Golden Hill Neighborhood Assn. v. City
of San Diego
Filed 11/25/13 Golden Hill Neighborhood Assn.
v. City of San Diego CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
GOLDEN HILL NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
CITY OF SAN
DIEGO,
Defendant and Respondent.
D062203
(Super. Ct. Nos. 37-2007-00074201-
CU-WM-CTL, 37-2008-00088429-
CU-MC-CTL)
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court
of
County, Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Law Offices
of Charles R. Khoury Jr. and Charles R. Khoury, Jr.; Haskins & Associates
and Steven W. Haskins, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Jan I.
Goldsmith, City Attorney, Carmen A. Brock, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent.
The Golden Hill Neighborhood
Association and property owner John McNab (collectively Association) prevailed in
a prior appeal in which this court ordered the trial court to vacate the
judgment and issue a new judgment granting the Association's requested relief
against the City of San Diego (City). (Golden
Hill Neighborhood Assn., Inc. v. City of San Diego (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th
416 (Golden Hill).) After the remittitur was issued and the trial
court entered the new judgment, the Association sought attorney fees under the
private attorney general doctrine. (Code
of Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 (§ 1021.5).)
The trial court denied the motion, finding it was untimely under
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(c)(1).
We determine the trial court erred
in ruling that the Association's attorney fees motion was governed by rule
3.1702(c)(1). Under settled law, rule
3.1702(b)(1) is the applicable rule and the Association's motion was timely
under this rule. We reject the City's
alternate contention that the Association waived its right to seek attorney
fees by failing to seek the fees after the initial trial or during the prior
appeal. We reverse and remand for the
court to consider the Association's attorney fees motion on its merits.
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 2007, the Association sued the City
challenging the legality of a City resolution establishing a Golden Hill
maintenance district (District) and challenging the City's initial 2007
assessments to fund services in the maintenance district. (Golden
Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 426-428.) In its complaint and
petition for writ of mandate, the Association claimed the City's formation of
the District and the 2007 assessments violated article XIII D of the California
Constitution (article XIIID), which limits a local government's ability to levy
special assessments against real property.
(Golden Hill, supra, at pp.
426-428.)
The next year the Association filed
a second lawsuit against the City challenging the District's 2008 tax
assessments. (Golden Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.) The lawsuits were consolidated. (Id.
at p. 421.)
After a bench trial on the
consolidated action, the trial court issued a judgment favoring the Association
in part and the City in part, but the judgment was not entirely clear as to the
grounds for the decision or the scope of the relief provided on the Association's
claims. (Golden Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.) No party sought attorney fees.
All parties appealed, and on
September 22, 2011 this court issued a lengthy published opinion holding that
the City's resolution establishing the District was unconstitutional. (Golden
Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th 416.)
In the Disposition section, we ordered the trial court to: (1) vacate its judgment; and (2) enter a new
judgment (i) granting the Association's petition for writ of mandate filed in
the 2007 lawsuit and (ii) ordering the issuance of a writ vacating the City's
resolution forming the District and invalidating all of the District's
assessments. (Id. at p. 440.) This was an
unqualified "win" for the Association.
The remittitur was issued on
November 22, 2011. Less than one month
later, the Association filed a proposed amended judgment with the relief
ordered by the Golden Hill
court. The proposed judgment included a
space for costs and attorney fees to be awarded. Shortly after, the City filed an opposition
to the proposed judgment, raising various issues with the judgment and
asserting that the Association was not entitled to any attorney fees because it
did not seek the fees after the first trial or in their appellate briefs filed in
the first appeal.
On January 9, 2012, the Association
filed a response to the City's objections, and also requested a hearing date on
the costs and attorney fees issues. The
Association argued it was entitled to raise the issue of attorney fees under
section 1021.5 and had not waived the issue.
On January 20, 2012, the
Association filed a motion seeking a hearing on the proposed new judgment and
requesting attorney fees incurred in the action. In its supporting memorandum, the Association
set forth legal and factual grounds for its entitlement to attorney fees under
the private attorney general doctrine.
On February 9, 2012, the court
signed the new judgment that had been proposed by the Association. The judgment states:
"1. The previous judgments in each of the
consolidated cases are VACATED;
"2. The Petition for WRIT of MANDATE filed by
Association in 2007 is GRANTED;
"3. The City's Resolution No. R-302887 forming
the Maintenance Assessment District of Golden Hill is vacated;
"4. The assessments imposed by that Maintenance
Assessment District are invalidated;
"5. A Writ shall issue to carry out the above
orders."
In the final line, the judgment states the issue of costs
and fees will be decided by "filed motions."
About one month later, on March 21,
the Association filed a formal motion for attorney fees under section 1021.5,
supported by extensive documentation regarding the nature of the attorney
services and the amount of the claimed fees.
On April 2, the City filed an opposition to the attorney fees
motion. The sole basis of its opposition
was that the court had no jurisdiction to consider the fees because the
Association had not requested the fees after the first trial or as part of the prior
appeal. In reply, the Association denied
it had waived its rights, asserting that it was not until the Court of Appeal
issued the Golden Hill decision that
it had succeeded in obtaining the primary benefit sought—a writ invalidating
the resolution forming the District and invalidating all (including the
post-2007) assessments.
After a hearing, the trial court
denied the Association's attorney fees motion on a different ground than had
been briefed by the parties. On its own
motion, the court concluded the Association's motion was not timely because it
was governed by rule 3.1702(c)(1), which requires an attorney fees motion to be
filed within 40 days after a remittitur is issued. The court stated the Association "did
not file [its] motion for attorneys' fees until March 21, 2012, beyond the
40-day limit."
Within several weeks, the
Association moved for a new trial, requesting the court to reconsider its
ruling because it was legally incorrect. The Association explained that rule
3.1702(b)(1), rather than rule 3.1702(c)(1), governs the timeliness issue,
citing several supporting authorities, including Yuba Cypress Housing Partners, LTD v. Area Developers (2002) 98
Cal.App.4th 1077 (Yuba). The Association argued that under rule 3.1702(b)(1),
the Association's attorney fees motion was required to be filed within 60 days
of the new judgment, and the Association filed its motion within this 60-day
period. The Association alternatively
argued that it substantially complied with the rule because it put the City on
notice of its intent to seek attorney fees within several weeks of the
remittitur and before the new judgment was even filed.
The court denied the new trial
motion.
DISCUSSION
I. Timeliness
of Motion Under the California Rules of Court
The Association contends the court
erred in concluding rule 3.1702(c)(1) applied instead of rule
3.1702(b)(1).
A. Review
Principles
The
Association's contention requires that we interpret the Rules of Court. In doing so, we apply well-settled statutory
interpretation principles. (
Cal.App.4th 394, 403 [traditional statutory construction principles applicable
to interpretation of California Rules of Court].)
focus on the language used in the applicable rules. (Centex
Homes v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1099.) If the words are not ambiguous, " 'the
plain meaning of the language governs.' " (Taxpayers
for Accountable School Bond Spending v. San Diego Unified School District
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1025.) We
presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute's plain meaning
governs. (Centex Homes,
We apply a
de novo review standard in considering whether the trial court properly
interpreted the Rules of Court. (
804-805.)
B. Analysis
Rule 3.1702
sets forth deadlines for attorney fees motions after trial or after an
appeal. The rule contains two separate
deadlines: one applicable to fees
incurred at trial or on appeal (rule 3.1702(b)); and one applicable only to
fees incurred on appeal (rule 3.1702(c)).
The first deadline, contained in rule 3.1702(b)(1) states in relevant part:
"(b) Attorney's fees before trial
court judgment
"(1) Time for motion
"A notice of
motion to claim attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition
of judgment in the trial court—including
attorney's fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial
court—must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of
appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case or under rules
8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case."
(Italics added.)
Under this rule, the Association had 60 days from the time
the new judgment was filed to file its motion.
It is undisputed the Association met this deadline.
The
3.1702(c)(1) states in relevant
part:
"(c) Attorney's fees on appeal
"(1) Time for motion
"A notice of
motion to claim attorney's fees on appeal—other
than the attorney's fees on appeal claimed under (b)—under a statute or
contract requiring the court to determine entitlement to the fees, the amount
of the fees, or both, must be served and filed within the time for serving and
filing the memorandum of costs under rule 8.278(c)(1) in an unlimited civil
case or under rule 8.891(c)(1) in a limited civil case." (Italics added.)
If this rule applies, the Association had 40 days from the
time the remittitur was issued to file its motion. (Rule 8.278(c)(1).) It is undisputed the Association did not meet
this deadline.
The trial court's conclusion that rule
3.1702(c)(1) applied to the Association's motion is not supported by the plain
language of this rule. First, rule
3.1702(c)(1) expressly applies only to motions seeking attorneys fees "on
appeal." Here, the Association was
seeking fees incurred at trial as
well as on appeal. Second, rule
3.1702(c)(1) applies only to attorney fee requests "other than the attorney's fees on appeal claimed under (b)." (Italics added.) Rule 3.1702(b) applies to attorney fees for services "up to and including
the rendition of judgment in the trial court—including attorney fees on an
appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial court." (Rule 3.1702(b)(1).) When the Association filed its attorney fees
motion in March 2012, it sought fees incurred during trial and on appeal, all
of which were incurred before the existing February 9, 2012 judgment. Because the Association sought fees for
services during trial and appeal and these fees were incurred before the
February 9, 2012 judgment, rule 3.1702(b)(1) applies.
More than 10 years ago, a Court of Appeal reached the same
conclusion under similar facts. (
and the appellate court remanded the case with orders for the trial court to
enter a new judgment in the plaintiff's favor.
(Id. at pp. 1080, 1087.) On remand, the plaintiff moved for attorney
fees, but the trial court found the portion of the motion seeking appellate
attorney fees was untimely under former rule 870.2(c)(1), the predecessor rule
to rule 3.1702(c)(1).
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] (Yuba,
at p. 1084.) On appeal, the
concluding subsection (c) contained the governing rule. (Yuba,
at pp. 1084-1086.) The court reasoned
that subsection (c) excludes fee motions falling under subsection (b), and the subsection
(b) language encompasses attorney fees on appeal " 'before the rendition
of judgment,' " which necessarily refers to appellate attorney fees
sought after "the appellate court reverse[d] a judgment following trial
and direct[ed] the entry of a new
judgment." (
where] appellate attorney fees are incurred after rendition of [the trial
court] judgment when the appellate court simply affirms the judgment without
remanding the matter for further proceedings entailing the entry of a new
judgment." (Ibid.)
Accordingly, when a party moves for
attorney fees after an appeal, the time deadlines depend on whether the
appellate disposition was a simple affirmance of an existing judgment (in which
case rule 3.1702(c)(1) applies) or whether the disposition was a reversal
and/or a reversal with directions to enter a new judgment (in which case rule
3.1702(b)(1) applies). (
1084-1086.) This interpretation has been
endorsed by the commentators. (See
Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and
14:122.5 ["The subdivision (b)(1) timing rule for claiming fees incurred
on an interim appeal applies (not the subdivision (c)(1) deadline) when the
appellate court reverses and remands
for further proceedings entailing the entry of a new judgment"]; 2 Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee
Awards (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2013) §§ 11.43, 12.21.)
Applying these principles here, the
Association's motion was timely. As in
directed the entry of a new judgment. (
p. 440.) After the remittitur was
issued, the trial court entered a new judgment consistent with the opinions
expressed in the Golden Hill opinion.
Thereafter, the Association moved for
attorney fees that were incurred before the new judgment. At that point, the prior judgment was no
longer in existence and had no effect.
(See Saller v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1237-1238
["effect of an unqualified reversal
is to vacate the judgment . . . as
if . . . no judgment had been entered"].) Accordingly, by definition, the fees sought
by the Association were fees "for services up to and including the
rendition of [the only existing] judgment in the trial court—including attorney's
fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial court." (Rule 3.1702(b)(1).) Thus, rule 3.1702(b) applied.
The City argues
case the plaintiffs "lost" in the trial court whereas in this case
each party prevailed in part. However,
with respect to the rule 3.1702 issue, this difference is not material. The critical point is that the rule 3.1702(b)(1)
deadline applies when the party is seeking appellate fees incurred before the "new"
judgment. In Yuba, as here, the court ordered the trial court to reverse the
prior judgment and enter a new judgment in the plaintiff's favor. Under those circumstances, the plaintiff seeking
prevailing party attorney fees for attorney services incurred before the new
judgment is governed by the deadline set forth in rule 3.1702(b)(1). (See Yuba, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1084-1086.)
Similarly, the fact that Yuba
involved an attorney fees motion under Civil Code section 1717, rather than
under section 1021.5, is a distinction without a difference. Rule 3.1702 expressly applies to "statutory
attorney's fees and claims for attorney's fees provided for in a contract." (Rule 3.1702(a).)
Finally, we disagree with the City's contention that the
prior judgment was not "reversed."
In the Disposition section, the Golden
Hill court stated: "The trial
court is directed to vacate the judgment and enter a new judgment granting the
Association's petition for writ of mandate filed in 2007 and ordering the
issuance of a writ vacating the city's resolution . . . forming the District
and invalidating the assessments imposed by the District." (Golden
Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.)
That disposition constitutes a reversal of the prior judgment.
II. Association
Did Not Waive Right To Seek Attorney Fees
The City alternatively urges this
court to affirm the court's order on the ground that the Association did not
file an attorney fees motion after the first trial and/or during the first
appeal. The City argues that by failing
to previously move for attorney fees, the Association waived its right to seek
the fees following this court's unqualified reversal of the judgment. Although the trial court did not reach this
issue, both parties briefed the issue in the proceedings below and in this
appeal, and request that we decide the issue.
For purposes of judicial economy, we agree it is appropriate to address
the issue on this appeal.
Under section 1021.5, " 'the court may
award attorney fees to a "successful party" in any action that "has
resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest
if: (a) a significant benefit, whether
pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large
class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement
are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the
interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.". . .' "
(Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565.)
The City contends that even
assuming the Association could satisfy section 1021.5's statutory elements with
respect to the results achieved from the Golden
Hill decision, the Association is precluded from seeking the fees for
services incurred to obtain these results because the Association had already
obtained this same successful outcome after the initial trial court
judgment. Essentially, the City argues
that there was no need for the first appeal because the Association had already
obtained its primary requested relief after the trial, even if its attorneys
did not recognize this.
This argument is unsupported. After the initial trial, the trial court
entered a judgment in favor of the Association on its cause of action alleging
that the City's special assessments were invalid because they were not imposed
for "special benefits," as is required under article XIIID. (Golden
Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at
p. 429.) But the trial court found in
the City's favor with respect to the Association's requests for declaratory and
injunctive relief pertaining to future assessments and other requested
relief. (Id. at p. 429.)
Our court stated that the "effect"
of this judgment was "unclear" and "it is uncertain whether the
trial court intended to invalidate the formation
of the District or simply invalidate the 2007 assessments levied by the
District as being unauthorized by article XIII D." (Golden
Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.)
In a footnote, the Golden Hill court
additionally observed that "[c]ase law is unclear as to whether a judicial
determination invalidating an initial assessment imposed in a newly formed
assessment district necessarily invalidates the formation of the assessment district established to levy the
assessment." (Id. at p. 428, fn. 9.) In
this same footnote, the court specifically rejected the City's argument that
the judgment necessarily invalidated the formation of the District. (Ibid.) Later in the opinion, the
judgment "appears to uphold the 2008 assessment," which would be
inconsistent with a conclusion that the trial court intended to invalidate the
District. (Id. at p. 429.)
After determining the trial court's
judgment was unclear and uncertain, our court engaged in a lengthy analysis of
the Association's and the City's appellate arguments regarding whether the City's
formation of the District and the imposition of the assessments satisfied
constitutional requirements. (
429-439.) The court ultimately concluded
the formation of the District violated the state Constitution (article XIIID)
because there was insufficient evidence to support the assigned values of
City-owned parcels within the District in determining whether there was a
proper affirmative vote from the property owners. (Golden
Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at pp. 429-435.) Our court also concluded that all assessments
were improper and unconstitutional because the City did not separately quantify
the general and special benefits to be provided by the assessments. (Id.
at pp. 436-439.) Based on these
conclusions, the Golden Hill court
ordered the prior judgment "vacate[d]" and ordered the trial court to
enter a new and different judgment and a writ of mandate vacating the City's
resolution forming the District and invalidating the assessments imposed by the
District. (Id. at p. 440.)
The Association asserts it did not
seek section 1021.5 attorney fees after the initial trial because "the
benefit of the lawsuit to the residents of Golden Hill was not at all clear
until the ambiguities in the trial court's rulings were resolved by this Court
of Appeal and the prior judgment vacated, a new judgment filed and a writ
issued . . . pursuant to this Court of Appeal's [decision]." The Association explains that it appealed the
trial court judgment "because their partial victory did not gain them what
they sought, the dissolution of the assessment district. That result was gained in the reversal and
public opinion of Golden Hill . . . ."
The Association's position is
supported by the Golden Hill
decision. Based on the statements,
conclusions, and disposition set forth in the Golden Hill opinion, the Association obtained new, qualitatively
different, and substantially greater relief in the new judgment than was
initially mandated by the original trial court judgment. Thus, the Association was entitled to seek
private attorney general fees incurred for obtaining this relief in a timely
motion filed for the first time after the new judgment was entered. To the extent the City believes that the
Association did not need to file the appeal to achieve this result, or that its
earlier partial victory was no different from its later appellate victory, those
arguments can be presented to the trial court when the court determines whether
the Association met its burden to show the statutory criteria for obtaining a
section 1021.5 attorney fees award and/or when the court examines the
reasonableness of the incurred fees during trial and on appeal.
DISPOSITION
Order reversed.
The court is ordered to vacate its April 19 order finding plaintiffs'
attorney fees motion untimely under rule 3.1702(c)(1). The court is ordered to consider the
Association's attorney fees motion consistent with the conclusions reached in
this opinion. The City is ordered to
bear appellants' costs on appeal.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
McDONALD, J.
All further rule references are
to the California Rules of Court.
The two rules are essentially
identical with respect to the issues raised here.
