Filed 10/11/17 Lynch v. California Coastal Commission CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
| BARBARA LYNCH et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION,
Defendant and Appellant.
| D064966
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2011-00058666- CU-WM-NC)
|
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Earl H. Maas, III, Judge. Reversed.
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, John A. Saureman, Assistant Attorney General, Jamee J. Patterson and Hayley Peterson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.
Axelson & Corn, Jonathan C. Corn and Vincent J. Axelson, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
I
BACKGROUND
Barbara Lynch and Thomas Frick (collectively, respondents) prevailed before the superior court in a mandamus action challenging three conditions the California Coastal Commission (Commission) imposed on their coastal development permit amendment. The superior court later entered an order awarding respondents' attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and Government Code section 800. The Commission separately appealed both the judgment granting respondents a writ of mandamus and the order awarding respondents attorney fees.
We reviewed and reversed the superior court's judgment granting respondents a writ of mandamus. The California Supreme Court reviewed and recently affirmed our decision. (Lynch v. California Coastal Com. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 470, 475 (Lynch.)
While the Supreme Court was reviewing our decision, we deferred consideration of the Commission's appeal of the order awarding respondents' attorney fees. Because of the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch, the parties have stipulated to a summary reversal of the order.
II
DISCUSSION
We may reverse the order upon stipulation of the parties if we make two findings: (1) "There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal"; and (2) "The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement." (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8)(A) & (B).) We have no difficulty making these findings in this case because the reversal of the superior court's judgment eliminated the prevailing party's prerequisite for respondents' attorney fees award and, consequently, invalidated the award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5; Gov. Code, § 800 subd. (a); Allen v. Smith (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1284; Merced County Taxpayers' Assn. v. Cardella (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 396, 402.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to enter a new order denying respondents' motion for attorney fees. The parties are to bear their own appeal costs.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
AARON, J.
