Filed 4/17/13 P. v. Salinas CA6
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IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MARK JAMES SALINAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
H038074
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. C1111922)
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Mark James
Salinas appeals from an order denying his motion under Penal Code section
1538.5, subdivision (m) to suppress controlled substances seized from his
person during a detention for a possible bicycle light infraction. Defendant contends that his detention was
unduly prolonged, resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the
under the circumstances. Accordingly, we
will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
City of San Jose Police Officers Dan Stromska and Andre Ribeiro were on foot patrol in
downtown San
Jose on
July 22, 2011. At approximately 9:39 p.m., they observed a group of five or six
individuals gathered in a semi-circle in an alcove by the Meriwest Building on First Street near Santa Clara Street. As
the officers approached the group, they observed defendant straddling a bicycle
with no lights, and an open container of alcohol right behind the group.
observed no lights on the bicycle or any type of device that could be used as a
light for the bicycle. Officer Ribeiro
observed the alcohol container to be within arm’s reach of three or four
members of the group, who were seated on the ground. The men told the officers that they were just
“hanging out.†After speaking with
defendant for a couple of minutes, Officer Stromska asked him to dismount his
bicycle and take a seat with the others in the group. Officer Stromska made this request because of
the bicycle light and open container violations, because defendant was a flight
risk on the bicycle, and because the two officers were outnumbered by the
group.
While the group
remained seated, the officers questioned each person separately. The officers asked each person for
identification, and whether he was on probation or parole defendant refused
Officer Ribeiro's request to search his backpack. The officers asked each person whether he was
carrying anything illegal, including weapons or anything that would stick or
poke them. The officers ran all members
of the group through dispatch to determine probation and parole status, and to
check for active warrants. Because of
heavy radio traffic that night, the officers used either the main channel or
the back-up channel. The officers
released most of the men after being informed by dispatch that they were not on
probation or parole. At some point,
everyone was allowed to leave except defendant and one other individual. The officers waited for dispatch to inform
them regarding defendant’s status before searching him or releasing him. Officer Ribeiro was about to conduct a pat
down search of defendant’s outer clothing when he was informed by dispatch that
defendant was on juvenile probation with search terms.
The
parties stipulated that nine to ten minutes elapsed between the time Officer
Ribeiro called defendant’s identifying information into dispatch and the time
he received notification that defendant was on active searchable
probation. After receiving this
information, Officer Ribeiro searched defendant and found two baggies in his
pocket, one containing methamphetamine and the other containing cocaine. The information further alleged one prior
strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
Defendant moved to
suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. The trial court relied on the computer-aided
dispatch (CAD) log to find that a detention of approximately 20 to 24 minutes
occurred in this case. The court noted
that the officers asked each person for identification, and whether he was on
probation or parole. The court further
noted that the officers explained that they were going to pat search everyone
for officer safety purposes, and they asked if anyone was carrying any weapons
or dangerous objects. The trial court
found that it would not be difficult for this serial inquiry to take ten
minutes given the number of individuals involved, and that such a detention was
not unreasonable. The trial court denied
the motion to suppress, concluding that defendant was detained for the bicycle
light infraction, but that the detention was reasonable, considering the
officers also were conducting an inquiry of the other members of the group for
the open container violation. The court
further concluded that the time it took dispatch to report back to Officer
Ribeiro regarding defendant’s probation status was also reasonable.
Defendant later
pleaded no contest to the three-count information and admitted the prior
juvenile strike. The trial court granted
defendant’s motion to dismiss the strike pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, and sentenced defendant to two years in
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of review
In reviewing a trial
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s factual
findings where supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591,
596-597.) However, we exercise
independent judgment to determine whether, on those facts, the
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at p. 597.)
B. Defendant’s detention was not unduly
prolonged
Defendant contends
that the trial court erred when it concluded that his detention was reasonable
and not unduly prolonged. According to
defendant, while his detention was initially lawful, it became unduly prolonged
because the officers were not diligent in investigating the possible bicycle
light infraction during the course of the detention. We disagree.
The temporary
detention of individuals during the stop of a motor vehicle by police
constitutes a “seizure†of “persons†within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, even though the detention is only for a brief period and for a
limited purpose. (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809-810.) A detention that is prolonged must be
supported by appropriate probable cause to be constitutionally valid. (Dunaway
v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 212.)
There is no set time limit beyond which a detention is automatically
deemed “unreasonably prolongedâ€; instead, each case must be judged on its
individual circumstances. (
Cal.App.3d 349, 358.) Police officers
may routinely run warrant checks on individuals detained for Vehicle Code
violations, provided the check does not unreasonably prolong the
detention. (People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 498.) Indeed, “[t]he government interest in
apprehending individuals with outstanding arrest warrants outweighs the minimal
inconvenience to that already lawfully experienced†by the detainee. (Ibid.) Police also may lawfully question a detainee
regarding his probation status during a routine traffic stop, and that questioning
does not constitute an improper general crime inquiry. (Id.,
at p. 499.) Rather, information
regarding a detainee’s probation status provides the officer with additional
pertinent information regarding the person being detained. (Ibid.)
Defendant was one of
five or six individuals fraternizing next to an open container of alcohol in
the downtown area of San Jose. It was
after dark, and defendant was straddling a bicycle without proper lighting
equipment. As part of their
investigation of the open container violation, as well as the investigation of
defendant for possible violation of Vehicle Code section 21201, the officers
directed all the men to remain seated on the ground. Each man was questioned individually
regarding his identity, and each man’s identifying information was run serially
through dispatch to determine his probation status, and to identify active
warrants. None of this was
improper. (Brown, supra, 62
Cal.App.4th at pp. 498-499.) Apparently,
defendant was at the end of the line so he incurred a longer wait than the
other individuals. But the mere order of
questioning does not itself make defendant’s detention less valid than that of
the individuals ahead of him in line. We
conclude that the detention of defendant while the officers questioned the
other individuals and then him--a period of 10 to 15 minutes--is not
unreasonable in this case. We further
conclude that the additional nine to 10 minute detention of defendant
attributable to dispatch obtaining warrant and probation information on a busy
Friday night also is not unreasonable.
Defendant relies on
577 and Williams v. Superior Court
(1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 349 to argue that his detention was unreasonable. In McGaughran, a police officer stopped a car going the
wrong way on a one-way street. The
officer never intended to cite the driver for the traffic infraction because
the road was confusing, it was common for drivers to make the same mistake, and
the officer’s practice was to issue warnings instead. (People
v. McGaughran, supra, at p.
585.) Nevertheless, after spending three
or four minutes with the defendant and his passenger, who both produced
identification to the officer, the officer continued to detain the two while dispatch
ran them both for warrants.
additional period of detention when the officer checked for arrest warrants
because it was not “reasonably necessary†to the process of handling the
traffic offense. (Id., at p. 587.)
In Williams, a police officer, suspecting that
the defendant was involved in recent robberies, stopped the defendant’s car
after he committed a traffic violation.
Although the officer promptly obtained all the information needed to
prepare a citation, he never commenced writing one. Instead, he began to interview the defendant
about the robberies and to investigate matters unrelated to the traffic
stop. The court held that the officer’s
investigation into the robberies unnecessarily extended the traffic detention. (Williams
v. Superior Court, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 359.) Williams
explained: “[t]he clear intent of McGaughran
is to preclude officers from imposing a general crime investigation upon the
detained traffic offender that is not ‘reasonably necessary’ to completion of
the officer’s traffic citation duties unless the officer has an independent
reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed unrelated offenses.†(Id., at p. 358.)
The present case is
distinguishable from both Williams
and McGaughran. In those cases, the police officer completed
his traffic investigation but continued to detain the defendant to investigate
matters unrelated to the initial detention.
Here, in contrast, Officers Ribeiro and Stromska were not detaining the
group, including defendant, after completing their investigation. Rather, in the course of their investigation,
the officers were lawfully confirming the identification and probation status
of all the men, and each man was promptly released after he was cleared. This inquiry did not constitute an unlawful
general crime investigation. (Brown,
supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p.
498.) Moreover, the fact that the
officers did not issue defendant a citation for the bicycle light infraction
does not make defendant’s detention unreasonable. The reasonable suspicion to detain defendant
was not negated by the officer's decision to abandon the investigation of the
Vehicle Code infraction after searching defendant and discovering contraband.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
____________________________________
GROVER,
J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
PREMO,
J., Acting P.J.
_________________________
MIHARA,
J.
Vehicle Code section 21201, subdivision
(d)(1) prohibits a person from operating a bicycle during darkness upon a
highway or a sidewalk without “[a] lamp emitting a white light that,
while the bicycle is in motion, illuminates the highway [or] sidewalk . . . in
front of the bicyclist and is visible from a distance of 300 feet in front and
from the sides of the bicycle.â€
San Jose Municipal Code section
10.12.010 prohibits the consumption of any alcoholic beverage on any public
street, sidewalk, alley, or highway within the city limits.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Because
we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the detention was not unduly
prolonged, we do not address the Attorney General’s alternative bases for
upholding the lawfulness of the probation search.
