P. v. Aceves
Filed 4/15/13 P. v. Aceves CA2/6
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SIX
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOSE MACHUCA ACEVES,
Defendant and Appellant.
2d
Crim. No. B239788
(Super.
Ct. No. 1347782)
(Santa
Barbara County)
Jose Machuca Aceves
appeals from a judgment after conviction by jury of
& Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and possession of methamphetamine for
sale (§ 11378).
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] The jury acquitted him of
prior felony convictions related to controlled substances and four prior prison
commitments. (§ 11370.2, subd. (c);
Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) The
court sentenced him to 23 years in jail.
Aceves contends the
trial court erred when it admitted evidence of his prior controlled substance
convictions because he would stipulate that he knew the narcotic nature of
methamphetamine. He would not stipulate
that he knew methamphetamine was present.
We affirm.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May of 2010, Jose
Martinez reported his car stolen. There
were no suspects.
About a week later, Martinez's
son Chad saw
the car. Chad
approached the driver, Aceves. Aceves
stopped and, when Chad
insisted it was his car, Aceves explained that he was test driving it. He said that "some guy on Bunny
Street" was selling it. Aceves gave Chad
his phone number and offered to drive him to the seller. Chad
declined, and "flagged . . . down" a police officer.
The police officer
detained Aceves, confirmed that the car was stolen, and searched it. He found three large bags of
methamphetamine: one in the driver's
side door pocket, one on the driver's side floor mat, and one on the passenger side
floor mat. The bags were not covered or
otherwise concealed. They were in plain
view. The officer also found seven small
baggies of methamphetamine in a coin purse in the center console. When Aceves got out of the car, he retrieved
a cell phone from under the passenger seat.
The officer found two more cell phones in the center console.
The methamphetamine
weighed 83 grams in total and had a street value of about $8,000. An expert testified that indicators such as
the quantity and packaging of the drugs and the number of cell phones were
consistent with drug sales.
The prosecution moved in
limine to admit evidence of four prior convictions for transporting
methamphetamine and possessing methamphetamine for sale. Aceves objected on the ground the evidence
was unduly prejudicial.
Aceves offered to
stipulate that he knew the narcotic nature of methamphetamine. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The trial court decided to admit the
convictions to prove knowledge of the nature and presence of methamphetamine,
unless Aceves also stipulated that he knew methamphetamine was present. He did not.
The trial court
tentatively limited the prior conviction evidence to the two most recent
convictions for possession of methamphetamine for sale in 2001 and 2005. (§ 11378.) The court found the probative value of the
other two convictions for transportation of methamphetamine in 1997 and 1998
was outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.
(Evid. Code, § 352.) But the
court eventually admitted the 1997 and 1998 convictions, after Aceves testified
that he had never bought or sold drugs and did not know their value.
Aceves testified that he
did not know there was methamphetamine in the car. He was test driving it because an
acquaintance named Isidro Munoz offered it to him to satisfy a debt. On direct examination, he said he saw
"[s]ome bags" and two cell phones in the car, and "a bag in a
little compartment." But he said he
did not know the bags contained drugs until the police officer told him.
On cross-examination,
Aceves said he did not see any baggies in the car. He said he did not see a bag on the floor by
his feet or in the car door. He admitted
that he knew the narcotic nature of methamphetamine.
The prosecutor first
confronted Aceves with his 2001 and 2005 convictions for possession of
methamphetamine for sale.
(§ 11378.) Aceves pointed
out that these were only possession offenses.
He said, "If you can show me that they caught me selling it on that
date . . . I've never sold it.
It's just possession. It's
minimum." He said, "I don't
buy it. I don't sell it." He had "no idea" what
methamphetamine is worth. The trial
court then allowed the prosecutor to impeach Aceves with his 1997 and 1998
convictions for transportation of methamphetamine. (§ 11379.)
The trial court
instructed the jury to consider the prior convictions only on the question of
whether Aceves knew of the nature and presence of methamphetamine, and not as
proof of propensity.
DISCUSSION
contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of his
prior drug convictions because he admitted he knew the narcotic nature of
methamphetamine. We disagree.
Generally, a prosecutor
is not compelled to accept a stipulation that would deprive it of its right to
introduce persuasive and forceful evidence of an element of an offense. (People
v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 17.)
But there is an exception to this rule where the risk of undue prejudice
to the defense outweighs the probative value of the evidence. (People
v. Thornton (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 44, 49.)
Evidence of prior convictions may be admissible to prove a defendant's
knowledge of the narcotic nature of a substance, but not when the defendant
stipulates to knowledge. (
760, 766 [prior convictions were admissible to prove knowledge where defendant
did not offer to stipulate].) To secure
convictions in this case, the prosecution was required to prove, among other
things, that Aceves knew two things: (1)
he knew methamphetamine's nature or character as a controlled substance, and
(2) he knew it was present. Aceves would
not stipulate that he knew it was present.
He testified that he never would have driven the car if he had known
methamphetamine was present.
Aceves' prior
convictions had a tendency in reason to prove that he did know methamphetamine
was present. It is reasonable to infer
that a person with four prior convictions for transporting methamphetamine and
possessing it for sale would be likely to notice and recognize narcotics
packages on the car's floor, in the driver's door pocket, and in the console of
a car. Aceves put his knowledge into
issue when he pled not guilty, and its probative value increased when he denied
ever buying or selling drugs. Any risk
that the jury might consider the prior convictions for the improper purpose of
proving propensity was alleviated by the trial court's limiting instruction.
This case is unlike
Cal.App.3d 488, in which the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of prior
narcotics convictions to prove knowledge that a balloon contained heroin. In Washington,
the defendant was charged with selling heroin in violation of section
11352, which, like section 11379, requires proof the defendant knew of the
nature and presence of the narcotic. The
defendant offered to stipulate that he was "familiar with heroin, the way
it is packaged and the way it is sold."
(Washington, at
p. 490.) That offer met the
"knowledge" elements sufficiently to render the prior convictions
unduly prejudicial. Here, Aceves
admitted that he was familiar with methamphetamine in general, but he did not
admit that he knew how it is packaged.
He affirmatively denied knowing about the way it is bought and
sold. He said, "I don't buy
it. I don't sell it." The trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it admitted evidence of Aceves' prior convictions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT,
P.J.
We
concur:
YEGAN, J.
PERREN, J.
Kay S. Kuns, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Mark R. Feeser, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E.
Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric E. Reynolds, William H. Shin,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Safety Code unless otherwise stated.
