Meddock v.
County
Filed 9/10/13 Meddock v. County of Yolo CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
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as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----
DWIGHT
MEDDOCK et al.,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
COUNTY OF YOLO,
Defendant and
Respondent.
C070262
(Super. Ct. No. CVPO10173)
A Fremont cottonwood tree fell on
plaintiff Dwight Meddock while he was in a paved parking lot located in a park
along the Sacramento
River
owned by defendant County of Yolo (County). The trial court granted
wife (collectively, Meddock) in their tort suit alleging a dangerous condition of
public property, by applying a statutory immunity for injuries “caused by a
natural condition of any unimproved public property[.]†(Gov. Code, § 831.2, hereafter § 831.2.) As we will explain, we conclude that
Meddock’s injuries were “caused by†a “natural condition†of unimproved
property where the tree grew, and the fact the tree fell on the improved
portion of the public property does not take this case outside the ambit of the
immunity.
Accordingly, we shall affirm the
judgment in favor of the County.
The Pleadings
This case involves the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code,
§ 810, et seq.; see City of Stockton v.
Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 741-742.)
The operative complaint alleged that
on March 21, 2009, Meddock was injured
when a tree fell on him while he “was lawfully upon an improved portion†of
public property, specifically, “the parking lot of Elkhorn Boat Ramp[.]†He alleged “many of the trees on the premises
. . . are leaning away from the river, toward and over the parking lot of the
above described premises. Some of these
trees are diseased [or] have parasites such as mistletoe, causing them to
constitute a dangerous condition of public property. The [accident] occurred as a result of a dead
tree, which was visibly dead due to the absence of bark in many places[.]†Meddock alleged that the County failed to
maintain the trees properly and failed to warn users of the lot that they were
dangerous.
The answer admitted the County owned
“Elkhorn Regional Park†and the trees therein, denied the County owned the boat
ramp, admitted some of the park’s trees “bear mistletoe[,]†but otherwise
denied the allegations, and alleged as one affirmative defense the section
831.2 immunity for “natural†conditions.
The Motion for Summary Judgment
The County’s separate statement of
six undisputed facts established that Meddock had been at the park--along the Sacramento River--to “go boating†in
recreational use of the park facilities, which included a parking lot, boat
ramp, restroom, and picnic area. While
Meddock was on the parking lot, one cottonwood tree fell on another, causing
tree limbs to fall, hurting him. The
County argued the natural condition immunity barred the action. The County did not argue it should not have
known these trees were in danger of falling.
The Opposition
Meddock did not dispute the County’s
facts. Meddock proffered the additional fact that
“some of the trees adjacent to the area where†his “truck and boat were parked
were leaning over the parking lot†and some of these trees were infested with
mistletoe. The Hearing, the Trial Court’s Ruling, and the Appeal
At the hearing, Meddock’s counsel
disclaimed reliance on the theory that the pavement contributed to the injury, for
purposes of summary judgment. And
Meddock did not argue that the County poorly
pruned the trees, rather than letting them decay, so as to cause a
non-natural danger, or exacerbate a natural danger.
The trial court granted summary
judgment, finding that Meddock’s injuries were “caused†by the trees on
unimproved property. The trial court
also made the policy observation that imposing liability might cause the County
to close the parking lot, thereby cutting off convenient access to the river or
forest areas.
Meddock timely appealed from the
ensuing judgment.
I
Summary and Standard of
Review
The
parties agree on the essential facts, but draw different legal conclusions
therefrom.
intended purpose when he was injured thereon, section 831.2 immunity does not
apply. The County posits that because
the injury was “caused by a natural
condition†of unimproved public
property, the immunity does apply. We
agree with the County.
In reviewing a defense summary
judgment, we apply the traditional three-step analysis used by the trial court,
that is, we: 1) identify the pleaded
issues; 2) determine if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff’s
case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so; 3) determine if
the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact.
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar); AARTS Productions,
Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061,
1064-1065.)
The County incorrectly asserts that
we must construe evidentiary gaps in its favor.
The general rule that we must draw reasonable evidentiary inferences in
favor of the judgment (see, e.g., Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564) does not apply here. The burden is on the County, as the movant,
to show that Meddock cannot prevail, before any burden shifts to Meddock.
supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851;
Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 317, 334-335 & fn. 7.)
II
We first consider whether--viewing the facts in the light
favorable to Meddock--the County breached a duty of care to him, then we
consider the immunity question. (See
Cal.4th 913, 917 (Ladd).)
“The [Government] Claims Act
provides that ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute,’ ‘[a] public entity
is not liable for an injury.’ (Gov.
Code, § 815.)†(Teter v. City of Newport Beach (2003) 30 Cal.4th 446, 451
[plaintiff “quite wrong†to assert “liability is the rule and immunity the
exceptionâ€]; see Metcalf v. County of San
Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129 [sovereign immunity waived only where
terms of the act “‘are satisfied’â€].)
Our Supreme Court recently emphasized that “the intent of the Government
Claims Act is ‘not to expand the rights of plaintiffs against government
entities. Rather, the intent of the act
is to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.’†(DiCampli-Mintz
v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 991.)
Here, the County evidently paved the parking lot and made
related improvements to help people launch boats on the Sacramento River. The County thereby assumed liability for a
dangerous condition of the parking lot, provided it had notice and time to
correct it. (See Gov. Code, §§ 830,
subd. (a), 835; Low v. City of Sacramento
(1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 826 (Low).) The facts, viewed in favor of Meddock, show
he was using the parking lot in the manner for which it was designed when one
or more obviously dangerous trees fell on him.
Thus, he established liability, at least provisionally.
We construe statutes “according to the usual, ordinary
import of the language employed in framing them.†(In re
Alpine (1928) 203 Cal. 731, 736-737.)
An ambiguity arises if and only if two or more plausible and
semantically permissible candidates of meaning are advanced. (City
of Sacramento v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th
786, 793-795.)
The statutory immunity extends to
“an injury caused by a natural
condition of any unimproved public property[.]â€
(§ 831.2, emphasis added.) The
use of the term “caused†is significant.
(Knight v. City of Capitola
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 918, 927 [“the only inquiry relevant†is whether the
injury was “caused by a natural conditionâ€], disapproved on other grounds by
512, 532, fn. 7.) Here, although the
injury occurred on improved property,
that is, the paved parking lot, it was caused
by the trees, native flora
perhaps super-adjacent to--the improved parking lot, but themselves on
unimproved property.
In Ladd, our Supreme Court construed the phrase “caused by†as set
forth in an immunity for any injury “caused by†an escaping prisoner. (Gov. Code, § 845.8, subd. (b)(1).) The court rejected the claim that the
immunity extended only to injuries to
others caused by an escapee:
“Section 845.8 uses broad terms to provide immunity for ‘[a]ny injury
caused by’ an escaping prisoner. Nothing
in the statutory language suggests an exception for injuries caused by a
prisoner to herself. No apparent purpose
would be served by such an exception.†(
Thus, the term “caused by†is to be
read in its ordinary sense. Accordingly,
the County’s interpretation of section 831.2 is manifestly plausible.
In contrast, Meddock posits that the
statute applies where the location of
the injury is improved. He presents a chart listing a number of cases
he argues apply the statute to improvements located much farther away from the
injured party than in this case, where no distance separated the location
improvement. The County responds that,
in those cases, the improvements bore no causal connection to the
injuries. We agree with the County that
the immunity does not turn on location, as Meddock himself elsewhere appears to
concede. Proximity may
therefor. “Significance should be given,
if possible, ‘to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act.’†(Mercer
v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 112.)
We cannot plausibly read “caused by†out of the statute, as Meddock
impliedly asks us to do.
In another case emphasized by Meddock, one court, quoting
Professor Arvo Van Alstyne, the lead drafter of the Government Claims Act,
stated “to qualify public property as improved
so as to take it outside the immunity statute ‘some form of physical change in
the condition of the property at the
location of the injury, which justifies the conclusion that the public
entity is responsible for reasonable risk management in that area, [is]
required to preclude application of the immunity.’†(Eben
v. State of California (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 416, 423.)
not substitute into the statute a spatial analysis for a causal one, instead,
the court was merely rejecting a claim that certain warning buoys, located
“some distance†from a waterskiing accident, meant the public property was improved
so as to take it outside the natural condition immunity. Further, “improvement of a portion of a park
area does not remove the immunity from the unimproved areas.†(Rendak
v. State of California (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 286, 288; see
199 Cal.App.3d 392, 398 [“Nor does the existence of signs and minimal
improvements such as toilets . . . mean that the area is improved public
property or that the dunes are not natural conditionsâ€].) A mountain lion is a natural hazard, even
when it attacks someone on improved property.
(See Arroyo v. State of California
(1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 755, 762-764 (Arroyo).) Thus, the location
of the occurrence is not material to the statute.
Commenting generally on a proposed immunity for “undevelopedâ€
park and recreation land, Professor Van Alstyne gave the following
opinion:
“The crux of the matter
evidently lies in the definition of ‘undeveloped.’ What is here intended by that term is those
portions of public lands intended for recreational uses which are presently
being held in their natural state, without substantial artificial improvements
or changes except to the extent that such changes are essential to their
presentation and prudent management (such as firetrails and firebreaks, roads
for prudent lumbering for conservation purposes, projects for reforestation of
burned areas, and the like).
cutting of roads and sidewalks, construction of buildings,
with stoves, running water, sanitary facilities, garbage service and organized
recreational activities, or which consist of playgrounds, golf courses, picnic
tables and other typical recreational facilities characteristic of municipal
parks, would be excluded from the scope
of this suggested immunity and presumably would be covered by the [former]
Public Liability Act (or its successors).
The distinction between the
‘developed’ and the ‘undeveloped’ sectors of a park might well be difficult to
identify in terms of boundary lines on a map, and might have to be treated as a
question of fact[.]†(A Study
Relating to Sovereign Immunity (Jan. 1963) 5 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963)
pp. 495-496, emphases added (Study by Prof. Van Alstyne).)
In another comment, Professor Van
Alstyne observed as follows:
“The State . . . owns
vast acreages that are unimproved and unoccupied. There should be an absolute immunity from
liability for any condition of such property until it has been improved or occupied.†(A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity (Jan.
1963) 4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963) p. 824, emphasis added (Study by
Prof. Van Alstyne).)
Although these passages can be read
to refer to the location of the injury, rather than its cause, they were
general, and do not raise any plausible ambiguity within section 831.2 itself.
In contrast, a relevant legislative commentary reads as follows:
“This section provides
an absolute immunity from liability for injuries resulting from a natural
condition of any unimproved public property.
Thus, for example, under this section and Section 831.4, the State has
an absolute immunity from liability for injuries resulting from natural
conditions of a state park area where the only improvements are recreational
access roads (as defined in Section 831.4) and hiking, riding, fishing and
hunting trails. [¶] This
section and Section 831.4 continue and extend an existing policy adopted by the
Legislature in former Government Code Section 54002. It is desirable to permit the members of the
public to use public property in its natural condition and to provide trails
for hikers and riders and roads for campers into the primitive regions of the
State. But the burden and expense of
putting such property in a safe condition and the expense of defending claims
for injuries would probably cause many public entities to close such areas to
public use. In view of the limited funds
available for the acquisition and improvement of property for recreational
purposes, it is not unreasonable to expect persons who voluntarily use
unimproved public property in its natural condition to assume the risk of
injuries arising therefrom as a part of the price to be paid for benefits
received.†(1964 Annual Report (Dec.
1963) 4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963) p. 232; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep.
on Senate Bill No. 42 (1963 Reg. Sess.) 2 Sen. J. (1963 Reg. Sess.) p. 1891.)
This passage correctly spoke of
injuries “resulting fromâ€--meaning “caused byâ€--natural conditions of public
property. The former statute referenced
in this comment provided immunity for injuries “caused by accidents on bridle
trails.†(Stats.
1949, ch. 81, § 1, p. 300; see Stats. 1943, ch. 940, § 1, pp. 2812-2813.) The new statute was designed to
“‘continue and extend’†the prior
limited immunity, and therefore “the Legislature did not intend a narrow
construction of†section 831.2. (
Cal.App.3d 926, 938.) Accordingly,
Meddock’s reliance on the general rule that statutory exceptions are generally
construed narrowly does not advance his claim of ambiguity in section 831.2
in particular.
name="_ftnref9" title="">[9]
We also observe that three cases
involving falling trees--including one out-of-state case cited by the
County--are wholly consistent with our view.
In Milligan, supra, 34
Cal.3d 829, our Supreme Court addressed the scope of section 831.2 on the
following facts: Eucalyptus trees
located on public property fell on Milligan’s house. (Milligan,
supra, at p. 831.) Milligan
held the natural condition immunity did not apply to “nonusers†of government
property who are injured “on adjacent property[.]†(Ibid.) Although that issue is not presented in this
case, in reaching its conclusion, Milligan
considered the legislative comment we quoted immediately ante, and observed:
“It is desirable to permit public use of governmental
property but governmental agencies might prohibit such use if they were put to
the expense of making the property safe, responding to tort actions, and paying
damages. The comment concludes by
pointing out the shortage of funds for improving property for recreational use
and the fairness of requiring users to assume the risk of injury. The comment did not state that in the absence
of the immunity the costs to public agencies would be prohibitive. The statement as to cost is limited to the
perception that cost might cause agencies to close their property to the
public.†(Milligan, supra, 34
Cal.3d at p. 833.)
name="_ftnref10" title="">[10]
Imposing liability in this case would thwart the policy
of reducing the probable cost to a public entity of making improvements to
public land, as the trial court observed.
We also find guidance stemming from a case decided
Claims Act, Smith v. County of San Mateo (1943)
62 Cal.App.2d 122 (Smith). In Smith,
a tree fell onto a cabin in a public campground, killing an occupant. Based on evidence that the trees in the area
were obviously “dead and partly rotted and were in constant danger of
falling[,]†as well as evidence about the particular tree that fell, the County
of San Mateo was found liable for failing to maintain the park in a safe
condition. (Smith, supra, 62 Cal.App.2d at pp. 124-129.) At the time, under the former Public
Liability Act, a governmental body was liable for a “defective or dangerous
condition†of public property, if it had notice thereof in time to remedy the
condition, similar to the present law.
(Stats. 1923, ch. 328, § 2, p. 675; see Gov. Code, §§ 830, subd. (a),
835.) But there was no explicit immunity
for “natural†conditions, and the court refused to read one into the
statute: “While the statute does not
evidence an intention on the part of the Legislature to make public
corporations liable for all injuries resulting from natural conditions upon the
public domain, it seems entirely clear that the Legislature intended to impose
liability upon a public corporation which might maintain for an unreasonable
time a known dangerous but remediable condition in a park or playground
regardless of whether such dangerous condition was attributable to natural or
artificial causes.†(
Alstyne’s report (that lead to the enactment of the Government Claims Act) as
an example of unwarranted public
liability in recreational settings. (See
A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity (Jan. 1963) 5 Cal. Law Revision Com.
Rep. (1963) p. 491, fn. 8 (Study by Prof. Van Alstyne).) Thus, the Legislature had decaying trees in
mind when it drafted section 831.2.
We also refer to a Pennsylvania case involving a model
recreational immunity statute as interpreted to extend only to land that was
“largely unimproved[.]†(
(1992) 419 Pa. Super 487, 496 [615 A.2d 743, 748].) Although the plaintiff was on “Y.M.C.A.’s
land to observe a baseball game, his
injury did not arise out [of] any improvement to the baseball field. [His] injury was caused by a falling, decayed
tree limb. Importantly,
Y.C.M.A.'s land which remained unimproved.â€
(Id. at p. 501 [615 A.2d at p.
750], emphasis added.) We find this
passage reflects an interpretation fully applicable to section 831.2.
Finally, Meddock asserts the County is liable for failing
to warn of dangerous trees and creating a “hidden trap†by inducing people to
use the lot despite the danger. The
“trap†theory is forfeited because it was not raised in the trial court. (See Saville
v. Sierra College (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 857, 872-873.) In any event, both theories fail to
persuade. Meddock points to an
observation by our Supreme Court that no provision of the Government Claims Act
“explicitly immunizes a public defendant for failure to warn.†(Peterson
v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 815 (
dangerous due to criminal activity, exacerbated by untrimmed foliage. (Peterson,
supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 805, 812-813.)
The passage relied on by Meddock is in a portion of the opinion
discussing an immunity for failure to provide police protection. (Peterson,
supra, at pp. 814-815; see Gov. Code, § 845.) However, “the failure to warn issue involves
the same basic policy considerations which led to the enactment of section
831.2. [Citation.] Therefore, liability for failure to warn is
inconsonant with the immunity the statute provides. The immunity applies whether or not the
dangerous condition amounted to a hidden trap and whether or not the public
entity had knowledge of it.†(
Cal.App.3d 158, 166; see Arroyo,
[“immunity applies whether or not the dangerous condition amounted to a hidden
trap and whether or not the public entity had knowledge of itâ€];
Cal.App.3d 981, 991-992.)
Because Meddock’s injuries were caused by decaying natural trees located on unimproved property,
the County is immune from liability therefor.
(§ 831.2.)
affirmed. The Meddocks shall pay the
County’s costs of this appeal. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)
DUARTE , J.
We concur:
BUTZ , Acting P. J.
MURRAY , J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Section 831.2 provides in full as
follows: “Neither a public entity nor a
public employee is liable for an injury caused by a natural condition of any
unimproved public property, including but not limited to any natural condition
of any lake, stream, bay, river or beach.â€
(§ 831.2; Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 1, p. 3273.)
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] These possible theories
are not briefed on appeal and therefore we deem them to be abandoned. (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008)
Appeal, § 701, p. 769 (Witkin).)
