
to the paternal grandfather” of the children because she was
“unable to locate him.” She had not had any contact with him
“in over 30 years,” and knew only that he lived somewhere in
Mississippi. She had no way to contact him. “Without reliable
contact information, DCFS could not reasonably have been
expected to interview” paternal grandfather David M. (In re
24
Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1083.) Accordingly, the
juvenile court did not err by implicitly concluding DCFS
conducted a proper and adequate inquiry into the children’s
possible Indian ancestry despite not having interviewed
the paternal grandfather.
As for the “paternal grandfather” with whom the children
were living, the record established he was not the biological
parent of father, but a step-grandfather. DCFS’s reports identify
“paternal grandparents” as paternal grandmother and Tommy S.
Paternal grandmother and Tommy S. share the same last name.
DCFS and the juvenile court reasonably could infer paternal
grandmother married Tommy S. after father’s birth. Accordingly,
any Native American heritage Tommy S. may have had would
have been irrelevant to DCFS’s initial ICWA inquiry. Moreover,
a step-grandparent is not an “extended family member” under
the statute. DCFS thus had no duty to inquire of Tommy S.
as to the children’s possible native ancestry.
Substantial evidence in the record otherwise supports the
juvenile court’s finding that DCFS performed an adequate ICWA
inquiry, and the court had no reason to believe ICWA applied.
DCFS documented its initial inquiry: the reporting party and
hospital staff had no information as to baby J.M.’s ICWA status;
and maternal aunt, mother, father, and paternal grandmother
all denied Indian heritage on DCFS’s first contact with them.
And parents and paternal grandmother continued to deny
Native American ancestry to the court—parents in their filed
ICWA-020 form and when questioned at the jurisdictional
hearing, and paternal grandmother when questioned at both
the detention and jurisdictional hearings.
25
Based on this record, the juvenile court reasonably could
find DCFS complied with its initial duty to inquire under ICWA
and that there was no reason for the court to believe ICWA
applied to the children.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
We concur:
ADAMS, J.
OCHOA, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
26