P. v. Wolf
Filed 4/2/13 P. v. Wolf CA2/2
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DAVID WAYNE WOLF,
Defendant and Appellant.
B233289
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA063264)
APPEAL from a judgment of the
Superior Court of
County. Cynthia Rayvis, Judge. Affirmed.
Joy A.
Maulitz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Allison
H. Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
Appellant
David Wayne Wolf appeals from the judgment
of conviction following a jury trial in which he was convicted of one
felony count of grand theft auto (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1))
(count 1) and two felony counts of attempted carjacking (§§ 664/215, subd.
(a)) (counts 2 and 3). He was sentenced
to the middle term of two years six months on count 2, with the same sentence
on count 3 and the middle term of two years on count 1, both to run
concurrently. On the date of his
sentencing on November 19, 2008, he received 713 days of custody and work
credit.
Appellant contends the trial court
violated his due process rights by not
conducting a competency hearing
postverdict and prior to sentencing. We
disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
On July 24, 2007, prior to
trial, defense counsel declared a doubt as to appellant’s competency to assist
her, and stated that she had received an inconclusive psychologist’s
report. The trial court suspended
criminal proceedings and ordered another psychologist to examine appellant
pursuant to Evidence Code section 730.
On August 14, 2007, the trial court
found appellant incompetent to stand
trial based upon the two reports.
The court ordered the criminal proceedings to remain suspended and that
appellant be committed to Patton State Hospital until his competence was
restored. The court also ordered that
the hospital was authorized to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication
to appellant when and as prescribed by his treating psychiatrist.
Patton
State Hospital eventually declared appellant to be competent. On January 25, 2008, the trial court
approved the certificate of mental competence and reinstated
After the
jury was selected, on March 27, 2008, defense counsel submitted an emergency
request for a conference with a
appellant’s competence, but stated that she had witnesses present and was
willing to proceed. The court ordered
the trial to proceed. Later that day,
defense counsel informed the court that the psychologist had evaluated appellant
and found him to be competent.
Appellant
testified at trial, stating that on the date of the crimes he was hearing
voices, he believed that people could read his mind and he thought he was in a
“movie.†On April 4, 2008, the jury
found appellant guilty on all three counts.
On the
original date set for sentencing, April 21, 2008, defense counsel stated that
she did not believe appellant was able to assist in his defense, and asked to
continue sentencing. Appellant, however,
asked to be sentenced that day and to represent himself. After the trial court granted appellant’s
request to represent himself and appellant addressed the court, the court
declared a doubt as to appellant’s competence, suspended proceedings,
reappointed defense counsel to represent appellant, and appointed two
psychologists to evaluate appellant. In the
meantime, the court denied two more requests by appellant for
On
September 17, 2008, the trial court noted that both appointed psychologists had
found appellant competent. The court reinstated
proceedings and granted appellant’s request to represent himself.
On October
28, 2008, appellant appeared for sentencing.
He stated that he had been refusing medication, but that he was ready to
be sentenced. Both the prosecutor and
the trial court noted that appellant did not appear to be lucid or awake. The court noted that while two psychologists
had found appellant to be competent for sentencing, the court found that
appellant was not competent to represent himself at sentencing. The court revoked appellant’s pro per status,
reappointed defense counsel, and continued the sentencing hearing.
At the
continued sentencing hearing on November 19, 2008, defense counsel stated that
she had discussed sentencing options with appellant, who was adamant that he
wanted to be sentenced to prison and not to a treatment program. Defense counsel stated that she did not join
in appellant’s request and that appellant “is, in fact, competent, though he
might be mentally ill.†The court then
proceeded to sentencing.
DISCUSSION
Appellant
contends the trial court violated his state and federal due process rights by
failing to conduct a competency hearing prior to his sentencing. We disagree.
I. Applicable Law.
“Trial of
an incompetent defendant violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the
States Constitution [citation] and article I, section 15 of the California
Constitution. Those protections are
implemented by statute in California.†(
1281.) “Our state statute provides that
a person is mentally incompetent to stand trial if, as a result of mental
disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the
nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a
defense in a rational manner.
(§ 1367.)†(
737; § 1367, subd. (a).) The right
to be both physically and mentally present extends through sentencing. (§ 977, subd. (b); People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 157; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847 [“The court’s duty to
conduct a competency hearing may arise at any time prior to judgmentâ€].)
“‘When the
accused presents substantial evidence of incompetence, due process requires
that the trial court conduct a full competency hearing.’†(People
v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1063.)
Substantial evidence is “evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide
doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial.†(People
v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 952.) “Evidence of incompetence may emanate from
several sources, including the defendant’s demeanor, irrational behavior, and
prior mental evaluations.
[Citations.] But to be entitled
to a competency hearing, ‘a defendant must exhibit more than
. . . a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little
bearing on the question . . . whether the defendant can assist
his defense counsel.’†(
p. 847.) If the evidence is not
substantial, “[i]t is within the discretion of the trial judge whether to order
a competence hearing.†(
p. 742.) “A trial court’s decision
whether or not to hold a competence hearing is entitled to deference, because
the court has the opportunity to observe the defendant during trial.†(People
v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847.)
“‘“When a competency hearing has
already been held and defendant has been found competent to stand trial,
however, a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second
competency hearing unless it ‘is presented with a substantial change of
circumstances or with new evidence’ casting a serious doubt on the validity of
that finding. [Citations.]â€â€™â€ (People
v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 864, quoting People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 542–543.)
II. The Evidence Did Not Require Another
Competency Hearing.
Appellant argues that the following
factors constitute substantial evidence that a competency hearing should have
been conducted prior to his sentencing:
(1) Both the trial court and the prosecutor noted that appellant did not
appear to be lucid or awake at the presentencing hearing on October 28, 2008;
(2) appellant stated at the October 28, 2008 hearing, against his own interest,
that he was willing to submit to the maximum sentence, and made misstatements
at the hearing; (3) the trial court had been informed at least three times
after the verdict that appellant was on suicide watch at the jail; (4) the
trial court knew that appellant was suffering from “a major mental illness†and
that he was currently refusing his medications; and (5) a psychologist had
testified at trial that appellant was a paranoid schizophrenic with bipolar
disorder and did not appear to be malingering.
We find appellant’s arguments unpersuasive.
28, 2008 Hearing
The prosecutor’s statement at the
October 28, 2008, presentence hearing that “I’m not quite sure the defendant is
awake or is lucid at the time. It looks
like he’s go [sic] ready to go to sleep,†was not a change in circumstance
casting doubt on the previous finding of competency. The prosecutor’s statement merely indicated
that appellant appeared drowsy. Although
appellant had stated that he was refusing his medication, the trial court
observed that appellant appeared to be medicated based on his drowsiness in
court: “I asked Mr. Wolf if he was
medicated because he appears to be medicated.â€
“[T]the mere fact that the petitioner was taking medications during his
trial does not raise a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to his competence to
v. Rice (C.D. Cal. 1998) 5 F.Supp.2d 854, 864 [citing Sturgis v. Goldsmith (9th Cir. 1986) 796 F.2d 1103, 1109–1110
[failure to present evidence of medication petitioner was taking or “how [the
medication] might have affected his competence at trial†did not raise a bona
fide doubt as to the petitioner’s competency to stand trial];
F.3d 1199, 1251–1252 [finding no substantial evidence of incompetence where
trial court commented on defendant’s sleepiness apparently caused by
medication].) In any event, appellant
thereafter participated in the proceedings and answered the court’s
questions.
Appellant next asserts that he
miscalculated the maximum term of imprisonment at the October 28, 2008
hearing. But he made clear that his
calculation was based on “what [he] read in the Penal Code book.†As the People note, this shows that appellant
had the presence of mind to read the Penal Code in preparation for his
sentencing hearing. Appellant also
points to his statement, in response to the trial court’s revocation of his right
to self-representation, “I object to this on the grounds that of [sic]
violation of time restraints before trial, I wasn’t able to file the
paperwork.†The court then pointed out
that trial had already taken place. A
defendant’s lack of technical legal knowledge is irrelevant to any competency
inquiry. (See People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 718.) And appellant had coherently responded to the
trial court’s question of whether he wanted a lawyer: “The
Court: Mr. Wolf, are you sure you
don’t want to have a lawyer? [¶] The
Defendant: Positive.â€
Appellant also argues that his
“self-defeating behavior†of stating that he was willing to accept the maximum
term of imprisonment was new evidence casting doubt on the trial court’s prior
finding of competency. We reject this
argument. “[A] possibly self-destructive
emotional approach to self-representation does not equate to substantial
evidence of incompetence to stand trial.â€
(People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42
Cal.4th 379, 406; see also People v. Lewis
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 526 [“a defendant’s preference for the death penalty
does not invariably demonstrate incompetenceâ€]; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 718 [“we have
rejected the notion that a defendant’s choice not to present a defense, even at
the penalty phase, amounts to substantial evidence of incompetenceâ€].) If anything, appellant’s willingness to
receive the maximum term of imprisonment indicated his awareness of wrongdoing: “I’m ready to accept everything that’s coming
to me.â€
Watch
Appellant also asserts that being
on suicide watch at the jail was a new circumstance alerting the trial court
that he was no longer competent. But on
September 17, 2008, appellant expressly told the trial court that he was not
suicidal: “Now, the situation is I am in
county jail, they have me on suicidal watch, but I am not suicidal. I told them I would sue them, because they
had to protect me.†Additionally, our Supreme
Court has found that evidence of a defendant’s “death wish†and planned suicide
attempt do not amount to substantial evidence of incompetence requiring a
competency hearing. (See
508–511.)
C.
Appellant
also points out that he was suffering from a major mental illness and that a
psychologist had testified at trial that he was a paranoid schizophrenic with
bipolar disorder and did not appear to be malingering. But “even a history of serious mental illness
does not necessarily constitute substantial evidence of incompetence that would
require a court to declare a doubt concerning a defendant’s competence and to
conduct a hearing on that issue.†(
p. 714; People v. Ramos, supra, 34
Cal.4th at pp. 508–511 [defendant’s death wish, history of psychiatric
treatment, planned suicide attempt, propensity for violence, and psychiatric
testimony that defendant was physically abused as a child and suffered from a
paranoid personality disorder did not constitute substantial evidence of
incompetence requiring court to conduct a competency hearing].)
Appellant
asserts that certain of his own testimony at trial was “nonsensical and
disturbing.†Even assuming appellant is
correct that his testimony indicated some form of
Court has repeatedly recognized that “more is required to raise a doubt than
mere bizarre actions [citation] or bizarre statements
[citation]. . . .’†(
at p. 403, quoting People v.
Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 285.)
Despite his own testimony and the
other factors discussed above, the record does not show that appellant lacked
an understanding of the nature of the proceedings or the ability to assist in
his defense. (People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1064.) Accordingly, we are satisfied the evidence
was insufficient to require a reexamination of appellant’s competency before
proceeding with sentencing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________________,
J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
_______________________________, P. J.
BOREN
_______________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.
We
granted appellant’s request for relief from default for failure to file a
timely notice of appeal. It would appear
that appellant has finished serving his sentence by now. However, because he raises constitutional
challenges, we reach the merits of his appeal.
