Douglas M. v. Superior Court
Filed 7/1/13 Douglas M. v. Superior Court CA4/1
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
DOUGLAS M. et al,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF SAN
DIEGO COUNTY,
Respondent;
D063633
(San Diego
County
Super. Ct.
No. NJ14663)
SAN DIEGO
COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Real Party in Interest.
Proceedings
for extraordinary relief after reference to a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26 hearing. Blaine
K. Bowman, Judge. Petitions denied.
Amanda J.
Gonzales for Petitioner Douglas M.
Elizabeth
Klippi for Petitioner Rachel P.
Thomas E.
Montgomery, County Counsel, John E.
Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Paula J. Roach, Deputy County
Counsel, for Respondent.
Douglas M. and Rachel P. seek writ review of
orders terminating their reunification
services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26 hearing regarding their son, Caleb R. Douglas argues he was
not provided with reasonable reunification services. Rachel joins in and adopts Douglas's
arguments and asks that her services be continued if Douglas's
petition is granted. We deny the
petitions.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 11,
2012, the San Diego County Health and
Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned on behalf of two-year-old
Caleb under section 300, subdivision (b), alleging he was at substantial
risk of serious harm because Douglas, while driving a car in which Caleb was a
passenger, displayed a gun to a passenger in another car and drove at excessive
speed; the car contained illegal drugs; Caleb tested positive for
methamphetamine; and Douglas was arrested on drug-related charges. The petition further alleged Douglas and Rachel
admitted using amphetamine and methamphetamine on a regular basis. The court ordered Caleb detained in foster
care.
One year
earlier, Douglas had been arrested for possessing and
selling prescription pills and marijuana, and Rachel had been arrested for
child endangerment because marijuana accessible to Caleb was found in the
family home. Douglas
then served eight months at the Vista Detention Facility (Vista),
but, after he was released in January 2012, he and Rachel returned to using
methamphetamine together.
At the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in July 2012, the court found the
allegations of the section 300, subdivision (b) petition to be true, declared
Caleb a dependent of the juvenile court, removed him from parental care and
ordered reunification services for Douglas and Rachel. Douglas was in custody
at Vista at the time of the hearing.
In
mid-October 2012, Douglas was transferred to the
California Institute for Men in Chino
(Chino). He was housed in the reception area, where he
was not eligible for services. In February
2013, he was moved to Chuckawalla Valley State Prison in Blythe,
California (Blythe). Meanwhile, Rachel had not been following
through with the substance abuse treatment she was offered. In February, she was arrested for being under
the influence of a controlled substance.
At the
six-month review hearing on March 21,
2013, the court heard testimony from the social worker and from Douglas. After considering the testimony, the
documentary evidence and argument by counsel, it found the Agency had offered
or provided reasonable reunification services, but Douglas and Rachel had not
made substantive progress with the provisions of their case plans. The court terminated reunification services
and set a section 366.26 hearing.
DISCUSSION
Douglas
contends there was not substantial
evidence presented to support the finding he received reasonable
reunification services. He argues the
social worker did not make sufficient efforts to help him obtain services or
visitation while he was at Chino,
and she did not send him a parenting prison packet until just before the
six-month hearing. Rachel joins in and
adopts his arguments.
In
determining the sufficiency of reunification
services the role of the appellate court is to decide "whether the
record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court's
finding that reasonable services
were provided or offered." (Angela S. v. Superior Court
(1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) The standard is not that
the best possible services were
provided, but that reasonable services
were provided under the circumstances. (In re
Misako R (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) The appellant bears the burden to show the
evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979)
98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
Soon after
Caleb was taken into protective custody, the social worker met with Douglas
at Vista and they discussed his reunification plan. She advised him to focus on recovering from
his drug addiction and reliance on a criminal lifestyle and to use the
resources that were available to him at Vista. Douglas told her he
had signed up for Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous (AA/NA) meetings,
had enrolled in a program at Vista called "Thinking
for Change," and he had been given additional privileges because of his
good behavior. The social worker
provided Douglas and Rachel with referrals to services, including a list of
shelters, emergency food assistance, substance abuse treatment centers and a
list of AA/NA meetings. She also gave
them a booklet guide to services and reviewed the booklet in detail.
Present at
a team decision-making meeting on June
10, 2012, were two social workers, Rachel, the maternal
grandparents and paternal grandparents, and a hospital staff member. Douglas was able to
participate briefly by telephone from Vista. Issues discussed at the meeting included Douglas's
drug use and the actions that had led to his incarceration and to Caleb's
removal. The paternal grandparents said
they would provide transportation for Caleb to visit Douglas
in custody.
Douglas
was not in custody two days later on June 12, and he attended the detention
hearing that day. The court made
voluntary services available and told Douglas he needed
to start those services immediately and had only six months to make
progress.
After Douglas's
incarceration, the Agency prepared a revised case plan for him that reflected
the fact that he was in custody. This
plan was attached to the July 23, 2012
addendum report that the court received into evidence at the dispositional
hearing, and the court ordered Douglas to comply with
its provisions. The plan stated Douglas
needed to participate in individual therapy, a parenting course, random drug
testing, a substance abuse recovery program and to follow recommendations by
the substance abuse specialist. The
objectives of the plan were that he live free from drug dependency, follow the
conditions of his probation or parole, meet Caleb's needs and be an appropriate
parent, and develop a positive support system.
When Douglas was placed in custody, a provision
was added to require him to participate in all comparable reunification
services available to him at his detention facility and upon release to
immediately enroll in all planned client services. Douglas's case plan
properly provided for the services that would address the issues that had led
to Caleb's dependency. It described the
treatment that was required, but also stated that if the specified treatment
was not available while he was incarcerated, he was to participate in all
comparable services available to him.
When Douglas
was transferred to Chino in October
2012, the social worker wrote to him and telephoned the prison. She learned no services were available to him
there, and the investigator for Douglas's counsel
confirmed that he was not able to attend any services during the time he was in
reception at Chino.
Douglas
objects that the social worker waited to send him a prison parenting packet
until January 2013. Although there was a
delay in Douglas receiving the packet, he can point to
no prejudice. He also notes that the
social worker did not contact the authorities at Chino to see if he could send
tapes to Caleb, she did not arrange to send materials to him at the prison to
read to Caleb on tape, and she did not inquire about what written materials
were available or send him written counseling or drug rehabilitation materials
or additional parenting booklets and tests.
Douglas's services plan stated he should participate in all comparable
services available to him at his facility and gave examples, such as parenting,
12-step meetings, and a program called "Read to Your Child by
Tape." The social worker sent
letters to him reminding him of what he needed to do in order to reunify with
Caleb. It was Douglas's
obligation to look for the appropriate services available to him.
Douglas
also claims the Agency did not adequately assist him with visitation. While Douglas was at Vista,
Caleb came to visit him once each week.
At Chino, Douglas
was not allowed to telephone Caleb, and the paternal grandfather said that when
he went to see Douglas at Chino,
their visit had been through a small hole.
The social worker submitted request forms to Chino for Caleb to visit,
and the paternal grandfather was willing to transport him, but the request had
not been approved by the time Douglas was moved to Blythe. After Douglas's
transfer to Blythe, the social worker contacted authorities there to request
Caleb be allowed to visit and she filed the necessary forms. Douglas began making
telephone calls to Caleb, but by the time of the six-month hearing, the social
worker had not yet received a reply to her request for visitation.
In view of
the total circumstances of this case, we conclude the record supports the
court's finding that Douglas was provided with
reasonable reunification services and visitation with Caleb, and the social
worker made adequate efforts to assist him.
It was Douglas's own criminal conduct that placed
him in custody, where he was unable to take advantage of services the Agency
could provide. (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998)
66 Cal.App.4th 965, 971.) He has not
shown error.
DISPOSITION
The petitions are denied.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
McINTYRE, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
