P. v. Tate
Filed 6/20/13 P. v. Tate CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
ANTONIAL TATE,
Defendant and
Appellant.
2d Crim. No.
B246319
(Super. Ct.
No. F481951)
(San
Luis Obispo County)
Antonial Tate appeals a
judgment committing him to the California Department of State Hospitals (CDSH)
for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) (Pen. Code, § 2962)
following his commitment offense for forcible rape. We conclude, among other things, that
court's finding that Tate's mental disorder was a cause or an aggravating
factor in his commitment offense. We
affirm.
FACTS
Tate filed a petition to
challenge a Board of Parole Hearings determination that he met the requirements
for commitment as an MDO. (Pen. Code,
§ 2962.) He waived his right to a
jury trial and the court appointed counsel to represent him.
At trial, Joseph Moreno,
a psychologist, testified
that Tate suffers from a "schizoaffective disorder" - a severe mental
disorder. Tate has a history of
"psychotic symptoms, auditory and visual hallucinations, paranoid and
grandiose delusions." He has
"mood disorder symptoms such as depression and mania." Tate had been in treatment for his disorder
for 90 days or more within the year prior to his "parole or release
date." His symptoms are not in
remission because, as of August 2012, he "was delusional, paranoid and
hallucinating."
Tate's commitment
offense for forcible rape was committed in 2000. Tate was convicted in 2010. Moreno
testified that his "mental disorder was at least an associated if not
causal factor in the crime." Tate
"represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." He believes rape is acceptable conduct.
Brandi Mathews, a
psychologist at Atascadero State
Hospital, testified that as of July 31, 2000, while in custody, Tate
was "clearly symptomatic of a severe mental disorder." She said, "it was quite evident he was
psychotic." But there was no
indication of "bizarre behavior" or "delusional statements"
at the time he committed the rape. The
crime was "quite goal-directed and suggests criminal behavior as far as
him entering through the window; raping; . . . unplugging the phone
first, which shows some organization," and covering the victim's face so
she could not identify him. On redirect
examination, Mathews testified there were no remarks in the police report that
Tate made delusional comments during the crime, but "[i]t's possible"
that he had "been under the delusion" that he had "some
relationship" with the rape victim.
The trial court noted
there was a conflict between Moreno
and Mathews on whether Tate's mental disorder was a cause or an aggravating
factor in the rape. It rejected Mathews'
testimony on that issue and found all the elements for an MDO commitment were
established.
DISCUSSION
Tate contends there was
insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that his mental
disorder "caused or aggravated his offense." We disagree.
In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, "[w]e consider the entire record in the light
most favorable to the judgment and must affirm if there is any substantial
evidence supporting the [trial court's] finding." (People
v. Valdez
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1016.) We do
not weigh the evidence. Nor do we decide
the credibility of the witnesses as that is a matter for the trier of fact. (People
v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
"An MDO commitment
requires a finding that the defendant suffers from a severe mental disorder
that was a cause of or an aggravating factor in the underlying
crime." (People v. Valdez, supra,
89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.) "A
qualified expert is entitled to render an opinion on the criteria necessary for
an MDO commitment . . . ." (People
v. Dodd (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th
1564, 1569.)
Moreno
testified that Tate's mental disorder was "at least an associated if not
causal factor in the crime." Tate
argues that this testimony was based on speculation. But Moreno supported his opinion by citing
several factors including that: 1) Tate
made "odd comments at the time of his arrest about a baby"; 2) he
made strange remarks "about being forgiven for all his sins"; 3) he
exhibited "odd behavior" as he was "crying, drooling, and
catatonic to the point" where he had to be carried to his cell; 4)
"[a]fter the offense, he was . . . declared incompetent to stand
trial and remanded to Atascadero for restoration"; 5) while incarcerated,
"he was frequently cited for indecent exposure or openly masturbating in
front of staff"; and 6) he has a pattern of believing "it's
acceptable for him to engage in these . . . types of
misconduct." In addition, Moreno
said, "[Tate] was not receiving treatment at the time of the offense, and
recent history shows that when not receiving treatment at the hospital, he
decompensated and, in fact, required a court order for involuntary
medication."
Moreno
said Tate's sexual misconduct is part of "his pattern of behavior over
time" and his belief that it is proper to commit these sexually
inappropriate acts. He said Tate has a
"history of violence as a juvenile" and "when talking about
rape," he "makes comments to suggest that he thinks that
. . . is acceptable conduct."
Tate had such "poor insight" that "he denied that he ever
committed a crime." He expressed no
"remorse" and had no "empathy for his victim." Moreno
said Tate has "an attitudinal system that essentially explains why he
engages in this conduct." Tate told
a doctor that "the Bible said that rape was acceptable and that if a woman
was abstinent or not having sex, it was up to him to set them
straight."
Tate claims the trial
court should have rejected Moreno's
testimony. He contends the court should
have adopted Mathews' opinion that his mental disorder was not a cause or an
aggravating factor in his commitment offense.
But the trial court expressly found that Mathews was not credible on
this issue. We do not decide the
credibility of the witnesses. That is a
matter exclusively for the trier of fact.
(People v. Young,
Mathews' analysis which focused exclusively on some facts about the commitment
offense was incomplete.
By contrast, the trial
court could view Moreno's opinion
to be based on more comprehensive factors including Tate's psychotic condition
at the time of his arrest, the finding that he was not competent to stand
trial, his medical history, his pattern of conduct, and his statements which
constitute evidence of his disorder and explain why he committed the
crime. (People v. Campos (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 304, 307-308 [expert may
rely on patient's statements in rendering opinions on MDO requirements].) We "'must presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.'" (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6
Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
Moreover, Mathews'
testimony was not completely in conflict with Moreno. She said "it's possible" Tate could
have been delusional at the time of the offense. She also testified that three months after
committing the offense, Tate was so "psychotic" that an evaluator
could not even complete an interview with him.
The evidence is sufficient.
The judgment is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT,
P.J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
PERREN, J.
Barry
T. LaBarbera, Judge
Superior
Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Gerald Miller, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E.
Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
