In re Anna M.
Filed 1/23/14 In
re Anna M. CA2/6
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re ANNA M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
2d Juv. No. B250445
(Super. Ct. No. J069092)
(Ventura
County)
VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
ANTHONY M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Anthony M. (father)
appeals from the juvenile court orders
terminating parental rights
to his daughter, Anna, and establishing adoption as her permanent plan (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 366.26).href="#_ftn1"
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] Father contends that the
finding of Anna's adoptability
is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2012 mother gave birth to
Anna, and the Ventura County Human Services Agency (HSA) removed Anna from her
care. Father was in custody. On October 30, 2012,
HSA filed a petition alleging that
mother and father were unable to protect and support Anna. (§ 300, subds. (b), (g).) HSA placed Anna with prospective adoptive
parents in late October.
Beginning in December 2012, father
had weekly one-hour supervised visits with Anna. On January 22, 2013, the juvenile court
ordered a bypass of reunification services for father
because he had failed to reunify with other children "due to [his] unaddressed
drug addiction" and a history of domestic
violence. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10),
(11), (13).) Father continued attending supervised
visits with Anna. The HSA personnel who
observed their visits did not detect any significant relationship between
them.
On June 20, 2013, the juvenile court conducted contested section 366.26 proceedings
to select Anna's permanent plan. It
admitted the section 366.26 report in which HSA recommended that the court
terminate the parental rights of both parents and select adoption as her
permanent plan. HSA reported that Anna
was still in the home of the prospective adoptive parents who had cared for her
for most of her life. The social worker
described Anna as a happy baby with an upbeat personality who has "met all
of her educational milestones."
Father testified he had visited Anna
consistently. During their visits, she
smiled and was excited to see him. He
cared for her, talked to her, comforted her, and played with her. She reached for him at the beginning and end
of each visit.
The juvenile court found that father
failed to establish that the parental benefit exception precluded its selecting
adoption as the preferred plan for Anna.
The court terminated the parental rights of both parents, found that Anna
was adoptable, and ordered adoption planning services.
DISCUSSION
Father contends there is not
sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that he failed to
establish the "parental benefit" exception to the statutory
preference for adoption. We disagree.
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1),
requires the juvenile court to terminate parental rights if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that a child is likely to be adopted, unless "the
court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be
detrimental to the child" due to an enumerated statutory exception. The "beneficial parental relationship"
exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), requires a showing of "regular
visitation and contact" and "benefit" to the child from "continuing
the relationship." (>In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
454, 466.) Only in the "extraordinary
case" can a parent establish the exception because the permanent plan
hearing occurs after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet
the child's needs. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
The exception requires proof of "a
parental relationship," not merely a relationship that is "beneficial
to some degree but does not meet the child's need for a parent." (In re
Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) The existence of a beneficial relationship is
determined by the age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in
parental custody, the quality of interaction between parent and child, and the
child's particular needs. (>In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th
681, 689 [beneficial relationship exists where children in mother's care the
majority of their lives].)
The juvenile court found that father
did not show he had a parental relationship with Anna, in the limited time he
spent with her. Under any standard of
review, the juvenile court's finding is proper because father did not meet his
burden of establishing the "extraordinary case" of the beneficial parental
relationship exception. (>In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1350; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 212, 229 ["To meet the burden of proof, the parent must show
more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or
pleasant visits"].) For nearly all
of Anna's life, she lived with prospective adoptive parents who satisfied her
daily needs for protection, guidance, food, shelter and medical care. She never lived with father. His one-hour supervised visits with Anna may
have been beneficial to some degree, but they did not meet her need for a
parent. (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.) As the court observed, her prospective
adoptive parents had met that need. Father
has not established that terminating his parental rights "would deprive
[Anna] of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that [she] would be greatly harmed." (>Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The orders finding Anna to be
adoptable and terminating parental rights are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
PERREN,
J.
We
concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
>
Ellen Gay Conroy, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Jamie A. Moran, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leroy Smith, County Counsel, Linda
L. Stevenson, Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
id=ftn1>
href="#_ftnref1"
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated. The court also terminated the parental rights
of Anna's mother, Shelly G. She is not a
party to this appeal.