In re L.P.
Filed 6/7/13 In re L.P. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re L.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO
COUNTY CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
E.W.,
Defendant
and Appellant.
E057716
(Super.Ct.No.
J238349)
OPINION
APPEAL
from the Superior Court
of
Bernardino County. Gregory S. Tavill, Judge. Affirmed.
Johanna
R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Jean-Rene
Basle, County Counsel,
Dawn M. Messer, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No
appearance for Minor.
The
juvenile court terminated E.W.’s (Father) parental rights to his daughter, L.P.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26)
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] and denied Father’s request to change a court
order (§ 388). Father contends the
parental rights because the court should have applied the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception to termination. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Father contends the juvenile court erred in
denying his request to change a court order because Father proved his
circumstances had changed and he had a strong bond with L.P. We affirm.
A. BACKGROUND
Father
and T.P. (Mother) were homeless in
Mother resided in a park. L.P. is female
and was born in August 2010. Father had
been unaware of L.P.’s birth until he coincidentally saw Mother applying for
aid while he was applying for food stamps.
After L.P.’s birth, Father found a residence for himself, Mother, L.P.,
and Mother’s mother (Grandmother), in Bakersfield.
On
December 27, 2010, Father
told Mother to leave the residence.
Father made Mother leave with L.P.; Mother was unable to take any
belongings with her, and it was raining.
Mother went to live with L.P.’s maternal aunt, H.E. (Aunt) On December
27, 2010, Mother and Grandmother were struck by a big rig truck while
crossing the street. Both Mother and
Grandmother died on December 28.
On
December 28, Father arrived at Aunt’s house seeking custody of L.P. Aunt convinced Father to stay at Aunt’s home,
because Father “had no items for the child.â€
Father left with L.P. on January
3, 2011. Father took L.P. to
Kern Medical
Center on the advice of an
attorney, after Father called the attorney “to try to obtain items for the
childâ€â€”presumably this attorney was involved in Father’s lawsuit related to
Mother’s death.
B. DETENTION
On
January 4, the Kern County Department of
Human Services (Kern Department) received a referral reflecting Father had
kept L.P. “‘out in the cold with very little clothes on.’†L.P. was in the hospital; she was suffering
from pneumonia. The reporting party
stated Father was homeless and keeping L.P. for the settlement money associated
with Mother’s death. The Kern Department
found L.P. had been admitted to the hospital with pneumonia. L.P. was “very dirty†when she arrived at the
hospital. Father told the Kern
Department L.P. had been sick for two weeks.
The
hospital social worker was concerned about discharging L.P. into Father’s
custody because (1) Father was not listed on L.P.’s birth certificate, (2) Father
had no proof he was L.P.’s father, and (3) Father told a nurse he had been
living in Arizona and only came
to town for Mother’s funeral. Father was
very dirty when he arrived at the hospital; the hospital gave him clothes,
food, and a shower. Father told staff at
the hospital that he did not have any money or clothing.
Father
admitted smoking methamphetamine on two occasions in 2006 or 2007. Father also drank “a lot,†but stopped around
2001. Father admitted smoking marijuana
from the time he was 18 years old; Father smoked marijuana approximately every
other day. Father was born in 1966, so
he was 18 years old in 1984.
The
Kern Department placed a hold on L.P. at the hospital. The Kern Department filed a petition alleging
L.P. was at risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness if left in
Father’s care because (1) Father had been unable to provide a stable home for
L.P. for two weeks; (2) L.P. was hospitalized for pneumonia and Respiratory Syncytial
Virus; (3) Father failed to seek immediate medical attention for L.P.’s
illness; (4) Father was a chronic abuser of marijuana; and (5) Father lived a
“nomadic lifestyle†and did not have a stable home. (§ 300, subd. (b).) The Kern County juvenile court (the “Kern
Courtâ€) found the Kern Department made a prima facie showing that L.P. came
within section 300, and ordered L.P. be detained.
C. JURISDICTION
L.P.
was placed on “a temporary visit†with maternal cousins, M.P. (Cousin) and C.P.
(collectively “Cousinsâ€), in Norco.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] Father failed to visit L.P. during a scheduled
visit on January 11. The following day,
Father contacted the Kern Department and explained he missed the visit because
he was suffering from a 102-degree fever.
Father missed another scheduled visit on January 29. Father called Cousins “constantly requesting
photos of [L.P.] and to talk to [Cousins].â€
Cousin told Father he could not call Cousin, but then Cousin began
receiving “non[-]stop calls from the paternal grandparents.â€
A
DNA test revealed there was a 99.99 percent probability that Father was L.P.’s
father. A drug test reflected Father
tested positive for marijuana on January 7.
Father had a prior conviction for cruelty to a child, which caused him
to serve three months in jail. Father
was residing with friends in Bakersfield.
Father said he had known the friends for 15 years, but did not know
their last names.
The
Kern Court declared Father to be L.P.’s presumed father. The Kern Court declared L.P.’s residence to
be Kern County and found she came within section 300, subdivision (b) in that
her needs were not being met.
Approximately
two weeks later, the Kern Court found Father legally resided in Vidal, in San
Bernardino County. The Kern Court
declared San Bernardino County to be Father’s and L.P.’s county of
residence. The Kern Court transferred
the case to San Bernardino County for disposition. San Bernardino accepted the case. The San Bernardino County Juvenile Court
ordered Father to have supervised visits with L.P. one time every other week
for four hours.
D. DISPOSITION
L.P.
continued to reside with Cousins on “an extended visit.†L.P. was happy and blending in well with Cousins’
family. Father admitted abusing
methamphetamine for a one-year period while dating Mother. Father was living in a trailer that his
parents owned, in Vidal. Vidal is a sparsely
populated area. Vidal residents must
travel to Blythe, California or Parker, Arizona for food, medical care, and
other services. Father offered to move
to Needles, in order to receive services and comply with his case plan. Father did not have a stable source of
income.
The
juvenile court declared L.P. a ward of the court, found Father to be L.P.’s
presumed father, and ordered L.P. continue to be placed outside of Father’s
physical custody. The court granted
Father two two-hour visits with L.P. per month.
E. SIX-MONTH REVIEW
L.P.
was officially placed in Cousins’ home, as opposed to being on an extended
visit. An attorney was representing
L.P., L.P.’s half brother, and Aunt in a civil lawsuit related to Mother’s
death. The lawsuit centered on a one
million dollar insurance policy, and the attorney was hoping to increase the
amount awarded to L.P., L.P.’s half brother, and Aunt—the three would split the
sum equally. Father was listed as L.P.’s
guardian ad litem. Father was requesting
money for himself, due to his own pain and suffering for the loss of Mother;
however, Father and Mother were never married and were not a couple at the time
of her death.
Father
moved his trailer to Needles and began residing there. Father obtained a job at a fast food
restaurant. Father’s case plan required
him to participate in parenting classes, counseling, and outpatient drug
treatment. Father sometimes appeared
sober and healthy. At other times,
Father appeared “very unkempt†and “not so sober.†In July, Father arrived at the Department’s office
with three certificates of completion related to his case plan. Father expected the immediate return of L.P. A social worker explained that Father would
have to wait until the six-month review hearing. Father became irate and was asked to leave
the building.
The
social worker spoke to Father’s drug counselor, who confirmed she had informed
Father he would need aftercare, including drug testing. Father had become irate with the drug
counselor and was “unnerved by the request to drug test.†On August 11, Father said he was unable to
urinate for a drug test, even when he was given water. On August 16, Father tested positive for
methamphetamines. Father explained he
took methamphetamines because he worked a late shift and then needed to stay
awake to drive to Riverside to see L.P.
Father’s story was problematic because he did not have a valid driver’s
license. Father admitted being under the
influence of methamphetamines during his visit with L.P.
During
the visits, Father often let Cousin, who supervised the visits, tend to L.P.
when she was crying or needed a diaper change.
When the Department instructed Cousin to allow Father to parent L.P.
during the visits, Cousin agreed. Father
appeared “uncomfortable and unsure of what to do when [L.P.] cried and he was
unprepared for [Cousin’s] lack of involvement.â€
Father was given unsupervised time to change L.P.’s diaper, and during
that time L.P. “was heard screaming to the top of her lungs.†At one point, Father requested the visits
take place at a Bass Pro Shop. The
Department explained such a store is not an appropriate place for a visit with
an infant. Father agreed to have the
visits take place at a restaurant.
Cousins
have two of their own children, who were three and five years old in 2011. The children considered L.P. to be their
sister. L.P. was “intertwined†with Cousins’
family. Cousin maintained contact with
L.P.’s 13-year-old half brother, who was adopted by his maternal aunt and uncle. On November 9, Cousins requested de facto
parent status.
At
a hearing on November 16, the juvenile court referred Father and the Department
to mediation on the issue of returning L.P. to Father. At the mediation, Father and the Department
agreed Father would continue with his reunification services and Father would
receive six hours of unsupervised visits with L.P. At a hearing on December 7, the juvenile
court found it was in L.P.’s best interests to not address the issue of
terminating Father’s parental rights, and that L.P. was likely to be returned
to Father’s custody. The court ordered Father
to participate in reunification services and granted him weekly six-hour
unsupervised visits with L.P.
F. TWELVE-MONTH REVIEW
Father’s
visits were increased to two weeks at a time, so each visit lasted two weeks. Father was able to meet L.P.’s needs and L.P.
looked to Father when she wanted to be held.
Father was working at two jobs: (1)
a part-time job at a retail store, and (2) several eight-hour days each week at
a local marina. Father repeatedly tested
negative for controlled substances. However,
on May 27, 2012, Father was arrested for driving under the influence and child
endangerment. Father was seen “weaving
all over the road in Blythe†at 1:34 a.m. with L.P. in the car. Father admitted drinking alcohol. Father did not report the incident to his
substance abuse counselor.
A
social worker asked why Father drove drunk with L.P. in the car; he explained
it was late at night and he did not want to bother the babysitters. Father also said he was not drunk, since he
only had two shots of whisky. Father
said he did not report the drunk driving to his substance abuse counselor
because he was ashamed. Father said he
failed to attend Alcoholics Anonymous and/or Narcotics Anonymous meetings
during the month of May because he “‘was busy with [his] daughter; doing other
things.’†Father twice told the social
worker that he was not an alcoholic.
Cousin
told a Department social worker L.P. would need to be placed in foster care if
the juvenile court granted Father another six months of services because the
matter took “‘a big toll’†on her family and the family did not “‘want anything
to with [Father] again.’†The juvenile
court found Father failed to make substantive progress in the court ordered
treatment plan. The court terminated
Father’s reunification services. The
court granted Father supervised visits for two hours every two weeks.
G. TERMINATION
L.P.
was returned to her placement at Cousins’ home.
When L.P. was initially returned to the placement from Father’s house,
L.P.’s nights and days were flipped, so that she was awake at night and
sleeping during the day. L.P. also
suffered nightmares upon her return.
After some time at Cousins’ home, L.P.’s nightmares ceased and she
returned to sleeping at night and being awake during the day. L.P. was small in size and suffered some
asthma-like symptoms, but met her developmental milestones and appeared bonded
to Cousins. Cousins wanted to adopt L.P.
Father
attended all of his visits with L.P., which took place in Barstow. During the visits, Father played with L.P. and
read books to her. L.P. usually cried
when separated from Cousin, in order to be transported to Barstow; however,
L.P. would “cheer up†when told she would be seeing Father.
On
November 14, 2012, Father filed a request to change a court order. Father requested the juvenile court return
L.P. to his custody or that he be granted reunification services and
unsupervised overnight and weekend visits.
Father asserted circumstances had changed because he was participating
in a substance abuse treatment program, testing negative for controlled
substances, working at a job, attending classes to obtain his G.E.D., completed
individual counseling, and living in a stable environment. Father alleged the change would be in L.P.’s
best interests because Father and L.P. shared a strong bond and L.P. was happy
when she visited Father.
In
November, it appeared Father was complying with his treatment plan, with the
exception of obtaining full-time employment.
The Department concluded Father “care[d] deeply for his daughter,†but
Father’s history of relapsing into substance abuse made it unsafe to return
L.P. to his custody.
A
contested termination hearing took place on December 5, 2012. Joanne Watts (Watts), L.P.’s adoption social
worker, testified at the hearing. Watts
believed L.P. enjoyed playing with Father during visits. Watts explained Father’s grandchildren were
currently going through an adoption process, but Father was excluded as a
possible placement for those children due to his unstable housing, history of
drug and alcohol abuse, prior substantiated referral for physical abuse of his
daughters in 2003, and his criminal history.
Watts believed L.P. viewed Cousins as parental figures because L.P.
referred to Cousins as “Mom and Dad.†Watts
concluded it would be detrimental to L.P. to remove her from Cousins’ home,
because L.P. “has experienced enough loss in her short life already.â€
Sonia
Gallegos (Gallegos), a Department employee who supervised visits between L.P.
and Father, also testified at the hearing.
L.P. “always seem[ed] happy†to see Father. Gallegos believed Father had a pattern of
conduct, which she described as follows:
“It seems the father is able to complete programs and get wonderful
references, but his sobriety seems to last five or six months. And then we’re kind of [starting] from square
one again.†Gallegos opined that L.P.
would not be safe in Father’s care due to this pattern of conduct. Gallegos cited Father driving drunk with L.P.
in the car as an example of Father’s inability to protect L.P. Gallegos believed it would be detrimental to
L.P. to remove her from Cousins’ home because L.P. had been in the home “so
long†and L.P. bonded with Cousins.
Father
testified at the hearing. Father was
working part-time at a barber shop. Father
pled guilty to drunk driving in the incident involving L.P. Father was attending Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings six or seven times per week. Father
explained that he had L.P. in his care for one month on an extended visit—May
2012, which was when he was found driving drunk. Father conceded he had a pattern of being
sober for up to eight months and then relapsing.
In
regard to Father’s request to change a court order, the juvenile court found
there had not been a change in circumstances “since the case started and
certainly not since services were terminated.â€
The juvenile court explained to Father, “[W]ith your long history of
addiction and periodic relapse being an ongoing problem, I just don’t have any
confidence that we’re in a different place now than we were six months ago or a
year ago. [¶] And it does not mean that you’re not
personally making some progress, but there has not been a change in
circumstances. [¶] I would fear that if the child were returned
to you, that you would relapse, and it would be an ongoing problem.â€
The
juvenile court also found it was not in L.P.’s best interests to change the
court’s order because L.P.’s interests would be best served by “leaving things
as they are with the caretakers and to go forward.†Thus, the court denied Father’s request to
change a court order. (§ 388.)
In
regard to terminating Father’s parental rights, the juvenile court found the
parent-child bond exception did not apply in this case. The court concluded Father and L.P.’s
relationship did not support application of the exception. The court explained, “It’s more of a friendly
person who she sees here on an infrequent but regular basis like an extended
family member, not as a parent.†Thus,
the court terminated Father’s parental rights and ordered adoption be L.P.’s
permanent plan.
A. REQUEST TO CHANGE A COURT ORDER
Father
contends the juvenile court erred by denying his request to change a court
order (§ 388) because his circumstances had changed and he has a strong bond
with L.P. We disagree.
Under
section 388, a parent may petition a juvenile court to modify a previous order
on the grounds of changed circumstances.
(§ 388; In re Nolan W. (2009)
45 Cal.4th 1217, 1235.) The petitioner
has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a change of
circumstances, and to show that the proposed modification is in the child’s
best interests. (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.570(h)(1).) “We review the grant
or denial of a petition for modification under section 388 for an abuse of
discretion. [Citations.]†(In re
B.D., at p. 1228.)
The
juvenile court’s finding that Father’s circumstances had not changed was within
reason because Father’s sobriety was relatively new. Father began abusing drugs at the age of 18,
and was approximately 46 years old during the dependency proceedings. Father supported the section 388 petition
with proof that he was in a treatment program and maintaining his sobriety. A drug test reflected Father tested positive
for marijuana on January 7, 2011. In
July 2011, Father arrived at the Department’s office with three certificates of
completion related to his case plan.
Father expected the immediate return of L.P. On August 16, Father tested positive for
methamphetamines. Father explained he
took methamphetamines because he worked a late shift and then needed to stay
awake to drive to Riverside to see L.P. Father
does not have a valid driver’s license.
Father admitted being under the influence of methamphetamines during his
visit with L.P.
On
December 7, 2011, the juvenile court ordered Father to participate in
reunification services and liberalized his visits with L.P. On May 27, 2012, Father was arrested for
driving under the influence and child endangerment. Father was seen “weaving all over the road in
Blythe†at 1:34 a.m. with L.P. in the car.
Father admitted drinking alcohol.
Given
the evidence of Father’s 28-year history of abusing drugs and alcohol, and his
history of relapsing after months of sobriety, the juvenile court was within
reason when it concluded Father’s six months of sobriety, from June to December
2012, did not sufficiently prove a change in circumstances. As noted by the juvenile court, Father was
making progress, but had not sufficiently changed the substance abuse issue.
In
regard to the second prong, the best interests of the child are determined by
considering (1) the seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency; (2)
the strength of the parent-child bond; and (3) whether the problem that led to
the dependency has been resolved, or the ease with which it may be
resolved. (In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685.)
L.P.
was detained because (1) Father had been unable to provide a stable home for
L.P.; (2) Father failed to seek immediate medical attention for L.P.’s illness;
and (3) Father is a chronic abuser of marijuana. (§ 300, subd. (b).) Father’s drug abuse appeared serious, since
he had been using drugs for over 20 years.
Father had begun resolving the drug abuse issue by participating in the
treatment process, but given his troubles with relapsing, the juvenile court
could reasonably conclude Father’s progress was too limited to consider the
substance abuse issue to be resolved.
As
to the parent-child bond, Father had positive visits with L.P. However, it appears L.P. only resided with
Father for a very brief time before the dependency started, so she mainly saw
him during visits. Father admitted being
under the influence of methamphetamines during one visit, and he was found
driving drunk during a second visit.
Given (1) the evidence that Father chose to allow his drug and alcohol
abuse to interfere with his visits with L.P., and (2) L.P.’s young age at the
time of removal, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude the two were not
strongly bonded. While Father and L.P.
appeared to enjoy their time together the bond was not that of a parent and
child, but more a friendly visitor.
In
regard to resolving the problem, Father was found driving drunk with L.P. in
the car in May 2012. Due to the recent
timing of that incident the juvenile court could conclude Father had not
resolved the substance abuse issue that led to the dependency. Further, given the evidence of Father’s 28-year
history of substance abuse and history of relapsing, the juvenile court was
within reason in finding the substance abuse problem would not be easily
resolved because Father had struggled with this problem for over half his life.
Father
argues he did “everything within his
power to show that circumstances had changed†and therefore the section 388
petition was a “sham,†in that the termination of his parental rights was inevitable
because he had “no genuine way of rebutting the ‘presumption that arises after
termination of reunification [services].’â€
Father’s argument is not persuasive because he is presenting this issue
as though a legal injustice was created but that is not the case. The juvenile court heard Father’s request to
change a court order. Thus, due process
was provided. The process did not break-down
and it was not a sham, rather, there was overwhelming evidence supporting the
denial of the petition, which likely made it difficult for Father to prove his
request should be granted. The fact that
Father was confronted with large amounts of unfavorable evidence does not make
the process a “sham.†Thus, we find
Father’s argument to be unpersuasive.
Father
contends he proved changed circumstances because he obtained a stable living
environment. Father asserts he proved
the changed order would be in L.P.’s best interests because he has a strong
bond with L.P., as evinced by Father constantly calling Cousins for photographs
of L.P., and Father’s testimony that he would love to have L.P. back in his
custody. Father’s argument is not
persuasive because he is only presenting the evidence that directly contradicts
the juvenile court’s ruling. This
argument is problematic because we cannot substitute our discretion for that of
the juvenile court, and we must give a high degree of deference to the court’s
ruling. (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 459.) Since there is evidence supporting the
juvenile court’s ruling, we cannot reverse the ruling merely because there is
contradictory evidence.
B. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Father
contends the juvenile court erred by terminating his parental rights because
the court should have applied the parent-child bond exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We disagree.
If
a juvenile court finds a dependent child is adoptable, then it will terminate
parental rights unless one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions is
applicable. (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1).) One of the enumerated
exceptions provides that parental rights shall not be terminated if “[t]he
parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship.†(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) “The benefit to the child from continuing
such a relationship must . . . be such that the relationship
‘“promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the
well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive
parents.â€â€™ [Citation.]†(In re
Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 449.) In other words, for the exception to apply,
the bond between the parent and child must be a parent-child bond, rather than
the type of bond a child might have with a friendly visitor or non-parent
relative, such as an aunt. (
454, 468.) We review the juvenile
court’s decision to not apply the parent-child bond exception for an abuse of
discretion.
title="">[3] (In re
Aaliyah R., at p. 449.)
It
appears from the record that Father missed some visits when the dependency
initially started, but otherwise consistently visited L.P. Accordingly, the record reflects that Father
maintained regular visitation and contact with L.P.
Now
we turn to the issue of whether L.P. would benefit from continuing the
relationship with Father, such that continuing the relationship outweighs the
benefit L.P. would gain from being in an adoptive home. Gallegos believed it would be detrimental to
L.P. to remove her from Cousins’ home because L.P. had been in the home “so
long†and L.P. bonded with Cousins. Watts
believed L.P. viewed Cousins as parental figures because L.P. referred to
Cousins as “Mom and Dad.†Watts
concluded it would be detrimental to L.P. to remove her from Cousins’ home,
because L.P. “has experienced enough loss in her short life already.â€
L.P.
was four months old when she was detained.
L.P. appeared to enjoy seeing Father; however, Father’s interactions
with L.P. appear to be more akin to a friendly visitor or non-parent relative,
such as an uncle. It does not appear
L.P. was particularly upset when the visitation sessions ended, or that she was
particularly anxious to visit Father, as evinced by her crying when separated
from Cousin. Further, Father was under
the influence of methamphetamine during one visit and under the influence of alcohol
during a second visit. Given the
unstable nature of Father’s sobriety and the lack of parent-child relationship
between Father and L.P., the juvenile court’s decision to not apply the
parent-child bond exception was within reason.
Thus, we conclude there was no error.
Father
contends he does not need to show that his relationship with L.P. is more than
that of extended family members. Father
asserts he only needs to show “[a] ‘“substantial positive emotional
attachment.â€â€™â€ To support this contention
Father cites an opinion from Fourth District, Division One, which sets forth
the rule that the juvenile court must make a determination about whether
continuing the relationship with the parent will benefit the child to such a
degree as to outweigh the benefit the child would gain from being in a
permanent home. (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297.) In In
re S.B. the appellate court concluded a parent did not need to prove the
child had a “‘primary attachment’ to the parentâ€; rather, it was sufficient to
show “the child has a ‘substantial, positive emotional attachment’ to the
parent.†(Id. at p. 299.)
Father’s
argument is not persuasive because, in a more recent opinion, the Fourth
District, Division One Court has changed its position on the
re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 937, the court explained that
for the proposition that a termination order is subject to reversal whenever
there is ‘some measure of benefit’ in continued contact between parent and
child.†The court then gave the
following rule: “‘[F]or the
[parent-child bond] exception to apply, the emotional attachment between the
child and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of being a
friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt.’ [Citation.]â€
(Id. at p. 938.) Given that the Fourth District, Division One
has clarified its rule and concluded the parent-child bond exception requires a
parent-child relationship, we are not persuaded by Father’s argument that he
need only show the type of relationship that would exist between a child and
extended family member.
The
judgment is affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J.
We concur:
KING
Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
All subsequent statutory references will be to the Welfare and
Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
It is unclear from the record if Cousins are L.P.’s great-aunt and uncle
or L.P.’s cousins.
