Marriage of Bastien and Dominguez
Filed 9/18/13 Marriage of Bastien and Dominguez CA4/1
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
In re the Marriage of ROCHELLE
T. BASTIEN and DENNIS O. DOMINGUEZ
ROCHELLE T. BASTIEN,
Appellant,
v.
DENNIS O. DOMINGUEZ,
Respondent.
D061209
(Super. Ct.
No. ED55622)
APPEAL from
orders of the Superior Court
of
County, William C. Gentry, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
David A.
Kay for Appellant.
Stephen
Temko for Respondent.
This appeal
is from the court's denial of Rochelle T. Bastien's request to set aside a
stipulated dissolution of marriage judgment.
The judgment was entered in August 2002.
On December 30, 2010,
eight years after the judgment was entered, Rochelle
sought to set aside the judgment on the grounds of fraud, under Family Code
section 2122, subdivision (a). She
asserted that in December 2009 she found one of
the mediator of their divorce $180 for legal fees, indicating an improper
relationship between Dennis and the mediator.
Dennis
brought a motion to dismiss the
request to set aside the judgment on the ground that it was barred by the
applicable one-year statute of limitations. The court granted the motion and awarded
Dennis $10,000 in attorney fees.
On appeal, Rochelle asserts (1) she
could not have discovered the alleged fraud earlier than when she accidentally
discovered it in December 2009; (2) because she had a fiduciary relationship
with their divorce mediator, she had no duty to investigate; (3) if she had
known about the attorney/client relationship, she would not have signed the
(4) the court erred in awarding attorney fees in the amount of $10,000 to
Dennis. We affirm.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Background
and Prior Actions and Motions
Dennis and
Rochelle were married in 1977. In 2002
the parties instituted divorce proceedings.
In June through August of 2002, Denny Kershek, an attorney and family
friend, mediated their dispute. Dennis
and Rochelle entered into an MSA, which in August 2002 was incorporated into
their judgment of dissolution.
In 2005
Rochelle wrote a series of letters to Kershek.
She accused Kershek of being biased in favor of Dennis and colluding
with him to hide assets. She wrote
Kershek that he "violated [his] ethical and legal mandate that [he] behave
in a fair and impartial manner, in [his] role as 'mediator.'" She further wrote, "I have had concerns
(before, during and after the signing of that 'agreement') gives [
malfeasance." "The process was
marked all along with flagrant, outrageous, and conspicuous behaviors on your
part, Denny." "I intend to
insist on the basis of fraud . . . ." "I accept responsibility for my own
generosity, but not for your deceit."
In 2005 Rochelle also had
"great suspicion" that her financial advisor, Ted Roman was in
alliance with Dennis. She claimed Roman
and Dennis worked in concert to
misrepresent that a Putnam account had been liquidated.
In January
2006 Rochelle filed a motion to divide the Putnam retirement account, which she
asserted was a missing asset. Dennis
contended the Putnam account was considered in the MSA and fell under a TD
Waterhouse IRA.
In 2007
Rochelle filed a civil lawsuit for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against
Dennis and Roman. On August 24, 2007, Rochelle dismissed
Dennis from the lawsuit.
In July
2007 Rochelle sought additional funds for their daughter's college
tuition. She filed a motion in family
court to force Dennis to pay a $10,000 loan their daughter had incurred. Rochelle's request for Dennis to pay the
$10,000 was denied by the court, the court finding it was not clear from the
MSA terms that Dennis was liable for the $10,000 loan.
In February
2008 Rochelle sought the appointment of a special master to determine if there
were missing assets. This request was
denied. A pension was valued at $350,000
and it turned out its true value was $35,000, not $350,000. During the hearing Rochelle admitted the
correct number was $35,000. At the end
of the hearing, the court stated
Rochelle's remedy was not the appointment of a special master but instead might
be moving to set aside the judgment on the basis of fraud.
In March 2008 Roman wrote Rochelle
an e-mail that said in part, "You have a belief that Dennis must be hiding
something from you, that there must be more than this but I don't see it. You keep trying to involve everyone in your
conspiracy theory such as your divorce attorney, Dennis and myself."
In May 2008
Rochelle filed a motion to set aside the judgment. She alleged fraud was committed by Dennis and
Roman. She alleged there were omitted
assets including accounts at Putnam, and Community First National Bank, life
insurance, pension and profit sharing plans and the value of Dennis's
business. The court denied Rochelle's
motion.
In September 2008 Rochelle wrote to
an individual named Brian Sample that Kershek and Roman were "working
against my best interests . . . ."
In March
2009 Rochelle filed a lawsuit against Kershek.
The gravamen of the complaint was that Kershek did not disclose a prior
attorney-client relationship with Dennis.
After a demurrer was granted, Rochelle filed a second amended
complaint. The second amended complaint
alleged fraud in that Rochelle had just found, in December 2009, a new piece of
evidence, a check dated April 2000 for $180 from her account to Kershek for
legal services.
In July
2010 the court granted Kershek's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
fraud complaint against Kershek. The
court found Rochelle's fraud claim against Kershek was barred by the three-year
statute of limitations contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 338,
subdivision (d). In doing so, the court
noted the 2005 letters Rochelle wrote accusing Kershek of deceit, as well as
partiality and loyalty to Dennis. The
court concluded that Rochelle's claim for fraud was barred since Rochelle had
control of the $180 check, the check register, and had made fraud claims
against Kershek as early as 2005. Rochelle had both notice or information of
circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry and she had the opportunity
to obtain knowledge from sources open to her investigation at least by
2005.
In April
2012 we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in Bastien v. Kershek (April 17, 2012, D058424) [nonpub. opn.].). In doing so, we concluded that Rochelle
discovered her cause of action no later than 2005, when she accused Keshek of
siding with Dennis.
Rochelle also sued her financial
advisor, Roman, and her two previous attorneys, Lowenstein and Fritz. Those cases were ultimately dismissed.
B. Rochelle's
December 30, 2010 Motion To Set Aside the Judgment
On December
30, 2010, eight and a half years after the judgment
of dissolution was entered, Rochelle filed in this action an order to show
cause (OSC) to set aside the August 2002 Judgment. This set aside request was again based upon
alleged fraud. Rochelle alleged that in
2002 attorney Kershek did not disclose he had previously represented Dennis.
Rochelle
alleged, as she did in her action against Kershek, that on December 31, 2009,
she was looking through some family records from 2000, and in boxes unrelated
to any issues with Kershek, she found a check dated April 3, 2000, from a joint
bank account she had with Dennis. The
check was written by Dennis to Kershek for $180 for "legal
fees." Rochelle asserted that
"[p]reviously there was no reason to look through these old bank records
regarding my claim against Mr. Kershek.
Only after issuance of a 2008 subpoena in another case was I reasonably motivated
to look at old bank records and stumbled upon this check."
Rochelle
admitted she had not looked at the check register, but asserted Dennis handled
paying bills during this period of time.
She also claimed she was unaware of any preexisting legal relationship
between Dennis and Kershek.
Rochelle
further alleged she did not receive one-half of the community estate because
Dennis's medical practice was undervalued, he had opened a checking account
with $15,000 from his medical practice in July 2002, and in September 2002,
after the MSA was signed, he issued a check back to his corporate account.
C. Dennis's
Motion To Dismiss
In
response, Dennis filed a motion for dismissal of Rochelle's motion, sanctions
pursuant to section 271, and for attorney fees and costs. In
that motion, Dennis outlined the history of Rochelle's motions since the 2002
judgment was entered. Dennis also argued
that Rochelle's motion should be dismissed on res judicata grounds because her
claim of fraud and challenge to valuation of the community property had been
previously raised and adjudicated by the court in 2008. Moreover, Dennis argued the $180 check to
Kershek was not for legal services, but reimbursement for a family camping
trip. He asserted he wrote the check on
Rochelle's business checkbook and with Rochelle's knowledge.
In that
motion Dennis requested attorney fees, as well as sanctions for frivolous
conduct. In support of the request for
attorney fees, Dennis filed an income and expense declaration (I&E).
In her
response to Dennis's motion, Rochelle argued the newly found $180 check was new
evidence, res judicata did not bar her claim,
executed and entered as a judgment. In
support of her response Rochelle filed a declaration that stated that Dennis's
"camping" explanation for the $180 check to Kershek was without
merit. She contended the camping trip
occurred in 2001, not 2000, as Dennis claimed.
Dennis also
asserted the motion was barred by the doctrine
of collateral estoppel as Rochelle's motion set aside the judgment
asserting the same facts presented previously to the court in her October 2008
motion to set aside.
Dennis
filed another I&E on August 3, 2011, and declared he had paid his attorney
$25,808 to date.
In August
2011 Dennis filed an in limine motion to dismiss Rochelle's motion on the
grounds of statute of limitations and res judicata. Dennis asserted that the one-year statute of
limitations contained in section 2122, subdivision (a) barred Rochelle's
claim. He argued Rochelle should have
discovered any fraud prior to December 30, 2009, or more than one year prior to
her filing her motion to set aside the 2002 judgment. Dennis lodged pleadings filed in the Kershek
malpractice suit, including the court's ruling granting summary judgment in
that action.
Dennis also
filed a declaration in response to Rochelle's supplemental declaration. Dennis again declared he had never hired
Kershek, never paid him for legal services and never paid him for mediation
and his daughter were best friends and there were many times they each would
advance expenses and pay each other back.
Dennis also stated the following:
(1) Rochelle had the actual check in her possession since at least 2002;
(2) she had a carbon copy of the check in her possession since April, 3, 2000;
(3) the check appeared on Rochelle's bank statement for April 2000; (4) the
cancelled check was returned to her by her bank; (5) the check was listed on
her bank register; and (6) Rochelle wrote checks out of the same checkbook both
prior to and after the April 2, 2000 check.
Rochelle
filed an opposition to Dennis's motion to dismiss. Her response focused on the res judicata
ground for denying her motion, but did not address the statute of limitations
argument. Rochelle also did not file a
response to Dennis's request for attorney fees or an income and expense
declaration.
D. The
Court's Ruling
On August
10, 2011, Rochelle's motion to set aside, and Dennis's motion for fees and
sanctions was heard. The court granted
Dennis's motion to dismiss. In doing so,
the court reasoned that Rochelle had control of the checking records, the check
was drawn on her account, and in 2008 she had filed a civil suit against
Kerhsek for fraud. The court found that
Rochelle "had the ability and should have discovered this prior to the
time that she did and prior to one year on the filing of her motion of December
30, 2010." The court awarded Dennis
$10,000 as fees and costs.
DISCUSSION
"[S]tatutes
of limitation do not begin to run until a cause of action accrues. [¶] Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues
at 'the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its
elements.' [Citations.] An important exception to the general rule of
accrual is the 'discovery rule,' which postpones accrual of a cause of action
until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of
action. [Citations.] [¶] A plaintiff has reason to discover a
cause of action when he or she 'has reason at least to suspect a factual basis
for its elements.' [Citations.] Under the discovery rule, suspicion of one or
more of the elements of a cause of action, coupled with knowledge of any
remaining elements, will generally trigger the statute of limitations
period." (Fox v. Ethicon
Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.)
"A
plaintiff need not be aware of the specific 'facts' necessary to establish the
claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery. Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of
wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file
suit or sit on her rights. So long as a
suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she
cannot wait for the facts to find her."
(Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1111 (Jolly).)
The applicable statute of
limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has information which would put a
reasonable person on inquiry. A
plaintiff need not be aware of the specific facts necessary to establish a
claim since they can be developed in pretrial discovery. Wrong and wrongdoing in this context are understood
in their lay and not legal senses. (Jolly,
supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1110-1111.)
As this court stated in Kline v. Turner
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1374, "'"[u]nder this rule constructive
and presumed notice or knowledge are equivalent to knowledge. So, when the plaintiff has notice or
information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the
opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [her] investigation (such
as public records or corporation books), the statute commences to
run."'"
It is
undisputed that the applicable statute of limitations in this case is section
2122, subdivision (a) which states, "The grounds and time limits for a
motion to set aside a judgment, or any part or parts thereof, are governed by
this section and shall be one of the following:
[¶] (a) Actual fraud where the defrauded party was kept in ignorance or
in some other manner was fraudulently prevented from fully
be brought within one year after the date on which the complaining party either
did discover, or should have discovered, the fraud." (Italics added.)
I.
A.
Rochelle's
action is time-barred because she had the opportunity to obtain knowledge from
sources open to her investigation at the latest by 2005. Rochelle's focus on the cancelled check
ignores the fact that she was aware of Kershek's alleged wrongdoing and bias on
behalf of Dennis at that time, and at that time accused Kershek of fraud
Moreover, she had already discovered, or reasonably should have
discovered, the facts and circumstances to support her prior claim of fraud
when, in May 2008, she filed a motion to set aside the same judgment based on
Kershek's fraud.
The
discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have,
inquiry notice of the cause of action.
Plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if
they have information of circumstances "'"to put a reasonable person
sources open to [their] investigation."
(Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 896-897 (
In order to
allege facts supporting a theory of delayed discovery, the plaintiff must show
that, despite diligent investigation of the circumstances of the injury, he or
she could not have reasonably discovered facts supporting the cause of action
within the applicable statute of limitations period. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 808.) Rochelle admits
no such diligent investigation occurred.
Moreover,
the $180 check, check register and bank statement were all under Rochelle's
control. Constructive and presumed
notice or knowledge are equivalent to knowledge. When Rochelle had "'"the
opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [her] investigation [such
as her own records in her own possession], the statute commence[d] to
run."'" (Kline v. Turner,
supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.)
Rochelle
contends that, based upon her fiduciary relationship with mediator Kershek, the
law requires "less investigation and diligence from the complaining
party." (AOB p. 17.) Indeed, Rochelle contends that because of her
fiduciary relationship with Kershak she was under no duty of inquiry, and that the statute did not run until she
"actually discovered the non-disclosed attorney/client
relationship." We reject this
contention.
1.
"Th[e]
point . . . was not raised in [plaintiffs'] opposition
papers or during argument below. Hence,
it was neither considered nor ruled upon by the trial court. It is axiomatic that arguments not asserted
below are waived and will not be considered for the first time on
appeal." (Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1998) 61
Cal.App.4th 1480, 1488, fn. 3.) "An
argument or theory will generally not be considered if it is raised for the
first time on appeal." (American
Continental Ins. Co. v. C & Z Timber Co. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1271,
1281.)
Rochelle
never raised any argument before the trial court that Kershek was a fiduciary
and she thus should be relieved of any duty to investigate. Moreover, at oral argument her counsel never
mentioned the word "fiduciary" or that Rochelle had no duty to investigate. Not
having raised the issue in the court below, and not giving the court an
opportunity to rule on this issue, the claim is forfeited. Moreover, even if we were to address this
contention on the merits, we would conclude it is unavailing.
2.
with Kershek
Rochelle
asserts she had no duty to investigate based upon her fiduciary relationship
with Kershak, because he was the parties' mediator. This contention is unavailing.
A plaintiff
is not absolved of her duty of due diligence or duty to inquire even if the
wrongdoer was a fiduciary as long as she has information which would put a
reasonable person on notice of wrongdoing.
(Miller v. Bechtel Corp.
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874-875 (Miller).)
Miller
is instructive. In that case, a marital
settlement agreement was entered into by a spouse who was allegedly unaware of
the true value of certain assets subject to the settlement. The plaintiff wife asserted that her
husband's attorneys misrepresented the value of stock owned by her
husband. (Miller, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 871.) When
the wife signed the marital settlement agreement in 1971, she had
"doubts" as to the actual value of her husband's Bechtel stock. In 1972 and 1973, the wife made unsuccessful
inquiries to investigate her doubts. (
872-873, 875.) The wife's complaint
alleged she had no knowledge of the "true value" of the stock until
it was sold in 1977. (Id. at p.
872.) The wife brought an action in
1978. The Supreme Court held that
despite wife's lack of definite knowledge, the statute began to run in 1971 and
1972 when her suspicions put her on inquiry notice. (Id. at pp. 873, 875.)
In doing
so, the California Supreme Court expressly considered and rejected the same
argument Rochelle makes here: that she
had no duty of inquiry because Kershek had a fiduciary duty to provide her with
full and correct information. The high
court held there that despite the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the
plaintiff wife nonetheless had a duty to investigate "if she became aware
of facts which would make a reasonably prudent person suspicious, [and that she
was] charged with knowledge of matters which would have been revealed by such
an investigation." (Miller, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 875.)
Likewise in
this case, Rochelle had the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open
to her investigation, because of the undisputed facts that the cancelled check
was written from her checking account, listed on her check register before and
after checks that she wrote, the check was mailed back to her with her bank
statement, and she kept all these items in her home for several years until she
went through her possessions in December 2009.
was a fiduciary relationship, Rochelle had a duty to investigate or to be
charged with the knowledge of the facts that investigation would have revealed.
Rochelle's
citations to Hobart v. Hobert Estate Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 412 (Hobart), Gutierrez, supra, 39
Cal.3d 892, April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805 (April)
and Amen v. Merced County Title Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 528 (Amen) do not support her
position.
In fact, Hobart
harms, rather than helps, her position.
There, our high court held that while it is true in some cases that the
existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship relaxes the duty to
investigate by reason of the fact that the plaintiff often relied upon the
assumption that her fiduciary was acting on her behalf, the duty to investigate
still arises once the plaintiff becomes aware of facts which would make a
reasonably prudent person suspicious, and the plaintiff is charged with the
knowledge of facts which would have been discovered by such an investigation. (Hobart, supra, 26 Cal.2d at pp.
440-442.)
Further,
the court found the defendant attorney had superior knowledge of the value of a
corporation's stocks and that plaintiff did not make a complete investigation
of the stock value in reliance of the defendant attorney's
representations. (Hobart, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 435.) Based on the
fiduciary relationship between the defendant attorney and plaintiff, the court
found the same degree of diligence was not required from plaintiff where he had
no reason to suspect the defendant attorney's fraud. (Id.
at p. 440.)
Here, by
contrast, Rochelle had reason to suspect an improper relationship between
Kershek and Dennis. Her letters in 2005
and the 2008 lawsuit were
sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion of some prior relationship between
Kershek and Dennis. Unlike the plaintiff
in Hobart, who had no reason to suspect the defendant attorney's
misrepresentations, Rochelle not only suspected an improper relationship
between Kershek and Dennis, but she advised Kershek in 2005 that she intended
to pursue claims of fraud against him.
Rochelle's
reliance on the April decision is likewise misplaced. The Court of Appeal there applied the delayed
discovery rule where the act causing the plaintiffs injury was difficult for
the plaintiff to detect, especially where the defendant has been in a far
superior position to comprehend the act and injury. (April, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 831.)
In April, the defendants erased evidence on the tapes of a
television show while the tapes were in their exclusive custody and
control. (Id. at p. 832.) Because the
defendants occupied a fiduciary relationship with respect to their plaintiff
client and the evidence was in their exclusive control, the April court
accrue until the plaintiff discovered the tapes were erased, not on the date of
their erasure. (Ibid.) Here,
there was no evidence that Kershek destroyed evidence that was in his sole
custody or prevented Rochelle from discovering information.
Amen and
Gutierrez, are also inapplicable.
In Amen, supra, 58 Cal.2d 528, a breach of contract action, the
court found that the plaintiff's ignorance of the defendant escrow agent's
breach in notifying her of the need to obtain a tax clearance certification to
avoid tax liability was justifiable, because she did not learn of any breach
until she became liable for taxes. (Id. at pp. 534-535.)
In Gutierrez,
the plaintiff patient claimed the statute of limitations against her doctors
did not begin to run until after she had consulted an attorney who advised her
that she had a cause of action, even though
she suspected her doctors committed malpractice at an earlier date. (Guiterrez,
supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 897.)
The California Supreme Court in Gutierrez found the statute of
limitations commenced when the plaintiff suspected her doctors' malpractice,
not when her attorney notified her of the legal theories and remedies. (Ibid.)
Here, by
contrast, as we have discussed, Rochelle suspected wrongdoing by Kershek that
caused her significant financial loss no later than 2005. She sued to set aside the same judgment on
the basis of fraud in 2008. As our high
court stated in Jolly, supra, 44
Cal.3d at page 1111: "Once the
plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she
must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear
that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to
find her. (Italics added.)
The Jolly
decision confirms that the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of
suspicion when a plaintiff is "on inquiry," as Rochelle was, and it
was her duty thereafter to find out the facts supporting her claim.
discovery rule because the undisputed evidence shows that she suspected Kershek
of fraudulent conduct and could have discovered the facts of Kershek's alleged
improper relationship with Dennis long before December 31, 2009. Kershek's role as a mediator did not diminish
her duty to investigate where she suspected Kershek's fraud no later than 2005.
Fees Award
Rochelle
asserts the court erred in awarding $10,000 in attorney fees to Dennis because
the court made no findings on whether an award of attorney fees is appropriate,
whether there was a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether
one party was able to pay for legal representation. Without citation to the record, Rochelle then
contends that the evidence demonstrated that Dennis could pay his own fees, and
it was she "who was probably in need of funds to pay her
attorney." We conclude this claim
has been forfeited as Rochelle failed to oppose the attorney fee request in the
proceedings below.
Section
2030, subdivision (a)(1) requires the trial court in a dissolution proceeding
to ensure that each party has access to legal representation. If necessary, the trial court may order one
party to pay the other party's "reasonably necessary" attorney fees
"based on the income and needs assessments" of the parties. (Ibid.)
Here, it is
undisputed that Rochelle never opposed Dennis's attorney fee request
below. "[U]nder the doctrine of
invited error, a party is estopped from asserting prejudicial error where
commission of the wrong." (Telles Transport, Inc. v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1167.) Thus, Rochelle is estopped from appealing
whether the court erred in awarding Dennis $10,000 in attorney fees. (Ibid.)
Moreover,
even if we were to conclude that Rochelle did not forfeit this issue, we would
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $10,000 in
fees. Dennis's income and expense
declaration stated he had incurred $25,808 in fees and costs. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the
court inquired of his counsel as to the time span within which these fees were
incurred. Counsel for Dennis then made
an offer of proof, which Rochelle's lawyer accepted, that identified fees for
the response to the motion and the civil lawsuit as about $14,000 to
$15,000. Defense of the set aside motion
amounted to $11,000. The court the court
reduced the award to $10,000. Based upon
this record, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees
to Dennis.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
Dennis shall recover his costs on appeal.
NARES, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD, J.
IRION, J.
As is the custom in family law
matters, the parties are referred to by their first names. (
re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 475, fn. 1.) We intend no disrespect.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
All further statutory references
are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.
