>P. v.
Willams

































Filed 4/10/13 P. v. Willams CA5



















NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS



California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.





IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT




>

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

F063696 (Super. Ct. No. VCF248957A) >OPINION

>THE COURThref="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">^*

APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Tulare
County. Valeriano Saucedo, Judge.

Peter
Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. French and
Doris A. Calandra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

>

>-ooOoo-

Appellant,
Ronald Williams, pled no contest to possession
of methamphetamine for sale (count 1/Health & Saf. Code, § 11378),
being under the influence of methamphetamine (count 2/Health & Saf. Code, §
11550, subd. (a)), and possession of narcotics paraphernalia (count 3/Health
& Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)).
Williams also admitted an allegation in count 1 that he had a prior
conviction for violating Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision
(c) and two prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd.
(b)).

On October
17, 2011, the court sentenced appellant to a four-year term with the final year
of the term to be served on mandatory supervision.

On appeal,
appellant contends the court erred when it denied his href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">motion to suppress. We affirm.

FACTS

The
testimony and other evidence submitted in connection with appellant’s motion to
suppress evidence established that on September 26, 2010, at approximately 8:30
p.m., Kingsburg Police Dispatcher Mayra Caldera received a 911 call from a
caller who stated that he heard noise in the room next door and that someone
was hitting, stabbing or trying to kill his wife in room 310 of the Kings Inn
Motel. The caller gave Caldera the
address of the motel, which is located off Highway 99. The call came from a pay phone at the Kings
Deli in Kingsburg.

Caldera determined that the motel
was in the jurisdiction of the Tulare County Sheriff’s Department and
transferred the call within seconds.
Caldera told the caller not to hang up, but the caller hung up anyway. Caldera told the sheriff’s department that
there was someone in room 310 at the motel either killing, stabbing, or hitting
his wife.

Tulare
County Sheriff’s Dispatcher Melinda Mathews received the call from Caldera and
dispatched Sheriff’s Deputy Robert Hadley to the Kings Inn Motel. Deputy Hadley drove to the Kings Inn Motel
and pulled up to room 310, which was dark with the air conditioner on. He knocked on the door three separate times,
waiting 30 to 60 seconds before knocking again, but he did not receive any
response. Deputy Hadley got a key to the
room from the night manager and knocked on the door again. When he again received no response, Deputy
Hadley used the key to open the door to check on the welfare of the woman who
had reportedly been assaulted or killed.
Hadley then saw Williams lying on a bed that was about 10 feet away from
the door and a second man lying on a bed that was closer to the door. He reached over and turned on the light so he
could see more clearly. He was then able
to see a large roll of currency and a large plastic baggie containing
methamphetamine at Williams’s feet.

Deputy
Hadley detained both men in handcuffs. After Williams told him he was on parole, the
deputy searched the room and found a scanner on top of a nightstand, a baggie
containing methamphetamine in a drawer, a baggie containing marijuana in
another drawer, and a glass pipe for smoking methamphetamine on Williams’s
bed. Williams exhibited signs of being
under the influence of a controlled substance.


DISCUSSION

Williams
contends the court erred when it denied his suppression motion because the
anonymous telephone tip did not justify the warrantless entrance into his motel
room. Respondent contends that the entry
into the room was justified by exigent circumstances. We agree with respondent.

“Motel guests are entitled to
the same Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures as are homeowners.
[Citations.]” (>People v. Jenkins (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th
368, 373-374.)

name="citeas((Cite_as:_51_Cal.4th_599,_246_P.3">name=B12024634846>name="______#HN;F3">name="SDU_602">“‘[T]he “physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”’name="sp_7047_773">name="citeas((Cite_as:_51_Cal.4th_599,_*602,_2"> [Citation.]
Thus, ‘searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.’ [Citation.] ‘Nevertheless, because the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness,” the warrant requirement
is subject to certain exceptions.’
[Citation.] In particular, ‘law
enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance
to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Troyer (2011) 51
Cal.4th 599, 602.)

“In
California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from
governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional
standards. [Citation.] … Because a
warrantless entry into a home is presumptively unreasonable, the government
bears the burden of establishing that exigent circumstances or another
exception to the warrant requirement justified the entry. [Citation.]

name="sp_999_3">name="______#HN;F7">“‘[P]olice may enter a home without
a warrant when they have an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or
imminently threatened with such injury.’
[Citation.] ‘“The need to protect
or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be
otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.”’ [Citation.]
‘“‘There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such
circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation
must be measured by the facts known to the officers.’”’ [Citation.]
On appeal, we uphold the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported
by substantial evidence, but review independently its determination that the
search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
[Citation.]

name=B82024634846>name="______#HN;F10">“The ‘“emergency aid
exception”’ to the warrant requirement ‘does not depend on the officers’
subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when
the emergency arises.’ [Citation.] Rather, the
exception ‘requires only “an objectively reasonable basis for believing …”
[citation] that “a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid.”’ [Citation.]
‘We are to approach the
Fourth Amendment name="citeas((Cite_as:_51_Cal.4th_599,_*606,_2">... with at least some
measure of pragmatism. If there is a
grave public need for the police to take preventive action, the Constitution
may impose limits, but it will not bar the way.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Troyer, >supra,
51 Cal.4th at pp. 605-606, italics added.)

In Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266, the United States Supreme
Court held that an anonymous telephone tip in that case, which reported that a
young Black male standing at a bus stop in a plaid shirt “[is] carrying a gun”
was insufficient¾without
more¾to
justify a detention and patdown search of the individual. (Id.
at p. 268.) In that case, there was no
audio recording of the tip, nothing was known about the informant, and it was
unknown how long it took the police to respond to the tip. Upon their arrival, the police officers
observed no suspicious conduct on the part of the individual and there was no
indication he might have been carrying a gun.
(Ibid.) The court recognized that there are
situations, as in the case of Alabama v.
White (1990) 496 U.S. 325 (White),
where “an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits ‘sufficient indicia of
reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory
stop.’” (Florida v. J.L., supra,
at p. 270.) In White, predictive information in the tip was corroborated by the
police and thus provided a reasonable basis to think the informant had inside
knowledge about the suspect. (>Florida v. J.L., supra, at pp. 270-271.) In
contrast, the tip in Florida v. J.L.
“lacked the moderate indicia of reliability present in White .…” (>Id. at p. 271.) “All the police had to go on in this case was
the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained
how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information
about J.L.” (Ibid.) Hence, the detention
and search in that case were incompatible with the href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">Fourth Amendment.

In >People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458 (>Dolly), an unidentified 911 caller
reported that an African-American male had “‘just pulled a gun’” on him and had
mentioned a gang name. The caller said
he believed the perpetrator was about to shoot him. The caller specifically described the
perpetrator, the parked vehicle the perpetrator was sitting in, and gave an
exact location. When the police officers
arrived at that location a few minutes later, they found the vehicle and a man
sitting inside who matched the description provided by the caller. The officers asked him to get out of the car,
at which time they found a loaded .38-caliber revolver. (Id.
at p. 462.) The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the anonymous tip was sufficient to justify the defendant’s
detention. The court concluded the
detention was justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under the
totality of the circumstances. (>Id. at pp. 465-466.)

In reaching this conclusion, the
Supreme Court considered a number of factors bearing upon the reasonableness of
the detention and the reliability of the anonymous call. First, pointing a gun at the caller and
threatening to shoot him posed a grave and immediate danger to the caller and
anyone nearby. (Dolly, supra, 40 Cal.4th
at p. 465.) Second, “there is no reason
to think that anonymous phoned-in tips concerning contemporaneous threats with
a firearm are any more likely to be hoaxes than are anonymous phoned-in tips
concerning a contemporaneous event of reckless driving,” which have been held
to provide police with a reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. (Id.
at p. 467.) As to this latter
consideration, the court noted that although the caller had not identified
himself, the 911 call was taped, which made the call inherently more reliable
because it raised the possibility that the caller could be identified by his
voice and made it less likely that the call was a hoax or a false report. name="SR;1661"> (Ibid.) Third, “the
tipster-victim provided a firsthand, contemporaneous description of the crime
as well as an accurate and complete description of the perpetrator and his
location, the details of which were confirmed within minutes by the police when
they arrived.” (Id. at p. 468.) In
elaborating on this third point, the court emphasized that a primary
determinant of a tipster’s reliability is the basis of his knowledge. (Ibid.) Thus, “[t]his case is … unlike >J.L., in which the informant ‘neither
explained how he knew about the [concealed] gun nor supplied any basis for
believing he had inside information’ [citation] and in which the record did not
reveal when the caller discovered the suspect had a concealed weapon or how
soon the police responded to the call [citation]. The police ‘may ascribe greater reliability
to a tip, even an anonymous one, where an informant “was reporting what he had
observed moments ago,” not stale or second-hand information.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.) Fourth, the caller provided a reasonable
explanation for wanting to protect his anonymity. (Id.
at p. 469.)

Here,
Dispatcher Caldera testified that the anonymous caller told her he was at the
Kings Inn Motel in a room next to room 310 when he heard noises coming from
room 310 that led the caller to believe that a man was beating or stabbing a
woman in that room. Although the
anonymous call came from a pay phone at a delicatessen located an undisclosed
distance away from the Kings Inn Motel, the caller appeared to be reporting
something he heard shortly before calling 911, and, as in Dolly, the call was recorded which enhanced its reliability. However, unlike the call in >Dolly which indicated that the defendant
merely posed a danger to the caller or the public, the situation here was more
urgent because it posed the real possibility a woman had already been beaten or
stabbed and might require immediate medical attention. Thus, given the urgency of the situation and
that the reliability of the anonymous call was enhanced because it was
recorded, Deputy Hadley had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that
someone in room 310 was in need of immediate aid.

Williams
contends there were no exigent circumstances in the present case because there
was no indication that the caller personally saw or heard anything, some of the
caller’s statements were based on inference, i.e., that a woman was being
beaten or stabbed, and the deputy did not observe anything at the motel that
indicated that an assault had occurred.
Williams also cites People v.
Ormonde (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 282 (Ormonde),
where entry into a home was found to be unlawful, as the case most factually
similar to the instant case and which he alleges had stronger facts justifying
entry into the home, to contend that his suppression motion should have been
granted. We disagree and find >Ormonde inapposite.

It is
apparent from the information relayed by the caller that he was reporting
noises he personally heard coming from an adjoining motel room soon after
hearing the noises. Further, although
the caller’s statement that a woman was being beaten or stabbed was conclusory,
it nevertheless raised the specter that someone in room 310 was undergoing a
vicious attack and in need of immediate medical assistance. That Officer Hadley did not initially hear
anything inside the motel room did not eliminate the need to check the room
because by the time he arrived, the victim could have been silent because she
was unconscious or any sound she made could have been drowned out by the sound
of the air conditioner. Moreover,
although Deputy Hadley did not see anything suspicious when he opened the door
to room 310, he was justified in turning the light on and entering the room
because he still had to check the room’s interior, including the bathroom, to
determine whether a victim was inside.

Ormonde
does not assist Williams. In that case,
a woman called from the corner of the block where Richard Ormonde’s apartment
was located to report that she had gotten in a fight with her estranged
husband, Christopher Olson, and that Olson had pushed her and kicked her in the
stomach. When two officers arrived at
Ormonde’s apartment, Olson was standing next to a car, 10 feet away from the
apartment’s front door, which was open.
After arresting Olson, an officer entered the apartment and took three
steps inside before Ormonde, his girlfriend, and a small child came out from
the back of the apartment. The officer
had them step outside and eventually he obtained permission from Ormonde to
search a dresser and a backpack where drugs belonging to Ormonde were
found. (Ormonde, supra, 143
Cal.App.4th at pp. 286-289.)

In reversing the denial of
Ormonde’s suppression motion the Ormonde
court found that exigent circumstances did not justify the initial entry into
the house because the domestic violence victim was outside of the apartment,
the estranged husband was arrested outside the apartment, none of the officers
who testified articulated any reason to believe that there were any other
victims or suspects inside the apartment, and none of the violence was reported
to have occurred inside the apartment. (>Ormonde, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 291-292.)

Ormonde
is easily distinguishable from the instant case. Here the alleged violence occurred inside
room 310 and, prior to entering the room, Deputy Hadley had not determined
whether the reported victim was in the room, or whether the alleged victim or
anyone else needed assistance. Accordingly,
we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Williams’s motion to suppress.

DISPOSITION

The
judgment is affirmed.