Terrace
Park
v. California
Coastal Commission
Filed 5/6/13 Laguna Terrace Park v. California Coastal Commission CA4/3
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
LAGUNA TERRACE
PARK LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CALIFORNIA
COASTAL COMMISSION,
Defendant and Respondent;
PAUL R.
ESSLINGER,
Intervener and Respondent.
G045986
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2010-00395819)
O P I N I O N
Appeal
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Ronald L. Bauer, Judge. Affirmed.
Requests for judicial notice.
Denied.
Hart,
King & Coldren, Robert S. Coldren and Boyd L. Hill for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Paul
J. Beard II for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, John A. Saurenman, Assistant
Attorney General, and Jamee Jordan Patterson, Deputy Attorney General, for
Defendant and Respondent.
No
appearance for Intervener and Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
Laguna
Terrace Park LLC (Laguna Terrace) appeals from the judgment entered after the
trial court denied its petition for a writ
of mandate and damages and a complaint for
petition) against the California Coastal Commission (the Commission). The trial court rejected Laguna Terrace’s
challenge to the Commission’s determination that it had jurisdiction, under the
California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.;
hereafter, the Coastal Act), over Laguna Terrace’s proposed conversion of a
mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership.
Laguna
Terrace argues (1) the proposed conversion did not constitute a
development within the meaning of the Coastal Act (Pub. Resources Code,
§ 30106), and was otherwise exempt from the Coastal Act’s requirements
under the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, §§ 66410‑66499.37);
(2) the Commission wrongfully asserted jurisdiction by considering
property beyond the boundaries of the mobilehome park itself; (3) the
trial court erroneously failed to grant Laguna Terrace’s requests to augment
the record with or take judicial notice of the City of Laguna Beach’s (the
City) administrative record; and (4) the court wrongfully denied Laguna
Terrace’s request for a statement of decision.
We
affirm. After initial briefing had
concluded in this appeal, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Palisades). The Supreme Court
rejected the primary argument asserted by Laguna Terrace, here, and held the
conversion of a mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership is
a development for purposes of the Coastal Act.
The Supreme Court further held that Government Code section 66427.5
of the Subdivision Map Act does not provide an exemption for such a
development. (Pacific Palisades, supra,
at p. 792.)
The
Commission properly considered Laguna Terrace’s application as proposing the
development of the 270‑acre parcel upon which the 20‑acre
mobilehome park sits. The trial court
did not err by refusing to augment the record with or judicially notice the
City’s administrative record. We deny
Laguna Terrace’s request that we judicially notice the City’s administrative
record for the reasons explained post. At oral argument, Laguna Terrace withdrew its
arguments that the facts relevant to this appeal are disputed and that the
trial court erred by denying its request for a statement of decision.
BACKGROUND
I.
Laguna Terrace Submits an
Application to Subdivide and Privatize Ownership of Its Mobilehome Park; the Commission Determines It Has
Original and Appellate Jurisdiction over the Application.
In
April 2010, Laguna Terrace applied to the City for a “vesting tentative tract
map that subdivides 157 existing single family residential mobilehome spaces
into 157 residential mobilehome lots plus 1 lettered non‑residential
lot.†The application purportedly sought
“the simple mapping of existing single family residential spaces under the
exclusive provisions of Government Code Section 66427.5.†Laguna Terrace’s application did not request
the issuance of a coastal development permit (CDP); Laguna Terrace took the position
the application was exempt from the Coastal Act.
In June
2010, after a hearing, the Commission decided the City’s approval of a CDP in
connection with Laguna Terrace’s application would be appealable to the
Commission pursuant to Public Resources Code section 30603,
subdivision (a)(2). In determining
the jurisdiction issue, the Commission disregarded unpermitted lot line
adjustments that had been made in 1995.
In July 2010, the City approved, inter alia, a CDP as to the Laguna
Terrace application
II.
Laguna Terrace Sues the Commission
for Unlawfully Assuming Jurisdiction over Its Application.
In
August 2010, Laguna Terrace filed the petition, asserting the Commission had
unlawfully assumed administrative jurisdiction over its mobilehome park’s proposed
conversion to resident ownership. The
petition was brought on four grounds:
(1) the Commission lacked administrative jurisdiction because the
proposed conversion did not qualify as a development under the Coastal Act;
(2) even assuming the proposed conversion qualified as a development under
the Coastal Act, it was exempt because the Coastal Act expressly provides no
CDP is required for a development involving improvements to single‑family
residences; (3) even assuming the proposed conversion qualified as a
nonexempt development under the Coastal Act, “the Laguna Terrace mobilehome
park subdivision to be approved by the City of Laguna Beach (‘City’) is located
entirely within the City’s Local Coastal Program and does not meet the criteria
for Commission appellate jurisdictionâ€; and (4) “as a matter of procedure,
the Commission assumed jurisdiction of the proposed conversion to resident ownership in violation
of express principles of fundamental fairness and due process by means of
biased and undisclosed ex parte and other unofficial communications.â€
The
petition sought a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Commission to vacate
and set aside its decision that it “has jurisdiction over the Application, Park
Map and/or CDP,†and civil penalties under the Coastal Act (Pub. Resources
Code, §§ 30327, 30824). The
petition also asked for injunctive relief “restraining the Commission from
proceeding with any appeals from the CDP or from enforcing any alleged
violation pertaining to the 1995 lot line adjustment,†and a judicial
declaration that “the Commission does not have any jurisdiction over the
Application, Park Map and/or CDP and that the 1995 lot line adjustment is
valid, legal and binding on the Commission.â€
The petition also sought damages and reasonable attorney fees under Code
of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
Intervener
Paul R. Esslinger filed a motion for leave to intervene in the action because
(1) he had filed an appeal with the Commission, challenging the City’s
approval of Laguna Terrace’s CDP; (2) he owned real property that is
adjacent to the “Project site†and would be impacted by the project;
(3) “the disposition of the Action in Esslinger’s absence would impair
and/or impede his ability to protect his interests because, contrary to
Esslinger’s position, [Laguna Terrace] contends that the Commission lacks
jurisdiction to hear or decide the Appealâ€; and (4) his “interests cannot
be adequately represented by the existing parties.â€
The
trial court granted Esslinger’s motion and ordered his proposed complaint in
intervention be deemed filed.
Esslinger’s complaint in intervention prayed that all of the relief
sought in the petition be denied with prejudice and also sought attorney fees
and costs.
The
trial court denied Laguna Terrace’s motion to augment the record to include the
City’s administrative record of its issuance of the CDP.
Before
the hearing on the petition, Laguna Terrace requested that the trial court take
judicial notice of “[a] true and correct copy of the City of Laguna Beach
Administrative Record†and “[a] true and correct copy of the California Coastal
Commission Consent Cease and Desist Order . . . and Consent
Restoration Order . . . and Exhibit B thereof . . . copied
from the Commission website.†Esslinger
requested that the trial court take judicial notice of a comparison map
“intended to clarify and illustrate the boundaries of the Vesting Tentative
Tract Map No. 17301 dated March 11, 2010†and “[t]he graphic prepared
by the [Commission] . . . regarding the coastal development permit at
issue in this action.â€
Shortly
before the hearing on the petition, Laguna Terrace filed a request for a
statement of decision which identified 10 controverted issues.
III.
The Trial Court Denies the
Petition.
After the
hearing on the petition, which occurred on April 18, 2011, the trial court
took the matter under submission. On
June 29, the court issued a minute order in which it denied the petition
and explained its ruling as follows:
“Petitioner
Laguna Terrace Park LLC (‘Laguna Terrace’) challenges the decision of
respondent California Coastal Commission (‘Commission’) that the latter has
appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the City of Laguna Beach ([‘]City’)
to approve Laguna Terrace’s application to subdivide a mobile home park into
separate parcels, each containing one mobile home.
“This
dispute is significantly impacted by the legal effect of the following
undisputed facts:
“—Laguna
Terrace’s application to the City related solely to the twenty acres occupied
by the subject mobile home park.
“—Until
1995, those twenty acres were part of a 270‑acre parcel.
“—In
1995, the City approved two lot line adjustments affecting the 270‑acre
parcel. This action gave birth to the
twenty-acre parcel that is the subject of the disputed application approved by
the City and challenged by the Commission.
“—No
coastal development permit was obtained for the 1995 lot line adjustments.
“The
foregoing facts are at the heart of the following competing contentions advanced
by the parties:
“Laguna
Terrace argues that the City’s approval of the subdivision of the twenty-acre
parcel, as a prelude to individual ownership of the 157 units in the mobile
home park, is specifically authorized by Government Code section 66427.5
and is beyond the authority of the Commission.
The Commission insists that its approval was required for the 1995 lot
line adjustments; in the absence of such approval, the present application must
be viewed as a development of the entire 270‑acre parcel; as such, it
cannot be cloaked by the terms of section 66427.5 and is subject to
Commission jurisdiction.
“The
parties focus their attention on Public Resources Code section 30106 which
defines a ‘development’ subject to Commission authority. Only a legislative drafter could love the
first paragraph of this code section, which is a 186‑word sentence
defining ‘development’ in terms that include thermal waste, kelp harvesting,
and (hurrah!) lot splits. This court has
had two sources of help in reaching its conclusion that the 1995 actions by the
City constituted development of the 270‑acre parcel. The first is Section 30106. With appropriate elisions, that statute
states that ‘“Development†means . . . change in the density or
intensity of use of land, including, but not limited to . . . any
. . . division of land, including lot splits
. . . .’ Second, the
court in La Fe, Inc. v. County of Los
Angeles (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 231, 240 concluded that ‘section 30106
explicitly applies to a “subdivision . . . and any other division of
land . . .†A lot line change constitutes a “division of land.â€â€™
“Laguna
Terrace suggests that there must be a specific finding of a change in the
density or intensity of use of land (beyond the mere lot split) for a lot split
to constitute a development within section 30106. This court disagrees, and, so does the
appellate court in La Fe. The legislature and the court of appeal have
told us that a lot split is a kind of ‘change in the density o[r] intensity of
use of land.’
“The
Commission has acknowledged that ‘If these lot lines [the 1995 actions] had all
of the Coastal Act authorization(s), the City’s latest action may not have been
appealable . . . .’
AR 1434. But our situation
is different. The 1995 actions required
Commission approval. In that absence,
‘the Commission properly reviewed [Laguna Terrace’s] . . .
application as though the unpermitted development had not occurred.’ LT‑WR,
L.L.C. v. California Coastal Com. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 770, 797. When the pending application is properly
viewed as a proposed development of the 270‑acre parcel, Commission
jurisdiction readily follows.
“Laguna
Terrace’s other objections are rejected.
Many of these posit an absence of evidence to support the Commission’s
conclusions and action, but the central issue outlined above is based upon
undisputed facts in the record. The
court also rejects Laguna Terrace’s request to take judicial notice of material
not considered by the Commission. Nor
does the court find any unfairness in the Commission’s procedures.
“In
brief summary, Laguna Terrace’s petition is denied. Counsel for the Commission is directed to
prepare and submit a judgment consistent with the foregoing.†(Original ellipses.)
IV.
The Trial Court Rejects Laguna Terrace’s
Claims and Does Not Issue a Statement of Decision; Judgment Is Entered; and
Laguna Terrace Appeals.
On
June 30, 2011, the trial court issued the following minute order: “In its minute order stating its decision in
this matter, the court did not directly respond to the questions posed in
Petitioner’s Request for Statement of Decision.
It is unnecessary to do so. Those
questions are barely-disguised argumentative contentions advanced by Laguna
Terrace. Comments about ‘significant
unreported ex parte communication’ and ‘incorrect legal conclusions’ of the
Commission and the like present the Petitioner’s point of view. The court’s earlier minute order shows that
it disagreed with these characterizations and explained how it reached its
decision on the principal controverted issues herein.†The court did not issue a statement of
decision.
Judgment
was entered in August 2011. The judgment
stated that the trial court “admitted the Commission’s administrative record
into evidence, denied Laguna Terrace’s request to take judicial notice of
matters not considered by the Commission, read and considered the briefs of the
parties, heard oral argument and took the matter under submission. The Court issued minute orders on
June 29, 2011, and June 30, 2011, explaining its decision to deny the
petition for writ of mandate and all other relief.†The judgment further stated that the petition
for a writ of mandate was denied and “[a]ll of Laguna Terrace’s other claims
for relief are denied.â€
Laguna
Terrace appealed. Laguna Terrace filed a
request that this court take judicial notice of the City’s administrative
record. Laguna Terrace filed another
request for judicial notice, in which it requested that this court judicially
notice events that occurred after the Commission’s jurisdiction
determination. We directed the parties
to submit letter briefs addressing whether this appeal is moot as a result of
the events described in the second request for judicial notice and its attached
documents. In their respective letter
briefs, Laguna Terrace and the Commission stated the appeal was not mooted by
the subsequent events described in Laguna Terrace’s second request for judicial
notice, or by the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review Issues
The
judgment not only denied Laguna Terrace’s “First Cause of Action for Writ of
Mandate,†it also rejected Laguna Terrace’s “Second Cause of Action for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,†and thereby triggered the application of
different standards of review of the judgment.
(Boldface, underscoring, & some capitalization omitted.)
For
example, “[i]n reviewing a decision denying a petition for administrative
mandate, our role is identical to that of the trial court. ‘We review the administrative record to
determine whether the Commission’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citation.]
To the extent the case involves the interpretation of a statute, which
is a question of law, we engage in a de novo review of the trial court’s
determination. [Citation.] ‘“Courts may reverse an agency’s decision
only if, based on the evidence before the
agency, a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the
agency.â€â€™â€ (Reddell v. California Coastal Com. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 956, 962,
first italics added; see Security National Guaranty, Inc. v. California
Coastal Com. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 402, 414 [“When the determination of an
administrative agency’s jurisdiction involves a question of statutory
interpretation, ‘the issue of whether the agency proceeded in excess of its
jurisdiction is a question of law’â€].)
On the
other hand, “‘[a] permanent injunction is a determination on the merits that a
plaintiff has prevailed on a cause of action . . . against a
defendant and that equitable relief is appropriate.’ [Citation.]
The grant or denial of a permanent injunction rests within the
not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] The exercise of discretion must be supported
by the evidence and, ‘to the extent the trial court had to review the evidence
to resolve disputed factual issues, and draw inferences from the presented
facts, [we] review such factual findings under a substantial evidence
standard.’ [Citation.] We resolve all factual conflicts and
questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge all
reasonable inferences to support the trial court’s order.†(Horsford
v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
359, 390, italics added.)
Here,
the minute order sets forth findings by the Commission that the trial court
adopted and characterized as “undisputed facts.†As clarified in oral argument on appeal,
Laguna Terrace neither disputes any of the relevant facts relied upon by the
Commission and the trial court, nor contends the Commission’s or trial court’s
findings are unsupported by substantial evidence. Instead, Laguna Terrace’s appeal challenges
the Commission’s and trial court’s interpretation of the Coastal Act and the
Subdivision Map Act in light of those undisputed facts.
of a statute, “which is a question of law, we engage in a de novo review of the
trial court’s determination.†(
Com. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 770, 780.)
We therefore conduct a de novo review of the Commission’s and trial
court’s statutory interpretation, assuming the truth of the Commission’s and
trial court’s findings as contained in the minute
order.
II.
Overview of the Coastal Act and the
Subdivision Map Act
Laguna
Terrace’s issues on appeal involve the proper interpretation of the Coastal Act
and the Subdivision Map Act. As recently
stated by the California Supreme Court in Pacific
Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
pages 793‑794, “[t]he Coastal Act ‘was enacted by the Legislature as
a comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone
of California. . . .’
[Citation.] The Coastal Act is to
be ‘liberally construed to accomplish its purposes and objectives.’ [Citation.]
Under it, with exceptions not applicable here, any person wishing to
perform or undertake any development in the coastal zone must obtain a coastal
development permit ‘in addition to obtaining any other permit required by law
from any local government or from any state, regional, or local agency
. . . .’†The court held
the Subdivision Map Act applies to mobilehome park conversions. (Pacific
Palisades, supra, at
p. 800.)
III.
The Trial Court Did Not Err in
Ruling on the Petition.
In its
opening brief, Laguna Terrace argues the judgment should be reversed for four
reasons. We address each contention of
error in turn.
A.
Court in Pacific Palisades Rejected Arguments That a Proposed Conversion Was Not a Development
Within the Meaning of the Coastal Act and That Even If It Was, It Was Exempt
from the Requirements of the Coastal Act, Pursuant to Government Code
Section 66427.5.
After
initial briefing was completed in this appeal, the California Supreme Court
issued its decision in Pacific Palisades,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at page 792,
which held, “the requirements of the California Coastal Act of 1976 [citation]
. . . appl[ies] to a proposed conversion, within California’s coastal
zone, of a mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership. In so holding, we reject the argument that
such a conversion is not a ‘development’ for purposes of the Coastal Act, and
further reject the argument that Government Code section 66427.5, a
provision of the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, §§ 66410‑66499.37),
exempts such conversions from the need to comply with other state laws, or precludes
local governmental agencies from exercising state‑delegated authority to
require compliance with state laws such as the Coastal Act.â€
In its
letter brief, Laguna Terrace acknowledges that “[t]he holding in
argument that [lot line adjustment] No. 95‑01 and the Tract Map were
not a ‘development’ subject to the Coastal Act.†Although its letter brief does not expressly
say so, Laguna Terrace has necessarily jettisoned its argument that Government
Code section 66427.5 exempted the proposed conversion from compliance with
the Coastal Act, in light of Pacific
Palisades. Laguna Terrace did not
include that issue in its list of “material questions that remain with respect
to the appeal.â€
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
B.
Improperly Consider Land Beyond the Boundaries
of the Mobilehome Park Itself in Determining Its Jurisdiction.
Laguna
Terrace argues the Commission inappropriately determined its jurisdiction by
considering an area beyond the boundaries of the mobilehome park itself. For the reasons we explain, we conclude the
Commission properly reviewed Laguna Terrace’s application involving the
property on which the mobilehome park sits, as though unpermitted development
had not occurred.
We
begin our analysis of Laguna Terrace’s argument by quoting from pertinent
portions of the report of the Commission’s “Findings and Declarationsâ€
addressing this issue. The report
states: “The subject site is an
approximately 270 acre area partly developed with a mobile home park located at
30802 Coast Highway, in the City of Laguna Beach, Orange County (Exhibit
#1). The developed part of the mobile
home park occupies about 14 acres within and at the mouth of a steeply sided
canyon. . . . The majority of the developed part of the park is
surrounded by undeveloped area.†The
report continues: “The proposal before
the City is to subdivide the Laguna Terrace Mobile Home Park into 157 lots for
residences and one lettered lot containing streets and other commonly owned
areas of land (Exhibit #7). This
subdivision would separate the developed mobilehome park portion of the subject
270 acre property, which the mobilehome park partly occupies, from the
undeveloped portion, thus creating new undeveloped parcel(s). . . .
[¶] Using the Post LCP Certification
Permit and Appeal Jurisdiction, City of Laguna Beach Map (‘post‑cert
map’) adopted by the Commission on September 16, 1993, the subject 270
acre area is depicted as being partly within the City of Laguna Beach’s coastal
permit jurisdiction, and partly within an area of deferred certification (ADC)
where the Commission retains direct coastal permitting authority
. . . . Based on a
graphic plotted on the proposed subdivision map, it appears that the area of
land that the applicant is proposing to divide into 157 numbered lots and one
lettered lot, would be within the area the post‑cert map says is City
jurisdiction. However, the remainder
area (i.e. remainder lot) would be in the ADC.
The proposed subdivision map, apparently assuming the validity of un‑permitted
lot line adjustments that occurred in 1995, depicts the remainder lot as a
separate lot between the proposed mobilehome park subdivision and the rest of
the 270 acre area. Commission staff
maintains that the creation of the remainder lot would still require a coastal
development permit directly from the Commission. Therefore, the City’s approval only covers
part of the land division and the applicant will need to apply to the
Commission for a coastal permit to cover the remainder of the land division
that is located in the ADC.â€
The
report further states: “The legal status
of division of the 270 acre area into various parcels is at the center of the
debate about the appealability of the City’s action. In 1995 there were two unpermitted, purported
lot line adjustments recorded by the landowner(s) that substantially changed
the configuration of lot lines within the subject 270 acre area, and resulted
in the creation of new parcels of land having a greater potential for development
than previously existed (Exhibit #3 & 4).
Pursuant to Section 30600[, subdivision ](a) of the Coastal
Act, any person wishing to perform or undertake non‑exempt development in
the coastal zone must obtain a coastal development permit, in addition to any
other permit required by law.†(Fn.
omitted.) The report notes that the term
“development,†as defined by Public Resources Code section 30106, means
“change in the density or intensity of the use of land, including, but not
limited to, subdivision pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act . . . and
any other division of land, including lot splits.†(Boldface & underscoring omitted.)
The report further
explains the 1995 lot line adjustments were “done without the benefit of any
coastal development permit.†The report
concedes that “[i]f these lot lines had all of the required Coastal Act
authorization(s), the City’s latest action may not have been appealable as the
City had determined. However, since
these lot lines have not received Coastal Act authorizations, the City’s action
is appealable because the City’s action results in a division of land that
changes the shape of, and intensity of use of, parcel(s) of land that is/are
within 100 feet of a stream.†(Fn.
omitted.)
The
report concludes, “Public Resources Code Section 30603[,
subdivision ](a)(2) confers the Commission with appellate jurisdiction
over development that is within 100 feet of any stream. The Commission finds that, because CDP application 09‑36
seeks authorization for development within 100 feet of a stream identified on
the City’s post‑cert map, approval of that application is appealable to
the Commission pursuant to Section 30603[, subdivision ](a)(2) of the
Coastal Act.â€
Citing
Com., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 770,
the trial court upheld the Commission’s determination of jurisdiction after
concluding the Commission properly reviewed Laguna Terrace’s application as
proposing the development of a 270‑acre parcel. The court explained the 1995 lot line
adjustments to that parcel were unpermitted and thus must be ignored for
purposes of evaluating the Commission’s determination of its jurisdiction under
the Coastal Act. In LT‑WR, L.L.C., supra,
152 Cal.App.4th at page 797, the appellate court held: “In order to enable the Commission to protect
coastal resources, and to avoid condoning unpermitted development, the
Commission properly reviewed the application as though the unpermitted
development had not occurred.â€
Here,
Laguna Terrace agrees the material facts are undisputed. The undisputed facts show that the mobilehome
park, for the Coastal Act’s purposes, is located on a 270‑acre parcel
that is within 100 feet of a stream.
Hence, the Commission properly determined it had jurisdiction over the
development of the mobilehome park, which, as discussed ante, includes an application proposing to convert the mobilehome
park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership.
C.
by Refusing to Augment the Trial Court’s Record with
or Judicially Notice the City’s Administrative Record.
Laguna Terrace argues the trial court erred by denying its motion to
augment the record with the City’s administrative record and by denying the
request that the court take judicial notice of that same record under Evidence
Code section 452, subdivision (c).
“‘The
general rule is that a hearing on a writ of administrative mandamus is
conducted solely on the record of the proceeding before the administrative
agency. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
Augmentation of the administrative record is permitted only within the
strict limits set forth in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1094.5,
subdivision (e) which provides as follows:
‘Where the court finds that there is relevant evidence which, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been produced or which was
improperly excluded at the hearing before respondent, it may enter judgment as
provided in subdivision (f) remanding the case to be reconsidered in light
of that evidence; or, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to
exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, the court may admit the
evidence at the hearing on the writ without remanding the case.’ (§ 1094.5, subd. (e); [citation].) In the absence of a proper preliminary foundation
showing that one of the exceptions noted in section 1094.5,
subdivision (e) applies, it is error for the court to permit the record to
be augmented. [Citation.] Determination of the question of whether one
of the exceptions applies is within the discretion of the trial court, and the
exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly
abused.†(Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 93, 101.)
Evidence
Code section 452, subdivision (c) provides that judicial notice
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of
any state of the
take judicial notice of the City’s administrative record for an abuse of
discretion. (Willis v. State of California (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 287, 291.)
Laguna
Terrace does not explain how the trial court’s consideration of the City’s
administrative record would support its arguments on appeal, or show how any
information contained in that record, but not also included in the Commission’s
administrative record, was relevant.
Laguna Terrace does not explain that any such information was “‘so
persuasive’†that it was unreasonable for the court to have refused to consider
it. (Willis
v. State of California, supra, 22
Cal.App.4th at p. 291.) The
Commission’s staff report, which is contained in our record, states,
“Commission staff requested the remainder of the City’s record and requested
that the applicant [(Laguna Terrace)] address the issues raised in the findings
on substantial issue. However, the
Commission has not received any of the documents requested.†The record does not show that any information
from the City’s administrative record was improperly excluded from the
Commission’s administrative record by the Commission.
Furthermore,
in light of Laguna Terrace’s concession at oral argument that the facts
relevant to the resolution of the issues on appeal are undisputed, we must
conclude that even were we to assume the trial court abused its discretion in
denying both the motion to augment and request for judicial notice, Laguna
Terrace suffered no prejudice.
D.
Withdrawn Its Argument the Trial Court Erred by Denying Its Request for a
Statement of Decision.
The
trial court denied Laguna Terrace’s request for a statement of decision
“explaining the legal and factual bases for its decision as to each of the
. . . principal controverted issues at trial with respect to both the
First Cause of Action for Writ of Mandate and the Second Cause of Action for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.†In
its opening brief, Laguna Terrace argues the trial court’s “refusal to prepare
a statement of decision results in mandatory reversal.†(See Code Civ. Proc., § 632 [upon the
request of any party in a nonjury trial, the court “shall issue a statement of
decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of
the principal controverted issuesâ€].)
Laguna Terrace had argued, in the appellant’s opening brief, there were
disputed issues of fact, namely, whether Laguna Terrace was located on a 270‑acre
parcel under the Coastal Act.
Since
initial briefing was completed in this case, the California Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Pacific Palisades,
supra, 55 Cal.4th 783, which, for the
reasons discussed ante, rejected the
principal argument advanced by Laguna Terrace in its appellate briefs. Also, and as described in the second request
for judicial notice filed by Laguna Terrace in this court, in June 2012, the
Commission approved the 1995 lot line adjustments for which no CDP had been
issued.
At oral
argument, Laguna Terrace’s counsel informed this court that Laguna Terrace has
abandoned its argument that the judgment should be reversed for the trial
court’s failure to issue a statement of decision. In light of the postappellate briefing developments,
described ante, we understand and
respect Laguna Terrace’s decision not to seek reversal of the judgment on the
ground the trial court denied Laguna Terrace’s request for a statement of
decision but to instead focus on persuading this court to take judicial notice
of recent events. We therefore do not
further address whether the trial court was required, upon request, to issue a
statement of decision as to any of Laguna Terrace’s claims.
E.
of Laguna Terrace’s Challenges to the Judgment, We Do Not Address the
Commission’s Arguments Pertaining to Whether Laguna Terrace Failed to Exhaust
All Required Administrative Remedies and Whether Laguna Terrace’s Challenges
Are Ripe for Appellate Review.
The
Commission argues: “This case is
premature and not ripe for judicial review†because “[t]he Commission’s
determination that the permit would be appealable is just the first step in the
administrative appellate process. All of
the following must occur before a final Commission decision can be judicially
reviewed: the City must make a final
permit decision; someone must actually appeal that decision to the Commission;
the Commission must determine whether to take jurisdiction over the appeal;
and, if it does take jurisdiction, the Commission must consider the appeal de
novo and approve or deny the permit. At
this point, the Commission has not yet completed its de novo review of the
appeal or acted on the permit application, therefore judicial review is simply
premature.â€
Because
we conclude Laguna Terrace’s arguments are without merit for the reasons
discussed ante, we do not need to
address the Commission’s exhaustion and ripeness arguments.
IV.
We Reject Laguna Terrace’s Requests
for Judicial Notice.
In its
first request for judicial notice, Laguna Terrace requests that we judicially
notice the City’s certified administrative record on Laguna Terrace’s
application under Evidence Code sections 452 and 459, and make various
factual findings under Code of Civil Procedure section 909. The Commission opposes this request. We reject Laguna Terrace’s argument for the
same reasons we conclude the trial court did not err by refusing to augment the
trial court’s record with or take judicial notice of the City’s administrative
record, discussed in part III.C. of the Discussion, ante.
In its
second request for judicial notice, Laguna Terrace requests that we take
judicial notice of documents attached to that request, which Laguna Terrace
identifies as (1) “the January 15, 2013 recordation by the Orange County
Recorder of the . . . ‘Notice of Acceptance of Coastal Development
Permit and Legality of Lot Line Adjustment’â€; (2) the notice of acceptance
itself; and (3) “the Adopted Findings attached to the Notice.†Laguna Terrace also requests that we make
certain factual findings, including that (1) “Coastal Development Permit
No. 5‑12‑121 (‘Permit’) is for the purpose of
‘approving and ratifying that certain Lot Line Adjustment approved by the City
of Laguna Beach on March 23, 1995, and referred to as LL 95‑01,
and recorded in the Official Records of the County of Orange on
November 22, 1995, as document number 19950520276’â€;
(2) “[r]ecordation of the Notice obligates [the Commission] to issue the
Permit to [Laguna Terrace] and other Permit applicantsâ€; and (3) “[t]he
Commission found with respect to the Permit that it constitutes a ‘waiver of
any legal action’ with regard to ‘the alleged violation concerning City of
Laguna Beach Lot Line Adjustment LL 95‑01.’†Laguna Terrace asserts, “[j]udicial notice of
this matter is relevant to the appeal because, upon recordation of the Notice,
the Commission is obligated to issue the Permit, thereby rendering moot the
sole legal basis (i.e., the lack of a
coastal development permit for LL 95‑01) for which the Commission
asserted jurisdiction over the subject City of Laguna Beach Coastal Development
Permit No. 10‑26 for the Laguna Terrace Park tentative tract
map.†The Commission opposed the request
for judicial notice.
As
discussed ante, Laguna Terrace and
the Commission agree the issue regarding whether the Commission lawfully has
jurisdiction over Laguna Terrace’s application was not mooted by those subsequent events or by the California Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Pacific
Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th
783.
In this
appeal, we are reviewing the issue whether the Commission properly determined
that it had jurisdiction over the proposed conversion of the Laguna Terrace
mobilehome park. Laguna Terrace does not
explain how anything that has happened since the Commission’s jurisdiction
determination sheds any light on the propriety of that determination, on the
record before the Commission, when it was made.
Accordingly, we decline to needlessly interfere with the ongoing
proceedings in this action by considering matters outside the limited issues
presented in this appeal. We therefore
deny Laguna Terrace’s second request for judicial notice.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed. Respondent
California Coastal Commission shall recover costs on appeal.
FYBEL,
J.
WE CONCUR:
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
ARONSON, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] We understand that Laguna
Terrace’s agreement that the relevant facts are undisputed is limited to the
resolution of the issues presented in this appeal only.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] In its letter brief, Laguna
Terrace states that the appeal is not moot because two issues remain: (1) whether the Commission acted in
excess of its statutory authority “in considering a different property than the
Park being subdivided by the Tract Mapâ€; and (2) whether the Commission’s
approval of a lot line adjustment CDP after the Commission’s determination of
jurisdiction regarding the proposed conversion (which approval is the subject
of Laguna Terrace’s second request for judicial notice filed in this court)
“act[s] as a Commission waiver, or estop[s] the Commission or result[s] in
mootness with respect to the Commission’s only finding in support of
jurisdiction over the Tract Map CDP.†We
address both arguments, post.
