Kaiser Foundation Hosp. v. Super.
Filed 6/13/13 Kaiser Foundation Hosp. v. Super. Ct. CA4/2
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS
et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
RIVERSIDE
COUNTY,
Respondent;
JOSHUA TUCKER et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
E058283
(Super.Ct.No. RIC1218828)
OPINION
ORIGINAL
PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Ronald L. Taylor, Judge. (Retired
judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Petition granted.
La
Follette, Johnson, De Haas, Fesler & Ames, Louis H. De Haas and David J.
Ozeran; Arnold & Porter, Lawrence
A. Cox and Brian K. Condon, for Petitioners.
No
appearance for Respondent.
Law
Offices of Patricia Law and Patricia A. Law; Arias & Lockwood and
Christopher D. Lockwood, for Real Parties in Interest.
In this matter we have
reviewed the petition and the opposition filed by real parties in
interest. We have determined that
resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law,
and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore
appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171,
178.)
DISCUSSION
The arbitration contract in
question requires the arbitrator to set out the reasons for the decision
“consistent with California Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(g) [
explain the factual and legal basis for the decision as to each of the
principal controverted issues or ultimate facts. (
arbitrator (or trial court) must address each fact without which a claim or
defense must fail. (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th
547, 559.) It is well settled that a
statement of decision need not address every legal or factual issue raised,
only the essential ones. (
all crucial issues is subject to being vacated.
(Mossman v. City of
Measured against this
standard, the arbitrator’s decision was adequate. The essential findings were that there was no
negligence up until a specified time, and that, even if surgery had been
performed at that time, real parties failed to establish “to a reasonable medical probability†that a better result would
have been obtained. Real parties
understandably do not like this conclusion, but we are not reviewing the
correctness of factual or legal findings, just the adequacy of the
explanation. Once the arbitrator found
that petitioners met the standard of care at least until 9.30 a.m. on the day
after plaintiff William Tucker’s admission, that plaintiff William Tucker had
suffered irreversible bowel damage by that time, and that plaintiffs failed to
show that less bowel would have been lost than was actually the case had
surgery been done at that time, petitioners’ subsequent acts, negligent or not, became irrelevant.
There was no requirement
that the arbitrator list every action or omission and expressly make a finding
on each one, although the finding that there was no negligence prior to 9.30
a.m. implicitly does make such
findings with respect to conduct up to that time, and in fact the arbitrator’s
award is explicit on many of the
points now raised by real parties. For
example, he did expressly find that
delaying surgery in order to place a nasogastric tube fell within the standard
of care. With respect to the “failureâ€
to address whether plaintiff’s pain should have suggested peritonitis, the
arbitrator again explained that any negligence in the evaluation of pain came
after the point at which bowel death had begun to occur, and that plaintiffs
failed to establish that earlier action would have resulted in a functionally
significant improvement in “saved†bowel.
The same analysis applies to plaintiffs’ argument that Dr. Wang
improperly delayed commencing surgery.
Plaintiffs also object that
the arbitrator failed to address their claim that the removal of viable, “pale
pink†bowel was below the standard of care.
However, the award discusses at length the medical significance of the
appearance of the removed portions of bowel, including the testimony to the
effect that even bowel that looks normal when removed may in fact be
irreversibly ischemic, and the award also stresses the failure of plaintiffs’
proof with regard either to the removal of “healthy†bowel or whether plaintiff
William Tucker would have had a better quality of life if surgery had been done
earlier.
In our view the award in
this case is exemplary, reflecting a careful attention to the details of
plaintiff’s care as well as a marshaling of the technical medical
evidence. The decision on the “ultimate
issues†of negligence and causation is clear and meticulously explained. Any omission of a specific discussion of
collateral, evidentiary issues does not invalidate the award.
DISPOSITION
Accordingly, the trial court
erred in vacating the award and remanding for a full new hearing.
Let a peremptory writ of
mandate issue directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate its order
granting real parties’ motion to vacate the arbitration award, and to enter a
new order denying said motion.
Petitioners are directed to
prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the
original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on
all parties. Petitioners to recover
their costs.
The previously ordered stay
is lifted.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN
OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
Acting
P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
J.
MCKINSTER
J.
requirement is very similar to the statutory rule governing arbitration awards,
which simply requires the arbitrator to include “a determination of all the
questions submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in
order to determine the controversy.â€
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1283.4.)
