S.C. v. Superior Court
Filed 6/18/13 S.C. v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
S.C. et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real
Party in Interest.
E058266
(Super.Ct.No. RIJ1201295)
OPINION
ORIGINAL
PROCEEDINGS; petitions for extraordinary
writ. Jacqueline C. Jackson,
Judge. Petition Denied.
David
KhanhHung Tran for Petitioner S.C.
Mark
A. Hover for Petitioner K.N.
No
appearance for Respondent.
Pamela
J. Walls, County Counsel, and Carole A. Nunes Fong, Deputy County Counsel, for
Real Party in Interest.
Petitioners
S.C. (Mother) and K.N. (Father) filed petitions for
Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court’s order denying
Mother reunification services as to her three children, and setting a Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.
evidence to support the juvenile court’s order denying her services under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] We reject this contention and affirm the
judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The
family came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Public
Social Services (DPSS) on December 20, 2012, when an immediate response
referral was received alleging physical abuse and general neglect of
eight-year-old Ky.R., six-year-old Ke.R., and one-year-old K.N.
diameter red bruise on his left hip, as well as an abrasion on his stomach with
purple bruising; that Father had hit Ke. with a bat; and that Father had kept
Ke. up all night on a time out with the last incident occurring about one week
prior. It was also reported that Ke. ate
only two pieces of bread and cereal all day.
When
the social worker made contact with Ke., Ke. immediately began to cry and
exclaimed that his mother and father would be mad at him if he spoke to the
social worker. Ke. eventually disclosed
the allegations and showed the social worker his injuries. The social worker observed that Ke. had a
visible two-inch red bruise on his left hip area; two healing marks or scars on
his chest area; a six-inch scrape mark with developing bruising that covered
his left rib area to his sternum area; and several other linear scars and
faint, yellow bruising on various areas of his torso. Ke. also stated that Father had tied him up
to a chair for “‘hours,’†and proceeded to show the social worker how Father
had used a rope to wrap him around a chair.
Ke. further reported that Mother had been at work, but when she got home
she talked to him while he was in the chair.
Ky.,
who was diagnosed with high functioning Autism, was unable to confirm whether
his brother had recently been in trouble.
Ky., however, disclosed that they often time do not have enough to eat
and that Father gives them two slices of bread and a sandwich bag of cereal to
eat.
Due
to the extent of Ke.’s injuries and Ky.’s disclosure of not having enough food
to eat, the children were placed in protective custody. Ke. and Ky. were transported to a hospital
for a medical examination. Ke. was found
to have new and old bruises on his stomach and two burn marks. In addition, while the physician’s assistant
was applying pressure to Ke.’s stomach to check for broken ribs, Ke. cringed
and stated it hurt. Ke. also had a
bruise on the right side of his forehead which was caused by Father punching
him with a closed fist. Ky. did not have
any marks or bruises. A urine test
revealed that the boys were dehydrated and had elevated pulses, and were given
intravenous fluids and food.
While
at the hospital, Ke. stated that he did not want to go home and explained how
Father had placed him on timeouts. Ke.
demonstrated how he had to stand on one leg while the other is bent and tied
with tape to his other leg with a book over his head from one hour up to four
hours. He also said that sometimes while
on timeouts Father would come and kick him in the stomach.
A
Child Abuse and Neglect (CAN) team examination was subsequently conducted on
Ke. Ke. was found to have numerous
bruises, red marks, linear bruises, and burn marks on his stomach, throat,
forehead, hand, back, thighs, and buttocks.
Ke. reported to the CAN team and law enforcement that the injuries were
sustained when Father hit him with a belt and bat; when Father held his hand
over a hot stove; and when Mother and Father pulled his ears and hit him with
wooden drumsticks on his bare back and buttocks. Ke. also stated that Father had made him eat
hot peppers, had rubbed hot peppers in his eyes, had whipped him with a jump
rope, and had punched him, choked him, and sat on him. The examining doctor concluded that Ke. had
“‘multiple patterned bruising, scars consistent with severe physical abuse,’â€
history of inflicted trauma, and history of “‘multiple extensive injuries’â€
consistent with torture; and that Ke. was subjected to severe physical abuse,
emotional abuse, and torture.
Father
reported that Ke. had behavioral issues and that he and Mother were constantly
receiving calls from his school due to Ke.’s tantrums and throwing chairs. He further stated that Ke. often times lied
and stole candy and food. He
acknowledged that he had placed Ke. in timeouts by having him kneel on tile
flooring for 15 minutes to two hours, and that he had disciplined Ke. based on
the severity of his behavior. He denied
that he had hit Ke. with a bat and explained that Ke. had often times lied, had
a wild imagination, and had injuries due to being very active. Father also stated that he checks the boys
every night for injuries and denied seeing any injuries on Ke. Father acknowledged that he and Mother had at
times tied Ke.’s legs with a rope or tape to a chair to prevent him from
running away when he was supposed to be in timeout or from running around the
house; that he had used wooden drumsticks to hit Ke. on the buttocks; and that
Mother was aware of Father’s methods of the timeouts and will even try to talk
to Ke. while he is in timeout. Father
also denied depriving the boys of food.
Father was eventually arrested for felony child abuse.
Mother
was at work when the social worker spoke with Father. She refused to leave work despite Father
explaining to Mother that DPSS was taking all three children. As such, the social worker spoke with Mother
the following day. Mother stated that
Ke. was a liar and that she believed her husband. She then admitted that she had given
permission to Father to discipline the boys when she was not at home. She then refused to answer questions about
the boys being tied up during timeouts without consulting her attorney. However, to an investigating detective,
Mother reported that “in their culture, they beat their children and it is
normal for ‘things like that to occur,’†and that “‘I was beaten when I was a
child and look how I turned out.’†She
also admitted that she and Father had used timeouts that consisted of the
children kneeling on the floor and that the timeouts last for days at a time if
the behavior is not corrected by the child.
Mother also admitted that spanking or slapping in the face is used when
the children are caught lying or stealing and confirmed that Father had taped
Ke. to a chair as a form of punishment.
She denied knowing that Ke. had injuries or knowing anything was going
on in her home, despite bathing the children every night. When shown photographs of Ke.’s injuries and
asked how she had not noticed them, Mother had no explanation.
The
family had prior referrals for physical abuse and general neglect with
CPS. A referral was received on December
9, 2011, for general neglect and physical abuse. The referral stated that Ky. had a bruise
under his left check. The parents
reported that the injury was a result of the boys boxing and showed DPSS an
area designated for boxing, which included boxing equipment and protective
gear. The allegations were subsequently
unfounded. Another referral was received
on March 14, 2012, alleging general neglect.
It was reported that Ky. had a one inch bruise near his hairline. Another immediate response referral was
received on March 22, 2012, alleging physical abuse of Ke. after Father had
pushed the child’s face into a sink full of water. At that time, following a team decision
meeting, the family agreed to voluntary family maintenance services. The services were, however, discontinued in
May 2012 after the parents, especially Father, were uncooperative. The parents had also stated that they did not
desire any further interaction with the social worker. Finally, another immediate response referral
was received on October 3, 2012, alleging general neglect and physical abuse
after Ky. was observed with fingerprint bruises on his arm and his stomach was
a little distended. The allegations were
determined to be unfounded after an investigation revealed that the bruises
were a result of boxing with Father and the distended stomach was due to the
child overeating.
On
December 24, 2012, a petition was filed on behalf of the children pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to
protect), (g) (no provision for support by the father of Ke. and Ky), (i)
(cruelty), and (j) (abuse of sibling).
formally removed from their parents and placed in foster care. The parents were offered services and
visitation.
Ke.
and Ky. were placed in the home of Ms. M, and K. was placed in the home of her
paternal uncle and aunt. The boys
appeared to be healthy, happy, and well cared for. Ky. disclosed that he had also been subjected
to timeouts and physical abuse by Father.
Both the boys reported that they desired to stay in Ms. M.’s home and
were very scared of Father. Ky. further
stated that he was not scared of Mother but admitted that she was present at
times when the abuse occurred. Ke.
stated that he was scared of his mother and paternal grandparents, because they
would tell Father when he would get in trouble, and Father would punish him and
Mother would not stop him. Ms. M.
reported that she has had no problems with the boys; that the boys had not
asked about their parents; and that the boys were fearful that Father would
find them and take them. Ky.’s
instructional aide reported that since being placed in foster care, she has
seen a remarkable difference in Ky. He
now appeared very happy, smiled often, and had told her that he did not want to
go back with his mother because he was happy.
School records did not indicate that Ke. had ongoing behavioral issues
and there were no concerns noted from his school.
Mother
had participated in supervised visits with the children. The visits appeared to have been going well
and there were no concerns until the January 31, 2013 visit. At that visit, Mother had given Ke. a card
from Father, who had been directed to have no contact with the children, and
the boys began acting up. The card was a
computer generated card with the words “‘Boxing Time!’†on the outside, and a
note from Father stating that he missed them and could not wait for them to
come home so they can box again. The
foster mother reported that Ke., who was normally friendly with other foster
children in the home, had hit another child and wet his bed. In addition, Ky. had been “‘harassing’†Ke.
and telling him he was going to get in trouble.
The foster mother also reported that the children never play on the play
area but have to sit with Mother during the entire visits; that Mother never
asks the boys if they want to play; and that the boys had sad faces watching
other children play. Ke. admitted that
during visits they do not play on the play area and that made him sad; and that
he desired to continue to see his mother but asked if they could play during
the visits. Ky. also confirmed that they
do not play during visits and desired to continue to see Mother but less
often.
The
social worker recommended that reunification
services be denied to the parents pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions
(b)(5) and (b)(6).
title="">[6] Based on the evidence in this case, the
social worker believed that the parents would not benefit from services and
that offering services to the parents would not be in the children’s best
interests.
The
contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on February 27 and
March 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 11, 2013.
Following the lengthy trial and hearing testimony from the boys, the
social workers, and arguments from the parties, the juvenile court found all
the allegations in the amended petition true, except allegation b-3 pertaining
to Mother’s neglect of the boys due to dehydration. The children were thereafter declared
dependents of the court, and removed from parental custody. Reunification services were denied to Mother
as to all three children and Father as to K.N. pursuant to subdivision
(b)(6). The court found that
reunification services were not in the children’s best interests, and set a
section 366.26 permanent planning hearing.
Mother
and Father seek extraordinary writs requesting that we vacate the order setting
the matter for a permanent planning hearing and order DPSS to provide family
reunification services to them.
II
DISCUSSION
Mother
argues that there was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s order denying
her reunification services pursuant to subdivision (b)(6). Father joins in Mother’s arguments.
Whenever
a child is removed from the custody of a parent or guardian, subdivision (a)
directs that the court shall offer the parent or guardian reunification
services, unless it finds by clear and
convincing evidence that one or more exceptions or bypass provisions
described in subdivision (b) apply. (
55, 63-64 (Ethan N.);
Cal.App.4th 509, 516 (Angelique C.).) The general rule of subdivision (a) reflects
a “strong preference for maintaining the family relationship if at all
possible. [Citation.]†(In re
Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.) When, however, one or more of the exceptions
or bypass provisions apply, “the general rule favoring reunification is
replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise
use of governmental resources.
[Citation.]†(
Subdivision
(b) requires bypass findings to be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. “Clear and convincing evidence
requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no
substantial doubt.†(
Cal.App.4th 839, 852 (Tyrone W.).) “‘“The sufficiency of evidence to establish a
given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and
convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and if
there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is
not open to review on appeal.â€â€™â€ (
When, as here, the court finds that a parent or guardian is described in
subdivision (b)(6), the parent or guardian has the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating that reunification with the child—and therefore offering
reunification services to the parent or guardian—would be in the child’s best
interest. (Ethan N., supra, 122
Cal.App.4th at p. 66; Tyrone W., at
p. 846; § 361.5, subd. (c).)
The
court has broad discretion in determining whether the parent or guardian has
met this burden and therefore whether to offer the parent or guardian
reunification services under subdivision (c).
(Angelique C.,
p. 523.) An appellate court may not
disturb the trial court’s best interest determination absent a showing of an
abuse of discretion. (
no substantial evidence to uphold the
findings. (Ethan N., supra, 122
Cal.App.4th at pp. 64-65.)
Under
subdivision (b)(6), the court must deny reunification services to a parent when
“the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivision of
Section 300 as a result of . . . the infliction of severe physical harm to the
child, a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent or guardian . . . and the court
makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification
services with the offending parent or guardian.â€
Severe
physical harm may be inflicted, inter alia, “by an act or omission of the
parent . . . or of another individual . . . with the
consent of the parent . . . .â€
(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6).)
Thus, by “its express terms, subdivision (b)(6) applies to the parent
who inflicted severe physical harm to the minor†(In re Kenneth M. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 16, 21) or consented to
such harm inflicted by another individual.
Unlike subdivision (b)(5), subdivision (b)(6) does not apply to a
negligent parent who reasonably should have known of the abuse. (Tyrone
W., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p.
851.) “[W]here there is no evidence to
show both parents knew the child was abused or injured, the court must identify
the parent who inflicted the child’s injuries before denying reunification
services to that parent under . . . subdivision (b)(6).†(Id.
at p. 852.) Thus, subparagraph (b)(6) “requires identification of the
perpetrator.†(Kenneth M., at p. 21.)
Here,
the juvenile court denied the parents services, having found Ke. was severely
physically abused. The court identified
Father as the perpetrator. As to Mother,
the court found that Mother “did consent to the behavior. She told Detective Ramirez that [Father] had
permission to discipline the boys, that timeouts could last for days at a time
if [the] behavior wasn’t corrected according to their satisfaction, that
slapping or spanking—slapping in the face was used, and that [Father] did in
fact tape [Ke.] to chairs as [a form] of punishment, that getting beaten with
sticks and brooms was acceptable in her culture.†Substantial evidence supports the court’s
findings that Father inflicted severe physical harm to Ke., and that Mother
knew and had consented to the abuse.
Relying
on Tyrone W., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 839, Mother argues that section subdivision
(b)(6) does not apply to her because there is no evidence that she
that she consented to Father’s abuse
of the children. In Tyrone W., after an infant died of sudden infant death syndrome,
the medical examiner discovered she was suffering from several two-week-old rib
fractures that were deemed suspicious and “‘likely indicative of child
abuse.’†(Tyrone, supra, at p.
853.) After the infant’s sibling was
found to be a child described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), the
juvenile court denied reunification services to the parents pursuant to
subdivision (b)(6). (
evidence, it found that the infant’s injuries were not visible and there were
no signs of injury; nor was there any evidence to show that, if one parent had
inflicted injury on the infant, the other parent knew about it. (Id.
at pp. 851-852.) Given those
circumstances, the court stated: “We do
not believe section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) applies to a parent who
‘reasonably should have known’ of the abuse because that parent was not
complicit in the infliction of physical harm by act, omission or consent. As defined in subdivision (b)(6), omission
and consent both require actual knowledge, if not of the physical harm itself,
then of another’s abusive acts. We hold that
subdivision (b)(6) applies to the parent or parents who inflicted severe physical
harm to the child whether by act, omission or consent, and does not apply to a
negligent parent.†(Id. at p. 851.) The
court explained that, as “defined in subdivision (b)(6), omission and consent
both require actual knowledge, if not of the physical harm itself, then of
another’s abusive acts. We hold that
subdivision (b)(6) applies to the parent or parents who inflicted severe
physical harm to the child whether by act, omission or consent, and does not apply
to a negligent parent.†(
The
Tyrone W. court, however, concluded
by stating that it did “not quarrel with the proposition that when the child’s
injury or injuries were obvious to the child’s caretakers and they failed to
act, the court is not required to identify which parent inflicted the abuse by
act and which parent inflicted the abuse by omission or consent. In such a case, the evidence supports a
conclusion that both parents knew the child was injured or being abused.†(Tyrone
W., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at
p. 852.) Ultimately, the
reunification services on the ground that the sustained allegations under
section 300, subdivision (j), showed more than negligence. (Tyrone
W., at p. 854.)
Here,
unlike in Tyrone, Ke. had bruises and
scars all over his body. As found by the
juvenile court, Ke. had marks “from his scalp to his ankles, and they cover his
body. I haven’t seen bruises cover a
body like this in a very long time.†The
court further commented that “[Ke.] does not merely have bruises. [Ke.] has scars, [Ke.] has a deep cut on his
hand, a slash on his penis, burn marks and bruises. And looking at the bruises, some look like
they’re in different stages of healing than others. Some are dark in color. Some are redder in color. [¶] So
we’re not talking about, it’s evident to the court, a single incident in which
there are some bruises that heal on [Ke.]
It’s quite evident there is substantial inflicted abuse on [Ke.] And that’s borne out by the CAN exam itself.â€
The
CAN examination found that Ke. had numerous bruises, red marks, linear bruises,
and burn marks on various parts of his body, including his stomach, throat,
forehead, hand, back, thighs, and buttocks.
Ke. reported that the injuries were sustained when Father hit him with a
belt and bat; when Father whipped him with a jump rope; when Father punched and
choked him; when Father held his hand over a hot stove; and when Mother and
Father pulled his ears and hit him with wooden drumsticks on his bare back and
buttocks. The examining doctor concluded
that Ke. had “‘multiple patterned bruising, scars consistent with severe
physical abuse,’†and history of “‘multiple extensive injuries’†consistent
with torture. As the juvenile court found,
“it rather incredible that any mother of a six-year-old child would not noticeâ€
the marks all over his body.
Besides
Ke.’s obvious physical injuries, there was also evidence that Mother was aware
of Ke. being tied up in a chair and that she had even spoken to Ke. while he
was tied up in the chair. The evidence
also showed that Mother had at times tied Ke.’s legs with a rope to a chair to
prevent him from running away; that Mother had used wooden drumsticks to hit
Ke.; and that Mother was aware of Father’s methods of disciplining the boys and
had given Father permission to discipline the boys. Mother admitted that she and Father had used
timeouts that consisted of the children kneeling on the floor and that the time
outs lasted for days at a time and that spanking or slapping in the face was
used when the children are caught lying or stealing. Moreover, she had informed law enforcement
that in their culture, it is acceptable to beat their children as a form of
discipline. And, when she was shown
photographs of Ke.’s injuries and asked how she had not noticed any of the
injuries, Mother had no explanation.
The
evidence here supported the juvenile court’s determination that Mother’s
conduct amounted to the type of omission or consent required for the
application of subdivision (b)(6).
Mother
next argues that the juvenile court failed to properly consider whether
services would benefit the children and whether granting services was in the
children’s best interests.
When
the prerequisites of subdivision (b)(6) are met, the juvenile court “shall notâ€
order reunification services for the offending parent unless it finds, “by
clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of
the child.†(§ 361.5, subd. (c).) ““‘[O]nce it is determined one of the
situations outlined in subdivision (b) applies, the general rule favoring
reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services
would be an unwise use of governmental resources. [Citation.]â€â€™
[Citation.] The burden is on the
parent to change that assumption and show that reunification would serve the
best interests of the child.†(
1220, 1227.) In determining whether
reunification is in the child’s best interest, a court considers any
information it deems relevant, including the “specific act . . .
comprising . . . the severe physical harm inflicted on the child,â€
the “circumstances under which the abuse or harm was inflicted,†the “severity
of the emotional trauma suffered by the child,†“[a]ny history of abuse of
other children by the offending parent,†the “likelihood that the child may be
safely returned to the . . . parent . . . within 12 months with
no continuing supervision,†and “[w]hether . . . the child desires to be
reunified with the offending parent . . . .â€
(§ 361.5, subd. (i).)
name="_ftnref7" title="">[7]
Here,
the specific acts constituting the abuse were egregious, causing Ke. to suffer
severe physical and emotional harm. The
circumstances of the abuse were exacerbated by Mother’s acts or omissions in
condoning the abuse; Mother’s dishonesty and denial of the abuse; Mother’s
statement that Ke. was a liar and that she did not believe the disclosures made
by Ke.; and Mother’s past unwillingness to participate in voluntary family
maintenance services. In addition, the family
had a history of five past referrals over the course of one year involving
yet Mother continued to allow the abuse of her children.
Further,
it was unlikely the children would be returned to Mother within 12 months. The boys consistently stated that they wanted
to stay in foster care and not return home.
At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, Ke. testified that he did
not want to go home with Mother; and when asked if he wanted to go home with
Mother if Father did not live there, he said “I don’t know.†Although Ky. testified that he wanted to go
home, when asked if he wanted to go home “today†or “wait a little bit,†he
said, “maybe just stay here.†Hence, it
appears that Ky. may not have wanted to go home to Mother. In any event, Ke. and Ky. prior to the
jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, had consistently stated that they were
happy in their foster home and that they did not want to go home.
The
boys also stated that they were afraid of Father. Ke. also stated that he was afraid of Mother
and believed that Mother would not protect him.
In addition, while in foster care, the boys never discussed why they
were in foster care or asked about their parents. Moreover, Ky.’s teachers reported that they
had observed a remarkable difference in Ky. since he was removed from his home,
noting that he appeared to be happy, smiled often, and told them that he did
not want to go back with his mother because he was happy. Indeed, the record reveals that the boys were
happy and were doing well in their foster home.
The boys also indicated that they wanted to visit Mother but less often
because they did not get to play.
Regarding
K.N., due to her young age, Mother would have had to demonstrate substantial
progress within six months had reunification services been offered. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) Based on Mother’s statements, actions,
omissions, and her inability to make use of services in the past, it was unlikely
services would be effective within the six-month period. In addition, due to K.N.’s tender age, even
if Mother received 12 months of services, she would still be too young to
protect herself from Father or Mother.
The
juvenile court’s finding that reunification services would not be in the
children’s best interests is supported by sufficient evidence.
Mother
argues that the juvenile court failed to adequately consider the factors set
forth in subdivision (i), instead primarily focusing on Ke.’s injuries. We find no error in the process by which the
court determined that reunification services for Mother would not benefit the
children under subdivisions (b)(6) and (i).
Subdivision (i) directs a dependency court applying subdivision (b)(6)
to consider “any information it deems relevant,†including the six listed
factors, as noted ante. Subdivision (i), however, does not require a
mechanical listing of the dependency court’s finding on every factor listed in
subdivision (i). (In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1259-1261.) Indeed, the court in In re S.G. held that findings may be implied rather than explicit,
and a reviewing court “will infer a necessary finding provided the implicit
finding is supported by substantial evidence.
[Citations.]†(
In
support of her argument that the court erred by failing to identify the factors
set forth in subdivision (i), Mother cites In
re Rebekah R. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1638 (Rebekah R.). That case,
however, is inapposite. Subdivision (i)
applies only if the dependency court finds true the predicate facts that invoke
subdivision (b)(6): severe sexual abuse or severe physical harm. In Rebekah
R., the dependency court did not find facts to support subdivision (b)(6)
or even invoke that subdivision. (
of the factors the court is entitled to consider†in making its determination
regarding reunification services under subdivision (b)(6), it did not hold that
a court must expressly identify each factor specified in subdivision (i), or
any of them, in making its decision. (
In
the present matter, the court implicitly and expressly considered and discussed
the factors of section 361.5, subdivision (i), including the circumstances of
the abuse, the severity of the abuse, the specific acts or omissions comprising
the abuse, the trauma to Ke., and the family’s past history with CPS. Mother has not established error. In fact, Mother fails to provide evidence
favoring her position that granting reunification services is in the children’s
best interests; instead, focusing on what factors the court failed to
adequately consider and pointing out that services were not provided by DPSS
following the detention hearing.
In
sum, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Mother and Father reunification services.
III
DISPOSITION
The
petitions for extraordinary writ are denied.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
MILLER
J.
CODRINGTON
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All future statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
name="_ftn2" title=""> [2] Father joins in Mother’s arguments.
