Marriage of Saadian
Filed 1/2/14 Marriage of
Saadian CA2/1
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re Marriage
of KATHRIN and GEORGE SAADIAN.
B227708
(Los
Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
BD479011)
KATHRIN
SAADIAN,
Respondent,
v.
GEORGE
SAADIAN,
Appellant.
Appeal
from orders of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles. David S. Cunningham III,
Judge. Affirmed.
The
Samoska Law Firm, William M. Samoska; Law Offices of Bruce Altschuld and Bruce
Altschuld for Appellant Landmark West Enterprises, LLC.
Turner,
Aubert & Friedmen, Steven Morris; R. Michael Collum for Respondent Kathrin
Saadian.
_______________________
This
appeal arises from a September 23, 2010 order of the family law department of
the Los Angeles Superior Court (the Order) in a
Kathrin Saadian (Kathrin) and respondent George Saadian (George), along with a
number of entities joined as parties, including Landmark West Enterprises, LLC
(Landmark West); Shenanwood Development, Inc. (Shenanwood); Branmark Trust; and
David Pasternak, temporary trustee of the Branmark Trust (Pasternak).
attorney fees and costs to be paid to Kathrin’s
attorneys.
Statement of Facts
George
and Kathrin married in August 1991. They
have two sons, born in June 1993 and May 1999.
The parties separated and Kathrin filed for dissolution in January 2008.
The September 23, 2010 Order
After
seven days of hearings on issues raised by five
fees, the trial court filed the Order, supported by factual findings. It found (in par. 7) that during his marriage
to Kathrin, George had “formed a labyrinth of companies and trusts and
exercised dominion and control over them, including distributions of monies for
those entities for his personal use.†It
found that during the marriage George had controlled a number of entities,
including Landmark West, Shenanwood, and the Branmark Trust (until Pasternak’s
March 2010 appointment as temporary trustee); that shortly before Kathrin’s January
2008 dissolution petition, these entities had a net worth exceeding $23 million;
and that George’s available monthly cash flow exceeded $62,400. The court went on to find (in par. 12) that Shenanwood—not
Landmark West—was entitled to specified proceeds from sales of a condominium
project, identified as “the Frozen Funds at Mara Escrow Company.â€
Based
on these and other findings, the court rendered detailed orders for payment, of
certain support arrearages to Kathrin, and for payment of pendente lite fees
and costs to Kathrin’s attorneys. Paragraph
4 of the Order specified that support
arrearages of $75,142 “shall be paid from the ‘frozen account’ on deposit
at Mara Escrow Company, . . . reflecting the net sales
proceeds from [specified property] in the amount of $568,668.79,†and ordered
Mara Escrow to immediately remit that amount to Kathrin. Paragraph 6 of the Order required George to
pay Kathrin’s attorneys $1 million for fees and costs, without prejudice to
future requests. And in paragraph 7, the
court ordered that $493,526.79 of that $1 million payment would be paid from
the balance of the frozen escrow account.
The
Order was expressly intended by the court to maintain the status quo between
the parties, leaving for future determination the appropriate division and characterization
of the involved entities and assets as community, quasi-community, or separate
property.
Appeals
from the Order
There
were four timely notices of appeal from the Order (or specified portions of it): on behalf of George; on behalf of Shenanwood;
on behalf of Pasternak, as temporary trustee of Branmark Trust; and on behalf of
Landmark West.
title="">[3]
Landmark West’s notice of appeal limits
its appeal to paragraphs 7 and 12 of the Order’s findings, and paragraphs 4 and
7 of the court’s Order.
The settlement
deal memorandum
On
February 3,
2012, while this appeal was pending, Kathrin
and George entered into a five-page “Deal Memorandum In Respect To Resolving
All Disputes, Known Or Unknown, Between George Saadian and Kathrin Saadian.†The memorandum recites the parties’ intentions
that their agreement would result in release of all claims by and among the
parties and “their entitiesâ€; that the parties would “be legally bound by this
agreement and that it be enforceable on its terms pursuant to CCP Sec. 664.6â€
(although further “boilerplate and technical language†would be added to a final
document); and that any dispute arising under the deal memorandum or the final settlement
“shall be submitted to binding arbitration†before a specified retired judge of
the superior court.
Following
their deal memorandum, the parties were unable to agree on the meaning of the
memorandum’s term “their entities,†however. Although the deal memorandum provided that
George would quitclaim (or would cause Landmark West to quitclaim) specified
properties to Kathrin, George contended that because of his April 2010
suspension as a trustee of Branmark Trust (which owned 85 percent of Landmark
West), his signature on the deal memorandum could not have bound Landmark West
to the settlement’s terms and could not bind it to transfer any of its share of
the properties.
On
March 21, 2012, the parties submitted their dispute over the deal memorandum’s
meaning to binding arbitration before the specified retired judge, the
Honorable Robert A. Schneider. Judge
Schneider’s April 4, 2012 ruling holds that the agreement requires George to
execute, “or, in the case of properties owned by Landmark West Enterprises,
LLC, to cause Landmark West Enterprises, LLC to execute†quitclaim deeds
conveying the listed properties to Kathrin.
The arbitrator’s ruling was expressly “without prejudice to the partners
(including individual members of partner entities) of Landmark West
Enterprises, LLC to raise any objections that they wish to raise in Probate
Court or any other court.†The record
contains no indication of any objection to that ruling by Landmark West or any partner
or member of a partner entity of Landmark West.
Requests
for extension of time to file opening brief
On February 17, 2012, George, Shenanwood, Landmark West, Pasternak, and Branmark Trust filed
a request in this court for a 60-day extension of time to file their opening
brief, unopposed by Kathrin. In support
of the request they advised the court of George and Kathrin’s February 3, 2012 deal
memorandum for a “global settlement of all outstanding issues,†which they anticipated
“will result in a motion to dismiss this appealâ€â€”but that additional time was required
“to be certain that the global settlement of all outstanding issues will indeed
result in a dismissal of this appeal.†The extension was granted.
On
April 17, 2012, George, Landmark West, Pasternak, and Branmark Trust filed
requests in this court for a “third unopposed 60-day extension of time to file
their opening brief.†Citing their previous
extension request that had anticipated a dismissal of the appeal, they sought
the additional extension “to obtain required approvals of parties and courts
concerned,†due to one disputed provision of the agreement. They attached copies of the February 3, 2012 deal memorandum and Judge Schneider’s April 4, 2012 arbitration ruling order interpreting the deal memorandum’s disputed
term. This court granted 60-day
extensions to file appellants’ opening briefs, to June 18, 2012.
Stipulated
probate court and family law court orders
In
May 2012, the parties and their attorneys executed a Stipulation For Entry Of
Judgment, seeking the probate court’s approval of the settlement in three cases
pending before it (case nos. SP007767, SP008227, and SP008228), and entry of
judgment in the family law case.
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4]
The stipulation provides (among many
other things) that Kathrin is to receive title to the seven properties listed
in the deal memorandum. It provides that
(subject to the probate court’s discretion), George, acting on behalf of
Shenanwood, would quitclaim two of those properties to Kathrin; that Pasternak,
acting on behalf of the Branmark Trust, would quitclaim one of those properties
to Kathrin; and that Pasternak, acting on behalf of Landmark West, would quitclaim
the remaining four of those properties to Kathrin.
stipulation (to be obtained following the probate court’s approval), the
stipulation provides that the probate court would cause Pasternak to make the
ordered distributions to Kathrin, and would then cause Pasternak’s discharge as
temporary trustee of the Branmark Trust, and George’s reinstatement as trustee.
On
June 8, 2012, the probate court entered an order approving “with conditions†the
parties’ stipulation for entry of judgment based on their settlement
agreement. Pursuant to the parties’
stipulation, the probate court order provides that Kathrin will receive title
to seven listed properties. It requires
Pasternak, as “Managing Member†of Landmark and of an entity known as Branmark
Group, to quitclaim five of those properties to Kathrin “in their entirety.†And it requires George, acting on behalf of
Shenanwood, to quitclaim the remaining two of those properties to Kathrin.
The
probate court order provides that upon the family law court’s approval of the stipulation
and the ordered distributions to Kathrin by Pasternak, it will cause
Pasternak’s discharge as temporary trustee of the Branmark Trust and George’s
reinstatement as trustee. The probate
court order was approved as to form by counsel for Kathrin, George, and
Pasternak (as well as by the guardian ad litem for the parties’ minor child),
and was entered by the probate court (Lawrence Cho, Judge) on June 8, 2012. The order was to become effective immediately
upon the entry of judgment in the family law court based on the parties’
stipulation.
On
June 11, 2012, the family law department of the superior court entered judgment in
accordance with the parties’ Stipulation For Entry Of Judgment.
Appellants’
opening brief
On
July 23, 2012, attorney William M. Samoska substituted in this court as attorney
for Shenanwood, Branmark Trust, and Landmark West. (He also moved to vacate this court’s July 12, 2012 dismissal of Shenanwood’s appeal for failure to timely file an
opening brief.) On August 8, 2012, attorney Samoska filed Appellants’ Consolidated Opening Brief, its
cover page identifying the appellants as Shenanwood and Landmark West. Although the brief’s cover identifies neither
George nor Branmark Trust as parties to the brief, its text identifies George as
a party, with whom Branmark Trust, Shenanwood, and Landmark West, “have joined
in this consolidated opening briefâ€â€”all represented by attorney Samoska.
In
27 pages of the 70-page opening brief the appellants argue five issues: that the trial court erred by relying on evidence
from Kathrin’s forensic experts about the funds available to pay her attorneys’
fees; that Landmark West did not cause or incur much of the awarded fees; that
the court wrongly applied the decision in Marriage
of Dick (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 144; that the court abused its discretion by
using assets of “joined entities†to pay attorneys’ fees; and that the court
erred in finding that Shenanwood, rather than Landmark West, owned the funds in
the Mara Escrow account.
name="_ftnref6" title="">[6]
Kathrin’s
motion to dismiss the appeals, and George’s opposition to dismissal
On
October 25,
2012, Kathrin moved to dismiss the appeal
as moot, due to the parties’ settlement of all disputes and release of all
claims.
On
November 9,
2012, attorney Samoska filed opposition to the
motion on behalf of George (but not on behalf of Landmark West or the other
joined parties).
title="">[7] George argued that the settlement agreement
does not require him to dismiss Landmark West’s appeal from the September 23, 2010 order, nor could it, because Landmark is not bound by the
settlement. George contended that the settlement
agreement required him to quitclaim to Kathrin only his own interests in the
specified properties, but not the shares held by Landmark West, because when
the settlement agreement was signed, Pasternak controlled Landmark West as trustee
of Branmark Trust (which owned 85 percent of Landmark West) and as trustee of
the children’s trusts (which together owned 15 percent of Landmark West). According to George, Landmark West therefore retains
an interest in this appeal despite George and Kathrin’s settlement of all
disputes.
George
concedes in the concluding paragraphs of his nine-page opposition to the motion
to dismiss, however, that the settlement requires both George and Shenanwood to
withdraw their appeals.
name="_ftnref8" title="">[8]
Kathrin’s
November 14, 2012 reply to George’s opposition to the motion to dismiss notes
that while George admitted he has no standing in this appeal, only he—and neither
Landmark West nor any other appellant—opposed the dismissal motion. Kathrin’s reply also cited the inconsistency
of George’s contention that he did not and could not bind Landmark West to the
settlement, with his earlier representations to this court that he anticipated
the settlement agreement would result in a dismissal of this appeal on behalf
of all parties. If George never intended
the settlement to bind Landmark West, he could not also have anticipated (as he
and Landmark West both represented) that the settlement would result in
dismissal of the appeal by all parties.
This
court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal on February 20, 2013. (On June 6, 2013, this court dismissed George’s appeal for his failure to file an
opening brief.)
Respondent’s
brief and appellant’s reply brief
Respondent’s
brief was filed May 15, 2013. On September 4, 2013, attorney Samoska filed Appellant’s Reply Brief on behalf of Landmark
West alone. It chastises Kathrin for her
motion to dismiss; it reaffirms that dismissal of George’s and Shenanwood’s
appeals is required; and it again represents that George and Shenanwood filed a
stipulation to withdraw their appeals “concurrently herewithâ€â€”again without any
such filing appearing in this court’s records. The last 8 pages of the 35-page reply brief repeat
the opening brief’s arguments on the merits.
The
appellants reflected by this court’s docket are Landmark West, Branmark Trust,
and Shenanwood. George (who admittedly
controls Shenanwood, and who has been restored as trustee of Branmark Trust, the
owner of an 85 percent interest in Landmark West) has represented to this court
that Branmark Trust and Shenanwood must be dismissed as parties to the appeal. As of the time briefing was completed, neither
Branmark Trust nor Shenanwood (who were represented in the opening brief by
George’s attorney) had advised this court to the contrary. We therefore will dismiss the appeals of Branmark
Trust and Shenanwood, leaving Landmark West as the sole appellant.
Discussion
Standing and Standard of Review
A
direct appeal lies from interim orders granting support and attorney fees,
which direct the payment of money or the performance of an act by or against an
appellant. (Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368-369;
Cal.App.4th 1232, 1234 [pendente lite order for child support and attorney
fees].)
When
an action is within a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, its decision
will be affirmed unless there has been a prejudicial abuse of the court’s
discretion. On appeal the court will
interfere only if no judge reasonably could have reached the challenged result
under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s
action. (Smith v. Smith (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 952, 958; Marriage of Laursen & Fogarty (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1082,
1086-1087.) It is the appellant’s burden
to affirmatively demonstrate error in the challenged order, and to demonstrate
the error’s prejudicial impact on the appellant. (Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
The
only cognizable issues raised by Landmark West’s appeal arise from the portions
of the Order identified in its notice of appeal, “regarding the amount of the
award of [Kathrin’s] attorney fees and the source from which the court ordered
them paidâ€â€”specifically, paragraphs 7 and 12 of the trial court’s findings, and
paragraphs 4 and 7 of its order—and only to the extent that Landmark West has
an interest in those funds. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 902; County of Alameda v.
Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [only parties aggrieved by the judgment
have standing to appeal]; Gonzales v.
R.J. Novick Construction Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 798, 805-806 [issues on
appeal from severable judgment are limited by appellant’s notice of appeal].)
We
conclude in this appeal that the record justifies the trial court’s conclusion
that Landmark West owns no interest in the funds ordered to be paid from the
Mara Escrow Company account, and therefore that the portions of the order
affecting Landmark West reflect no abuse of the trial court’s discretion or
prejudice to Landmark West.
Landmark West’s appeal fails to demonstrate that the
Order abused the trial court’s discretion.
The
fundamental contention in Landmark West’s appeal is that the trial court abused
its discretion by ordering payment of fees to Kathrin and her attorneys from funds
held by Mara Escrow Company. The use of those
funds, its appeal contends, rests on an erroneous finding that those funds
belong to Shenanwood (an entity that George admittedly owns and controls), rather
than to Landmark West, which George contends he does not own or control. Landmark West contends also that use of its
funds to pay Kathrin’s attorney fees was error because Landmark West did not
cause or incur much of those fees, and that these errors came about because the
trial court wrongly applied the decision in Marriage
of Dick, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th
144, to justify its reliance on evidence provided by Kathrin’s forensic experts
about George’s financial resources and control of Landmark West.
These
issues are governed by the familiar rule affording every presumption in favor
of determinations supported by substantial evidence. “On appeal, when the evidence is
contradictory, conflicting interpretations are presented thereby, or
conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, that which favors the judgment
must be accepted as true, and that which is unfavorable must be discarded as
not having had sufficient verity for acceptance by the trial court.†(Ross v.
Lawrence (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 229, 232; Estate of Teel (1944) 25 Cal.2d 520, 527 [“All of the evidence most
favorable to the respondent must be accepted as true, and that unfavorable
discarded as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact.â€].)
a.
Landmark West has standing to appeal from the Order
only to the extent it has an interest in the awarded funds.
In
a determination that is fully supported by evidence in the record, the trial
court found that Landmark West lacked any interest in the funds in the Mara
Escrow account. For that reason alone,
Landmark West’s appeal from the Order’s use of those funds flounders. Landmark West’s standing to challenge the
trial court’s fee award derives wholly from its claim of ownership of the funds
in the frozen escrow account from which the award is to be paid. Because Landmark West has been found upon
substantial evidence to have no interest in those funds, it is not aggrieved by
the Order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902;
aggrieved by the judgment have standing to appeal].)
The
record fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that Landmark West was not
entitled to the funds frozen in the Mara Escrow account.
b.
Landmark West’s appeal fails to demonstrate error in
the trial court’s determination that it was not entitled to any portion of the
funds ordered to be paid from the escrow account.
Paragraph
4 of the challenged Order awards payment of $75,142 in arrearages in support
for Kathrin “from the ‘frozen account’ on deposit at Mara Escrow Company, . . .
reflecting the net sales proceeds from [the Shenandoah Street condominium sales] in the amount of $568,668.79.†Paragraph 7 of the Order awards payment of
$493,526.79 from the frozen Mara Escrow account to Kathrin’s attorneys, out of a
total award of $1 million.
In
support of these orders, the trial court found that if Landmark West had any interest
in the loan transaction between it and Shenanwood for Shenanwood’s acquisition
of the property for the Shenandoah
Street condominium project,
“Landmark West’s interests, if any, were not properly secured and perfected.†The trial court’s determination that
Shenanwood—admittedly wholly owned and controlled by George—is entitled to the
proceeds of the Shenandoah
Street condominium sales
frozen in the Mara Escrow account, and therefore that Landmark has no interest
in them, is supported by substantial evidence.
The
initial order freezing the funds, filed September 17, 2009 (Jill Robbins, Judge Pro Tem), required Mara Escrow Company to hold
specified condominium sales proceeds in its account pending further court order,
and prohibited the parties from interfering in any manner with the escrow
process.
title="">[10]
On November 16, 2009, the court revised its freezing order to find that the escrow funds
resulting from the sale of one of the condominium units then totaled
$568,668.79, and to extend the restraining orders with respect to those funds.
Landmark
West (and George) contend that Landmark West is neither owned nor controlled by
George; that Landmark West, not Shenanwood (or George), is contractually
entitled to the frozen escrow funds; and therefore that the court abused its
discretion by ordering those funds to be used to pay the fees of Kathrin’s
attorneys. However, those contentions
are dispelled by evidence that: George
had exercised substantial control over both Shenanwood and Landmark West in the
Shenandoah Street condominium project and other circumstances; by evidence that
Landmark West records indicate the absence of any bona fide debt owed to
Landmark West by Shenanwood; by the court’s conclusions that George “was not
credible†regarding his cash flow and management of assets acquired and under
his control during the marriage; by the finding that George had used “a
labyrinth of companies and trusts†to obtain funds for his personal use while
concealing their sources; and that during the marriage he had controlled not
just Shenanwood, but also Landmark West and the Branmark Trust, which owned 85
percent of Landmark West.
It was
in this respect that the court found this case to be similar to the
circumstances in Marriage of Dick,
that Landmark West contends is unjustified.
In Marriage of Dick, the trial
court had found, upon substantial evidence, that the husband had the ability to
pay the amounts ordered for temporary support and attorney fees, despite his
denials. “It is clear that the trial
court utterly disbelieved him, and its assessment of husband’s credibility is
binding on this court.†(
husband’s apparent control of entities in which he denied any interest, and his
denials of ownership of assets that he elsewhere treated as his. (Id.
at pp. 162-165.) George distinguishes
there the evidence suggested illegality and fraud by the husband. But the trial court in this case was entitled
to disbelieve George, and to find that his use of various entities to hold his
assets, with or without fraud or illegality, did not deprive him of the
resources or ability to cause payment of the funds awarded.
The
trial court’s conclusions in this case are supported by evidence that George
formed Shenanwood in 2005 in order to develop the Shenandoah Street property, which was then held in the name of Landmark West. According to George, he purchased the property
from Landmark with a bank loan, along with a loan of about $4.1 million from
Landmark West secured by the property, and that Shenanwood eventually sold or
leased (at a loss) all of the condominium units it had built. If it were true that Shenanwood had a
legitimate outstanding debt of $4.1 million to Landmark West on Shenanwood’s
note, (and if Landmark West was not an entity controlled by George), then Landmark
West, not Shenanwood, would be entitled to the proceeds of the condominium
sales—the funds that the Order required to be paid to Kathrin and her
attorneys. However, the trial court,
based on the evidence found to the contrary.
In
connection with its orders freezing the escrow funds, however, the trial court
had before it ample evidence indicating that the transaction between Landmark
West and Shenanwood was not an arms-length sale between independent entities. Evidence and previous court findings
indicated that in purchasing the properties from Landmark, Shenanwood had
executed two different promissory notes for the same property, dated two days
apart, with different terms; that the deed had not been executed at the same
time as the purported note; and that by the time the deed was actually executed,
it had been clear that the condominium project could not be a financial success,
based on the parties’ own figures. The
evidence showed, in addition, that in mid-2007 (about 6 months before Kathrin
filed her dissolution petition) Landmark West had issued checks to George
totaling $250,000.
name="_ftnref11" title="">[11]
And as of September 30, 2007, George
prepared a consolidated financial statement claiming that his net
worth—combined with Landmark West and other entities—was over $29 million, his consolidated
financial statement dated August 30, 2006 showed a net worth of more than $23
million, and his consolidated financial statement dated March 19, 2008 showed a
net worth of more than $21 million. George
signed the purchase agreement and escrow instructions for the Shenandoah
property on behalf of both the seller and the purchaser, and the promissory
note on behalf of both the borrower and lender.
Despite
the purported January
31, 2007 sale of the Shenandoah Street property by Landmark West to Shenanwood, George’s financial
statement dated August 30, 2008 identifies the Shenandoah Street property as being owned “100%†by Landmark West. Moreover, Landmark West’s general ledger as of
December 31,
2007 showed the balance owed by Shenanwood
on the note as zero. The note was not
recorded.
Based
on these and other facts, Kathrin’s expert witness testified that George had
created a sham loan to Landmark West in order to shift condominium sales
proceeds from Shenanwood to Landmark West, both of which George controlled, and
that the proceeds from the condominium sales—the funds in the Mara Escrow
account—“should belong to the owner of the property, Shenanwood, and not the
fictitious lender, [Landmark West].â€
interests [in the proceeds of the Shenandoah Street condominium project], if any, were not properly secured and
perfected.â€
It
is true, as George argues at length, that he offered evidence and explanations
for many of these circumstances, which, if credited, might have justified
conclusions contrary to those reached by the trial court.
evidence that supports the trial court’s order, and to disregard that which
does not. (Ross v. Lawrence, supra, 219
Cal.App.2d at p. 231; Estate of Teel,
supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 524.) The trial court’s determination that Landmark
West is not entitled to the funds frozen in the Mara Escrow account is
supported by substantial evidence.
Conclusion
Because
Landmark West has no interest in the funds awarded by the trial court for the
payment of attorney fees to Kathrin’s attorneys, it lacks standing to challenge
the trial court’s determinations that George exercised control over Landmark
West’s affairs, that Landmark West did not cause or incur the ordered fees,
that Landmark West was not an alter ego of George, or that the fee award was in
any way improper or unjustified. The
outcome of those challenges could not entitle Landmark West to the funds that
the Order requires Mara Escrow to pay to Kathrin’s attorneys.
Disposition
The
Order of September 23, 2010 is affirmed, without prejudice to the trial court’s
discretion to determine the extent to which any party to the underlying action
has been prejudiced by the filing and maintenance of appeals in this matter by
or on behalf of any party that knew or should have known that it lacked either reasonably
arguable standing to maintain its appeal, or reasonably arguable grounds for
appeal; and to order payment of reasonable fees and costs arising from such
determination. Respondent is entitled to
her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CHANEY,
J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.
MILLER, J.
of clarity. (Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 584, fn. 1.)
Family Code section 2032 based on the parties’ stipulation.
