In re J.M.
Filed 9/23/13 In re J.M. CA2/4
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re J.M., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
J.M.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
B244430
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VJ42423)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Stephanie M. Davis, Juvenile Court Referee. Reversed.
Courtney
M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Eric E. Reynolds and
Connie H. Kan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant
J.M. appeals from a juvenile court decision finding a charge of trespass upon
school grounds to be true, as part of a Welfare and Institutions Code section
602 petition. He contends the court
lacked sufficient evidence to
conclude that he violated the relevant trespass statute because the school
failed to provide a sufficient hearing and notification. Without reaching appellant’s claims, we find
the evidence insufficient to support the court’s ruling, because respondent
failed to demonstrate appellant’s willful and knowing entry upon the school
campus. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment.
On
the morning of February 22, 2012, appellant J.M. was sent to
the discipline office at his high school for defiant and disrespectful conduct
toward a campus security officer. Pamela
Trimble was a teacher on special assignment working in the discipline office
that morning. She met with appellant,
then in the ninth grade, to discuss the incident sometime between 8:15 and 8:30
a.m.
She planned to place appellant on
in-house suspension for his actions with the security officer. But as they discussed the incident, appellant
became upset. He called her a “dirty ass
teacher.â€
Trimble
decided that appellant’s comment merited more serious punishment. She spoke to the dean in charge of discipline,
who made the final decision that appellant should be placed on a two-day
suspension. After completing the notice
of suspension form, Trimble ensured that appellant read and signed it, and
orally informed him of its terms. During
this process, Trimble provided an opportunity for appellant to explain his side
of the story, as is standard procedure when suspending a pupil. She explained that during the two-day
suspension, between February 22 and 23, he was not permitted to be on campus or
attend any school events until the suspension ended. If he needed to retrieve items from his
locker, appellant would need to do so “before he left. Because once he was suspended officially, he
could not come back on campus.â€
Prior
to releasing appellant, somebody in the school’s discipline office called his
mother to ask that she pick him up, or to obtain permission for him to walk
home. Upon receiving the call, and
learning that her son had been suspended, the mother allowed him to walk home. Sometime between 8:30 and 8:45 a.m., after Trimble
completed her meeting with appellant, the discipline secretary walked him up to
the front office. Trimble believed that
appellant then walked home.
At 9:20
a.m., campus security officer Maria del Carmen Rivera noticed that appellant was
on campus in an outdoor area where student lockers were located. Rivera alerted Deputy Sheriff Cesar Gallegos,
who was working on campus that morning. Appellant
appeared to be opening a locker, so Gallegos asked him what he was doing. He responded, “You’re a little bitch for
stopping me. I was just here to get a baseball cap.†Gallegos detained appellant for violating the
suspension order, and escorted him to the discipline office.
On
April 23, 2012, respondent filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602
petition. It charged a single count of
trespass on school grounds, in violation of Penal Code section 626.2,
February 22, 2012. Appellant denied the
allegation.
The
juvenile court found the petition true beyond a reasonable doubt, declared
appellant a ward of the state, and ordered him to remain on home probation. In reaching this determination, the court
addressed appellant’s claims that the circumstances of his suspension satisfied
neither the hearing nor notice requirements of section 626.2. It concluded that an opportunity to respond
during the meeting with Trimble was sufficient to satisfy the “after a hearingâ€
requirement of section 626.2. As to the
requirement that the notice be sent by “registered or certified mail,†the
court determined that “actual notice trumps all written notice.†It identified a portion of section 626.2 that
provides “[t]he presumption [of knowledge if notice has been given as
prescribed in this section] established by this section is a presumption
affecting the burden of proof.†(§ 626.2, subd. (c).) The court concluded that where “a person
actually knows about something,†as appellant knew about his two-day
suspension, then the statutory notice requirements are “excused.†Accordingly, it declared the violation a
misdemeanor, and awarded appellant five days of
Appellant
contends the court erred in finding the Welfare and Institutions Code section
602 petition to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues that the court lacked sufficient
evidence to conclude that he violated section 626.2. Raising procedural deficiencies, he contends the
court failed to satisfy the hearing and notice requirements of the statute, and
thus lacked sufficient evidence to sustain the charge against him. Finding the court lacked
willfully and knowingly entered the school campus, we need not address his
claims.
Section
626.2 prohibits a pupil, under a current suspension order, from entering a
school campus. It provides, in relevant
part: “Every student or employee who,
after a hearing, has been suspended or dismissed from a community college, a
state university, the university, or a public or private school for disrupting
the orderly operation of the campus or facility of the institution, and as a
condition of the suspension or dismissal has been denied access to the campus
or facility, or both, of the institution for the period of the suspension or in
the case of dismissal for a period not to exceed one year; who has been served
by registered or certified mail, at the last address given by that person, with
a written notice of the suspension or dismissal and condition; and
campus or facility of the institution to which he or she has been denied access,
without the express written permission of the chief administrative officer of
the campus or facility, is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .â€
(§ 626.2, italics added.)
It is
the prosecution’s burden to prove all elements of a crime. (§ 1096 [placing the burden of proof on the
state to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt]; Evid. Code, § 520
[“The party claiming that a person is guilty of crime or wrongdoing has the
burden of proof on that issue.â€].) In
the present case, respondent must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant willfully and knowingly entered
the high school campus following his suspension, in addition to the other
elements of the crime. (§ 626.2.)
“The
test to determine a claim of insufficient evidence is whether, on the entire
record, a rational trier of fact could find appellant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.†(In re Leon S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1556, 1560 citing People v.
Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576–577 (Johnson).) In determining whether the evidence for each
essential element is substantial, we “review the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment below.†(
The
record fails to establish that appellant entered the campus following his
suspension. Section 626.2 requires that
the pupil “willfully and knowingly enter[] upon the campus or facility of the
institution to which he or she has been denied access.†After school officials escorted appellant to
the front office following his suspension meeting, the record is silent as to
where he went next. Trimble assumed he
walked home, as his mother had authorized him to, but there is no evidence
indicating that he did so. Trimble
recounted that 40 minutes passed between the time appellant was released at the
front office and the time he was seen near the lockers. This narrow window of time supports, at a
minimum, an inference that appellant remained on campus, and thus committed no
willful and knowing entry in defiance of his suspension order.
In
the trial court transcript, respondent emphasized that the discipline secretary
escorted appellant to the front of the school following his suspension. While this may support an inference that
appellant proceeded to walk off campus, and then returned to his locker to
retrieve his baseball cap, there is no evidence that he exited and entered the
campus. Any conclusion at trial that
appellant entered the campus following his suspension is speculative. In fact, respondent all but concedes appellant
never left the school. Its brief states
that prior to arresting him, school officials received a “radio call that he
was still on campus.†(Italics added.) Because the facts are silent as to appellant’s
alleged willful and knowing entry, we find that the record fails to supply
evidence sufficient for the trial court to reasonably conclude that appellant
violated section 626.2.
The
judgment is reversed.
EPSTEIN,
P. J.
We concur:
WILLHITE, J.
SUZUKAWA, J.
to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
