face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">In re O.P.
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">Filed 1/28/14 In re O.P.
CA4/2
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">In re O.P., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman"> Plaintiff and Respondent,
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">v.
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">C.P. et al.,
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman"> Defendants and Appellants.
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman"> E059335
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman"> (Super.Ct.No. J244556)
face="Times New Roman">
face="Times New Roman"> O P I N I O N
face="Times New Roman">
APPEAL from the
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant A.N.
Matthew I. Thue, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.P.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and
Danielle E. Wuchenich, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Defendants and appellants, A.N.
(Mother) and C.P. (Father), are the parents of O.P. In this case initiated by plaintiff and respondent,
San Bernardino
County Children and Family
Services (CFS), the juvenile court removed O.P. from the parents’ custody
because of the parents’ drug use and domestic violence issues. O.P. was placed with his maternal
grandparents. After the parents failed
to reunify with O.P., CFS recommended that the maternal grandparents adopt O.P.
At a hearing held pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.26,
selected adoption as the permanent plan for O.P. The maternal grandparents are the prospective
adoptive parents.
On appeal, Mother argues the court erred by: (1) failing to grant an evidentiary hearing
on Mother’s request for change of court
order, or section 388 petition; and (2) failing to apply the beneficial parental
relationship exception to terminating
court’s orders.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Detention (May – June 2012)
In May 2012, Mother and Father were arrested
following an altercation in which Father attempted to gouge Mother’s eye out
and Mother broke Father’s nose. Their
18-month-old son, O.P., was in the house at the time of the fight.
After the parents were released from jail, a
social worker met with Mother. Mother initially
described the fight with Father as a verbal altercation. She later admitted the fight became physical,
but would not give the social worker details.
She admitted that she and Father used marijuana; Mother used it for her
glaucoma and Father for his bi-polar disorder.
O.P.’s maternal grandmother told the social
worker that the parents had fought other times, but never so violently. According to the maternal grandmother, Mother
and O.P. were supposed to stay at her home following’s Mother’s release from
jail; however, they stayed with her only one night before returning to Father’s
house.
CFS took O.P. into protective custody. He was placed with maternal grandmother.
CFS filed a juvenile dependency petition
based on section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). CFS alleged Mother and Father engaged in
domestic violence in the presence of O.P., putting the child at substantial
risk of serious physical harm, and the parents suffered from substance abuse issues
that impaired their ability to appropriately parent O.P.
At a detention hearing, the court found a
prima facie case for juvenile court jurisdiction under section 300 and placed O.P.
in the temporary custody of CFS. The
court ordered separate, supervised visits for each parent to take place once
each week.
B. Jurisdiction/Disposition
(June – July 2012)
In a report prepared for the jurisdictional/dispositional
hearing, CFS described evidence of the parents’ history of domestic violence
and drug use. In addition to the
incident that led to their arrest, Father reported two other instances of
physical fights with Mother. The first occurred
when Mother was pregnant, before O.P. was conceived. (That pregnancy was terminated by an abortion.) Regarding drug use, Mother said she first
used marijuana when she was 12 years old and began using on a nightly basis
since she was 16 years old. (She was 22
years old at the time of the social worker’s report.) Father admitted using marijuana every morning
and night (and midday on his days off from
work) when he could afford to do so. He
had also used Percocet, morphine, and ecstasy.
The social worker opined that “neither parent
would intentionally harm the child, however[,] it is clear he would be at risk
with either parent due to domestic violence and substance abuse issues.†“The escalating intensity of the violence,â€
she added, “puts the child at serious risk for physical harm. Furthermore, the parents minimizing the
severity of the violence show that they do not understand the effect that it is
having on their child.â€
The parents’ visits with O.P. were described
as “positive.â€
At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the court found the
allegations of the petition true, declared O.P. a dependent of the court, and
removed him from the parents’ custody.
Reunification services were ordered for the parents. O.P. continued to be placed with maternal
grandmother.
C. Six-month Review Period
(July 2012 – February 2013)
During the next six months, Mother reportedly “made substantial
progress†in therapy and was “able to address her anger issues as well as [her]
and [Father’s] unhealthy relationship.†She completed parenting education and anger
management programs, and was attending a domestic violence program. According to the social worker, Mother
“appears to be motivated toward reunifying with [O.P.],†“has been
cooperative,†“visits frequently with [O.P.],†“and is actively engaged in her
case plan.â€
Regarding her marijuana use, Mother “relapsed by testing positive
for marijuana†on one occasion in late November 2012. Nine other tests were negative. Mother said the relapse occurred when she
smoked marijuana with Father. However, Father
denied this; while he admitted smoking marijuana, he said he did not do so with
Mother.
Although Father’s case plan required substance abuse treatment, Father
informed the social worker he would not participate in such a program because
he had a medical marijuana card. He did
not report for drug testing during the six-month review period. Father began an anger management program in
September 2012 and had not completed the program by the time the social worker
made her report.
In November 2012, a social worker indicated
there was a compelling reason to find that terminating parental rights at that
time would be detrimental to the child because the parents had maintained
regular visits and O.P. would benefit from continuing the relationship.
In December 2012, the parents were involved in a domestic violence
incident. As a result, Father was
arrested and charged with inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant and
with being “involved in a hit and run with property damage . . . .†Ten days later, Mother obtained a restraining
order against Father.
As Mother progressed in her case plan, her
visits with O.P. were liberalized to eight hours per week. However, after her marijuana relapse, visits
were reduced to four hours per week. The
social worker observed that her visits were “very consistent and appropriateâ€
and Mother “and [O.P.] appear to be well bonded.†Father’s visits were not consistent. He missed several visits due to his “hectic
work schedule†and, later, his incarceration for the December domestic violence
incident.
Although the social worker indicated concern
over Mother’s marijuana relapse and her “unhealthy interaction†with Father,
the social worker concluded that Mother would be able to continue to address
her issues if she was provided with continued services.
At a six-month review hearing in January
2013, the court told Mother that she was “doing really well on [her] plan,†and
there was “no problem†with her; Father “is the problem.†The court admonished Mother not “to go around
[Father] and expose [her] child to domestic violence.†Mother told the court she did not plan to
have any contact with Father.
The court made a tentative ruling to terminate services for
Father. Father’s counsel requested the
matter be set for a contested hearing.
In January 2013, a social worker observed Mother and Father
embracing and kissing outside Father’s home.
Mother initially denied the contact, but later admitted she had spent
the night at Father’s house.
In early February 2013, Mother and Father
were at a nightclub together. Later,
they went to Father’s house and had a violent physical altercation, causing
injuries to each of them. A search by
law enforcement of Father’s house revealed Mother’s “ID,†credit card, and telephone,
as well as marijuana paraphernalia, a shotgun barrel, a shotgun magazine tube,
and a 12-gauge shotgun round. Father was
arrested on charges of spousal abuse, violating a domestic violence order, and
being a felon in possession of ammunition.
At the contested review hearing held in
February 2013, the court terminated services for each parent and set a hearing
to be held pursuant to section 366.26.
Regarding visitation, Mother’s counsel requested visits of four hours
per week. The court responded: “I’ll agree with you on this one in this
case. Counsel has represented that
you’re bonded with [O.P.]. I don’t know
if it will change anything when we have the [section 366.26] hearing, but it is
the only thing as far as I’m concerned you have going for you.†Visits between Father and O.P. were limited
to two hours, twice each month.
D. Section 388 Petition and
Section 366.26 Hearing (March – December 2013)
In April 2013, Father and Mother were
involved in another domestic violence incident.
As a result, Father was arrested on charges of burglary (of Mother’s
residence), inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant, and violating a
protective order. He remained in custody
throughout the remainder of the juvenile court proceedings.
In a report prepared in May 2013 for the section 366.26 hearing, CFS
recommended that parental rights be terminated and a permanent plan of adoption
be implemented. The social worker
reported that O.P.’s maternal grandparents, with whom O.P. had been placed
since he was detained, wished to adopt the child. The child reportedly viewed the prospective
adoptive parents as his parental figures.
The maternal grandparents indicated that after adoption, O.P. “will
continue a relationship with [Mother] so long as the relationship is beneficial
for [him.]†However, the social worker
said it is unlikely that the prospective adoptive parents would feel it is safe
to continue contact with Father.
In June 2013, Mother filed her section 388 petition. She requested that the court return O.P. to
her custody or, in the alternative, reinstate reunification services and
liberalize visitation. Mother listed the
following changed circumstances: she is
in a drug treatment program and testing clean; she is participating in anger
management and parenting classes; she is in therapy; her visits with O.P. have
been regular and positive; and she is employed and has suitable housing. She asserted that the requested change would
be beneficial to O.P. because she “has a close bond with [O.P.] and loves him
very much[, and] believes that he should be raised by his mother.†Attached to the petition was documentary
evidence of her participation in drug treatment services and classes in anger
management and parenting, notes regarding her visits with O.P., and therapy
progress reports.
The court set a hearing on the petition. The written order does not indicate any
limitation concerning the presentation of additional evidence. However, when minor’s counsel asked the court
whether the order setting the hearing was “for an evidentiary hearing†or
whether the parties would be “arguing the issue of prima facie on that date,â€
the court stated, “[y]ou’re arguing prima facie and you might be doing the
hearing.â€
CFS filed two more reports prior to the hearing. In the first, CFS recommended that Mother’s
section 388 petition be denied. While
acknowledging “the plethora of services†Mother has participated in, CFS expressed
“concern about whether [Mother] has truly benefited from services and can truly
refrain from engaging in domestic violence.â€
The social worker observed that Mother had been untruthful about her contact
with Father and that the two had engaged in “approximately four reported
domestic violence incidents†during the reporting period. The most recent incident resulted in Father’s
incarceration.
In the second report, the social worker
reported that Mother had attended most of her scheduled visits with O.P. and acted
appropriately. O.P. became excited when
Mother arrived for the visits. He
reportedly enjoyed the visits, “but is able to separate at the conclusion of
visits without becoming upset by [Mother’s] departure.†Father’s visits with O.P. were also described favorably. However, Father had not visited O.P. since
his arrest in April 2013.
The hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition was heard in July 2013. CFS submitted after introducing the agency’s
section 366.26 report and the two reports prepared in response to the section
388 petition. The court then called for
argument. Mother’s counsel presented
argument based upon the documents attached to Mother’s petition. Counsel for O.P., CFS, and Father each argued
against granting the petition.
In denying the petition, the court
explained: “I can tell you, on its face,
the [section] 388 request looks solid.
However, by the time it came before the Court, [Mother] had again
engaged in domestic violence with [Father].
. . . So granting the [section] 388 [petition] is not in the
best interest of the child. [Mother has]
failed to demonstrate true change of circumstances. Yes, going to meetings and counseling is
good, but if you don’t get anything out of it, then you’re completely wasting your
time, which is the way it looks.
[¶] So with that in mind, the [section]
388 [petition], to grant it, is not in the best interest of [O.P.], and it does
not state new evidence or change of circumstances. So, the [section] 388 [petition] is dispensed
with.â€
The court then held the section 366.26
hearing. Mother did not testify. Father testified and presented the testimony
of O.P.’s paternal grandfather and paternal grandfather’s girlfriend. Following argument, the court found that O.P.
was adoptable and the parents’ bond with O.P. was “not significant enough to
change the plan of adoption.†The court then
ordered that the parents’ parental rights be terminated and selected adoption
as the permanent plan. The parents
appealed.
III. ANALYSIS
face="Times New Roman">A.
Mother contends the court erred by failing to
hold a “full evidentiary hearing†on her section 388 petition. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the
court’s handling of the hearing and no deprivation of due process, we reject
this argument.
name="_ftnref3" title="">face="Times New Roman">[3]
face="Times New Roman">Section 388, subdivision (a) provides: “Any parent or other person having an
interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court
. . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence,
petition the court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set
aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of
the court. The petition shall be
verified and . . . shall set forth in concise language any change of
circumstance or new evidence that is alleged to require the change of order or
termination of jurisdiction.â€
face="Times New Roman">The question of whether to grant a
hearing on a section 388 petition is governed by subdivision (d) of that
statute, which provides: “If it appears
that the best interests of the child . . . may be
promoted by the proposed change of order . . . the court shall order
that a hearing be held . . . .†The petitioner establishes the requisite
appearance by making a “prima facie showing†demonstrating (1) a genuine change
of circumstances or new evidence and (2) the requested change would be in the
child’s best interest. (
Dist., Div. Two]; In re Anthony W. (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) A prima facie
showing is made when the evidence submitted in support of the petition refers to
facts that will sustain a decision favorable to the petitioner. (In re Edward H.
(1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.)
face="Times New Roman">Although the record is not clear as
to whether the court in this case found that Mother’s petition established the
required prima facie showing, it did grant Mother a hearing on her
petition. CFS concedes that Mother’s
petition established a prima facie case entitling her to a hearing.
face="Times New Roman">Section 388 does not specify the
nature or conduct of the hearing that “the court shall order,†or whether and
what type of additional evidence must be received. That question is governed by rule 5.570(h) of
the California Rules of Court.
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1339 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two];
court is required to conduct the hearing on a section 388 petition “as a
disposition hearingâ€â€”i.e., a hearing at which (among other requirements) the
“court must receive in evidence and consider . . . any relevant
evidence offered by . . . the parent or guardian.†(Rules 5.570(h)(2), 5.690(b).) These situations arise when: “(A) The
request is for removal from the home of the parent or guardian or to a more
restrictive level of placement; [¶] (B) The
request is for termination of court-ordered reunification services; or [¶] (C) There is a due process right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses.†(Rule
5.570(h)(2).) The
first two situations are patently inapplicable here. The third was not raised below and is not
asserted on appeal.
face="Times New Roman">When, as here, the situation is not
among the three specified in rule 5.570(h)(2), the rule further provides that “proof
may be by
declaration and other documentary evidence, or by testimony, or both, at the
discretion of the court.†(Rule
5.570(h)(2) (last. sent.); see In re Lesly G., supra,
162 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.) This
rule is in accord with the long-held understanding “that juvenile proceedings need not be ‘conducted
with all the strict formality of a criminal proceeding.’ [Citations.]â€
(In re Lesly G., supra, at p. 914.) Thus, even when the petition and its
supporting evidence are sufficient to entitle the petitioner to a hearing, “the
right to a hearing does not necessarily entitle the petitioning party to a full
evidentiary hearing.†(
In re C.J.W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1080-1081 [hearing requirement of § 388 satisfied by hearing limited
to receipt of written evidence and substantial argument from counsel].)
face="Times New Roman">Although the juvenile court has discretion to
limit the evidence at a section 388 hearing, such discretion “is not absolute
and does not override due process considerations.†(
must be determined ‘what process is due.’
[Citations.]†(
flexible concept which depends upon the circumstances and a balancing of
various facts.†(Ibid.;
In re Jeanette V. (1998)
68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817.)
In re C.J.W., supra,
instructive. In that case, the juvenile
court held a hearing on the parents’ section 388 petitions, but did not allow the
parents to testify. (
It did, however, “receive written evidence and heard substantial
argument from counsel for the parties.†(
appeal, this court held that the hearing “comported with due process,†citing
the failure of the parents to identify what further evidence they wanted to
present and the fact that the juvenile court appeared to base its ruling on the
paucity of evidence submitted by the parents in their petitions, not on the
social workers’ reports. (
face="Times New Roman">Here, it appears the court received and
considered the documentary evidence attached to Mother’s section 388 petition,
which the court said “looks solid.†The
parents did not make a further offer of proof or otherwise indicate what
evidence they would have offered if a “full evidentiary hearing†had been held.
they desired to testify or requested to cross-examine a social worker about
statements in the reports.
face="Times New Roman">A fact that potentially distinguishes
the social workers’ reports, while the court in this case appears to have based
its ruling on the social workers’ reports that Mother “had again engaged in
domestic violence with [Father].†Such
reliance on the social workers in this case, however, does not raise a due
process concern because the parents did not dispute any facts set forth in the
social workers’ reports or indicate any desire to cross-examine the social
workers or present evidence to rebut the statements. Indeed, during argument, Mother’s counsel
expressly “acknowledge[d] the April 1st domestic violence incident.†Father’s counsel went further, arguing against
granting Mother’s petition because of concern for Mother’s “cannibalistic
traits.â€
face="Times New Roman">In their briefs on appeal, neither parent
identifies what additional evidence they would have presented if permitted to
do so. Under these circumstances, we
hold the court acted within the discretion it was given under rule 5.570(h)(2)
regarding the conduct of the hearing and that the parents were not deprived of
due process.
face="Times New Roman">The cases Mother primarily relies upon are
inapposite. In re Hashem
H. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1791 and In re
Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424 involved juvenile court rulings
that denied a parent’s section 388 petition without any hearing
whatsoever. (See In re Hashem
H., supra, at p. 1798; In re Aljamie D., supra,
at p. 429.) In In re Hashem
H., the ruling was erroneous because the mother’s petition
demonstrated “an adequate prima facie showing of changed circumstances . . . ,
which required the court to hold a hearing.â€
(In re Hashem H., supra, at p.
1800.) The petition in
hearing. (In re
Aljamie D., supra, at p. 432.)
In contrast to both these cases, Mother was granted a hearing in this
case. The cited cases do not address the
situation presented here in which a hearing is granted, but the hearing is
something less than a full evidentiary hearing.
face="Times New Roman">Finally, the parents’ argument is focused on
the court’s decision to hold a limited hearing on the section 388
petition. It does not appear to us that
they are making the further claim that, if the hearing was procedurally
sufficient, the court’s ruling on the merits was wrong. To the extent they are making such an
argument it is rejected; the evidence of Mother’s ongoing contact and physical
altercations with Father is sufficient to support the court’s findings that
Mother had not demonstrated a change of circumstance and that the requested
change was not in O.P.’s best interest.
B. Beneficial Parent-child
Relationship Exception to Adoption
Mother contends the court erred in failing to apply the beneficial
parental relationship exception to terminating parental rights set forth in
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile
court determines a permanent plan of care for a dependent child. (In re Celine R.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52-53; In re Casey D.
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50.) Adoption
is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. (In re Autumn H.
(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.) “‘Only
if adoption is not possible, or if there are countervailing circumstances, or
if it is not in the child’s best interests are other, less permanent plans,
such as guardianship or long-term foster care considered.’ [Citation.]â€
(Id. at p. 574.)
“Once the court determines the child is
likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show that termination
of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the
exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1).†(In re S.B.
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297.) One
such exception is the beneficial parental relationship exception. This exception applies when there is “a
compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the
child†because the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with
the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.†(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
Here, CFS does not dispute that Mother satisfied the threshold requirement
of regular visitation. We are therefore
concerned only with whether Mother established the existence of a beneficial
parental relationship and a compelling reason as to how termination of the
parental relationship would be detrimental to the children.
face="Times New Roman">To prove the existence of a beneficial
parental relationship, the “parent must do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and
loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond with the child, or that parent
and child find their visits pleasant.
[Citation.]†(
promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the
well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive
parents. In other words, the court balances
the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous
placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would
confer. If severing the natural
parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the
preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not
terminated.†(In re Autumn
H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
The juvenile court in the present case
addressed the beneficial parental relationship exception in its ruling when it
stated that the parents’ bond with O.P. was “not significant enough to change
the plan of adoption.â€
In reviewing challenges to a trial court’s decision as to the
applicability of the beneficial parental relationship exception, we will employ
the substantial evidence or abuse of discretion standards of review depending
on the nature of the challenge. (
of review to evaluate the evidentiary showing with respect to factual issues. (
determination of questions such as whether, given the existence of a beneficial
parental relationship, there is a compelling reason for determining that
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child “is a
quintessentially discretionary determination.†(In re Scott B.
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 469.) We
review such decisions for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) In the dependency context, both standards call
for a high degree of appellate court deference. (Ibid.;
Mother points to the evidence of her regular
visits with O.P., reports that O.P. was excited about and enjoyed the visits,
and her “loving relationship with O.P.â€
CFS acknowledges that Mother’s visits with O.P. “went well and were
consistent,†but adds that O.P. “never perceived [M]other in a parental role.†Although the two played together during
visits, Mother did not bathe, feed, clothe, or put O.P. to bed for a nap. Mother was, CFS contends, “merely a
playdate.â€
The evidence described by Mother is the kind of evidence of “‘“frequent
and loving contactâ€â€™â€ that courts have found is not sufficient to establish the
existence of a beneficial parental relationship. (See, e.g., In re
Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643; In re Bailey
J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1315-1316; In re Derek
W., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 827.) Although such interaction “will always confer
some incidental benefit to the child†(Autumn H, supra,
27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575), the beneficial parental relationship exception to
adoption contemplates that the parent occupy a parental role in the child’s
life (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th
1411, 1419). Although CFS’s “playdateâ€
comment is unnecessarily pejorative, we agree that the juvenile court could
reasonably have concluded that Mother did not occupy a parental role in O.P.’s
life.
Even if O.P. and Mother shared a strong
parent-child bond, Mother has failed to establish that severing that bond would
be detrimental to O.P. A social worker
reported that O.P. views the prospective adoptive parents—his maternal grandparents—as
parental figures and that O.P. is able to separate from Mother at the end of
visits without becoming upset. There is
no evidence from any social worker, caregiver, or therapist suggesting that
O.P. would be harmed if his relationship with Mother was terminated.
Mother relies on a statement by a social worker made by checking a
box on a printed form indicating that the beneficial parental relationship
exception would apply. This form does
not appear to have been offered or introduced into evidence at the section
366.26 hearing. Moreover, that statement
was made in November 2012—eight months before the section 366.26 hearing and
prior to Mother’s relapse for marijuana use and the incidents with Father that
led to the termination of services. Even
if it had been before the court at the hearing, it would likely have had little
or no persuasive value.
Based on our review of the record, the court
did not err in concluding that the beneficial parental relationship exception
to adoption did not apply.
IV. DISPOSITION
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
face="Times New Roman">NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
face="Times New Roman">KING
face="Times New Roman"> J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
MILLER
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> face="Times New Roman">face="Times New Roman">[1] All further statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
name="_ftn2" title=""> face="Times New Roman">face="Times New Roman">[2] Counsel for Father asserted
that Mother had not benefitted from her services. She added:
“The underlying issue as far as [Father is] concerned is the safety of
[O.P.], and Father feels that with Mother’s cannibalistic traits, one of which
points to Father. . . .â€
The court interrupted her at this point and asked about her use of the
word “cannibalistic.†Counsel then
invited Father to explain. Father (who
was not under oath) stated: “She ate my
ear in the last fight in April.†Father
attributed this to Mother’s “alcoholism and other drug habits.â€
