In re T.H.
Filed 6/4/13 In re T.H. CA2/8
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
EIGHT
In re T.H., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B243492
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
HELEN H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. CK84972)
APPEAL from
an order of the
County Superior Court.
Marguerite Downing, Judge.
Affirmed.
Michelle L.
Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant
Helen H.
John F.
Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica
S. Mitchell, Senior Associate County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
Helen H.
(Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s finding that T. H. is a child
described by Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivision (b). Mother
contends there was insufficient evidence
to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. We affirm.
FACTS
Diane T.
gave birth to T. in 1996. T. was
thereafter adopted by Henrietta H. when she was six months old. Henrietta also adopted a boy, Charles H. When Henrietta died of cancer in 2008, Mother
and Henry H.
title="">[2]
(Father) adopted T. and Charles. On
December 23, 2010, a juvenile dependency petition under section 300 was
sustained against Mother and Father on the grounds they inappropriately
disciplined T. and Charles.
Specifically, Father pushed Charles’s head and grabbed his shirt. Mother pushed T. and pulled her hair. The social worker also heard Mother yell at
Charles. Charles stated Mother often
called him a liar. Mother and Father
participated in court-ordered counseling and parenting classes. Both T. and Charles continued to live with
Mother and Father, and the case closed in July 2011.
On May 1, 2012, a juvenile
dependency petition was again filed under section 300 stemming from an
altercation between Mother and T. on February 28, 2012. T. reported to the case worker that Mother
asked her to vacuum that day. When she
knocked over some glass bottles and failed to comply with Mother’s directions
quickly enough, Mother came into the room and asked her if she had a
problem. When T. responded by asking
Mother if she had a problem, Mother grabbed her by the wrists and began shaking
her. Mother’s hand also hit her in the
face. T. reported that Mother often
called her a “ho†or a “slut.â€
T. denied
being physically disciplined by Mother and Father. Instead, she said they usually took things
away from her and refused to allow her out of the house. T. felt that Mother and Father were too
strict and did not want her in the home.
T. herself did not want to live there and wanted to live with her godmother,
Natalie P., instead. T. admitted to
recently sneaking out of the house to stay with a friend for a few days. Mother and Father reported her missing on
February 20, 2012, and March 1, 2012. T.
also snuck a boy into her bedroom on at least three occasions.
Mother denied hitting T. in the
face, but admitted grabbing her by the wrist to restrain her. Mother felt T. was disrespectful and wanted
to live elsewhere so she could “run wild.â€
Mother and Father agreed to voluntary family reunification services when
T. continued to express a desire to leave the home.
T. was placed in a foster home on
March 15, 2012, because Mother and Father did not want her placed with
Natalie. In April, the foster mother
took T. to Las Vegas to visit her biological mother. As the foster mother was getting ready for
the visit, T. left the hotel room without permission to meet her biological
mother alone. When they returned from
Las Vegas, the foster mother asked to have T. removed from her home but later
changed her mind. T. continued to
express a desire to live with her godmother or remain with her foster
mother.
Mother and Father were upset that
T. refused to come home, but were unwilling to participate in services. Father told the caseworker, “I went through this
a year ago . . . I’m not going to do it again.†Mother wanted T. at home only if she agreed
to follow the rules. She felt the
referral was a “set up†by T. Asked
about her upbringing, Mother stated she was “whooped with the switch†but did
not consider that child abuse. Likewise,
Father “got [his] butt tore up (spankings)†when he was a child but did not
consider spanking child abuse.
The social worker who had
previously worked on T. and Charles’s case in 2010 was also interviewed. He received a phone call from T. in February
2012. She told him she no longer wanted
to live with Mother and Father, and asked how she could be removed from the
home. He asked her if she was being
abused and she denied any abuse occurred.
He then told her she would need to be physically or sexually abused and
provided her with the child protective services hotline. Natalie’s mother, Melinda A., confirmed
Mother and Father were very strict and that Mother often demeaned T. and called
her names. Melinda wanted T. to live
with her and Natalie.
At the contested jurisdictional
hearing, T. testified Mother shook her, slapped her, and slammed her against
the wall. Mother also threatened to
“slam [T.] on the ground and stomp [her] out.â€
T., for the first time, described Mother hitting her arms repeatedly in
the living room in December 2011 or January 2012. The court sustained the petition under
section 300, subdivision (b) as follows:
“In February of 2012, the child [T.]’s mother, Helen . . . , physically
abused the child, in that the mother grabbed the child’s hands, shook the
child, and struck the child’s face with the mother’s hands. The child does not want to reside in her
mother’s home. Such physical abuse was
excessive and caused the child unreasonable pain and suffering. The child is a prior dependent of the
Juvenile Court due to the mother’s physical abuse of the child. Such physical abuse of the child by the
mother endangers the child’s physical health and safety, creates a detrimental
home environment and places the child at risk of physical harm, damage, danger
and physical abuse.â€
The juvenile court explained that
he “agree[d] with some of what the attorneys on the other end, [Mother’s] way
of resolving it is completely inappropriate, but [T.] is willful, was AWOL, was
trying to run her own program, had boys in and out of the house. I didn’t find her to be credible. Her ability to sit here and say that it was
all them and that it’s not me, I did not find to be credible. I think that the discussion from this end of
the table about her setting this up, getting out of the home, she thinks she
can have more freedoms, I think a lot of that is true. But I think
that . . . adults need to do better.†Mother appealed from the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional order on August 13, 2012.
Mother paints T. as a typical
rebellious teen who wants more freedom and does not want to follow the rules of
strict parents. She urges us to reverse
the jurisdictional findings and redirect our time and resources to children
“who really do need the protection of the court.†Mother raises two separate issues with regard
to whether T. falls within the definition of section 300, subdivision (b): (1) T. did not suffer “serious physical harmâ€
as described by subdivision (b); and (2) an isolated incident does not support
an inference T. is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the
future. We find substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding T. is a child described by section 300,
subdivision (b).
A child may be considered a
dependent of the court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result
of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately
supervise or protect the child . . . The child shall
continue to be a dependent child pursuant to this subdivision only so long as
is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm
or illness.†(§ 300, subd. (b).) Thus, a jurisdictional finding under section
300, subdivision (b), requires: (1)
neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation;
and (3) serious physical harm
or illness to the child, or a substantial risk of such harm or
illness. (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135.)
On appeal, the substantial evidence
test is the appropriate standard of review for jurisdictional findings. (In re
Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875.)
Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is evidence which is
reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (In re
J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1433.)
“We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but
merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the
trial court.†(In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321.)
I. Serious Physical Harm
Mother contends that her
altercation with T. was an isolated incident that failed to produce any
“serious physical harm†as required by section 300, subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) does not define “serious
physical harm.†The limited authority on
the topic suggests that, at a minimum, serious physical harm may be found where
there is physical evidence of the harm, such as bruising, lacerations, broken
bones or other internal injuries. For
example, in In re Mariah T. (2008)
159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438, this court found serious physical harm where the
mother struck a three-year-old child with a belt on the stomach and forearms,
leaving deep purple bruises, but declined to find serious physical harm where
the eight-year-old sibling was left with a red line on her back. In In
re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1645, the court found serious
physical harm where a seven-year-old child was struck with a belt or a cord,
leaving welts, bruises and broken skin.
Subdivision (a) of section 300 is also instructive in that it provides
that “ ‘serious physical harm’ does not include reasonable and
age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks where there is no evidence of serious
physical injury.â€
Here, there is no evidence serious
physical injury resulted from a 63-year-old woman grabbing the wrists of a
16-year-old girl, shaking her, and hitting her in the face.
Children and Family Services sent a social worker to investigate the incident
the day it occurred. The social worker
reported there were no visible marks or bruises on T. at that time and T.
denied there ever were any. Further, T.
was not afraid of Mother. Substantial
evidence does not support a finding T. suffered serious physical harm under
section 300, subdivision (b) as the result of this incident.
II. Substantial
Risk of Future Harm
Even if T. did not suffer serious
physical harm as a result of that incident, however, the record supports a
finding that a substantial risk remains that T. will suffer serious physical
harm in the future. “In determining what
constitutes a substantial risk of serious physical harm [under subdivision
(b)], some general guidance may be drawn from subdivision (a) of section 300,
which uses the same language to authorize jurisdiction where ‘[t]he minor has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will suffer, serious
physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the minor by the minor’s parent or
guardian.’ For purposes of that subdivision,
‘a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury based on
the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated
inflictions of injuries on the minor or the minor’s siblings, or a combination
of these and other actions by the parent or guardian which indicate the child
is at risk of serious physical harm.’ (§
300, subd. (a).)†(In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 823.)
Mother admitted she grabbed T.’s
wrists and shook her. Two years prior to
this incident, Mother pushed T. and pulled her hair. Even if serious physical injury did not
result from the incident in question, it is evident that Mother’s mistreatment
of T. is escalating. Mother does not
view her behavior as abusive, despite participating in parenting classes and
counseling in 2011. Also, she feels
being “whooped by the switch†is not child abuse. She does not accept responsibility for any of
the tension with T. Instead, Mother
blames T. and feels she was “set up.â€
T.’s and Mother’s mutual animosity creates a strong possibility of
greater harm in the future.
Mother relies on a number of cases
which hold an isolated incident is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction under
section 300. (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1026; In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1137.) None of these are relevant since this is not
an isolated incident. The record shows
there were prior physical altercations involving Mother and T. and Father and
Charles as well as the incident at issue.
Moreover, in each of these cases, there is evidence that the parents
regretted their actions and had learned from their mistakes and, thus, it was
unlikely that the children were at risk of future harm. That is not the case here.
In In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, for example, the parents
became intoxicated and the father crashed the family’s van into a light
pole. Two of the couple’s children were
injured, including a 14-month-old toddler whose older brother had released his
safety harness. The mother ignored an
officer’s advice to apply pressure to her child’s wound, refused to hand the
child to the officer when asked to do so, and behaved in a belligerent manner
toward another woman at the scene. (
children pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b).
On appeal, the court addressed
whether evidence of a single episode of parental conduct was sufficient to
bring the children within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. “In evaluating risk based upon a single
episode of endangering conduct, a juvenile court should consider the nature of
the conduct and all surrounding circumstances.
It should also consider the present circumstances, which might include,
among other things, evidence of the parent’s current understanding of and
attitude toward the past conduct that endangered a child, or participation in
educational programs, or other steps taken, by the parent to address the
problematic conduct in the interim, and probationary support and supervision
already being provided through the criminal courts that would help a parent
avoid a recurrence of such an incident.â€
(In re J.N., supra, 181
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1025-1026.) There was
no evidence that the parents had a substance abuse problem that put the
children at risk of serious physical harm.
The children were otherwise healthy, loved and well cared for. The parents were remorseful and indicated
they had learned from their mistakes. (
jurisdictional order. (
In In re Nicholas B., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, the court concluded
that the allegations in the petition were insufficient to support jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (b), in that they did not allege a current
substantial risk that the child would suffer serious physical harm as a result
of appellants’ inability to supervise or protect him. The petition alleged one triggering incident
of physical abuse by the mother, which she admitted and regretted, and there
were no further allegations that the serious physical harm inflicted by the
mother would occur again. (
1134-1135.) As a result, the petition
failed to allege facts to demonstrate present or future risk of physical
harm. (Id. at p. 1135.)
Unlike the parents in
re Nicholas B., there is no evidence Mother is remorseful; indeed, she
feels she did “nothing wrong.†Mother
continues to feel she is blameless in this matter and that it was all a “set
up†by T. to obtain more freedom. Mother
relies on In re Precious D. (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1251 to argue that there was no parental negligence, fault or
unfitness that violated the requirements of section 300, subdivision (b).
facts. There is ample evidence to
support the conclusion Mother’s conduct was inappropriate and T. was removed as
a result of it.
There is no evidence in the record
to suggest Mother learned a lesson and will not repeat her mistakes. The jurisdictional and dispositional reports
indicate she placed the blame squarely on T.’s shoulders. She continued to complain about T.’s behavior
during the investigation and was unwilling to participate in any services. Mother was also reluctant to accept T. back
into the house. She told the caseworker
T. would be allowed home only if she followed the rules. This leaves us with a record demonstrating a
well-founded concern about future harm to T. if she fails to follow the rules.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional
order is affirmed.
BIGELOW,
P. J.
We concur:
RUBIN,
J.
GRIMES,
J.
further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise specified.
is Henrietta’s father.
