P. v. Meeks





















Filed 3/21/13 P. v. Meeks CA2/1

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>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.







IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION
ONE




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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHARON MEEKS, Defendant and Appellant.

B231385 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA373050)

APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Los Angeles
County. Craig E. Veals and Alex
Ricciardulli, Judges. Conditionally
reversed and remanded with directions.

Ann Bergen,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Chung L. Mar and Erika D.
Jackson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.







__________________________________

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Sharon
Meeks appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted her of href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">simple possession of a controlled substance
(cocaine base). (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11350.) After Meeks waived her href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">right to jury trial on prior conviction
allegations, the trial court found true that Meeks had suffered eight prior
prison term convictions within the meaning of Penal Codehref="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">>[1]
section 667.5, subdivision (b), and had suffered one prior serious or violent
felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes Law (§§ 667, subds.
(b)-(1) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
The court sentenced Meeks to eight years and eight months in prison: the
low term of 16 months for the offense, doubled under the Three Strikes Law,
plus six years for six prior prison term convictions.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">>[2] The court awarded Meeks href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">custody credit of 247 days and conduct
credit of 122 days.

Meeks
contends she is entitled to additional presentence conduct credits under the
October 2011 amendment to section 4019, arguing the amendment should be applied
retroactively to her sentence under principles of href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">equal protection of the law. Applying Supreme Court precedent, >People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314,
330, we reject Meeks’s contention.

Meeks also
asks this court to review the record of the in camera hearing on her >Pitchess motion. (Pitchess
v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.)
We conditionally reverse the judgment and remand the matter because the
record demonstrates Meeks was entitled to disclosure of additional discoverable
information.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"
title="">>[3]

DISCUSSION

Conduct Credits

Meeks’s
commitment offense occurred on June
29, 2010. She was sentenced
on March 2, 2011. At the time of her offense, Meeks was
entitled under former section 4019 to two days of conduct credit for every four
days actually served. The trial court
correctly awarded Meeks 122 days of conduct credit based on her 247 days of
actual custody credit.

Effective October 1, 2011, section 4019 was
amended to provide two days of conduct credit for every two days of actual
custody credit. (§ 4019, subd. (f) [“a
term of four days will be deemed to have been served for every two days spent
in actual custody”].) The amended
statute provides: “The changes to this section . . . shall apply prospectively
and shall apply to prisoners who are confined to a county jail, city jail,
industrial farm, or road camp for a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011.” (§ 4019, subd. (h).) Despite this express statement of prospective
application, Meeks contends the amendment should be applied retroactively to
her sentence under principles of equal protection of the law.

Our Supreme
Court rejected this equal protection argument in People v. Brown, supra,
54 Cal.4th 314 (Brown), in deciding
whether an earlier amendment to section 4019 “should be given retroactive
effect so as to permit prisoners who served time in local custody before that
date to earn conduct credits at the increased rate provided for by that
amendment due to a state fiscal emergency.”
(People v. Ellis (2012) 207
Cal.App.4th 1546, 1550.) The >Brown Court
explained “the important correctional purposes of a statute authorizing
incentives for good behavior [citation] are not served by rewarding prisoners
who served time before the incentives took effect and thus could not have
modified their behavior in response.
That prisoners who served time before and after former section 4019 took
effect are not similarly situated necessarily follows.” (Brown,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp.
328-329.) The Supreme Court held the
equal protection clauses of the federal and California Constitutions did not
require retroactive application of the amendment. (Id.
at p. 318.)

Meeks’s
attempt to distinguish Brown
fails. She argues Brown relates to “temporal distinctions based on the enactment of
statutes,” while her equal protection argument relates to “a distinction based
on the date that the crime occurred.”
Meeks’s argument is a distinction without a difference. (See People
v. Ellis, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1550, 1552 [applying Brown in
rejecting the defendant’s equal protection argument that “the October 1, 2011,
amendment [to § 4019] created two identically situated classes of prisoners:
those who earn conduct credits at the enhanced rate because their crimes
occurred on or after October 1, 2011, and those (like defendant) who do not
earn conduct credits at the enhanced rate because their crimes occurred before
that date”].)

Pitchess Motion

Meeks filed a >Pitchess motion, requesting pretrial
discovery of personnel records of four Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
officers. In her motion, Meeks asserted
the officers lied about the conduct which led to her arrest and filed a false
police report. Meeks sought records
relating to dishonesty and false statements.
The trial court granted her motion.
On October 8, 2010,
the court conducted an in camera hearing and ordered discoverable material to
be disclosed to Meeks. Meeks requests an
independent review of the in camera proceedings to determine whether the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in ordering disclosure of discoverable
material. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228-1232.)

During
preparation of the appellate record in this matter, the court reporter
indicated she did not have notes from the in camera hearing on Meeks’s >Pitchess motion and could not prepare a
transcript. Meeks filed a motion with
this court, requesting an order requiring the trial court to settle the record
regarding the in camera hearing on her Pitchess
motion. We granted Meeks’s motion
and issued the requested order. On May 3, 2012, the trial court held an
in camera hearing to settle the record.
The reporter’s transcript from that hearing was filed under seal with
this court.

We have
reviewed the sealed transcript from the May
3, 2012 hearing, which provides a description of the records the
trial court reviewed at the October 8,
2010 in camera hearing on the Pitchess
motion as to each of the four officers, and indicates the records ordered
disclosed to Meeks. We noted a potential
discrepancy or inconsistency in the sealed transcript regarding whether certain
information was ordered disclosed or not disclosed to Meeks at the time of the
October 8, 2010 Pitchess
hearing. We ordered the trial court to
settle the record regarding the potential discrepancy or inconsistency in the
reporter’s transcript from the May 3, 2012 hearing. On January 30, 2013, the trial court held an
in camera hearing to settle the record.
The reporter’s transcript from that hearing was filed under seal with
this court. After reviewing the sealed
transcripts from the May 3, 2012 and January 30, 2013 hearings, we conclude the
trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering discoverable material
to be disclosed to Meeks at the October 8, 2010 hearing on the >Pitchess motion.

During the
May 3, 2012 hearing to settle the record, LAPD informed the trial court of an
additional complaint regarding Officer Diaz which was not produced at the time
of the October 8, 2010 hearing on Meeks’s Pitchess
motion but falls within the scope of records required to be produced. The trial court reviewed the complaint,
provided a description and stated for the record it would have disclosed the
information to Meeks if it had been aware of it at the time of the October 8,
2010 hearing on her Pitchess
motion. The complaint was about alleged
false statements regarding the complainant’s arrest.

We remand
the matter and direct the trial court to order the additional discoverable
material regarding Officer Diaz identified at the May 3, 2012 hearing to be
disclosed to Meeks. Thereafter, the
court shall allow Meeks an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice and shall order
a new trial if there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been
different had the information been disclosed.
If, after a reasonable time, Meeks has failed to demonstrate prejudice,
the court shall reinstate the judgment.
(People v. Hustead (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 410, 419, 422-423.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is conditionally
reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to order the
additional discoverable material regarding Officer Diaz identified at the May
3, 2012 hearing to be disclosed to Meeks.
After such disclosure, the

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trial court shall allow Meeks an opportunity to demonstrate
prejudice, and order a new trial if prejudice is demonstrated. If prejudice is not demonstrated, the trial
court shall reinstate the original judgment.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.





CHANEY,
J.



We concur:







MALLANO,
P. J.







JOHNSON,
J.