In re Alejandro C.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 6/21/13  In re Alejandro C. CA3

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

 

 

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT

(San
Joaquin)

----

 

 

 
>

In re ALEJANDRO C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,                           Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   ALEJANDRO C.,                           Defendant and Appellant.	C072387   (Super. Ct. No. 69145)

 

 

            Following a
contested jurisdiction hearing, the
San Joaquin County Juvenile Court found that minor Alejandro C., age 15, came
within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he
resisted or obstructed a peace officer. 
An allegation that the minor committed battery on a school employee was
dismissed due to insufficient evidence.  The minor was adjudged a ward, ordered to
participate for eight days in a juvenile work program, and released to his
mother’s custody under various terms and conditions of probation.

            On appeal,
the minor contends there was no substantial
evidence that the officer was acting lawfully when the minor resisted.  We affirm.

FACTS

>Prosecution’s Case-In-Chief

            On the
afternoon of May 17, 2012, href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">San Joaquin
County Sheriff’s Deputy Cody Brum was working as a school resource officer
at Franklin High
School. 
After school concluded for the day, Brum observed the minor “walking
away from the front of Franklin High School to the bus stop” where other
students were standing.  The minor was
“[w]alking away from” the school principal as he “was trying to stop” the
minor.  The two were still at “a part of
the school” as both were on the lots between the school and staff parking lot
and Brum was on an adjacent sidewalk. 

            Deputy Brum
explained that the principal “was walking behind the [minor] and telling him to
stop and pointed at me and then pointed at the [minor] to stop him.”  Brum said the principal’s conduct suggested
to him “[t]hat something had happened.” 

            Deputy Brum
then “walked to get in front of” the minor. 
Brum described what happened next: 
“As I walked in front of [the minor], the principal reached out and
grabbed his backpack and the [minor] turned and the principal stepped back as if he was pushed.”  (Italics added.)  After the principal stepped back, Deputy Brum
told the minor to “put his hands behind his back.”  The minor did not comply.  Brum grabbed the minor’s arm, and the duo
“moved toward a wrought iron fence that [the minor] grabbed.” 

            As the
minor grabbed the fence, Deputy Brum “again told him to put his hands behind
his back, and he refused.”  Rather than
comply, the minor “continued to hold onto the fence.”  Brum “put a handcuff on [the minor’s] right
hand and told him to put his hands behind his back again, and he refused.” 

            Eventually,
Deputy Brum was able to get the minor’s hands off of the fence.  As Brum held the minor’s right arm and the
principal held his left arm, the minor “resisted and would not comply with
directives.”  The minor “spun around,
continue[d] to spin and try to just get away.” 
Ultimately, Brum was successful in putting the handcuffs on the
minor. 

            After
taking the minor into custody, Deputy Brum “escorted him to the principal’s
office.”  As they were walking, the minor
told Brum “to stop touching him and spun away again and . . . bent
down at his waist,” requiring Brum “to grab him again.”

            While he
was in the principal’s office, the minor tried to maneuver the handcuffs to the
front of his body.  Deputy Brum
explained:  “He tried to put the
handcuffs under his butt and ended up with them stuck on the back side of his
knee.”  At that point, Brum “asked [the
minor] if he could stand up so I could fix his handcuffs.  He didn’t comply again.” 

            Later,
after being advised of his rights, the minor told Deputy Brum why he had been
uncooperative.  The minor explained that
he “was walking with a girl.  The
principal told him to separate, and he did. 
He continued to walk, and the principal grabbed his bag and he turned
and pushed his hands away, and then didn’t want to comply because he didn’t
like being told what to do.”  The minor
told Brum he “was trying to get away” because “he felt he was being treated
like an animal.” 

>Defense

            The minor
testified on his own behalf and said he was in the ninth grade.  After school on May 17, 2012, about 2:10
p.m., the principal approached the minor as he was walking toward
the bus stop.  Earlier that day, the
principal “had told [the minor] to stop holding [his] friend’s hand.  So [the minor] had let go.”  The principal said the school had a rule
against hand-holding, but the minor had not been aware of the rule.

            The minor
testified that, after releasing his friend’s hand, he began walking.  The principal called out to the minor.  He did not hear the principal and kept
walking.  At one point, the minor saw
“[Deputy Brum] in front of [him] and [the principal] behind” him.  Then the minor felt a push and believed the
principal had pushed him.  The minor
“turned around and told [the principal] to stop and let [him] go because [he]
did nothing wrong.” 

            The minor
testified that, after being pushed, he “started restraining [>sic] because [Deputy Brum] and the
principal were trying to take [him] down.” 
The minor said he resisted Brum because he “didn’t do anything wrong”
and Brum “had no right to touch” him. 

            Deputy Brum
told the minor to put his hands behind his back.  The minor did not comply because he felt
threatened and “was just using self-defense” against the officer and the
principal.

DISCUSSION

            The minor
contends the judgment must be reversed because no substantial evidence shows
that Deputy Brum was acting lawfully when the minor resisted him.  We are not persuaded.

A

>Standard Of Review

            In an “appeal challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a juvenile court judgment sustaining the criminal
allegations of a petition made under the provisions of section 602 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code, we must apply the same standard of review
applicable to any claim by a criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a judgment of conviction on appeal.  Under this standard, the critical inquiry is
‘whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.’  [Citation.]  An appellate court ‘must review the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’  [Citations.]” 
(In re Ryan N. (2001)
92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.)

B

>Elements
Of Penal Code Section 148

            Penal Code section 148, subdivision
(a)(1), provides in relevant part: 
“Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any
. . . peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to
discharge any duty of his or her office or employment, when no other punishment
is prescribed, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars
($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by
both that fine and imprisonment.”

            “The legal elements of that crime
are as follows:  ‘ “(1) the defendant
willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the
officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was a
peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties.” ’  [Citation.]” 
(Yount v. City of Sacramento
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, 894-895.)

            “Section 148 is most often applied
to the physical acts of a defendant. 
[Citation.] . . . [such as] physical resistance, hiding,
or running away from a police officer.” 
(In re Muhammed C. (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329.)  But the
crime “is not limited to nonverbal conduct involving flight or forcible
interference with an officer’s activities. 
No decision has interpreted the statute to apply only to physical acts,
and the statutory language does not suggest such a limitation.”  (People
v. Quiroga (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961, 968.)

            A “[d]efendant cannot be convicted
of an offense against an officer engaged in the performance of official duties
unless the officer was acting lawfully at the time.  [Citation.] 
‘The rule flows from the premise that because an officer has no duty to
take illegal action, he or she is not engaged in “duties,” for purposes of an
offense defined in such terms, if the officer’s conduct is unlawful.  [Citations.]’ 
[Citation.]”  (>People v. Simons (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th
1100, 1109.)

            “ ‘Under California law, an officer
is not lawfully performing her duties when she detains an individual without reasonable suspicion or arrests an
individual without probable cause.’ 
[Citation.]”  (>Garcia v. Superior Court (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 803, 819.)

C

>Detentions On School Grounds

            Although,
as we have noted, a lawful detention commonly requires that the officer have
reasonable suspicion, a lesser standard applies to detentions of minor students
on school grounds.  “[D]etentions of minor students on school grounds
do not offend the Constitution, so long as they are not arbitrary, capricious,
or for the purposes of harassment. 
[Citations.]  Reasonable
suspicion--whether called ‘particularized suspicion’ [citation], ‘articulable
and individualized suspicion’ [citation], ‘founded suspicion’ [citation], or
‘reasonable cause’ [citation]--need not be shown.”  (In re
Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 567.) 
Applying Randy G, the juvenile
court ruled that Deputy Brum did not need reasonable suspicion in order to
detain the minor.

            The minor contends >Randy G. “is distinguishable” because,
here, “there was no evidence the minor resisted [Deputy] Brum’s detention >on school grounds during school hours.”  The minor’s first claim -- that the detention
was not on school grounds -- fails because Brum testified that the area where
the detention occurred was “still part of the school.”  Brum’s uncertainty whether the place was “on
the school campus” does not detract from the fact that it was part of the
school. 

            The minor’s second claim -- that the
detention did not occur during school hours -- appears to find support in
Deputy Brum’s acknowledgment that the detention occurred “after school.”  But Brum made plain that the incident
occurred immediately following school hours, while students were preparing to
board an afternoon bus. 

 

            >Randy G. acknowledged that a minor
student “ ‘[is] deprived of liberty to
some degree from the moment she enter[s]
school, and no one could suggest a constitutional infringement based on
that basic deprivation.’ 
[Citations.]”  (>In re Randy G., supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 563, italics added.) 
The obvious, if unarticulated, corollary is that the deprivation of
liberty continues >until the moment the student leaves school,
by means such as riding the afternoon bus.

            Randy
G. further acknowledged that a student is “ ‘not free to roam the halls or
to remain in [the] classroom as long as she please[s], even if she behave[s]
herself.’ ”  (In re Randy G., supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 563.)  Thus, even a well-behaved student is not free
to linger in a classroom or hall, for as long as she pleases, >following the conclusion of the school day.  Rather, the student must leave school by some
appropriate means, such as walking or riding a bus.  Nothing in Randy G. suggests that students traversing school property at the
end of the day are less subject to supervision by school authorities than they
had been while seated in the classroom. 
Indeed, a rule lessening the ability of school authorities to supervise
students enroute to the afternoon bus could hamper the school’s ability to
fulfill its constitutional responsibility to furnish safe, secure and peaceful
schools.  (Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 28, subd. (f)(1); Randy G. at
pp. 562-563.)

            In sum, the minor’s argument that
Deputy Brum detained him “outside the
school setting” has no merit.  The
juvenile court properly determined that Randy
G. applied to this case.

            The minor nevertheless contends his
detention was unreasonable because there was insufficient evidence that it was
“not arbitrary, capricious, or for the purposes of harassment.”  (In re
Randy G., supra, 26 Cal.4th
at p. 567.)  But the juvenile court
could infer that the detention was for the purpose of investigating, first,
whether the minor had pushed the school principal; and second, whether the
minor had done so without legal justification.

            The evidence showed that Deputy Brum
first saw the minor as he was “[w]alking away from” the school principal as he
“was trying to stop” the minor.  Brum
said the principal “was walking behind the [minor] and telling him to
stop.”  The principal then pointed at
Brum “and then pointed at the [minor] to stop him.”  Brum said the principal’s conduct suggested
to him “[t]hat something had happened.” 

            Deputy Brum
then “walked to get in front of” the minor. 
Brum described what happened next: 
“As I walked in front of [the minor], the principal reached out and
grabbed his backpack and the [minor] turned and the principal stepped back as if he was pushed.”  (Italics added.)   After the principal stepped back, Deputy
Brum told the minor to “put his hands behind his back.”  The minor did not comply.  Brum grabbed the minor’s arm, and the duo
“moved toward a wrought iron fence that [the minor] grabbed.” 

            Thus, the evidence was ambiguous as
to whether the minor had pushed the principal and, if so, whether the minor had
done so without legal justification. 
“[T]he possibility that the circumstances are consistent with lawful
activity does not render a detention invalid, where the circumstances also
raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  The public rightfully expects a police
officer to inquire into such circumstances; indeed the principal function of
the investigative stop is to resolve that ambiguity.  [Citation.]” 
(People v. Dolliver (1986)
181 Cal.App.3d 49, 56.)  Even if the
principal’s conduct prior to the evident push had been arbitrary and
capricious, and even if Brum had not been entitled to detain the minor simply
“because he did not obey the principal’s order to stop,” Brum >was entitled to stop the minor in order
to investigate whether he had unlawfully pushed the principal.  (Ibid.)  The observed act of a student pushing a
principal was sufficiently out of the ordinary that it raised “more than an
‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch.” ’  [Citation.]” 
(United States v. Sokolow
(1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 [104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10].) 
Even if Randy G. did not apply
to this case, we would conclude Deputy Brum had reasonable suspicion to detain
the minor.

DISPOSITION

            The
judgment is affirmed.

 

 

 

                                                                                       ROBIE          , J.

 

 

 

We concur:

 

 

 

          HULL           , Acting P. J.

 

 

 

          DUARTE         , J.