P. v. Brown

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 6/17/13  P. v. Brown CA3

 

 

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

 

 
>

THE PEOPLE,                           Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   DONALD RAY BROWN,                           Defendant and Appellant.

C071109   (Super. Ct. No. 05F07166)

 

 

            Following
an unsuccessful  ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 25 s
FJLXXY000001 l "Penal Code section 1538.5"
Penal Code section
1538.5 motion to suppress evidence essential
to his conviction, defendant Donald Ray Brown pled no contest to driving with a
blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or higher ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 29 s
FJLXXY000002 xpl 1 l "Veh. Code, § 23152, subd.
(b)" Veh. Code,
§ 23152, subd. (b))href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] and admitted he had five prior convictions
for driving under the influence.  On
appeal, he claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.  Under the totality of the circumstances in
this case, we find the officer reasonably suspected defendant had violated the  ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FJLXXY000013 Vehicle Code.

BACKGROUND

            Because the sole issue on appeal is
the denial of the motion to suppress, we summarize the facts as adduced at that
hearing. 

            On May 1, 2005, at 2:12 a.m.
Officer Gary Hirdler was driving east on La Riviera Boulevard.  Officer Hirdler was driving approximately one
to two car lengths behind a Dodge Neon, close enough to be able to read the
license plate and see all the occupants of the Neon.  As they approached the intersection, the Neon
was traveling in the left-most portion of the lane when the driver of the Neon
made an abrupt right-hand turn without signaling.  Officer Hirdler considered the turn unsafe
and a violation of the  ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FJLXXY000013 Vehicle Code, so
he initiated a traffic stop for making an unsafe turn in violation of  ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 24 s FJLXXY000014 l "sections 22107 and 22108" sections 22107 and
22108.  The Neon accelerated before
pulling over to the right side of the road and stopped with the right front
tire partially on the sidewalk.  Officer
Hirdler illuminated the vehicle and saw the driver jump into the backseat and
the passenger move to the driver’s seat. 
Officer Hirdler spoke to the woman sitting in the driver’s seat,
Christine Bufford, who told him her boyfriend (defendant) had been
driving.  She informed Officer Hirdler
they had switched seats because defendant did not have a driver’s license.  Officer Hirdler spoke with defendant and
“smelled the fruits of an alcoholic beverage emanating from his person.”  In addition, defendant’s eyes were bloodshot
and watery, his speech was slurred and he was unsteady on his feet.  Defendant denied driving and refused to
answer questions.  In general, he was
agitated and uncooperative.  Officer
Hirdler administered a breath test, which showed a 0.16 percent blood-alcohol
level.  Because seven years had passed
between the traffic stop and the suppression hearing, Officer Hirdler did not
independently recall any additional details of the stop.

            Defendant was charged with driving
under the influence of alcohol with three or more prior drunk driving
convictions within 10 years ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 18 s FJLXXY000015
xpl 1 l "§ 23152, subd. (a)"
§ 23152, subd.
(a); count 1), driving while having a 0.08 percent or more blood-alcohol
level with three or more prior drunk driving convictions within 10 years ( ADDIN BA xc <@$st> xl 18 s
FJLXXY000002 xpl 1 § 23152, subd.
(b); count 2), and driving on a suspended license ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 20 s
FJLXXY000016 xpl 1 l "§ 14601.2, subd. (a)"
§ 14601.2, subd.
(a); count 3).  As to counts 1 and 2,
it was further alleged defendant had sustained five prior convictions for
driving under the influence, and as to count 3 it was further alleged defendant
had sustained two prior convictions for driving on a suspended license.

            Defendant filed a motion to suppress
evidence under  ADDIN BA xc <@$st> xl 25 s
FJLXXY000001 Penal Code section
1538.5.  Following a contested
hearing, the trial court denied the motion. 
Defendant then pled no contest to count 2 and admitted the five prior
convictions.  In exchange, he was granted
five years’ formal probation, conditioned on serving one year in county jail
and the remaining counts were dismissed.

DISCUSSION

            Defendant contends the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress, as the initial detention was
unlawful.  Defendant also contends there
was no traffic violation as there was no evidence he performed an unsafe turn
and his failure to signal the turn did not actually or potentially affect other
drivers.  We disagree.

            The standard of review of the denial
of a suppression motion is well settled. 
We defer to the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by
substantial evidence.  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 43 s
FJLXXY000003 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Weaver (2001)26
Cal.4th 876" People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 924.)  “Once the facts are determined, we then
decide de novo whether the search or seizure was reasonable under established
constitutional principles.”  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 49 s
FJLXXY000004 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Logsdon (2008)164
Cal.App.4th 741" People v. Logsdon (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 741, 744 ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 7 s
FJLXXY000004 xpl 2 Logsdon).)  All presumptions favor the trial court's
exercise of its power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any
conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw factual inferences,
“ â€˜and the trial court's findings on such matters, whether express or
implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial
evidence.’ â€  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 45 s
FJLXXY000005 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Leyba (1981)29
Cal.3d 591" People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597, quoting  ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 41 s FJLXXY000006 xhfl Rep xqt xpl 1 l "People v. Lawler (1973)9 Cal.3d 156" People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160.) 

            “[A]n officer may stop and detain a
motorist on reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the law.  [Citations.] 
The guiding principle in determining the propriety of an investigatory
detention is ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.’  [Citations.] 
In making our determination, we examine ‘the totality of the
circumstances’ in each case. 
[Citations.]”  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 49 s
FJLXXY000007 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Wells (2006)38
Cal.4th 1078" People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082-1083.)  An ordinary traffic stop is treated as a
detention and is reasonable under the  ADDIN
BA xc <@con> xl 16 s FJLXXY000017 l "Fourth Amendment" Fourth Amendment
“only if the facts and circumstances known to the officer support at least a
reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the  ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FJLXXY000013 Vehicle Code or
some other law.”  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 48 s
FJLXXY000008 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Miranda (1993)17
Cal.App.4th 917" People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926 ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 7 s
FJLXXY000008 xpl 2 Miranda).)  “ â€˜If the facts are sufficient to lead
an officer to reasonably believe that there was a violation, that will suffice,
even if the officer is not certain about exactly what it takes to constitute a
violation.  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]” 
(
ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 46 s FJLXXY000009 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "In re Justin K. (2002)98 Cal.App.4th 695" In re Justin K. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 695, 700.)  “When assessing the reasonableness of a
traffic stop, the question is not whether appellant actually violated the  ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FJLXXY000013 Vehicle Code, but whether there was some
‘ â€œobjective manifestation” that [he] may have’ violated the  ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FJLXXY000013 Vehicle Code.  [Citation.]” 
(
ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 46 s FJLXXY000010 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People v. Durant (2012)205 Cal.App.4th 57" People v. Durant (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 57, 63, italics
omitted.)

             ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s FJLXXY000012 Section 22107
provides, “[n]o person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right
or left upon a roadway until such movement can be made with reasonable safety
and then only after the giving of an appropriate signal . . . in the
event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.”   ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 13 s FJLXXY000018 l "Section 22108" Section 22108 clarifies that “[a]ny
signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during
the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.”  “ ADDIN BA xc <@$osdv> xl 24 s
FJLXXY000014 Sections 22107 and
22108 must be read together to mean that ‘a motorist must continuously
signal during the last 100 feet traveled before turning, but only in the event
other motorists may be affected.’  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 51 s
FJLXXY000011 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Carmona (2011)195
Cal.App.4th 1385" People
v. Carmona (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1394.)  Actual impact upon another motorist is not
required; a potential effect is sufficient to trigger the signal
requirement.  [Citation.]”  ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 49 s
FJLXXY000010 xhfl Rep xpl 1 People v. Durant, supra,
205 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.) 

            In denying the motion to suppress,
the trial court implicitly found defendant’s abrupt turn was unsafe and that a
signal was required as the turn might have affected Officer Hirdler.  There is substantial evidence supporting
these findings.  “The purpose of the
signaling requirement is to inform other drivers what the initial driver
intends and thus, provide them with an indication as to his or her future
course. Without such an indication, a driver is bereft of necessary information
by which preparations can be made to drive safely.”  ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 41 s
FJLXXY000004 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Logsdon,
supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 746.) 
This is a particularly important purpose when driving at 2:00 a.m.,
as darkness reduces vehicle visibility to other motorists.  The primary beneficiaries of the signal
requirement are drivers of cars behind the signaling vehicle.  ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 40 s
FJLXXY000008 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Miranda,
supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 930; see also  ADDIN
BA xc <@$cs> xl 41 s FJLXXY000004 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Logsdon, supra,
164 Cal.App.4th at p. 744.)  An
officer driving a patrol car is included among the intended beneficiaries of
the signal requirement, whether or not there is other traffic.  ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 40 s
FJLXXY000004 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Logsdon, >supra 164 Cal.App.4th at p.
744.)  It is a reasonable inference that
Officer Hirdler, driving closely behind defendant and in the same lane, in the
dark hours of the morning might be affected by an abrupt right turn without a
signal. 

            Contrary to defendant’s argument, it
was not necessary to establish the exact distance between defendant and Officer
Hirdler as they were driving down the street. 
“Under  ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 26 s
FJLXXY000012 l "Vehicle Code section 22107"
Vehicle Code section
22107, the failure to properly signal where another ‘may be affected by the
movement’ is prima facie unsafe, for it creates the possible danger the statute
was designed to prevent.”  ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 40 s
FJLXXY000008 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Miranda, supra,
17 Cal.App.4th at p. 930.)  Officer
Hirdler also testified he considered the turn defendant made unsafe; this is
substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s implicit findings.

            Accordingly, defendant was properly
detained because the facts and circumstances known to Officer Hirdler supported
at least a reasonable suspicion that defendant violated the  ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FJLXXY000013 Vehicle Code by
making an unsafe turn. 

DISPOSITION

            The judgment is
affirmed.

 

 

 

                                                                            BLEASE                             , J.

 

 

We concur:

 

 

                RAYE                                 , P.
J.

 

 

                NICHOLSON                    , J.