Filed 8/22/17 In re K.D. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Lafferty, Melinda J. Lasater, and Charles R. Gill, Judges. Affirmed.

Ashley N. Johndro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Kristine A. Gutierrez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I

INTRODUCTION

While the victim was walking on a pier with her family, defendant and appellant K.D. (minor) aided and abetted an adult who attempted to steal the victim’s purse. Following a jurisdictional hearing, the San Diego County Juvenile Court found true that minor aided and abetted an attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211/664).[1] After the case was transferred to Riverside County, the Riverside County Juvenile Court declared minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation. Minor’s sole contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court’s true finding minor aided and abetted an attempted robbery. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

II

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 12, 2016, at around 6:45 p.m., Carolina S., her husband, and her sister-in-law were walking on the pier in Oceanside, California. Carolina was pushing her two-year-old child in a stroller and had her medium-sized blue purse over her right shoulder. At around the same time, minor and another male, later identified as Anthony Crenshaw, were also walking on the pier.

About two minutes later, she felt someone pulling on her purse. She turned around and “saw them.” Crenshaw was attempting to take her purse. Minor was standing to the left of Crenshaw, approximately two to three feet away from Crenshaw. Crenshaw tugged hard on the purse for approximately 30 seconds. Carolina’s husband intervened once he realized what was happening and tried to pull the purse away from Crenshaw. Carolina and her husband screamed at Crenshaw to let go of the purse.

Carolina’s husband estimated that minor was standing about 12 feet away from Crenshaw. Eyewitnesses, Y.P. and V.M., who were about two to three feet from Carolina and her husband, stated minor and Crenshaw were next to each other when one of them attempted to grab the purse. At one point, Y.P. saw minor and Crenshaw getting closer to Carolina from behind and “[t]hey were pulling on her purse.” Y.P. could not see which of the two young men were pulling on the purse, but that both minor and Crenshaw were there. V.M. believed that it was minor who attempted to grab the purse. No conversation was heard between minor and Crenshaw before the incident. However, V.M. heard minor and Crenshaw “talking normally” to each other before the incident.

After letting go of the purse, Crenshaw punched Carolina’s husband in the head. Carolina’s husband hit him back. Minor stood by watching while Crenshaw fell to the ground. Minor then approached and assumed a fighting stance, with his fists up. Carolina pushed minor, and Crenshaw ran away. Carolina’s husband then punched minor and they briefly fought. Minor then walked away, turned around, and said, “ ‘Are you really going to be hitting my homie.’ ” Carolina responded, “ ‘Is your homie really trying to rob me right now?’ ” Minor then turned around and ran in the same direction as Crenshaw. Minor and Crenshaw did not run side by side. Crenshaw ran through the sand while minor ran on the cement.

V.M. called 911. A short time later, the police located minor and Crenshaw in a car parked in a lot adjacent to the pier. Minor was seated in the front passenger seat and Crenshaw was hiding in the back of the vehicle. Crenshaw told the police that he wanted “ ‘to take responsibility’ ” for what happened on the pier and that he did not want any charges filed against minor.

Minor testified on his own behalf. Minor claimed he went to the pier with his friend Darrell and Darrell’s family, including Crenshaw, to talk to girls. After he had been there for about three hours, and while he was standing on the pier talking to girls, he heard a commotion and yelling coming from behind him about 15 to 20 yards away on the pier. He turned around and saw Crenshaw fighting with another male. Minor thought there had been “a racial dispute” and ran to defend Crenshaw. When he reached the fight, he pulled his pants up and assumed a fighting position. Minor took two steps back and said, “ ‘You better go off [sic.] the homie.’ ” Carolina yelled, “ ‘Are you really going to let him steal my purse?’ ” At that point, minor then took two steps back and placed his hands on top of his head in disbelief. Crenshaw then ran past him toward the beach. Minor claimed he was not aware of the robbery attempt until he was questioned by the police.

III

DISCUSSION

Minor argues the juvenile court’s true finding must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence he aided and abetted the attempted robbery. Specifically, he maintains there was no evidence to show he intended to aid his friend in committing the attempted robbery.

“The standard of review is well settled: On appeal, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66 (Snow); see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319-320 (Jackson).) The same reviewing standard applies to cases in which the People rely on mainly circumstantial evidence. (Snow, at p. 66.) It is the duty of the fact finder to acquit the accused if it finds the circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to innocence. (Ibid.) However, it is the fact finder, not this court, which must be convinced of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.) This court must accept logical inferences that the fact finder may have drawn from the circumstantial evidence. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) The substantial evidence standard of review is applied in juvenile cases. (In re Brandon G. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1079-1080.)

The prosecution’s theory was that minor was an aider and abettor in the attempted robbery. Thus, it was required to show that minor acted with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission of the offense by act or advice. (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118; People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409 (Campbell) [“ ‘A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.’ ”].) “Whether a person has aided and abetted in the commission of a crime is a question of fact, and on appeal all conflicts in the evidence and attendant reasonable inferences are resolved in favor of the judgment. Among the factors which may be considered in determining aiding and abetting are: presence at the crime scene, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.” (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5, fns. omitted (Juan G.); see In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094 (Lynette G.).) Neither mere presence when a crime is committed, nor failure to prevent it, is sufficient. (Campbell, at p. 409.) Although proof of only one of the factors, standing alone, may be insufficient to establish a defendant aided and abetted the commission of a charged offense, in combination these factors can constitute sufficient evidence to support such a finding. (See Ibid.; People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 521.)

Based on the record in this case, there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that minor aided and abetted the attempted robbery. A factfinder could reasonably conclude that minor “did not independently happen by the scene of the crime.” (Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.) Carolina testified that she saw minor and Crenshaw together on the pier and that about two minutes later, she felt someone tugging on her purse. She turned around and saw Crenshaw and minor. Crenshaw was pulling on her purse for about 30 seconds while minor was standing two to three feet away. Minor was still there while Carolina and her husband began screaming at Crenshaw to let go of her purse. After Crenshaw fought with Carolina’s husband, minor approached and assumed a fighting stance. Crenshaw then fled. After Carolina’s husband and minor briefly fought, minor also fled in the same direction as Crenshaw. Eyewitnesses, Y.P. and V.M., also saw minor and Crenshaw next to each other when one of them attempted to steal Carolina’s purse. In fact, V.M. believed minor attempted to steal the purse, showing how close together minor and Crenshaw were to each other during the attempted robbery. V.M. also saw minor and Crenshaw prior to the attempted robbery talking to each other. Furthermore, minor and Crenshaw were found together in a car after the incident. We note that though there was some ambiguity with V.M.’s testimony about who attempted to steal Carolina’s purse and with Carolina’s and her husband’s testimony about how far minor was standing from Crenshaw when Crenshaw attempted to steal the purse, any evidentiary disputes must be resolved in favor of the judgment. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 577-578.) Moreover, we do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 319-320; People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 460 (Staten); People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)

Minor chooses to focus on his testimony that he did not know about the attempted robbery, that he did not see the attempted robbery, and that he approached the scene after the attempted robbery and Carolina’s husband’s testimony he was further away during the incident to support his argument there was insufficient evidence he intended to assist in an attempted robbery. In doing so, he neglects to view the evidence as a whole. Once the totality of the evidence is viewed in context, circumstantial evidence shows that minor knew of his friend’s attempted robbery and that minor intended to facilitate the commission of the attempted robbery. Minor also ignores that, as noted above, we do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (Staten, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 460.) The juvenile court here was not required to accept minor’s testimony or the testimony of Carolina’s husband concerning the distance minor was standing when Crenshaw attempted to steal Carolina’s purse. (See People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) There was conflicting testimony from Carolina, Y.P., and V.M. who testified that they saw Crenshaw and the minor together before, during, and after the robbery.

Minor’s case is analogous to that of Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th 1. In that case, the minor stood next to the perpetrator who pulled a knife from his waistband, pointed it at the victim from about one foot away, and demanded money. (Id. at p. 3.) The victim felt threatened by the minor, who stood close enough to touch him. (Ibid.) After the perpetrator took the victim’s money, he and the minor fled the scene. (Id. at p. 4.) The minor claimed he did not know the perpetrator had a knife or was planning to rob the victim, and he ran away with the perpetrator because he was drunk and not thinking clearly. (Ibid.) The juvenile court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the minor aided and abetted the robbery in light of his presence at the crime scene, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense which indicated he knew of and shared the perpetrator’s criminal intent. (Ibid.)

In affirming the juvenile court’s finding, the reviewing court noted that the minor was present at the robbery and was in the perpetrator’s company immediately before the robbery and during the attempted escape. (Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 5; see Lynette G., supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 1095 [the minor found to have aided and abetted robbery when she was present at the crime, watched perpetrator rob victim, fled with the perpetrator and two others, and remained with them until all were detained].) The Juan G. court added that the juvenile court was not obligated to believe the minor’s testimony, and its decision to sustain the petition undeniably reflected its conclusion that the minor was not credible. (Juan G., at pp. 5-6.)

Similarly, the circumstantial evidence, taken together, was sufficient for the juvenile court to reasonably infer that minor had knowledge of the attempted robbery prior to the commission, had the intent to assist Crenshaw in committing the offense, and had affirmatively played a role in the crime. Minor was not merely at the scene of the crime, but was close to Carolina and her husband when Crenshaw was tugging on Carolina’s purse. Minor was also close to the attempted robbery when Carolina and her husband were screaming at Crenshaw to let go of the purse. While Crenshaw was fighting with Carolina’s husband, minor approached him and took a fighting stance. After minor became involved, Crenshaw was able to flee the scene. Minor also subsequently fled the scene and ran in the same direction as Crenshaw. Minor and Crenshaw were found together in a car a short time after the robbery.

Reversal on the ground of insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless “ ‘upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) As stated in Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at page 5, “Whether a person has aided and abetted in the commission of a crime is a question of fact, and on appeal all conflicts in the evidence and attendant reasonable inferences are resolved in favor of the judgment.” Resolving all inference in favor of the judgment, the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that minor aided and abetted Crenshaw in the attempted robbery. Minor’s claims to the contrary are without merit.

IV

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

J.

We concur:

MILLER

Acting P. J.

FIELDS

J.