P. v. Garza
Filed 1/29/14 P.
v. Garza CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
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8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MERIJILDO GARZA,
Defendant and Appellant.
G047307
(Super. Ct. No. 11WF0025)
O P I N I O N
Appeal
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Steven D. Bromberg, Judge. Affirmed.
Christine
Vento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R.
Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant
Sabrina Y. Lane-Erwin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
A jury
found defendant Merijildo Garza guilty of two counts of committing a lewd and
lascivious act upon a child under 14 years old, and one count of sexually
penetrating a child 10 years of age or younger.
The jury also found true several enhancement allegations.
We
affirm. The trial court did not err by
admitting evidence, under Evidence Code section 1108, showing that Garza previously
committed other uncharged sexual offenses. The court properly exercised its discretion
under Evidence Code section 352 before admitting that evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. In his opening brief, Garza argues that we
must direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the
correct statutory violation for which he was convicted in count 2 of the
information. During the pendency of this
appeal, an amended abstract of judgment, citing the correct statute for count 2,
was filed.
FACTS
I.
Offenses Committed Against A.
On January 20, 2010, four‑year‑old A. lived in an apartment with her
brother and parents, G. and V. That
evening, V.’s then 76‑year‑old grandfather, Garza, offered the use
of his car to G. so that she could drive to a Subway restaurant to purchase
sandwiches for G., Garza, and the children.
G. accepted Garza’s offer and left the children in Garza’s care. This was not an unusual turn of events. Garza frequently came to the apartment,
sometimes weekly, and would watch the children when G. and V. were out; Garza
provided G. money for the purpose of going out and buying things for the
children or for the purpose of G. and V. going out to eat or to see a movie.
In the
late evening of January 20, G. saw A. lying on her bed and rubbing her
vaginal area with both hands. G. asked
A. what she was doing. A. said she was
touching herself. G. asked A. why she
was doing that and where she learned to do this. A. told G. that Garza, whom A. referred to as
“Grandpa Joe,†had “put his fingers there†and that “Grandpa Joe did it to
me.†She also told G. that Garza had
moved her underwear and put two fingers in her “pee‑pee†area. A. said that “it†happened every time G. left
the apartment and that, on one other occasion, Garza took A. to the laundry
room and put his fingers into her vagina.
A. said that she told Garza to stop and that it hurt her.
G.
called the police. Sergeant Craig McIver
of the Garden Grove Police Department was dispatched to the apartment where he
spoke with G. and A. He asked A. what
had happened; A. pointed to her
“Grandpa Joe put his finger there.â€
McIver asked A. if Garza’s finger went inside of her; she said it did
and it felt bad.
A.
testified at trial. After initially
denying that Garza had touched her vaginal area, A. testified that he had
touched her on the “pee‑pee†once; when she told him to stop, he did. She had told G. the day it happened.
Garza’s
daughter, A.J., testified that after she heard about what happened to A., she
confronted Garza. Garza told her that he
did not remember doing anything to A. He
told A.J. that on the night in question, he noticed A. had a hole in her
underwear and told her about it. In
response to A.J.’s question whether Garza touched A.’s vaginal area, Garza said
he did not remember. A.J. asked Garza
what he meant by not remembering whether he had touched A.’s vaginal area;
Garza similarly responded, “I don’t remember.â€
II.
Offenses Committed Against B.
B., who
is one of Garza’s grandchildren, was 19 years old at the time of trial. She testified that when she was a seven‑
or eight‑year‑old third grader, she went to Garza’s house on the
weekends and spent the night. When B.
took a shower at Garza’s house, he would come into the bathroom and watch her
shower. B. testified Garza also rubbed
her thighs, and put his hand down her pants or pajamas and touched her vaginal
area outside of her underwear. She said
that would happen when she was sleeping or when he had her sit on his lap while
she played a game on the computer. B.
testified Garza’s conduct happened “[l]ots of times,†more than 15 and less
than 100. Garza’s conduct stopped when B.
was in either the fifth or the sixth grade and no longer went to his
house. B. testified she had not told
anyone, explaining that she was confused and knew Garza financially helped her
family. B. came forward after she heard
about A.; B. explained that after learning what Garza did to A., she thought “it
could have been my daughter, and I couldn’t have that happen.â€
III.
Summary of Evidence Regarding Garza’s Prior
Sexual Offenses
Other
female members of Garza’s family and female friends of his daughters testified
about prior instances of sexual abuse by Garza, which had occurred over several
decades. Garza’s daughter, M.G., who was
56 years old at the time of trial, testified that when she was eight years old,
Garza played the “snake game†with her, during which he would have her sit on
top of his groin area while he lay on his back on the floor and moved his
body. M.G. said they played the snake
game “several times.†Sometimes, Garza
would not be wearing a shirt. M.G.
remembered that she felt Garza’s penis was hard when they played the snake
game. She had not told anyone about the
snake game because it was hard to talk about, being so young, and she felt
embarrassed and uncomfortable talking about it.
M.G.
also testified that one day when she was 15 or 16 years old, she came home from
school and found Garza in the garage with one of her childhood friends who was “[a]round
12 to 14†years old. She saw Garza’s left
hand down the front of the girl’s pants and his right hand fondling her
breasts; he was also kissing the back of her neck. M.G. screamed at Garza, ran to the bathroom,
and got sick to her stomach. Garza
offered M.G. money and threatened that she had better not say anything about
what she had seen. That same day, M.G.
told her mother what had happened. M.G. had
not told anyone else because she was scared of Garza.
Another
of M.G.’s friends, C.S., who was 56 years old at the time of trial, testified
that when she was eight years old, she had spent the night at Garza’s
house. On both of those occasions, Garza
entered the room where she was sleeping, put his hands inside her underwear,
and “felt all in†her vaginal area.
Yet
another of M.G.’s friends, C.E., who was 48 years old at the time of trial,
testified that when she was five years old, she was walking home from school
one day when Garza called her over to him.
He fondled her vaginal area inside her underwear. C.E. testified that one time when she was in
kindergarten or the first grade, she spent the night at Garza’s house. Garza entered the room where she was
sleeping, pulled her down to the bottom of the bed, and orally copulated
her. She did not say anything to anyone about
what had happened.
A.B.,
who was 27 years old at the time of trial, grew up believing that Garza was her
father. Starting when A.B. was six or
seven years old, A.B. and her sister went to Garza’s house every weekend. They would spend the night. On more than 20 occasions, while the sisters
slept, Garza would pull down their pajamas or underwear, and touch them. He licked A.B.’s vaginal area. On one or two occasions, but not more than
four times, Garza inserted his penis into A.B.
A.B. saw him do the same thing to her sister once or twice. Garza called it “the secret game.†When A.B. would tell Garza she did not want
to play the game, he would not respond.
Instead, he would stop giving the sisters the toys and other items they
wanted. He told them to “keep it
quiet.â€
A.J.
testified that in 1987, she confronted Garza about molesting other family
members and neighbor friends. At first,
Garza told A.J. that “they were all lying,†then stated, “if I did, I don’t
remember.â€
IV.
Evidence Regarding the Theory of Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation
Clinical
and forensic psychologist Jody Ward testified about the theory known as child sexual
abuse accommodation. She testified about
the following five circumstances commonly present in child sexual abuse cases,
based on studies: (1) secrecy, (2) helplessness,
(3) entrapment and accommodation, (4) delayed and unconvincing
disclosure, and (5) recantation or retraction.
Ward
explained that child sexual abuse occurs in secret and the victims often keep
the abusive conduct secret because they are told to, and, sometimes, because
they are threatened to keep it secret.
She stated that children who are victims of sexual abuse feel a sense of
helplessness in light of the power differential between themselves and adults,
their following instructions to obey adults, their dependence on the adults
around them to provide for their physical and emotional needs, and their physical
inability to fight off the abuse and lack of resources to get out of the
situation. She further explained that
child sexual abuse victims become entrapped in the situation and accommodate
the abuse as a result of their tendency not to report the abuse right away. By acquiescing to the abuse, the child
victims often make it easy for the abuser to continue the abusive conduct. Ward testified that children who are victims
of sexual abuse tend to develop a blind spot and might fail to recognize that
they are putting themselves in a bad situation.
The child victims commonly feel they must tolerate the abuse to receive
the positive financial or emotional aspects of their relationship with their
abuser. Disclosure of sexual abuse is
often made after a delay, and such disclosures tend to be tentative or
hesitant. Child victims also have shown
a tendency to recant or retract reports of sexual abuse because they love their
abusers and do not want to see them go to jail.
V.
Defense
Garza
testified that “the allegations or charges†are not true. He admitted that A.J. confronted him and
asked him whether he put his fingers inside A.’s vagina. He responded that he had not, but if he had,
he did not remember.
BACKGROUND
Garza
was charged in an information with (1) committing a lewd and lascivious act
upon a child under 14 years of age (A.), in violation of Penal Code section 288,
subdivision (a) (count 1); (2) sexual penetration of a child 10
years of age or younger (A.), in violation of Penal Code section 288.7,
subdivision (b) (count 2); and (3) committing a lewd and
lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years (B.), in violation of
section 288, subdivision (a) (count 3). As to counts 1 and 3, the information
alleged, pursuant to Penal Code section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and
(e)(5), that, in the commission of those offenses, Garza committed an offense
specified in section 667.61, subdivision (c), against more than one
victim. The information further alleged,
as to counts 1 and 3, that pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.066,
subdivision (a)(7), Garza committed those offenses on more than one
victim.
The
jury found Garza guilty of all counts as charged in the information, and found
true the enhancement allegations as to counts 1 and 3. The trial court sentenced Garza to a total
prison term of 30 years to life. Garza
appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Trial Court Did Not Err by
Admitting Evidence of Garza’s Prior Uncharged Sexual Offenses Under Evidence
Code Section 1108.
In his
opening brief, Garza argues the evidence that he committed prior uncharged
sexual offenses should not have been admitted under Evidence Code sections 1108
and 352 because it lacked probative value and any such value was substantially
outweighed by its undue prejudicial effect.
For the reasons we will explain, the trial court’s admission of the
evidence of Garza’s prior uncharged sexual offenses was not error.
A.
Applicable Legal Principles
“Character
evidence, sometimes described as evidence of a propensity or disposition to
engage in a type of conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person’s
conduct on a specified occasion.
[Citations.] . . . The Legislature has . . . created
specific exceptions to the rule against admitting character evidence in cases
involving sexual offenses [citation],
and domestic violence, elder or dependent abuse, or child abuse
[citation]. [Citation.]†(People
v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1159, italics added.) Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a) provides: “In a criminal action in which the defendant
is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of
another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by
Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section
352.†(See People v. Falsetta
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911.)
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
Evidence
Code section 352 provides: “The
court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.†The California Supreme Court, in
supra,
21 Cal.4th at pages 916‑917, stated the trial court’s “careful weighing
process under
prior sex offense under
nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its
commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the
jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its
likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in
defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less
prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but
not all of the defendant’s other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though
inflammatory details surrounding the offense.†(See
1121
[trial court’s decision to admit evidence under
discretion];
B.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
Here,
the trial court analyzed, under Evidence Code section 352, whether to
admit the prior uncharged sexual offenses, stating:
“Is it inflammatory? Well, okay, I have yet to see an issue that
comes to this court or this tower from floors 8 to 11 that’s not
inflammatory. It’s all inflammatory. That comes back to the position where is it
any more inflammatory than the charges themselves, is it so inflammatory that
it’s going to confuse the jury. And
there is actually a crossover as to that entire issue.
“And I
haven’t actually seen that happen yet where it’s been confusing because it’s
usually laid out very carefully because prosecutors, quite frankly, are as
concerned as the court or anyone else about being reversed if it’s not done
properly. So I take these as they
come. It’s been laid out very succinctly
in the [prosecutor’s] brief as to what the evidence would be, you’ve now indicated
who you’re not going to call, so I don’t see that as being a reason to not
allow it because of the inflammatory nature or being confusing.
“Remote? That’s basically the whole issue with [Evidence
Code section ]1108 in more than half the cases that come up, as pointed
out in the brief. And that case has been
around for awhile also. 30 years might
not be remote. 50 years might not be
remote. Three years could be
remote. Depends on the circumstances.
“Again,
based on taking it for how it was set forth in the brief as to what the
evidence is intended to show, I don’t see remoteness as being an issue. It goes back to propensity, and that’s where
this all fits together almost like a puzzle.
“Consumption
of time. We’re here to do justice, and that’s—I
don’t see it as being a consumption of time.
The big issue is also, of course, raising the probative value versus the
prejudicial nature. That’s the whole
basis for 1108 in the first place.
“As for
a[n Evidence Code section] 352 analysis, I fully appreciate, [Garza’s counsel],
your position on that. I think in this
case, as it’s been laid out, and, quite frankly, the 23 pages of the People’s
brief w[ere] very thorough as to that issue, so I’m going to allow that.â€
Garza’s
counsel argued that A.B.’s testimony should not be admitted under Evidence Code
section 352 as being too remote in time in light of the different and more
serious nature of Garza’s sexual offenses against her and her sister. The trial court responded, “[b]ut what’s also
significant, which I think overcomes the remoteness, is the age. The alleged victims, whether they were the
family members or whether they were the sleepover friends, were all within the
same age. And I think that sort of—I
hate to use the word ‘trumps,’ but that does take out the remoteness concern
because, again, it’s that puzzle. And
that’s why we have to look at each one of these [Evidence Code section ]1108
motions so individually.â€
C.
by Admitting Evidence
of the Prior Uncharged Sexual Offenses.
The
trial court understood its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 and
exercised that discretion on the record in admitting the evidence of Garza’s prior
uncharged sexual offenses under Evidence Code section 1108. Garza contends that evidence should have been
excluded because it lacked probative value, and any probative value it had was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. For the reasons we explain, the trial court
did not err.
1.
The Evidence Admitted Under Evidence Code Section 1108
Was Probative.
Garza
argues the evidence of his prior uncharged sexual offenses, admitted under
Evidence Code section 1108, lacked probative value because it showed he
engaged in conduct that was remote in time and insufficiently similar to the
charged offenses, and also because “the sources of the evidence of these acts
were insufficiently independent of the charged offenses.â€
“‘No
specific time limits have been established for determining when an uncharged
offense is so remote as to be inadmissible.’
[Citation.] ‘“[S]ubstantial
similarities between the prior and the charged offenses balance out the
remoteness of the prior offenses. [Citation.]†[Citation.]’â€
(People v. Robertson (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 965, 992.) “Numerous
cases have upheld admission pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108 of
prior sexual crimes that occurred decades before the current offenses.†(Ibid.)
Here,
the evidence admitted under Evidence Code section 1108 showed Garza
committed sexual offenses dating back several decades, but also included
evidence of ongoing sexual offenses over the course of those decades. The remoteness of those offenses is more than
balanced out by their substantial similarity to the charged offenses, as we
have discussed in detail.
In
the California Supreme Court stated, “[t]he probative value of evidence of
uncharged misconduct also is affected by the extent to which its source is
independent of the evidence of the charged offense.†Some, if not all, of the prior sexual
offenses came to light after the
charged offenses occurred, and what had happened to A. was discussed among Garza’s
family members. In People v. Ewoldt, however, the Supreme Court stated that this
factor was of “limited significance†in that case because it was only after learning
the victim of the charged offense made a similar accusation, that the victim of
a prior sexual offense accused the defendant of molesting her. (Id.
at p. 405.) The Supreme Court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior
uncharged sexual offense evidence. (
2.
Exercised Its Discretion in Concluding the Prejudicial Impact of the Evidence
of Garza’s Prior Uncharged Sexual Offenses Did Not Substantially Outweigh Its
Probative Value.
Garza
argues the evidence of his prior uncharged sexual offenses “had an extensive
prejudicial effect†(underscoring omitted) as he was never convicted in
connection with any of the prior sexual offenses and the jury might have thus
been inclined to punish Garza for the uncharged sexual offenses. He also argues that the prior uncharged
sexual offenses involved conduct that was “more inflammatory than the evidence
of the charged offenses.â€
As
discussed ante, the prior uncharged sexual
offenses bore similarities to the charged offenses. Nothing in the record suggests that the jury
was inclined to punish Garza for committing the prior uncharged sexual offenses
instead of, or in addition to, the charged offenses, or that the jury was
otherwise confused by that evidence. We
recognize a few of the prior sexual offenses involved forms of sexual conduct
other than that charged in this case, such as oral copulation and sexual
intercourse. The trial court acknowledged
the nature of the evidence of Garza’s prior uncharged sexual offenses, but
concluded, after carefully conducting its Evidence Code section 352
analysis, that the prejudicial impact of that evidence did not substantially
outweigh its probative value. We cannot
say the trial court abused its discretion in reaching that conclusion.
II.
The Trial Court Did Not Err by
Admitting Ward’s Expert Testimony on the Theory of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation.
Garza
contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Ward’s expert
testimony regarding the theory of child sexual abuse accommodation and thereby violated
his constitutional rights to due process, to present a defense, and to have a
fair trial. For the reasons we explain,
Garza’s argument has no merit.
“[U]nder
subdivision (a) of [Evidence Code ]section 801, expert testimony is
admissible on any subject ‘sufficiently beyond common experience that the
opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.’†(People
v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 905.)
“It is beyond dispute that CSAAS [(child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome)] testimony is inadmissible to prove that a molestation actually
occurred. . . . [¶] [But] . . . CSAAS testimony has
been held admissible for the limited purpose of disabusing a jury of
misconceptions it might hold about how a child reacts to a molestation. [Citations.]
[¶] Identifying a ‘myth’ or ‘misconception’ has not been interpreted as
requiring the prosecution to expressly state on the record the evidence which
is inconsistent with the finding of molestation. It is sufficient if the victim’s credibility
is placed in issue due to the paradoxical behavior, including a delay in
reporting a molestation.
[Citations.]†(
1737, 1744‑1745.)
In
commentators have noted the close analogy between use of expert testimony to
explain the behavior of domestic violence victims, and expert testimony
concerning victims of rape or child abuse.
[Citations.] In
. . . , we held expert testimony concerning rape victims—the
rape trauma syndrome—to be admissible under [Evidence Code] section 801 to
dispel common misconceptions about how such victims behave [citation], but not
to prove that the victim had actually been raped [citation]. And in People
v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385 . . . , the Court of
Appeal said that when an allegedly abused child ‘recants his story in whole or
in part, a psychologist could testify on the basis of past research that such
behavior is not an uncommon response for an abused child. . . .’ [Citation.]
Although the expert in Bowker
had referred to the ‘child abuse accommodation syndrome,’ the Court of Appeal
observed: ‘[A]n expert has little need
to refer to the syndrome in order to testify that a particular type of behavior
is not inconsistent with a child having been abused.’ [Citation.]
[¶] Thereafter, in [People v.]
McAlpin [(1991)] 53 Cal.3d 1289, we
made it clear that admissibility of expert testimony does not depend on a
showing based on a recognized ‘syndrome.’
That case concerned expert testimony about the behavior of parents of
abused children. We first explained the
admissibility of evidence about the behavior of the children themselves: ‘[E]xpert testimony on the common reactions
of child molestation victims is not admissible to prove that the complaining
witness has in fact been sexually abused; it is admissible to rehabilitate such
witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct
after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her
testimony claiming molestation.
[Citations.] “Such expert
testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about
child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused
children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior.â€â€™â€
The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ward’s testimony. Garza
testified that he did not commit any sexual offenses against anyone, ever. Garza’s victims’ testimony raised questions
about why they delayed in reporting the alleged sexual abuse. The trial court stated that Ward was not to
refer to child sexual abuse accommodation as a syndrome but must refer to it as
a theory. Ward followed the court’s
direction. In addition, Ward testified
that she was unfamiliar with the facts of this case and that her testimony was
based on studies.
The
court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193, stating: “You have heard testimony from Dr. Jody
Ward regarding child sexual abuse theory.
[¶] Dr. Jody Ward’s testimony about child sexual abuse theory is
not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against
him. [¶] You may consider this evidence
only in deciding whether or not A[.]’s, B[.]’s, M[.]G.’s, [C.]S.’s, C[.]E.’s,
and A[.]B.’s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has
been molested, and in evaluating the believability of her testimony.â€
In
short, the court “handled the matter carefully and correctly†by admonishing
the jury on the limited purpose of the child sexual abuse accommodation
theory. (People v. Patino, supra,
26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1745) The jury
is presumed to have followed this instruction.
(People v.
We find
no error.
III.
The Abstract of Judgment Has Been
Amended to Reflect the Proper Penal Code Section Garza Was Convicted of Violating
in Count 2.
Garza
argues that the abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect the correct
Penal Code section that he was convicted of violating in count 2. He was convicted in count 2 of violating
Penal Code section 288.7, subdivision (b). The abstract of judgment, filed August 15, 2012, however, states Garza was convicted in count 2 of violating Penal
Code section 287, subdivision (b).
In the respondent’s brief, the Attorney General states the abstract of
judgment should be corrected to accurately reflect that Garza was convicted of
violating section 288.7, subdivision (b) in count 2, not section 287,
subdivision (b).
During
the pendency of this appeal, an amended abstract of judgment, filed August 6, 2013, correctly reflects count 2 as a violation of Penal Code
section 288.7, subdivision (b).
The trial court’s minute order, dated August 9, 2013, states that a conformed copy of the amended abstract of judgment was
mailed to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In light of these developments, combined with
Garza’s silence on this subject in his reply brief filed August 23, 2013, no remand is warranted.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
FYBEL,
J.
WE CONCUR:
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
BEDSWORTH, J.
v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at
page 915, the Supreme Court stated:
“As the legislative history indicates, the Legislature’s principal
justification for adopting [Evidence Code] section 1108 was a practical
one: By their very nature, sex crimes
are usually committed in seclusion without third party witnesses or substantial
corroborating evidence. The ensuing
trial often presents conflicting versions of the event and requires the trier
of fact to make difficult credibility determinations. Section 1108 provides the trier of fact
in a sex offense case the opportunity to learn of the defendant’s possible
disposition to commit sex crimes.â€
