In re John M.
Filed 5/23/13 In re John M. CA2/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
In re JOHN M., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B243107
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. CK34003)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOHN M., SR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court
of
County, Sherri Sobel, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Jesse
McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
John F.
Krattli, County Counsel,
James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel,
and Jessica S.
Mitchell, Senior
Associate County
Counsel.
——————————
John M.,
Sr. (father), appeals the dependency court’s jurisdictional and dispositional
order denying him custody of his son John M. (John). Father, who was incarcerated at the time of
John’s detention and who was the subject of an amended petition, argues that
Welfare & Institutions Code section 361.2
noncustodial parent is entitled to placement consideration without regard to
whether such parent is offending or nonoffending. Conceding that, in dependency court, he did
not raise the possibility of John’s placement with him, father argues
nonetheless there was no forfeit. Father
also argues that insufficient evidence
supports the jurisdictional findings against him. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 21, 2012, DCFS filed a
petition alleging that Toni R. (mother) had bipolar disorder, a 25-year history
of substance abuse, and was a current daily abuser of heroin, alcohol, and
prescription medication. The petition
alleged two counts against mother under section 300, subdivision (b).
The
detention report stated that John was placed in foster care, and that John’s
older sibling, J.R., had been removed from mother’s care in 1998 and adopted as
a result of mother’s substance abuse in 2002.
At the time of J.R.’s detention, mother and father had custody of John,
but father was in prison. John’s
parents’ home was in an unsanitary and unsafe condition, with no utilities and
no bed for the minor to sleep on.
Mother, in addition to a history of substance
abuse, had a history of arrests and convictions for drug related offenses,
including possession of a controlled substance.
Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received the current referral on January 28, 2012 based on mother’s
treatment at an emergency room for pain in her left elbow. Mother admitted to emergency room staff that
she was injecting heroin into her left arm.
After mother’s discharge from the hospital, DCFS assessed John’s
parents’ home for a safety plan. On February 1, 2012, the social worker
conducted an unannounced home visit, and mother admitted she used heroin
daily. Mother also took numerous
medications for her bipolar disorder. On
February 6, 2012, during a
follow-up visit, the social worker found the home in disarray, and instructed
mother to clean and purchase groceries.
On February 15, 2012, John’s maternal
grandfather Kenneth R. informed DCFS that John was in the custody of paternal
aunt Anna M. against the orders of DCFS, and mother had disappeared. Father was incarcerated in Wasco State
Prison.
Anna told
DCFS that she had been sober for the past seven years, and had room to care for
John. Kenneth was unwilling to care for
John. Anna told the social worker that
she had previously cared for John because mother was unable to care for him due
to her substance abuse. John told DCFS
that he did not want to reside with Kenneth.
At the February 21, 2012 hearing, the court
found that father was John’s presumed father.
Mother, whose location remained unknown, was ordered to a drug treatment
program with random testing, and given once a week monitored visitation. On March
13, 2012, Christina O., John’s adult paternal cousin, was given the
right to make educational decisions for John.
On March 20, 2012, DCFS filed an amended
petition, adding the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)
that Kenneth had physically abused John by hitting him with a belt on the
buttocks, and that mother failed to protect John. The petition further alleged under section 300,
subdivision (b) that father had a history of substance abuse, including heroin,
and that mother and father had a history of engaging in verbal altercations.
DCFS’s March 20, 2012 detention report
stated that John remained in foster care placement. Mother had an extensive criminal background
dating from 1986 including arrest and convictions for various drug offenses,
prostitution, disorderly conduct, and robbery.
DCFS’s jurisdictional report dated March 20, 2012 added that John was doing well in his
placement. Father was in prison for a
July 2011 altercation with mother in front of father and mother’s apartment, at
which time mother sustained injuries to her face and head. Neighbors told the paternal aunt that mother
threw herself on the car and would not let father leave. Mother told police the mirror broke off and
hit her face. However, after leaving a
party in their car, father hit mother with his fists repeatedly, causing
injuries to mother’s head. John, who was
not in the car at the time, believed mother had simply cut her head on the
car’s mirror. John stated his parents
were “[v]ery, very super nice.†John had
seen mother hit father with her hand, and denied that mother and father threw
objects at each other. John admitted
that Kenneth had disciplined him with a belt.
John did not know whether his parents used drugs or alcohol.
John told
the social worker mother and father fought at home. Mother sometimes slapped father because they
were mad at each other. Although the
parents yelled at each other, John did not know why they were angry. John denied that father hit mother. When his parents were fighting, John would go
in the other room and try to ignore them.
DCFS
further reported that mother’s location remained unknown. DCFS had located father in Vacaville State
Prison, and attempted to contact him, but had not received a response. Christina told DCFS that John’s parents had
been involved with each other “‘on and off’†for “‘at last 10 years.’†Christina believed father was incarcerated
for hitting mother. Kenneth denied
hitting John, and told DCFS father was in prison for hitting mother.
John’s
Individualized Education Program (IEP) stated that John performed near grade
level academically, but had difficulty relating to his peers due to limited
social skills. John engaged in
argumentative behavior, was defiant, and had poor control of his anger. John lacked focus and was inattentive,
demonstrated significant impairment in his social-emotional function, with
resulting adverse effect on his educational performance. However, John was very verbal and could carry
on a conversation with an adult regarding many topics, and had good background
knowledge.
On March
19, 2012, Christina’s home was approved under the Adoption and Safe Family Act
(ASFA), and John was placed in her home.
Father’s
arrest report from the July 25, 2011 incident disclosed that a neighbor stated
she called the police at 12:30 a.m. The
neighbor also stated that when the police arrived they found mother bleeding from
the head. Mother and father denied any
wrongdoing, but mother admitted to police they had been fighting and father had
been drinking. Father had ordered her to
get into the car and drove off very fast.
They went to a party where father continued drinking and after they left
to go home, father hit mother on the head, and continued to hit her after they
got home.
At the
March 20, 2012 hearing, the court set the matter for jurisdictional hearing on
April 24, 2012. On April 13, 2012, at a
progress hearing, father’s counsel announced that father wanted to be present
at the April 24, 2012 hearing. At the
April 24, 2012, hearing father appeared through counsel, who requested to
continue the matter. The court granted a
four-week continuance to May 22, 2012.
DCFS filed
an information for the May 22, 2012 hearing, to wit: Father had told DCFS he was willing to comply
with a reunification plan and that he was scheduled to be released from prison
on July 24, 2012. Father denied any
domestic violence between him and mother, and stated that mother had lied about
the incident. According to father, he
and mother were in the car arguing when mother pulled the wheel, causing father
to sideswipe a tree. The mirror broke
off and hit mother’s head. Father denied
that Kenneth physically disciplined John.
Father was aware of mother’s bipolar diagnosis and he had attended some
counseling with her. Father denied drug
use, but admitted to drinking beer.
On May 22,
2012, father was not present at the hearing and remained in custody despite a
removal order permitting him to attend the hearing. The court continued the matter to July 3,
2012. At the July 3, 2012 hearing,
father, although there was a removal order, was again absent. The court continued the matter to July 30,
2012.
At the July
30, 2012 hearing, father was present in court.
Father requested the court to dismiss the allegations against him. He argued the July 25, 2011 incident was a
“one-time†occurrence and father denied being the perpetrator and asserted that
John, who was not present at the incident, had told social workers that mother
was the aggressor in his parents’ fights.
Father had no record of current drug use. The court sustained allegation b-4 against
father based upon domestic violence with mother. The court found there was an immediate danger
to John’s physical and emotional well being if returned to his parents, and
ordered John removed from his parents’ custody.
The court denied reunification services to mother based upon her failure
to reunify with J.R. The court ordered
reunification services for father consisting of random drug testing, with
father to enter a program if he gave a positive test. The court also ordered anger management,
parenting class, individual counseling, and monitored visitation two times per
week. Father did not object at the
hearing to any of these orders, or request custody of John.
I. Sufficiency of Findings Under Section
300, Subdivision (b)
Father
argues that insufficient evidence supports the jurisdictional findings against
him because his history of domestic violence did not pose a current risk of
harm to John because John was never actually at risk of harm by father’s past
conduct: John was not present when
father beat mother; the July 2011 incident was isolated and had occurred over a
year earlier; John reported that both of his parents were very nice; John was
not a toddler at the time of the hearing, and thus less at risk if he were
present during violence between mother and father; and mother, whose location
was unknown, could not fight with father and thus there was no longer a risk of
domestic violence proximate to John.
At the
jurisdictional hearing, the dependency court’s finding that a child is a person
described in section 300 must be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a);
Cal.4th 242, 248.) We review the
dependency court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence, and review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the dependency court’s findings and
draw all reasonable inferences in support of those findings. (Elijah
R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) “Section 300, subdivision (b) provides a
basis for . . . jurisdiction if the child has suffered, or
there is a substantial risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm or
illness caused by the parent’s inability to provide regular care for the child
because of the parent’s mental illness, developmental disability or substance
abuse.†(In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135.)
A
jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires “(1)
neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation;
and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial
risk’ of such harm or illness.†(
820.) “Subdivision (b) means what it
says. Before courts and agencies can
exert jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), there must be evidence
indicating that the child is exposed to a substantial
risk of serious physical harm or illness.†(
“In
evaluating risk based upon a single episode of endangering conduct, a juvenile
court should consider the nature of the conduct and all surrounding
circumstances. It should also consider
the present circumstances, which might include, among other things, evidence of
the parent’s current understanding of and attitude toward the past conduct that
endangered a child, or participation in educational programs, or other steps
taken, by the parent to address the problematic conduct in the interim, and
probationary support and supervision already being provided through the
criminal courts that would help a parent avoid a recurrence of such an
incident. The nature and circumstances
of a single incident of harmful or potentially harmful conduct may be
sufficient, in a particular case, to establish current risk depending upon
present circumstances.†(
1025–1026.) We must have a basis to
conclude there is a substantial risk the parent’s endangering behavior will
recur. (Id. at p. 1026.)
We disagree
with father’s analysis. The parents’
history of domestic violence evidences an ongoing pattern that, while not yet
causing harm to John, presented a very real risk to John’s physical and
emotional health. Both parents hit each
other; verbal altercations were frequent; and father engaged in reckless
driving with mother in the car. The fact
that mother’s location is not known does not reduce the risk to John because
father could engage in angry and violent behavior toward John without mother
being present. John’s age would do
little to protect him from father’s violent outbursts. Finally, the severity of the July 2011
incident is not lessened by the fact it was isolated and in the past; indeed,
father was incarcerated for his conduct during that incident that resulted in
mother’s injury.
II. Placement with Father
as Noncustodial Parent
Father
argues that the dependency court, which proceeded under section 361 in removing
John from his custody, erred in failing to apply section 361.2 because although
father was incarcerated at the time, he could have arranged for Anna to look
after John until father was released from prison. Father contends section 361.2, which does not
explicitly limit its reach to nonoffending parents, therefore provides a
noncustodial parent is entitled to placement consideration without regard to
whether such parent is offending or nonoffending. Conceding that he did not raise the
possibility of John’s placement with him pursuant to section 361.2 in the
dependency court, father argues the issue was nonetheless not forfeited.
At the
outset, a parent’s failure to raise placement under section 361.2 in the
dependency court forfeits the issue.
(See, e.g., In re A.A. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 597, 605.) Father did
not raise the issue at any of the scheduled (and continued) jurisdictional and
dispositional hearings, thereby forfeiting the issue under In re A.A., at page
605. Nonetheless, father argues the
issue was not waived because the claim presents a pure question of fact that
can be decided on undisputed facts, citing In
re V.F. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th
962, 968. Further, father asserts that
nothing in section 361.2 requires the parent to raise the issue to be
considered for custody, instead the statute directs the court to consider
whether there is a noncustodial parent desiring custody. Finally, because the trial court used the
wrong statutory framework in making findings under section 361, his trial
counsel could not lodge reasonable objections.
We find
some merit to father’s contention that the statutory language, which commands
the court to consider a noncustodial parent for placement, precludes forfeiture
by the failure to raise the issue in the dependency court. However, the purpose of the forfeiture
doctrine is to avoid the situation in which father acknowledges he finds
himself here—bereft of a factual record on which to make a compelling argument
tailored to the requirements of a different statute. (In re
Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754.) Thus, we conclude father forfeited the issue
by his failure to raise it in the dependency court, which would have permitted
the court to determine the applicability of section 361.2 and rule on the issue
with an adequate record and argument.
Is a Requirement of Section 361.2
Nonetheless,
putting aside father’s forfeiture of placement under section 361.2, we find on
the merits that father was not entitled to consideration under section 361.2
because he was neither nonoffending nor noncustodial.
Section
361.2, subdivision (a), provides in part that “[w]hen a court orders removal of
a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there
is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that
the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of
Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child.†The section provides that “[i]f that parent
requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it
finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.†(§ 361.2, subd. (a).) If the parent wants the child placed with
him, the court must do so unless there is clear and convincing evidence of
detriment. (In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1829.)
Under
section 361.2, subdivision (a), the court examines whether it would be
detrimental to temporarily place a child with the nonoffending noncustodial
parent; under subdivision (b), the court decides whether that placement should
be permanent and whether the court’s jurisdiction should be terminated. (In re
Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1131.) “[T]he Legislature envisioned a two-step
process: under [section 361.2]: subdivision (a), the court examines whether
it would be detrimental to temporarily place a child with the nonoffending
noncustodial parent; under subdivision (b), the court decides whether that
placement should be permanent and whether the court’s jurisdiction should be
terminated.†(In re Austin P., at p.
1131.) In assigning custody of the child
to either parent, “the court’s focus and primary consideration must always be
the best interests of the child.†(
251, 268.) If the dependency court finds
that placement with the noncustodial parent would be detrimental, the court
proceeds as to that parent as if it were removing the child from the custodial,
offending parent. The court may provide
reunification services under section 361.5, or no services if services are not
warranted. (See In re Terry H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1847, 1855;
44, 53, 58, fn. 8, 59.)
“‘Our role
in construing a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so [that we
may] effectuate the purpose of the law.’â€
In that regard, “[w]e consider first the words of the statute because
they are generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.†(In re
J. W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209.)
Where, as here, “‘“the statutory language is unambiguous, we presume the
Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute
controls. [Citation.]†[Citation.]
We consider extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, only if the
statutory language is reasonably subject to multiple interpretations.’†(In re
W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 52.)
The word
“nonoffending†is not found in the text of section 361 .2. This term first appeared in the case law in
a parent who was not involved in the conduct that caused removal of the child
from a parental home under section 361.
(In re Marquis D.,
assumed, without deciding, that section 361.2 applied solely to nonoffending
parents, and have not analyzed whether the statute could apply to a
noncustodial parent who was also the subject of the current dependency
proceeding and have characterized section 361.2, subdivision (a) as permitting
placement with a “nonoffending noncustodial parent,†as though “nonoffendingâ€
is a separate statutory requirement.
(See, e.g., In re Joshua G.
(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 202; In re
Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1129–1132; In re Isayah C. (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 684, 700.) While none of
those decisions specifically discusses the meaning of “nonoffending,†it
appears that they use “nonoffending noncustodial parent†as shorthand for the
statutory requirement of a parent “with whom the child was not residing at the
time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the
provisions of Section 300.â€
(§ 361.2, subd. (a).)
However,
962, the Fourth Appellate District made no such distinction. “[W]hen a noncustodial parent is
incarcerated, the [dependency] court must proceed under section 361.2 to
determine whether the incarcerated parent desires to assume custody of the
child. Unlike section 361.5, section
361.2 does not distinguish between an offending and nonoffending parent, and
the court applies section 361.2 without regard to the characterization of the
parent as offending or nonoffending.†(
custody of the child, the court must determine whether “placement with that
parent would be detrimental to the [child’s] safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being.†(§ 361.2,
subd. (a).) Among the factors in
determining detriment are the noncustodial, incarcerated parent’s ability to
make appropriate arrangements for the care of the child and the length of that
parent’s incarceration. (
1077; In re Isayah C.,
In
care due to the mother’s drug charges based on section 300, subdivision (b),
and the court placed the child with the father; dependency jurisdiction was
terminated. However, while mother was
incarcerated on the drug charges, a new dependency proceeding was initiated
based upon the father’s physical abuse of the child, and after the father
failed to reunify, the court set a selection and implementation hearing. Mother filed a section 388 petition seeking
reunification services, and argued on appeal that the court erred in failing to
consider her for the child’s placement under section 361.2. (In re
A.A., at pp. 602–604.) The Fourth
Appellate District in In re A.A. held
that the court was not required to consider the mother for placement because
she was neither nonoffending nor noncustodial within the meaning of section
361, subdivision (c) and 361.2. (
962 had found the fact of incarceration should not preclude a noncustodial
parent from obtaining custody under section 361.2 where the parent can make
arrangements for the child’s care, In re
A.A. distinguished the case before it from In re V.F. on the basis that mother was the subject of a section
300, subdivision (b) allegation in the current dependency proceedings. “While an incarcerated parent can avoid
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (g) by arranging for his or her
child’s care [citations], the same is not true of a parent whose acts or
omissions have led to jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision
(b).†(In re A.A., at p. 607.)
Further,
the core holding of In re V.F.,
found that the “[dependency] court should not be required to consider placing a
child with an incarcerated parent who has previously been the subject of a
removal order due to acts or omissions by that parent that brought his or her
child within the description of section 300 and whose custody right has not been
restored. In other words, if the
noncustodial status of the incarcerated parent is due to a prior dependency
order removing custody, and there has been no intervening restoration of the
parent’s right to physical custody of the child, the court need not inquire if
that parent desires to have the child placed with him or her.†(In re
A.A., at p. 608.) In re
A.A. elaborated: “a parent ‘with
whom the child was not residing at the time’ of the initiation of the
dependency, whether or not due to a family law custody order, is presumptively
entitled to custody because he or she has not been previously found to pose a
risk of harm to the child. It is
reasonable to assume the Legislature intended to require a juvenile court to
first consider placement of a child with this class of parent, to avert the
trauma of a foster placement. A parent
who is noncustodial because of a prior finding of detriment is not merely a
parent ‘with whom the child was not residing at the time’ of the events that
resulted in the dependency.†(
Similarly,
in In re Isayah C.,
court held that the dependency court may consider placing a child with a
noncustodial, incarcerated parent under section 361.2 if that parent seeks
custody of the child, the parent is able to make appropriate arrangements for
the child’s care during the parent’s incarceration and placement with the
parent is not otherwise detrimental to the child. The Isayah
C. court based its decision on the case law that held the juvenile
dependency system has no jurisdiction to intervene “when an incarcerated parent
delegates the care of his or her child to a suitable caretakerâ€
under section 300. (
the length of a parent’s incarceration may be a factor in determining detriment
under sections 361, subdivision (c) and 361.2, subdivision (a), but a finding
of detriment cannot be based solely on the fact a parent is incarcerated.†(In re
Noe F. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 358, 369.)
Thus,
In re Isayah C., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th 684 recognize that not all bases for
dependency court jurisdiction are created equal. A section 300, subdivision (g) allegation when
merely based on incarceration should not deny a noncustodial parent custody
when the parent is able to make arrangements for the child. An allegation under subdivision (g) is
distinct from a section 300, subdivision (b) allegation. Thus, applying this rationale to father here,
his status as an offending parent under section 300, subdivision (b) precludes
him from being considered for custody of John.
Father is not merely a parent with whom the child was not residing at
the time of the initiation of the dependency; rather, father and mother shared
custody of John. The dependency court
had sustained allegations against Father based upon his quarrels and domestic
violence history with mother. Thus,
Father does not stand in the same shoes as the parents in In re V.F., supra,
were nonoffending but incarcerated.
Further, Father was a custodial parent until his incarceration for
domestic violence separated him from John.
As such, because father’s criminal offense was the cause of his
noncustodial status, we do not find he fits within the purpose of the statute
to keep children with their parents if possible.
Nonetheless,
father makes numerous arguments why section 361.2 should apply to him. He asserts that a detriment finding cannot be
implied from the record here because it was not clear that placement with
father would be detrimental, and further the court applied the detriment
standard under section 361, not section 361.2.
Father points out that his substance abuse history did not support such
a finding as there was no current history of drug use and father’s domestic
violence past was not directed at John.
We need not reach the detriment issue here because under section 361.2,
we would not get to this stage of the analysis due to father’s sustained
section 300, subdivision (b) allegation.
Father
argues that reading a nonoffending requirement into the language of section
361.2 would frustrate the purpose of the statute to keep the child a parent,
any parent, if possible; with a nonoffending requirement inserted, the
dependency court could not conduct a careful or individualized placement plan,
and all parents who have a jurisdictional finding would never have a chance at
custody. We disagree. Parents who have a section 300, subdivision
(g) finding may or may not be awarded custody, depending on the
circumstances. The two-step process
envisioned under the statute permits the court to tailor the custody
arrangement with appropriate reunification services to the parent awarded
custody, if necessary; therefore, father’s reading of the statute ignores this
important function of the statute.
Lastly,
father argues reading a nonoffending requirement into the statute would
undermine the requirement that there be clear and convincing evidence of
detriment before placement with a noncustodial parent can be denied, while a
jurisdictional finding need only be made under the preponderance of the
evidence standard. (See, e.g.,
pp. 1827–1829.) Father’s analysis misses
the mark. In re Marquis D. also recognized an implicit nonoffending
requirement in section 361.2. As
explained in In re Marquis D.,
standard of proof to remove custody from the custodial parent while denying
placement with the noncustodial parent based on a
to the anomalous result that a parent who had no connection with the circumstances that brought the child within the
jurisdiction of the court could have his or her rights terminated upon a
lesser showing than the parent who created those circumstances.†(Id. at
p. 1829, italics added.)
recognizes the nonoffending requirement in section 361.2; thus father, who does
not qualify for application of section 361.2 in the first instance, is not
subjected to a lesser standard of proof than an offending parent.
DISPOSITION
The order
is affirmed.
NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED.
JOHNSON,
J.
We concur:
MALLANO,
P. J.
ROTHSCHILD,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
All statutory references herein are to the Welfare & Institutions Code
unless otherwise indicated.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
The allegation against father, b-4, alleged that: “The
child[’s] . . . mother . . . and
father . . . have a history of engaging in verbal and
physical altercations. The father
currently remains incarcerated due to the domestic violence. Such domestic violence by the parents
endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the child at risk
of physical harm, damage, and danger.â€
