Ricotta v. San Diego Co. Employees
Retirement Assn.
Filed 9/23/13 Ricotta v. San Diego Co. Employees Retirement
Assn. CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
THOMAS RICOTTA, SR.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SAN
DIEGO COUNTY
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
D062839
(Super. Ct.
No.
37-2012-00052700-CU-FR-NC)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Robert P. Dahlquist, Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas
Ricotta, Sr., Plaintiff and Appellant in pro. per.
Crowell
& Moring, Steve P. Rice and Queena Mewers for Defendant and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Thomas
Ricotta, Sr. (Thomas) filed a complaint against the San Diego County Employees
Retirement Association (SDCERA) alleging seven causes of action. All of Thomas's claims are based on the
premise that SDCERA acted illegally in paying a portion of Thomas's pension
benefits to the estate of his former wife, Ellen Ricotta (Ellen), pursuant to a
1998 family court order (1998 Order).
Thomas maintains that the 1998 Order is defective and invalid.
that it could not be held liable for obeying a court order, among other
contentions. The trial court sustained
SDCERA's demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of
SDCERA.
On appeal,
Thomas claims that the 1998 Order is invalid on various grounds, including that
the pension benefits are his separate property and may not be paid to his
former wife's estate. Thomas also claims
that the 1998 Order was procured by extrinsic fraud and violates federal law,
including the Americans With Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et.
seq.).
We conclude
that SDCERA cannot be held liable for complying with the 1998 Order, and that
the validity of the 1998 Order may not be adjudicated in this action. We affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.
The family
court entered the 1998 Order in a dissolution action between Thomas and Ellen (
Diego County, 1993, No. DN 64503) (DN 64503).
earned by Thomas and provides in relevant part:
"On June 26, 1996, the Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District, Division One of the State of California ordered that all
retirement payments awarded on behalf of [Thomas] commencing August 12, 1994
[when Thomas turned 50], and continuing thereafter, shall be divided equally
between [Thomas] and [Ellen]. . . .
"[¶] . . . . [¶]
"If [Ellen] predeceases [Thomas], the portion of
[Thomas's] benefit payable to [Ellen] . . . shall continue to be paid to
[Ellen's] estate or designated beneficiary during [Thomas's]
lifetime."
The 1998
Order further provides:
"The Court shall expressly reserve jurisdiction
over the disposition of the retirement benefit earned by virtue of [Thomas's]
employment with the County of San
Diego and to make all necessary and appropriate
orders regarding those benefits pursuant to applicable law."
B.
In April
2010, Thomas filed a complaint against SDCERA in which he alleged claims
labeled extrinsic fraud, breach of contract, violations of the Americans With
Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et. seq.), violations of various
provisions of the Government Code, violations of the County Employees
Retirement Law (Gov. Code, § 31450), violation of the
Constitution and injunctive relief.
In his
complaint, Thomas alleged that the "[1998 Order] that gave one half of
Thomas' disability pension to . . . [Ellen's Estate] is defective and
invalid." Thomas claimed that
SDCERA's payment of the benefits to Ellen's Estate rendered it "liable for
all funds dispersed by this defective and invalid
order . . . ."
According to Thomas, the 1998 Order is invalid for a number of reasons,
including that it was procured by extrinsic fraud, Thomas did not sign the
order, and the benefits that were the subject of the order are his separate
property. Thomas also contended that the
1998 Order violated various provisions of federal and state law, including the
County Employees Retirement Law (Gov. Code, § 31450) and the Americans
With Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et. seq.).
C.
SDCERA
filed a demurrer to the complaint. In
its demurrer, SDCERA noted that Thomas had previously unsuccessfully sought
reversal of 1998 Order both in this court and in the Supreme Court. SDCERA also noted that Thomas had
unsuccessfully sought reversal of the 1998 Order by filing a lawsuit against
SDCERA in 2011 in federal court.
With
respect to the current action, SDCERA argued that Thomas appeared to contend
that the 1998 Order was invalid to the extent that the order: (1) awards
one-half of Thomas's pension payments after he turned 50 to Ellen and (2) makes
the former spouse's benefits inheritable.
SDCERA argued that Thomas had previously raised these same contentions
in prior proceedings in this court and in the Supreme Court. SDCERA further argued that it could not be
held liable for complying with the 1998 Order.
SDCERA also contended that Thomas's claim for extrinsic fraud failed as
matter of law because it was untimely.
In addition, SDCERA maintained that Thomas would be unable to establish
the "meritorious defense" element of his extrinsic fraud claim both
because the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded him from raising that
defense and because the 1998 Order complied with controlling California
law.
SDCERA
requested that the trial court take judicial notice of various records
pertaining to: Thomas's 1993 marital dissolution action (DN 64503); the 1998
Order entered in DN 64503; and the 2011 federal lawsuit brought by Thomas
against SDCERA.
It appears
that Ricotta may have filed an opposition to the demurrer, but he has not
included the opposition in the record on appeal.
D.
After
SDCERA filed a reply, the trial court held a hearing on the motion, and later
entered an order granting SDCERA's request for judicial notice and sustaining
SDCERA's demurrer without leave to amend. The court reasoned in part:
"[SDCERA's] general demurrer to [Ricotta's] entire
complaint is sustained without leave to amend.
This ruling is without prejudice to the possibility of [Ricotta] seeking
an order in Family Court Case No. DN 64503 to vacate [the 1998 Order].
"In the current civil jurisdiction case, [Ricotta]
seeks damages from SDCERA on account of SDCERA's payments of pension benefits
in accordance with [the 1998 Order].
Ricotta asserts in his complaint that the [1998 Order] is defective and
invalid. If that is true, then Ricotta's
remedy is to obtain an order from the Family Court vacating the order, not
seeking an award of money damages in a separate civil case. SDCERA may not be held liable for damages for
complying with an existing order issued by the Family Court. So long as the [1998 Order] remains in
place . . . Ricotta's complaint fails to state facts upon
which relief may be granted."
The trial
court subsequently entered judgment in favor of SDCERA.
E.
Ricotta
appeals from the judgment.
III.
DISCUSSION
The trial court did not err in sustaining SDCERA's demurrer without
leave to amend
Thomas
contends that the trial court erred in sustaining SDCERA's demurrer without
leave to amend.
title="">[4]
"In
evaluating a trial court's order sustaining a demurrer, we review the complaint
de novo to determine whether it contains sufficient facts to state a cause of
action. [Citation.]" (Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1589.)
Thomas's
claims for breach of contract, violations of the Americans With Disabilities
Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et. seq.), violations of various provisions of the
Government Code, violations of the County Employees Retirement Law (Gov. Code,
§ 31450), and violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution appear
title="">[5]
to be premised on Thomas's assertion that SDCERA may be held liable for money
damages for distributing Thomas's benefits pursuant to the 1998 Order because
the 1998 Order is invalid. None of these
common law or statutory theories of liability provide that an entity may be
held liable for damages for complying with an existing court order. Thus, the trial court properly sustained
SDCERA's demurrer as to these causes of action.
With
respect to Thomas's claims for extrinsic fraud and injunctive relief, Thomas
appears to seek a judicial determination that the 1998 Order is invalid.
law because Thomas may not adjudicate the validity of the 1998 Order in this
action. Rather, in light of the family
court's express reservation of jurisdiction in DN 64503 "over the
disposition of the retirement benefit earned by virtue of [Thomas's] employment with the County of San
Diego," any attempt to declare the 1998 Order invalid must be made in that
action. Thomas's claims for extrinsic
fraud and injunctive relief thus also fail to state a cause of action.
Accordingly, the trial court properly
sustained SDCERA's demurrer to all of Thomas's claims, without leave to amend.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed. Thomas is to bear
costs on appeal.
AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL,
P. J.
O'ROURKE,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Thomas also named the Estate of Ellen Ricotta (Ellen's
Estate) as a defendant. The trial court
granted a motion to quash the service of summons on Ellen's Estate. The motion to quash is not contained in the
record and Thomas has not raised any claim pertaining to the motion in this
appeal.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Thomas's briefs on appeal contain both a large number of
irrelevant and extraneous factual assertions without citation to the record, as
well as a number of disparaging remarks directed at members of the
judiciary. For example, in his opening
brief, Thomas states, "The attorneys and the attorneys in black robes
steal more money than all the criminals in our prisons that used
guns." Thomas's reply brief
contains an extensive discussion of purported judicial corruption that is
entirely irrelevant to the issues on appeal.
Thomas is admonished that similar assertions in future filings in this
court may subject him to sanctions.
