Dalal v. City of Los Angeles
Dalal v. City of Los Angeles
02:10:2006
Dalal v. City of Los Angeles
Filed 2/3/06 Dalal v. City of Los Angeles CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
HEMAL V. DALAL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and Respondent.
B177804
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC 290270)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Morris Jones, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of R. Thomas Wire, R. Thomas Wire; Law Offices of Edward J. Achrem & Associates, and Edward J. Achrem for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Janet G. Bogigian, Assistant City Attorney, and Blithe S. Bock, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
* * * * * *
Appellant Hemal V. Dalal appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict in favor of respondent City of Los Angeles (City).[1] Appellant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting into evidence a traffic study and a defense expert's opinion based in part on the traffic study. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. The Accident
On February 19, 2002, at 6:30 p.m., the 33-year-old appellant was struck by a vehicle while crossing the intersection of Sixth and Hill Streets in Downtown Los Angeles. Appellant was walking northbound on Hill Street in a marked crosswalk and had made it halfway across Sixth Street. The speeding vehicle, driven by Steven Sediva, ran the red light and struck appellant.
Hill Street runs north and south and has two lanes in each direction. Sixth Street is a one-way street, with four travel lanes heading east. Sediva testified he was going east on Sixth Street and had driven for four or five blocks in the second lane from the left, making every light. When Sediva first saw appellant, appellant was in the easterly crosswalk on Hill Street, just passing over the center line to the north. Sediva did not see appellant until immediately before the impact. He tried to avoid appellant by turning the car to the right. It appeared to Sediva that appellant turned back and took a step or two toward the south just before the impact. The front driver-side headlight of Sediva's car hit appellant.
The posted speed was 25 miles per hour, and Sediva believed he was going anywhere from 30 to 40 miles per hour.
2. Procedural History
Appellant brought suit against the City alleging the City created a dangerous condition of the intersection because the signals and signal timing contributed to the accident. The City asserted that the signal design, placement and phasing complied with applicable traffic engineering standards and that Sediva's negligence was the sole cause of the accident.[2] The City also asserted appellant's lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of design immunity.[3] (Gov. Code, § 830.6.)
The case was tried to a jury. The parties stipulated to the jury instructions and also stipulated to two special verdicts submitted to the jury: one addressed the issue of dangerous condition of public property and comparative negligence and the other was directed to the issue of design immunity. The jury returned a defense verdict, finding the intersection did not constitute a dangerous condition of public property and there was no causal relationship between the plan or design of the intersection and the accident.[4]
The trial court entered a judgment in the City's favor. Appellant moved for a new trial, which the court heard and denied. This timely appeal followed.
3. Conflicting Evidence on Dangerous Condition[5]
At trial, appellant argued that the lack of an all-red clearance interval created a dangerous condition in the intersection that caused the accident. Appellant's expert, engineer Harry Krueper, testified there was only a three-second interval on the yellow light for vehicles to clear the intersection. Krueper opined there should have been a clearance interval including one second of an all-red phase in which all directions of movement in the intersection would show red. Krueper believed that there was an insufficient interval for Sediva to clear the intersection before appellant received the signal to walk. Appellant's accident reconstruction expert, Kerry Berg, testified that the accident would not have happened had there been a one-second all-red phase because Sedivia would have had an additional second to clear the intersection.
Both Krueper and Berg acknowledged an all-red clearance interval was not required by the state traffic manual.
Appellant also proffered an alternative theory that the signals were malfunctioning at the time of the accident because they were operating on a longer cycle than designed. Krueper testified he timed the signal light cycle at 110 seconds, the same figure stated in the police report.
The City proffered evidence that the signal had been installed at the intersection two years before the accident, in March 2000, and it complied with all state regulations. The City's expert, traffic engineer David Royer, testified that the intersection was not dangerous. Royer found the intersection's signal plan was reasonable, appropriate and in compliance with existing design standards. According to Royer, the signal was functioning properly at the time of the accident and the timing for walking distance was more than sufficient for all four crossings at the intersection. The suggested yellow interval for a 25 miles per hour speed limit was three seconds, which was what was designed and in place at the intersection. Royer determined the accident rate at the intersection was less than one-half of the typical expected accident rate for an urban intersection and there was no pattern of accidents in the intersection indicating any problem.
Michael Varat, the City's accident reconstruction expert, opined that if Sediva had been going 25 miles per hour and started braking on the yellow, he could quite easily have come to a gentle stop before the intersection. Varat testified that even if Sediva had been going 30 miles per hour, ignored the yellow and started to brake on the red, he still could have stopped before hitting appellant. In Varat's opinion, there was â€
02:10:2006
Filed 2/3/06 Dalal v. City of Los Angeles CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
HEMAL V. DALAL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and Respondent.
B177804
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC 290270)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Morris Jones, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of R. Thomas Wire, R. Thomas Wire; Law Offices of Edward J. Achrem & Associates, and Edward J. Achrem for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Janet G. Bogigian, Assistant City Attorney, and Blithe S. Bock, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
* * * * * *
Appellant Hemal V. Dalal appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict in favor of respondent City of Los Angeles (City).[1] Appellant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting into evidence a traffic study and a defense expert's opinion based in part on the traffic study. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. The Accident
On February 19, 2002, at 6:30 p.m., the 33-year-old appellant was struck by a vehicle while crossing the intersection of Sixth and Hill Streets in Downtown Los Angeles. Appellant was walking northbound on Hill Street in a marked crosswalk and had made it halfway across Sixth Street. The speeding vehicle, driven by Steven Sediva, ran the red light and struck appellant.
Hill Street runs north and south and has two lanes in each direction. Sixth Street is a one-way street, with four travel lanes heading east. Sediva testified he was going east on Sixth Street and had driven for four or five blocks in the second lane from the left, making every light. When Sediva first saw appellant, appellant was in the easterly crosswalk on Hill Street, just passing over the center line to the north. Sediva did not see appellant until immediately before the impact. He tried to avoid appellant by turning the car to the right. It appeared to Sediva that appellant turned back and took a step or two toward the south just before the impact. The front driver-side headlight of Sediva's car hit appellant.
The posted speed was 25 miles per hour, and Sediva believed he was going anywhere from 30 to 40 miles per hour.
2. Procedural History
Appellant brought suit against the City alleging the City created a dangerous condition of the intersection because the signals and signal timing contributed to the accident. The City asserted that the signal design, placement and phasing complied with applicable traffic engineering standards and that Sediva's negligence was the sole cause of the accident.[2] The City also asserted appellant's lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of design immunity.[3] (Gov. Code, § 830.6.)
The case was tried to a jury. The parties stipulated to the jury instructions and also stipulated to two special verdicts submitted to the jury: one addressed the issue of dangerous condition of public property and comparative negligence and the other was directed to the issue of design immunity. The jury returned a defense verdict, finding the intersection did not constitute a dangerous condition of public property and there was no causal relationship between the plan or design of the intersection and the accident.[4]
The trial court entered a judgment in the City's favor. Appellant moved for a new trial, which the court heard and denied. This timely appeal followed.
3. Conflicting Evidence on Dangerous Condition[5]
At trial, appellant argued that the lack of an all-red clearance interval created a dangerous condition in the intersection that caused the accident. Appellant's expert, engineer Harry Krueper, testified there was only a three-second interval on the yellow light for vehicles to clear the intersection. Krueper opined there should have been a clearance interval including one second of an all-red phase in which all directions of movement in the intersection would show red. Krueper believed that there was an insufficient interval for Sediva to clear the intersection before appellant received the signal to walk. Appellant's accident reconstruction expert, Kerry Berg, testified that the accident would not have happened had there been a one-second all-red phase because Sedivia would have had an additional second to clear the intersection.
Both Krueper and Berg acknowledged an all-red clearance interval was not required by the state traffic manual.
Appellant also proffered an alternative theory that the signals were malfunctioning at the time of the accident because they were operating on a longer cycle than designed. Krueper testified he timed the signal light cycle at 110 seconds, the same figure stated in the police report.
The City proffered evidence that the signal had been installed at the intersection two years before the accident, in March 2000, and it complied with all state regulations. The City's expert, traffic engineer David Royer, testified that the intersection was not dangerous. Royer found the intersection's signal plan was reasonable, appropriate and in compliance with existing design standards. According to Royer, the signal was functioning properly at the time of the accident and the timing for walking distance was more than sufficient for all four crossings at the intersection. The suggested yellow interval for a 25 miles per hour speed limit was three seconds, which was what was designed and in place at the intersection. Royer determined the accident rate at the intersection was less than one-half of the typical expected accident rate for an urban intersection and there was no pattern of accidents in the intersection indicating any problem.
Michael Varat, the City's accident reconstruction expert, opined that if Sediva had been going 25 miles per hour and started braking on the yellow, he could quite easily have come to a gentle stop before the intersection. Varat testified that even if Sediva had been going 30 miles per hour, ignored the yellow and started to brake on the red, he still could have stopped before hitting appellant. In Varat's opinion, there was â€
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