Filed 9/10/13
County of Los Angeles v. Ivanov CA2/2
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
TWO
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MARINO IVANOV et
al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
B242806
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MC022564)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County. Brian C. Yep,
Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan
T. Trevillyan for Defendants and Appellants.
John
F. Krattli, County Counsel, Lawrence L. Hafetz, Assistant County Counsel, and
Dušan Pavlović, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
Defendants Marino Ivanov, Jennifer
Ivanov, and Storybrook Properties, Inc., own and operate a mobilehome
park. When they failed to obtain a
conditional use permit (CUP) for the continued operation of the mobilehome
park, plaintiff County of Los Angeles (the County) cited them for violation of
the Los Angeles County Planning and Zoning Code (Zoning Code) and ordered them
to either apply for and obtain a CUP or cease operating the mobilehome
park. Defendants refused to bring the
property into compliance with the Zoning Code, prompting the County to bring
suit against them. The County moved for
granted. Defendants appeal,
contending: (1) the Zoning Code is
preempted by state law; (2) the Zoning Code only applies to new mobilehome
parks; (3) the Zoning Code’s amortized schedule amounts is illegal; and (4) the
County did not provide them with adequate notice of the alleged Zoning Code
violation.
We
affirm.
The
mobilehome park
Defendants
own and operate a 15-space mobilehome park on a rural property in the
unincorporated community of Leona Valley, located within the County (the
property). The property is a 10-acre
desert lot located in the A-1 (light-agricultural) zone. It has been used as a mobilehome park and
rented to tenants since the 1950’s.
Since 1983, the property has lawfully operated pursuant to an annual
permit to operate, issued by the State of California Department of Housing and
Community Development.
Defendants
purchased the property in 2005.
The
Zoning Code
In
1978, the County Board of Supervisors enacted an ordinance amending Zoning Code
section 22.24.100 to require a CUP for operation of mobilehome parks in the A-1
zone. Pursuant to Zoning Code section
22.56.1540(B)(1)(g), all properties developed as a mobilehome park prior to
1978 received either a 20-year or 25-year amortization period, after which time
the affected property owners were required to either discontinue the
nonconforming use or apply for and secure a CUP, as set forth in Zoning Code
sections 22.56.010 et seq. and 22.52.500.
Finally, Zoning Code section 22.60.350 provides that any property used
in violation of the Zoning Code constitutes a public nuisance.
Defendants
did not possess a CUP
In May 2007, the
County learned that defendants did not possess a CUP to operate the mobilehome
park. As a result, it served notice of
violations on defendants, maintaining that the use of a mobilehome park was not
permitted without a CUP. Then, the
County cited defendants for violation of the Zoning Code and ordered them to
either apply for and obtain a CUP or cease operating the mobilehome park within
30 days. After defendants refused to
comply with the County’s administrative enforcement order, the County imposed a
$2,289 noncompliance fee. Defendants
paid the fee, but failed to bring the property into compliance with the Zoning
Code.
The
instant action
On
May 10, 2011, the County filed the instant action against defendants, alleging
that their use of the property violates the Zoning Code and that such violation
constitutes a public nuisance per se.
On June 28, 2011,
defendants filed an answer and cross-complaint, alleging, inter alia, that they
were not required to comply with the Zoning Code because it was preempted by
the Mobilehome Parks Act (MPA) (Health & Saf. Code, § 18200 et seq.); that
they were not required to obtain a CUP; and that the County failed to provide
defendants with proper notice, in violation of their due process rights.
The County then
moved for summary judgment. After
entertaining oral argument, the trial court granted the County’s motion.
Defendants’ timely
appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard
of Review
trial court properly grants summary judgment where no
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(c).) We review the trial court’s
decision de novo.†(Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)
II.
Judgment was Proper
We
conclude that the trial court properly awarded judgment to the County. The County’s complaint alleges two causes of
action against defendants: (1) violation
of Zoning Code section 22.24.025; and (2) public nuisance per se.
To prove a claim
for violation of the Zoning Code, the County was required to establish that (1)
defendants own, use, or maintain the property, (2) the property is used as a
mobilehome park, (3) the property is located in the A-1 zone, and (4)
defendants do not possess a CUP to operate the mobilehome park. The County presented undisputed evidence in
support of each of these elements.
Having established that defendants violated the Zoning Code, the County
also proved through undisputed facts that the use of the property without a CUP
constitutes a public nuisance per se.
In urging us to
reverse, defendants argue that they are not required to obtain a CUP to operate
the mobilehome park because Zoning Code provisions are preempted by the MPA.
A local law is
preempted by state law when (1) it
duplicates state law;
(2) contradicts state law; or (3)
enters an area fully occupied by state law, either expressly or by legislative
implication. (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41
Cal.4th 1232, 1242.) Local legislation
enters an area that is fully occupied by general law when the state Legislature
has manifested its intent to fully occupy the area. (City
of Claremont v. Kruse (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169.)
The MPA regulates
the construction, maintenance, occupancy, use, and design of mobilehome
parks. (Health & Saf. Code, §§
18250-18254.) Thus, as the County
agrees, the State of California fully occupies the field with respect to
mobilehome regulation. (Health &
Saf. Code, § 18300, subd. (a).) However,
the statutory framework also makes it clear that the state tolerates limited
local action. (See, e.g., Health &
Saf. Code,
§ 18300, subd. (g)(1);
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1492.)
Specifically, the County is expressly authorized to establish zones
where mobilehomes may be located and nothing in the statutory scheme
“prevent[s]†the County “from adopting rules and regulations by ordinance or
resolution prescribing park perimeter walls or enclosures on public street
frontage, signs, access, and vehicle parking or from prescribing the
prohibition of certain uses for mobilehome parks.†(Health & Saf. Code, §18300, subd.
(g)(1).) In other words, local
governments do retain authority to regulate location and land use in mobilehome
parks. (Sequoia Park Associates v. County of Sonoma (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
1270, 1281.) Because Zoning Code section
22.52.500 regulates only expressly authorized aspects of use and development of
mobilehome parks, it stays within the confines of Health and Safety Code
section 18300, subdivision (g)(1), and is not preempted by state law.
Defendants further
argue that the County cannot require them to obtain a CUP because the
mobilehome park existed on the property prior to the enactment of the 1978
amendment to the Zoning Code. Nothing in
the plain language of Health and Safety Code section 18300, subdivision (g),
suggests that a local authority’s right to regulate a mobilehome park applies only
to new mobilehome parks. Absent legal
authority in support of defendants’ proposition, it fails. (Benach
v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)
In any event,
defendants are mistaken; the County may require a CUP for a previously existing
mobilehome park with expired nonconforming status. A nonconforming use is a land use that
lawfully existed on the effective date of a new or amended zoning ordinance and
has existed in its original form without conformance to the new ordinance. “California cases have firmly held zoning
legislation may validly provide for the eventual termination of nonconforming
property uses without compensation if it provides a reasonable amortization
period commensurate with the investment involved.†(Castner
v. City of Oakland (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 94, 96.)
Under the Zoning
Code, all properties developed as a mobilehome park prior to 1978 received
either a 20-year or 25-year amortization period, after which time the affected
property owners were required to either discontinue the nonconforming use or
apply for and secure a CUP. (Zoning
Code, § 22.56.1540(B)(1).) It is
undisputed that defendants’ mobilehome park existed on the property at the time
the 1978 amendment to the Zoning Code was enacted. At that time, the property became a
nonconforming use. Defendants had until
the expiration of the amortization period to secure a CUP.
In challenging the
amortization set forth in Zoning Code section 22.56.1540, defendants assert
that the amortized schedule amounts are illegal. Again, however, defendants neglect to offer
any legal authority in support of their contention. (Benach
v. County of Los Angeles, supra,
149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852.) And,
other than unfounded hyperbole, there is no evidence or argument to support
defendants’ claim that the 25-year period to eliminate its nonconforming status
was anything less than reasonable. (
Cal.3d 875, 878 [legislation may validly provide for eventual discontinuance of
nonconforming uses within a prescribed reasonable amortization period];
(1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1365, 1396 [owner/user of the property bears the burden
of establishing unreasonableness of amortization period].)
Finally,
defendants argue that their due process
rights were violated as the County did not provide them with proper notice
of the alleged Zoning Code violations.
This issue is a red herring.
Regardless of whether defendants were served with proper notice of the
alleged Zoning Code violations, it is undisputed that they were timely and
properly served with the complaint and moving papers in this case. And, once again, defendants fail to offer any
legal authority in support of their suggestion that the alleged failure to
serve proper notice of Zoning Code violations obviates the County’s claims
asserted in this lawsuit. (
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed. The County is
entitled to costs on appeal.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________________,
J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
______________________________, P. J.
BOREN
______________________________, J.
FERNS
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] We reject defendants’ contention that pursuant to Civil
Code section 3482 (statutory immunity) the mobilehome park is not a public
nuisance. It is not defendants’
operation of a mobilehome park that constitutes the alleged nuisance; rather,
it is defendants’ operation of a mobilehome park without a CUP that constitutes
a public nuisance.
name="_ftn2" title="">* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
