Filed 5/1/17 Werner v. Brown CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE


ERIK V. WERNER, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
IRMA BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.


A149450

(Lake County
Super. Ct. No. CV415136)


Erik V. Werner and Monica Thibodeaux (collectively, plaintiffs) and Irma Brown own adjoining property in Lake County. Brown used a driveway on plaintiffs’ land to access her property. At some point, the parties disagreed about who owned the driveway, and plaintiffs filed a complaint against Brown for declaratory and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for plaintiffs.
Brown appeals in propria persona. We conclude Brown has failed to provide an adequate record to demonstrate error, and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs and Brown own adjoining real property in Lake County. Brown used a driveway on plaintiffs’ property to access her property. At some point, Brown installed fencing and a locked gate on the driveway — which prevented plaintiffs from accessing their property — and plaintiffs filed a complaint against Brown for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that Brown had a “non-exclusive easement . . . and not a grant in fee simple” on the driveway; plaintiffs also sought an injunction requiring Brown to remove the fences and gates on the driveway and to refrain from interfering with their use of the driveway. The complaint attached various exhibits, including Brown’s grant deed (Assessor’s Parcel No. 007-027-32), plaintiffs’ grant deed (Assessor’s Parcel No. 007-016-21), and a survey depicting the properties. Brown’s grant deed contained two parcels: parcel one, and parcel two, an easement over the driveway.
In a verified answer, Brown admitted she had “a non-exclusive easement” on the driveway in parcel two. In an affidavit, Brown admitted her deed contained a “drafting error” regarding the driveway. The parties presented evidence at a court trial. In its tentative decision, the court described the drafting error in Brown’s grant deed, and noted Brown admitted “she only has a non-exclusive easement in parcel two.” The court concluded plaintiffs had “proven . . . the allegations . . . of their complaint” and that “[t]he evidence received at trial overwhelmingly supports this tentative decision.”
The court observed: “[a]lthough not specifically plead by [Brown], she introduced some evidence and made some argument that she was entitled to a fee interest in parcel two based upon the legal doctrine of adverse possession. The evidence does not support [Brown’s] contention that she is entitled to prevail on the doctrine of adverse possession. [Brown] was not able to prove that she paid the property tax on parcel two for the relevant period. The evidence was that she never paid any taxes on that parcel. [¶] Additionally, the evidence supports that conclusion that [Brown]’s occupation of parcel two was not exclusive or hostile for a period of five years immediately prior to the filing of the complaint.”
The court entered judgment for plaintiffs, concluding: “[o]ther than the easement . . . Brown ha[d] no right, title or interest” in parcel two, the driveway, and Brown had “not shown the elements of adverse possession.” The court ordered Brown to “remove all fences, gates or other obstructions that she . . . placed” on parcel two and to refrain from attempting to “block or in any way impede or interfere with” plaintiffs’ use of parcel two.
DISCUSSION
Brown challenges the judgment on several grounds. She contends: (1) the easement on parcel two is described inadequately; (2) she owns parcel two by “adverse possession”; (3) plaintiffs’ survey is “unreliable and ignores existing monuments”; and (4) the judgment imposes a hardship on her. The record Brown has provided on appeal fails to demonstrate error.
“ ‘ “A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] ‘A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.’ ” (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)
Here, Brown has not provided a trial transcript “or any other adequate statement of the evidence. The record consists solely of a partial clerk’s transcript . . . . Generally, appellants in ordinary civil appeals must provide a reporter’s transcript at their own expense.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186 (Foust).) Numerous “appellate courts have refused to reach the merits of an appellant’s claims because no reporter’s transcript of a pertinent proceeding or a suitable substitute was provided. [Citations.] [¶] . . . ‘Consequently, [appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [appellant].’ ” (Id. at p. 186-187; Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132 [without reporter’s transcript, defendants could not demonstrate insufficient evidence supporting trial court’s finding]; In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1002-1003 [appellant’s claim considered abandoned where appellant failed to provide reporter’s transcript of relevant proceeding].)
Brown’s claims “cannot be resolved on an appeal utilizing only” a partial “clerk’s transcript. Without a reporter’s transcript or the exhibits presented at trial we cannot undertake a meaningful review of [Brown’s] argument on appeal. . . . [Brown] seems to want this court to . . . reweigh the evidence presented below,” but we cannot. (Foust, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 187-188.) By failing to provide an adequate record, Brown cannot meet her burden to demonstrate error and we must resolve any challenge to the judgment against her. (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)
 



_________________________
Jones, P. J.


We concur:


_________________________
Simons, J.


_________________________
Needham, J.












A149450
Filed 5/1/17 Werner v. Brown CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE


ERIK V. WERNER, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
IRMA BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.


A149450

(Lake County
Super. Ct. No. CV415136)


Erik V. Werner and Monica Thibodeaux (collectively, plaintiffs) and Irma Brown own adjoining property in Lake County. Brown used a driveway on plaintiffs’ land to access her property. At some point, the parties disagreed about who owned the driveway, and plaintiffs filed a complaint against Brown for declaratory and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for plaintiffs.
Brown appeals in propria persona. We conclude Brown has failed to provide an adequate record to demonstrate error, and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs and Brown own adjoining real property in Lake County. Brown used a driveway on plaintiffs’ property to access her property. At some point, Brown installed fencing and a locked gate on the driveway — which prevented plaintiffs from accessing their property — and plaintiffs filed a complaint against Brown for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that Brown had a “non-exclusive easement . . . and not a grant in fee simple” on the driveway; plaintiffs also sought an injunction requiring Brown to remove the fences and gates on the driveway and to refrain from interfering with their use of the driveway. The complaint attached various exhibits, including Brown’s grant deed (Assessor’s Parcel No. 007-027-32), plaintiffs’ grant deed (Assessor’s Parcel No. 007-016-21), and a survey depicting the properties. Brown’s grant deed contained two parcels: parcel one, and parcel two, an easement over the driveway.
In a verified answer, Brown admitted she had “a non-exclusive easement” on the driveway in parcel two. In an affidavit, Brown admitted her deed contained a “drafting error” regarding the driveway. The parties presented evidence at a court trial. In its tentative decision, the court described the drafting error in Brown’s grant deed, and noted Brown admitted “she only has a non-exclusive easement in parcel two.” The court concluded plaintiffs had “proven . . . the allegations . . . of their complaint” and that “[t]he evidence received at trial overwhelmingly supports this tentative decision.”
The court observed: “[a]lthough not specifically plead by [Brown], she introduced some evidence and made some argument that she was entitled to a fee interest in parcel two based upon the legal doctrine of adverse possession. The evidence does not support [Brown’s] contention that she is entitled to prevail on the doctrine of adverse possession. [Brown] was not able to prove that she paid the property tax on parcel two for the relevant period. The evidence was that she never paid any taxes on that parcel. [¶] Additionally, the evidence supports that conclusion that [Brown]’s occupation of parcel two was not exclusive or hostile for a period of five years immediately prior to the filing of the complaint.”
The court entered judgment for plaintiffs, concluding: “[o]ther than the easement . . . Brown ha[d] no right, title or interest” in parcel two, the driveway, and Brown had “not shown the elements of adverse possession.” The court ordered Brown to “remove all fences, gates or other obstructions that she . . . placed” on parcel two and to refrain from attempting to “block or in any way impede or interfere with” plaintiffs’ use of parcel two.
DISCUSSION
Brown challenges the judgment on several grounds. She contends: (1) the easement on parcel two is described inadequately; (2) she owns parcel two by “adverse possession”; (3) plaintiffs’ survey is “unreliable and ignores existing monuments”; and (4) the judgment imposes a hardship on her. The record Brown has provided on appeal fails to demonstrate error.
“ ‘ “A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] ‘A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.’ ” (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)
Here, Brown has not provided a trial transcript “or any other adequate statement of the evidence. The record consists solely of a partial clerk’s transcript . . . . Generally, appellants in ordinary civil appeals must provide a reporter’s transcript at their own expense.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186 (Foust).) Numerous “appellate courts have refused to reach the merits of an appellant’s claims because no reporter’s transcript of a pertinent proceeding or a suitable substitute was provided. [Citations.] [¶] . . . ‘Consequently, [appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [appellant].’ ” (Id. at p. 186-187; Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132 [without reporter’s transcript, defendants could not demonstrate insufficient evidence supporting trial court’s finding]; In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1002-1003 [appellant’s claim considered abandoned where appellant failed to provide reporter’s transcript of relevant proceeding].)
Brown’s claims “cannot be resolved on an appeal utilizing only” a partial “clerk’s transcript. Without a reporter’s transcript or the exhibits presented at trial we cannot undertake a meaningful review of [Brown’s] argument on appeal. . . . [Brown] seems to want this court to . . . reweigh the evidence presented below,” but we cannot. (Foust, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 187-188.) By failing to provide an adequate record, Brown cannot meet her burden to demonstrate error and we must resolve any challenge to the judgment against her. (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)
 



_________________________
Jones, P. J.


We concur:


_________________________
Simons, J.


_________________________
Needham, J.












A149450