In
re Alvin N.





Filed
2/26/13 In re Alvin N.
CA2/3



>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

>

>

California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115



IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION
THREE




>

In re Alvin N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	B242520 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. JJ17422)
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alvin N., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tamara Hall, Judge.
Affirmed.



Arielle
Bases, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.



No
appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.



Defendant
and appellant Alvin N. appeals from the order
of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) entered following the juvenile
court’s revocation of deferred entry of judgment (Welf. & Inst. Code, §
790) which had been ordered following Alvin N.’s admission that he committed
the felony of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). Alvin N. was placed at home on probation with
a maximum confinement time of six years.
We affirm the trial court’s order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Facts.href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]

On September 30, 2009, witnesses observed Alvin N. and three
companions park a white van in front of the victims’ residence. Alvin N. was in the front passenger
seat. He was later seen carrying items
from the rear of the victims’ residence and passing them over a fence to one of
his companions. His companion then
carried the items to the van, where yet another companion was acting as a
lookout. After the van had been loaded
with items, Alvin N. and his companions returned to the vehicle.

In the meantime, a witness to Alvin
N.’s and his companions’ activities had called the police. Before they could leave the scene, officers
arrived and detained Alvin N. and his cohorts.


One of the officers discovered that
the bars had been pried open and a screen removed from one window, which had
then been used as a point of entry to the house. In addition, officers discovered that the
van, which was being driven by one of Alvin N.’s companions, had been reported
stolen. The van had a broken driver’s
side window and the key in the ignition did not fit. In the back of the van, officers found
numerous items such as keyboards, computers, speakers, an “Xbox” and controller and an audio mixer.

Alvin N. and his companions were
transported to the 77th Street
Station for booking, then taken to Los Padrinos.

When they returned home from work
on that day, police officers were still at the victims’ residence. When the victims went inside, they observed
that their house had been ransacked, that the bars on one window had been pried
open and that a trash can had been placed under the window.

2.
Procedural history.

On October
30, 2009, a petition
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602 was filed alleging that, on or about September 3, 2009, 16-year-old Alvin N. committed first
degree residential burglary in violation of Penal
Code section 459, a felony.

At proceedings held on March 8, 2010, the district attorney
indicated that an agreement for disposition of the matter had been
reached. If Alvin N. admitted committing
the alleged burglary, the People would defer entry of href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">judgment.
The juvenile court then addressed Alvin N., stating, “You know what your
responsibilities are. [¶] The [district attorney] is going to advise
you of your rights. If you admit this
matter and I accept it, you go on deferred entry of judgment, which means
you’re on probation for a year. If you
do good and you obey [your probation officer] . . . you will have no felony on
your record and that will be vitally important to you later on when you’re
planning to go to Harvard or someplace . . . .”

Alvin N. indicated that he
understood and was waiving his right to a “juvenile adjudication,” his right to
confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him, his right to use the subpoena power of the court at no
cost to him to bring in his own witnesses, his right to put on a defense and
his right to remain silent. The
prosecutor then explained to Alvin N. that “deferred entry of judgment” was “an
informal [one year] probation” where he would be required to follow, and in
some instances complete, all of the terms required by the court. If he completed all of those terms, the case
against him would be dismissed. If he
did not fulfill all of the terms, the court could extend the period of
probation for up to three years. The
prosecutor continued, “If you fail to complete deferred entry of judgment,
there are . . . consequences . . . .
[Y]ou can be placed home on [formal] probation[,] . . . [or you could
be] placed in a foster home, away from the care of your family . . . [or you
could be] placed in juvenile hall, and last of all, you [could] be placed in
camp community placement. [¶]
What that means is [you would be in] a lockdown facility in which you
[would] have to follow the terms of probation and the terms the court gives
you, and follow what the people [at] the camp tell you.”

The prosecutor indicated that, if
Alvin N. failed to complete the requirements for a deferred entry of judgment,
judgment would be entered against him and he would be required to pay a fine in
an amount somewhere between $100 and $1,000, and to reimburse the victims for
any damages they may have suffered as a result of his and his companions’
conduct.

After he indicated that he
understood that the “maximum [period of] confinement on this case could be six
years” and he was “freely and voluntarily” admitting commission of the crime,
Alvin N. admitted having committed the crime of first degree residential
burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459, a felony. Both defense counsel and the prosecutor
joined in the waivers of rights, concurred in the admission and stipulated to a
factual basis for the plea. The juvenile
court accepted the plea and placed Alvin N. on “Welfare [and] Institutions Code
section 790 probation.” The juvenile
court then listed for Alvin N. the conditions of his probation.

In a probation officer’s report
dated July 6, 2010, the
officer indicated that Alvin N.’s “conduct under probation supervision
[had been] marginal to poor.” The
officer indicated that “[r]esidential care [could] be required.” In a report dated October 6, 2010, the probation officer indicated
there had been some improvement in Alvin N.’s behavior. The officer stated, “The minor’s overall
progress under probation supervision is fair at this time. [He] has reported as [instructed] and
refrained from any further negative contact with law enforcement officials . .
. .” The officer recommended that the
previous terms of probation remain in full force and effect and that the matter
remain on the appearance calendar.
However, in a probation report issued on January 4, 2011, the officer indicated that Alvin N. had
“a bench warrant issued by Department 264.”
When, after he was detained he was questioned by the probation officer,
Alvin N. indicated that he “use[d] drugs, [drank] alcohol and participate[d] in
gang activity.” He stated that he
belonged to the “Athens Park Blood Gang” and that his moniker was
“ ‘Smiley.’ ”

In a probation officer’s report
filed March 3, 2011, the officer indicated that, on December 20, 2010, a
petition had been filed alleging that Alvin N. possessed for sale a controlled
substance, Xanax, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11374,
subdivision (b)(1). After being booked
and cited for the offense, Alvin N. was released to the custody of his father.

Following Alvin N.’s arrest for
possession of a controlled substance, his probation officer reported that,
although Alvin N.’s conduct was not sophisticated, it “demonstrate[d] a
[certain] level of escalating delinquency” which should concern the court. This was particularly so because Alvin N. was
a documented gang member who previously had admitted smoking marijuana. The probation officer continued, indicating
that this arrest placed Alvin N. in violation of the terms of his probation and
showed a “blatant disregard for the instructions of the court and the Probation
Department.” The probation officer
recommended that Alvin N.’s status as one whose entry of judgment had been
deferred be revoked, that the matter proceed to disposition and that Alvin N.
“be made a ward of the court under [section] 602 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code.” Finally, the probation officer
recommended that Alvin N. “be detained in Juvenile Hall for 30 days[.]”

A later probation report, filed April 24, 2012, indicated that Alvin
N. had been arrested in October 2011 for tailgating in violation of Vehicle
Code section 21703 and arrested again in
December 2011 for driving with a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code, §
14601.1, subd. (a)). In addition, Alvin
N. had completed only eight of the 50 hours of community service which had
been ordered by the court and had “shown
no further progress.”

Alvin N.’s case regarding the
deferred entry of judgment entered after his admission that he had committed
first degree residential burglary was set for a hearing before the juvenile
court on May 17, 2012. However, when Alvin N. failed to appear
without a sufficient excuse, a warrant for his arrest was issued and the matter
was set to be heard on May 24, 2012.

Alvin N., who was at that time over
18 years of age, appeared before the juvenile court on May 24, 2012.
He was accompanied by his counsel and his sister. The juvenile court indicated that Alvin N.’s
progress report indicated that he was, at that time, on probation in adult court. In addition, there was a warrant outstanding
for his arrest in the Compton
court. In view of these circumstances,
the juvenile court indicated that the deferred entry of judgment which had been
ordered on March 8, 2010 was
to be revoked and the petition sustained.
When Alvin N.’s counsel then requested a “disposition hearing,” the
juvenile court stated: “[W]e don’t need
a disposition here. It is within the
court’s discretion whether or not [the] minor remains on 790. This petition was [filed in] October
2009. The minor admitted on March [8,]
2010 and during this period of time he has not done what was required of him,
and in the interim, he picked up an adult case.” The juvenile court continued, “Deferred entry
of judgment is revoked at this time. . . . The petition is found true [and] is
sustained. [Alvin N.] falls within . . .
section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.”

When Alvin N.’s counsel continued
to insist that Alvin N. was entitled to a dispositional hearing, the juvenile
court responded, “Counsel, the court has ruled.
This petition is a sustained petition.
[Alvin N.] was on 790. It is . .
. within the court’s discretion to revoke 790.
[Alvin N.] has been on deferred entry of judgment for two years and
during [that] time he [has] picked up one petition and an adult matter, and he
is now on adult supervision.” The
juvenile court then declared Alvin N. “a ward of the court pursuant to section
602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code” and indicated that his “care,
custody[,] . . . control and conduct [were thereby] placed under the
supervision of the Probation Department.”
The court, however, allowed Alvin N. to “remain in the home of his
parents” although the conditions “of probation [previously]
ordered . . . [were to] remain in full force and effect.” The court then added a condition, that
Alvin N. provide a DNA sample.

After the court made its ruling,
Alvin N.’s counsel requested that it re-open the matter so that she could make
a record regarding Alvin’s
entitlement to a hearing during which he could contest the court’s finding that
Alvin N. had violated the terms of the deferred entry of judgment. The juvenile court obliged and allowed
counsel to argue that, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.580, Alvin
N. had a right to a dispositional hearing.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">>[2] The juvenile court responded, “Counsel, the
disposition was 790 with the understanding that if your client [did] not
successfully complete 790, then [it could] be revoked. It was revoked. It is within the court’s discretion, and the
matter proceeds to home on probation.”
In addition, the juvenile court noted that “[t]he recommendation of
probation was to terminate juvenile jurisdiction because [Alvin N.] ha[d]
an adult matter. That [was] the
recommendation.” The court, however,
decided not to terminate “juvenile jurisdiction because, one, the minor has not
complied with all the conditions of his probation, and as indicated, 790 was
the disposition. [Alvin N.] was advised
that it [was] a program that [would] last three years. It is within the court’s discretion to revoke
the program. In this case, the court
exercised its discretion to revoke 790, because one, the minor is on informal
probation [on] a matter out of Compton,
a misdemeanor matter. [In addition,
Alvin N.] has been on deferred entry of judgment since March of 2010,
and . . . has had two years to this date to comply, and he did
not and has not complied. Instead, he
has picked up an adult case and it is for those reasons that [this] court [has]
exercised its discretion, revoked [Alvin N.’s] 790 [status], and proceeded with
home on probation.”

On May
31, 2012, Alvin N. filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial
court’s May 24, 2012
ruling. In the notice of appeal, Alvin
N. indicated that he was appealing from the juvenile court’s “[h]ome on
[p]robation [o]rder after [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 790
revocation.” Alvin N. asserted that he
was “denied [his] right to [a] disposition hearing pursuant to [Welfare and
Institutions Code section] 793.”href="#_ftn3"
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3]

>CONTENTIONS

After examination of the record,
appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief which raised no issues and
requested this court to conduct an independent review of the record.

By notice filed November 20, 2012, the clerk of this court
advised Alvin N. to submit within 30 days any contentions, grounds of appeal or
arguments he wished this court to consider.
No response has been received to date.

>REVIEW ON APPEAL

We have examined the entire record
and are satisfied counsel has complied fully with counsel’s
responsibilities. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278-284; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443.)



>DISPOSITION

The order of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602)
is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS











ALDRICH,
J.



We concur:



KLEIN, P. J.









KITCHING, J.