Walnum v. City of Los Angeles
Filed 12/19/13
Walnum v. City of Los Angeles CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ANN WALNUM,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LOS
ANGELES et al.,
Defendants and Respondents;
AUTRY NATIONAL CENTER OF
THE AMERICAN WEST,
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.
B244096
(Los
Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BS133193)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Ann I. Jones,
Judge. Affirmed.
The
Law Office of Daniel Wright and Daniel E. Wright for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Michael
N. Feuer, City Attorney, Laurie
Rittenberg, Assistant City Attorney, Gabriel S. Dermer, Deputy City Attorney,
for Defendant and Respondent City of Los Angeles.
Alston
& Bird, Edward J. Casey and Neal P. Maguire for Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.
* *
* * * *
Ann
Walnum (appellant) appeals from a judgment denying her verified petition for
writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive
relief against respondents the City of Los Angeles (the City) and its Board
of Recreation and Park Commissioners (the Board) for alleged violations of the Ralph
M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.)
a special meeting conducted by the Board in which respondent the Autry National Center of the
American West (Autry Center) was granted approval to renovate spaces within its Museum of the
American West (museum). We affirm the
judgment in its entirety.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On
January 23,
1987, the City approved a 50-year ground
lease agreement with the Autry Center for construction and operation of the museum. The lease authorized the museum to occupy
approximately 12.75 acres of land located in the northeast portion of Griffith Park for the
construction and operation of the museum.
Under the terms of the lease, the museum is required to obtain the Board’s
approval prior to construction of modifications to the museum structure for
renovations in excess of $25,000 for internal modifications or $5,000 for
external modifications.
Appellant
is a property owner in the City of Los Angeles and
founder of the Friends of the Southwest Museum Coalition (Coalition). The Coalition is an advocacy group which
seeks to hold the Autry Center accountable for merger commitments it made to rehabilitate and
continue the land use of the historic Southwest Museum at its Northeast Los Angeles location
in the community of Mount Washington/Highland Park. According to the petition, appellant is
concerned with potential negative environmental and policy impacts associated
with ongoing efforts of the museum to move the land uses of the Southwest
Museum from its National Register of Historic Places location in Mount
Washington to the basement of the museum in Griffith Park. A number of California residents are opposed
to the museum’s ongoing efforts to abandon the historic Southwest Museum site
rather than rehabilitating it for continued public
service. In 2009, protests were made
against the museum’s efforts to expand the Griffith Park museum
building to move the entire Southwest Museum into an expanded Autry Museum.
On
May 4, 2011, the Board held a regularly scheduled meeting. At the end of the regular meeting, Barry
Sanders, the President of the Board (Board President), stated that he would be
absent for the scheduled May 18, 2011 regular
meeting. Another commissioner also
stated that she would not be available for the May 18, 2011 meeting. Because it appeared
that it would be difficult to have a quorum for the next meeting, President
Sanders directed the Board’s staff to poll the other commissioners to confirm a
quorum for that meeting. If no quorum
was available, staff was directed to determine when a quorum would be available
for a meeting on a different nearby date in May 2011 at Cheviot Hills Recreation Center.
On
May 5, 2011, Mary Alvarez, the Board’s executive assistant (executive
assistant), sent an e-mail to the commissioners to determine their availability
to attend a Board meeting on May 20, 2011. Three commissioners, including the Board President,
in a reply to all, confirmed that they would be available on May 20, 2011. The executive assistant
stated by e-mail that a quorum was confirmed for May 20, 2011. She further stated that,
unless she was advised otherwise, the Board’s next meeting would be May 20, 2011.
On
May 9, 2011, the Board posted a notice of cancellation of the regular meeting
scheduled for May 18,
2011 at four places: the Board’s downtown Los Angeles office;
the Board’s usual meeting location (the EXPO Center); the
special meeting location (Cheviot Hills); and City Hall East.
On
May 16, 2011, the executive assistant e-mailed a draft agenda for the May 20, 2011 special meeting to the Board President for his review and
approval. The notice and agenda of the May 20, 2011 special meeting were sent by courier to the Board President and the
commissioners.
On
May 18, 2011, the notice for the May 20, 2011 special meeting was
posted at the four locations listed above.
Board Report No. 11-129 of the General Manager’s Report was “Griffith
Park-Autry National Center-Renovation of Existing Exhibit Space at the Museum
of the American West.†The City’s Early
Notification System did not provide electronic notice of the May 20, 2011 special meeting to its subscribers.
On
May 20, 2011, the Board held a special meeting to consider a report of the General
Manager, Board Report No. 11-129.
The report sought approval of renovations of existing exhibits in the
galleria, the outdoor area and restrooms at the museum. The Board approved the report at the May 20, 2011 special meeting. After the Board
approved the report, the matter was considered at four different publicly held
noticed meetings by the Los Angeles City Council (City Council). Appellant attended and participated in all
four of those meetings and filed written comments and objections. On June 21, 2011,
the City Council voted to uphold the Board’s actions.
On
August 3, 2011, appellant filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and for
declaratory and injunctive relief. The
petition challenged the Board’s public meeting procedures generally and
specifically as to the May 20, 2011 special
meeting. The petition alleged that the
Brown Act only authorized the presiding officer or a majority of the
legislative body to “call†a special meeting.
The call must be a written and signed document. The call and notice of the business must be
sent to other members of the body and certain members of the press, and
publicly posted at least 24 hours in advance of the special meeting. According to the petition, no interested
member of the public attended the May 20, 2011
special meeting because the Board’s practices violated the Brown Act and failed
to provide adequate notice. The petition
alleged: the May 18, 2011 posted notice
was less than 72 hours prior to the start of the May 20, 2011 special
meeting; the notice did not include a “call†of the special meeting; on
information and belief, the Board’s post of the special meeting agenda on its Web
site was less than 24 hours prior to the start time of the special meeting; no
“call†of the special meeting was posted on the Web site; and the agenda of the
special meeting failed to give to the public adequate notice that the Board
intended to take action to approve anything.
In
addition, the petition alleged that the City created an Early Notification
System for meeting agendas that proactively sends notices of the City Council
and the Board meetings and agendas to members of the interested public. When the Board posts a meeting agenda at its
physical location, its staff is responsible for uploading the Board’s meeting
notices and agendas to the system which forwards e-mails to subscribers of the
system. No subscribers were notified of
the May 20,
2011 special meeting through the system.
In
the first cause of action, appellant sought a writ of mandate invalidating the
project approvals adopted on May 20, 2011 on the ground the
Board failed “to issue or post a ‘call’ of the special meeting.†The second cause of action sought a writ of
mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief for the Board’s alleged pattern
and practice of ignoring the “call†requirement. The third cause of action sought the same
remedies for the Board’s alleged routine pattern and practice of conducting
special meetings “concurrently with, immediately before, or immediately afterâ€
a regular meeting.
In
support of the petition, appellant produced evidence showing an ongoing dispute
between the museum and some members of the public over the museum’s operation
of the Southwest Museum. This included the 2009
attempt to renovate the museum.
Appellant
argued that the May 20, 2011 special meeting
was invalid because the Board President did not “call†the meeting as required
by the Brown Act. According to
appellant, section 54956 of the Brown Act imposes a number of
“non-delegable†duties on the legislative body in calling a special
meeting. As a result, only the presiding
officer or a majority of the legislative body can: (1) call the meeting; (2) deliver the
call and notice to the other legislative body members; (3) notify other
interested members of the press; and (4) physically post the call and notice of
a special meeting.
Appellant
also argued the Board violated Los Angeles City Charter section 907, which
imposes a higher notification standard than the Brown Act requires by
implementing an Early Notification System by the City. Appellant’s claim was that she relied on her
friends who in turn relied on the system to receive notice of agendas. However, the Board did not utilize the system
for the May
20, 2011 special meeting so the decision
had to be nullified.
Appellant
also claimed that deposition testimony by the executive assistant showed a
pattern and practice of violating the Brown Act through the procedures utilized
in this case. Appellant argued
injunctive relief against the Board was warranted to restrain the Board from
its pattern and practice of conducting regular and special meetings during the
same meeting.
In
opposition to the petition, the Board President filed a declaration. He declared, at the end of the Board’s May 4, 2011 meeting, he discovered that he and at least one other commissioner
of the Board would not be available for the regular meeting scheduled for May 18, 2011. He then directed staff to
poll the other commissioners to confirm a quorum for the May 18, 2011 meeting. If the quorum was
not possible, staff was directed then to determine when a quorum would be
available on another date in May 2011.
Throughout his tenure as Board President, there had been no special
meetings of the Board unless he called them.
He had received and he believed all other commissioners have always
received proper notice of the meetings.
The
executive assistant described her duties as a Board employee. Her responsibilities included supervision of
staff concerning the duties of the office.
Board staff prepared agendas, notices and minutes of Board
meetings. The staff is responsible for
notifying the commissioners and public of the agendas. She confirmed that on May 4, 2011, the Board President directed staff to poll the other commissioners
about a quorum for the May 18, 2011 regular
meeting. The Board President directed
staff that, if no quorum was available, to determine when a quorum would be
available in May. The staff delivered
the special agenda to all Board commissioners on May 18, 2011. Notice of the May 20, 2011 meeting was posted in four public locations.
The
executive assistant further declared that, when there is a special meeting and
regular meeting on the same day, the Board considers the special agenda items
separate and apart from the regular agenda items. She declared: “The two meetings are conducted one after the
other, not concurrently or simultaneously.
Once the special meeting is called, only matters on the special
meeting’s agenda are discussed; no other business is conducted until the special
meeting is adjourned.†She denied that
staff calls special meetings. She simply
handles the administrative portion of the special meetings. The staff prepares agendas and submits them
to the Board President for approval. She, too, was unaware of a commissioner
missing a regular or special meeting due to lack of notification. She had been informed that the Early
Notification System did not notify subscribers of the May 20, 2011 special meeting.
The Autry Center filed a
brief which reiterated the procedures followed by the Board in conducting the May 20, 2011 special meeting. In
addition, the Autry Center noted that in granting consent on May 20, 2011 for the proposed renovations, the Board also determined that the
renovations were not subject to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).
On
May 31, 2011, the City Council held a publicly noticed meeting and asserted
jurisdiction over the Board’s consent for the renovations. City Council members stated they wanted the
public to have another opportunity to comment on the proposed renovations
because the Early Notification System had malfunctioned. The matter was referred to the City Council’s
Arts, Parks, Health and Aging Committee (Committee), which held a publicly
noticed meeting on June 3, 2011 to consider the Board’s
consent for the renovations. After
appellant appealed the CEQA determination, the Committee held a public meeting
on the consent and CEQA determination.
On June 21, 2011, at a publicly noticed meeting, the City Council upheld the Board’s
actions. The CEQA determination is on
appeal in a separate matter.
The
trial court denied the mandate petition.
The court began by indicating that appellant’s references to years of
discord between the Coalition and the museum were irrelevant to the issue of
whether the Board complied with the Brown Act regarding the May 20, 2011 special meeting. The court
then concluded that the Board substantially complied with the Brown Act’s
requirements. The court rejected
appellant’s claims that section 54956 required the presiding member of the
legislative body to call a special meeting “by personally preparing and distributing
a call and notice.†The decision to call
the special meeting was made indirectly by the procedure taken by the Board President
on May 4,
2011 when he inquired about the inability
to establish a quorum on May 18, 2011. The executive assistant then acted in
conformity with the Board President’s instructions to set a special meeting on
the first available date when a quorum could be obtained. The court concluded that the protocol, while
perhaps not the “‘best practice,’†actually and substantially complied with the
Brown Act.
The
trial court then rejected arguments by appellant that the Board President was
required to personally deliver written notice to each member and to interested
media outlets or post the notice in a freely accessible public location. The trial court concluded there was no evidence
the Board failed to comply with the Brown Act in setting the May 20, 2011 special meeting. There was
also no competent evidence that there was a pattern and practice of allowing
the executive assistant to call special meetings. The Board did not violate section 907 of
the Los Angeles City Charter, which only refers to the Department of
Neighborhood Empowerment. It does not
require electronic notification or posting of agendas of the Board’s meetings. The trial court entered judgment on July 23, 2012 denying the mandate petition and requests for declaratory and
injunctive relief. This timely appeal
followed.
I. Mandate
and Review Standards
Code
of Civil Procedure section 1085 subdivision (a) provides: “A writ of mandate may
be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a
party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled,
and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal,
corporation, board, or person.†For a
writ to issue, two requirements must be met: (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial
duty upon the part of the respondent; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial
right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty. (City
of King City v. Community Bank of
618.) But, mandamus does not lie to
control a body’s exercise of its discretion in a particular manner. (
School Dist. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 986, 1002;
52, 62.) An appellate court applies a
deferential standard of review to determine whether the findings and judgment
are supported by substantial evidence, however, questions of law are
independently reviewed when the facts are undisputed. (Inglewood
Redevelopment Agency v. Aklilu (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1114;
(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 13, 21.)
II. The
Brown Act Requirements
The
Brown Act facilitates public participation in the public decision and also
curbs the misuse of the democratic process through secret legislation. (Service
Employees Internat. Union, Local 99 v. Options–A Child Care & Human Services Agency (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 869, 877.)
To accomplish this goal, the Brown Act requires public agencies to take
their actions and conduct their deliberations “openly.†(§ 54950.) The Brown Act provides for three types of
meetings: regular meetings requiring 72
hours notice in a location freely accessible to the public (§ 54954.2);
special meetings which may be called at any time but require 24 hours notice
(§ 54956); and emergency meetings which may be called in rare cases on
one-hour notice to interested media outlets (§ 54956.5). While courts may declare null and void actions
taken in violation of the Brown Act, a violation does not necessarily
invalidate the agency’s action. (
Responsible Education v.
must show prejudice. (
(d)(1) provides that a court shall not determine an action taken in violation
of the Brown Act to be null and void if the action taken was in substantial compliance
with section 54956.
A. The Board did not violate the Brown Act.
The
special meeting requirements are set forth in section 54956, subdivision
(a). The statute provides: “(a) A special meeting may be called at any
time by the presiding officer of the legislative body of a local agency, or by
a majority of the members of the legislative body, by delivering written notice
to each member of the legislative body and to each local newspaper of general
circulation and radio or television station requesting notice in writing and
posting a notice on the local agency’s Internet Web site, if the local agency
has one. The notice shall be delivered
personally or by any other means and shall be received at least 24 hours before
the time of the meeting as specified in the notice. The call and notice shall specify the time and
place of the special meeting and the business to be transacted or discussed. No other business shall be considered at these
meetings by the legislative body. The
written notice may be dispensed with as to any member who at or prior to the
time the meeting convenes files with the clerk or secretary of the legislative
body a written waiver of notice. The
waiver may be given by telegram. The written
notice may also be dispensed with as to any member who is actually present at
the meeting at the time it convenes. [¶]
The call and notice shall be posted at least 24 hours prior to the
special meeting in a location that is freely accessible to members of the
public.†(§ 54956, subd. (a).) Effective January 1, 2012,
section 54956 was amended to add subdivision (c) to require that the
agenda be posted on the local agency’s Internet Web site, if the local agency
has one. (Stats. 2011, ch. 692,
§ 9.)
Appellant
claims section 54956 must be interpreted to mean the Board violated the
Brown Act when it designated the tasks of e-mailing the commissioners about the
May 20,
2011 special meeting to the executive
assistant. According to appellant, the
e-mail procedure did not result in a “calling†of the meeting because the “presiding
officer†did not do so in writing. Appellant
states the statute requires “the call and notice of items of business must be
delivered and posted publicly as objective and manifest evidence of the act of
calling the special meeting.†Appellant
further asserts the Board then improperly delegated to staff the task of
notifying commissioners, the press, and public posting of the special
meeting. We disagree.
We
decline to interpret the statute in the manner suggested by appellant because
section 54956 clearly and plainly states only that a special meeting may
be “called†by the “presiding officer.†(See
Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013)
57 Cal.4th 157, 165.) The record shows that
at a regular meeting on May 4, 2011, the Board President
directed staff to determine whether a quorum would be available for the regular
meeting on May 18,
2011.
If no quorum was available on that date, staff was directed to determine
when a quorum would be available on a nearby date in May 2011. The executive assistant followed up with the Board
President’s decision to hold the special meeting by e-mailing individual
commissioners to determine the first date when a quorum could be
established. Thus, the trial court
correctly concluded that the procedure did not violate section 54956
because the Board President is the party who decided to call the special meeting
in the event there was no quorum available for the next regularly scheduled
meeting. Staff merely facilitated the Board
President’s direction to have the special meeting on the first date a quorum
could be established in May 2011. This
was substantial if not actual compliance with section 54956. We need not interpret the statute in the expansive
manner suggested by appellant because the statute clearly sets forth the
requirements for calling a special meeting, which the Board met.
Similarly
lacking in merit is the claim that section 54956 must be interpreted to
require the presiding officer of a legislative body to personally engage in the
administrative tasks of posting notices and service on other members of the
legislative body and members of the press.
Section 54956, subdivision (a) specifies: “The notice shall be delivered personally
any other means and shall be received at least 24 hours before the time
of the meeting as specified in the notice.â€
(Italics added.) Thus, nothing in
section 54956 requires personal service by the “presiding officer†or precludes
delegation of the task to staff. For
that reason, appellant is incorrect that language in section 54954.2,
subdivision (a)(1) regarding regular or emergency meetings in
section 54956.5 requires a different result. Section 54954.2, subdivision (a)(1)
provides that “[a]t least 72 hours before a regular meeting, the legislative
body of the local agency, or its designee, shall post an agenda
. . . .†Section 54956.5
contains similar language concerning a “designee.†It is of no consequence that
section 54956 does not contain “designee†language because it states that
service may be personal or “by any other means.â€
We
also disagree with appellant that City of
Orange v. Clement (1919) 41 Cal.App. 497 (City of Orange), which was not a Brown Act case, requires a different result. City of
Orange concerned an alternative writ of mandate issued which required the
treasurer of the city to pay a warrant for a land purchase by the city for use
of as a city hall. (Id. at p. 497.) The
petitioner in that case, City of Orange,
alleged that a special meeting had occurred which authorized the purchase of
the land. (Id. at pp. 497–498.)
However, based on the evidence presented in the appellate court, it was
determined that no written notice of a special meeting was delivered to any
member of the board of trustees and one member of the board of trustees was
absent from the meeting. (
Orange concluded that the meeting and all proceedings thereof were
void. (Ibid.) This case is
distinguishable because the record establishes that each commissioner in this
case was given personal notice of the May 20, 2011
special meeting. Moreover, this case
involves the Brown Act whereas City of
Under
the circumstances, appellant has failed to establish a Brown Act violation
regarding the May
20, 2011 special meeting. So, the trial court correctly refused to
grant the petition as to the first cause of action.
B. The Board
did not violate the City Charter.
There
is also no merit to appellant’s claim the Board violated section 907 of the Los
Angeles City Charter by failing to post a notice through its Early Notification
System, which purportedly provides more protection than the Brown Act. (See § 54953.7 [providing local agencies
may impose requirements on themselves which allow greater access to meetings
than the minimal standards in the Brown Act].)
The system, however, applies to the Department of Neighborhood
Empowerment. There is no indication that
the Board or the City imposed a requirement of e-mailing the Board’s agendas or
posting notifications through this system.
Thus, appellant cannot prevail on this issue.
C. There was no competent pattern and
practice evidence.
Appellant
also claims the trial court should have granted relief because the evidence
established the Board violated the Brown Act by its practices of conducting
“concurrent†regular and special meetings on the same date. The opening brief contains numerous
painstaking and conclusory descriptions of various aspects of the Board’s
patterns and practices concerning special and regular meetings which are
scheduled on the same day.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] However, we note that most of these arguments
were not fully developed in the trial court.
The
executive assistant provided evidence that the Board held special and regular
meetings on the same date. However, the
executive assistant also declared that, when there is a special meeting and
regular meeting on the same day, the Board considers the special agenda items
separate and apart from the regular agenda items. She declared: “The two meetings are conducted one after the
other, not concurrently or simultaneously.
Once the special meeting is called, only matters on the special
meeting’s agenda are discussed; no other business is conducted until the
special meeting is adjourned.†Given
this evidence, the trial court did not err in its conclusions that there was no
competent evidence of any pattern or practice of violating the Brown Act.
Furthermore,
contrary to appellant’s suggestion otherwise, neither section 54956 nor
section 54952.2 precludes special and regular meetings from occurring on the
same day. Section 54956 permits a
special meeting to be “called†at “any time†on 24-hour notice. Nothing in either the special meeting statute
or the regular meeting statute prohibits an agency from having the meetings on
the same date.
D. The trial court did not err in its
evidentiary rulings.
Appellant
also asserts the trial court erred in a number of evidentiary rulings. The trial court’s evidentiary rulings are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (
Appellant
claims the trial court erred by failing to address the issue of the executive
assistant’s testimony as substantial evidence in the record. We need not consider this argument which was not
fully developed in appellant’s opening brief but rather was only developed in
the reply brief. (Greenlining Institute v. Public Utilities Com. (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329, fn. 5; Dills v.
Redwood Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1.)
Appellant
argues the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings regarding declarations
submitted by the executive assistant and several other parties to the extent
they established the context of the dispute, a motive by the Board, and
prejudice. Again, there are no specific
claims raised concerning the 90 separate evidentiary rulings addressed to
appellant’s declarations. We note only
that some of the declarations address the Early Notification System and the fact
that it was not working for the May 20, 2011 special
meeting. There was no dispute the system
was not working on the date in question so we are unable to find an abuse of
discretion as to the exclusion of this evidence. The declarations also outline the history of
the disputes between various groups and the Museum. The trial court’s determination that evidence
concerning the history of acrimony between the parties was irrelevant to the
Brown Act compliance was not an abuse of discretion.
In
addition, appellant asserts the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling
refusing to consider a declaration by Terry Francke, general counsel of
Californians Aware, concerning his purported expert views on the Brown
Act. The trial court excluded the
declaration on the grounds it offered nothing more than legal conclusions which
was in the trial court’s province to decide. “‘[I]t is thoroughly established that experts
may not give opinions on matters which are essentially with the province of the
court to decide.’†(Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863,
884.) We have examined the Francke declaration
and conclude the trial court acted well within its discretion to exclude the
opinion which purported to resolve the legal issues before the trial
court. (Downer v. Bramet (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 837, 841–842.)
The
trial court also acted within its discretion to exclude materials in
appellant’s judicial notice request of documents including a docket sheet from
an unrelated Superior Court action, South
Central Farmers Action Fund v. City of Los Angeles, case No. BS117561. According to appellant, the documents would
have established that the City and the Los Angeles City Attorney “have for
years been on notice of potential infirmities with its special meetings.†The trial court acted within its discretion
to refuse judicial notice of a ruling and docket sheet in an unrelated
matter. (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 418.)
Appellant
also claims the trial court erred in considering appellant’s discovery
admissions that she did not check the posted notice for the May 20, 2011
special meeting, was not a subscriber to the Early Notification System and did
not have Internet access. Appellant also
claims the trial court should not have considered evidence concerning her
participation at the City Council meetings which upheld the Board’s action
because only the Board could cure its violations. She further asserts that the documents
establishing the City Council’s four subsequent meetings were improperly
admitted. The trial court overruled
appellant’s relevancy objections to the admission of this evidence. Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the
trial court’s admission of this evidence exceeded the bounds of reason or
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (
The parties raised the issue of whether appellant was prejudiced by the May 20, 2011 meeting. The evidence
established that appellant appeared at the subsequent City Council meetings
where she was allowed to participate and raise her objections. Although the trial court ultimately declined
to reach the prejudice issue, it did not exceed the bounds of reason to admit
the evidence.
The
judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded
their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
FERNS
We concur:
____________________________,
P. J.
BOREN
____________________________,
J.
ASHMANN-GERST
references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.
brief contains a number of superfluous and immaterial matters concerning the
acrimonious history between appellant’s various coalitions and the Autry Center as to
the operation of the museum and the Southwest Museum. Moreover, the opening and reply briefs
contain extraneous matters. We have had
to decipher and condense the matters to their simplest forms to decide the
pertinent issues on appeal. Those issues
are: was there a violation of the Brown
Act on May 20,
2011 and did appellant establish a pattern
and practice of violating the Brown Act?
For these reasons, we decline to judicially notice the eight-volume
legislative history lodged with the record on appeal, which is irrelevant to
our resolution of the pertinent issues on appeal. (Doe v.
City of Los Angeles
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4.)
In a separate order, we denied
appellant’s judicial notice request of documents in an unrelated case which purportedly
established the trial court’s animus against appellant’s counsel in this
case. Appellant asserts in her opening
brief that the animus resulted in unfavorable rulings on the merits of her
petition as well as on the evidence. We
do not consider these claims, which have been raised for the first time in the
appeal. (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1207; Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210,
1218.)
