Filed
3/25/13 P. v. Knight CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MANUEL JOSHUA KNIGHT,
Defendant and Appellant.
F062043
(Super.
Ct. No. SF15648A)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of
Jessie
Morris, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and Tiffany
J. Gates, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
In July of
2010, an information was filed charging appellant Manuel Joshua Knight in count
1 of battery against a custodial officer
causing injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(1))
in count 2 of battery against a custodial officer (§ 243.1); and in count
3 of resisting an executive officer by threats or violence (§ 69). In November of 2010, a jury was impaneled to
try the case, but after the jury was unable to reach a verdict on any of the
counts, a mistrial declared.
On January
27, 2011, following a second jury trial, appellant was found guilty in count 1
of the lesser offense of battery on a peace officer without injury (§ 243,
subd. (b)) a misdemeanor; in count 2 of battery against a custodial officer
(§ 243.1), a felony; and in count 3 of the lesser offense of resisting or
obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), a misdemeanor.
The trial
court denied probation and sentenced Knight to
for the felony offense, and to 90 days in county jail for each of the
misdemeanor convictions, to be served concurrently with the prison
sentence.
On appeal,
we agree with Knight’s contentions that he was improperly convicted of battery
upon a custodial officer in violation of section 243.1, and that the section
654 prohibition against multiple punishment for offenses arising from the same
transaction barred separate punishments for misdemeanor battery of a peace
officer and resisting a peace officer.
We disagree with his claim that exclusion of his grandmother from the
courtroom violated his constitutional right
to a public trial. We remand for
resentencing.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mid-morning
on May 10, 2010, Tracy Wright, a detention deputy with the Kern County
Sheriff’s Department, was on duty at the Lerdo Pre-Trial Facility when she was
called to respond to E Pod. Deputy
Wright had been a detention deputy for approximately 11 years, and her duties
included supervising and maintaining the safety and security of the inmates. At the time of the incident in question,
Deputy Wright was wearing a standard sheriff’s uniform and was not armed. When Deputy Wright arrived at E Pod, another
deputy placed appellant Knight in her custody and instructed her to escort him
to a holding cell in “receiving,†a holding area for inmates being brought in
or taken out of the facility.
When Deputy
Wright and Knight arrived at receiving, Knight turned toward the releasing area
and said he was going to be released.
Deputy Wright told him “no,†and tightened her grip on his arm to turn
him back toward the holding cell area.
As Deputy Wright did this, Knight turned suddenly towards her and
“headbutted†her. Deputy Wright was
dizzy and lightheaded, but was able to push Knight against a nearby wall, where
both fell down onto the concrete floor.
Deputy Wright fell on her back, hit her head on the concrete floor, and
lost consciousness. Knight fell
face-down on top of her.
Detention
Deputy Carlos Quiroz, the supervisor on duty in the receiving area that
morning, saw Knight fall on top of Deputy Wright. He then announced a “Code Red,†or
inmate-officer fight, over the radio and ran over to pull Knight off of Deputy
Wright. Eight to 10 other detention
deputies responded, including Detention Deputy Kalae Paxson, who pulled Deputy
Wright away from Knight as he was struggling with Deputy Quiroz.
When Deputy
Wright regained consciousness, she was disoriented and confused and her eyes
glazed over. When she attempted to pull
herself up on a nearby table, she became nauseated and began vomiting. She also experienced severe pain in the front
and back of her head, dizziness, and blurred vision. Both Deputies Quiroz and Paxson saw a red
mark on Deputy Wright’s forehead.
On May 18,
2010, Deputy Quiroz contacted appellant Knight to discuss the events of May 10,
2010. Deputy Quiroz read Knight his
which he waived. According to Knight,
after Deputy Wright escorted him to receiving, Knight did not know where to go,
so he turned to Deputy Wright, startling her and causing her to fall to the
ground. Knight denied head-butting
Deputy Wright and denied making any contact with her with his own body.
At trial,
Knight claimed that, when he and Deputy Wright arrived at “receiving,†he
turned to look around and, when he did so, Deputy Wright told him to go to the
ground. Knight complied by getting down
on his knees and lying on his stomach.
Approximately six officers then ran in, beat him up with their feet,
knees and elbows, and took him to the infirmary. Knight was not certain whether Deputy Wright
was one of the deputies who beat him up, nor could he identify any of his
alleged attackers.
Knight
denied head-butting Deputy Wright, striking any part of her with any part of
his body, lunging at her, running from her, or trying to turn away from
her. Knight testified that Deputy Wright
did not pull or push him in any direction, but she did apply some physical
force to get him to the ground. Knight
did not recall coming into contact with the wall, nor did he see Deputy Wright
come in contact with the wall. Knight
did not know how Deputy Wright sustained the injuries described at trial, and
he did not see her vomiting. Knight
sustained no injuries as a result of the incident.
When he was
later interviewed about this incident, Knight claimed never to have touched
Deputy Wright and that his body was never on top of her. Knight denied saying that he was “going homeâ€
when he and Deputy Wright first arrived in the receiving area, and he also
denied resisting any deputies.
DISCUSSION
I.
WAS KNIGHT IMPROPERLY CONVICTED OF BATTERY UPON A
CUSTODIAL OFFICER UNDER SECTION 243.1?
Knight
claims that his conviction of battery upon a custodial officer under section
243.1, was improper and must be reversed.
Knight essentially argues that he was wrongly charged and tried under
section 243.1 because the victim of the battery,
Deputy Wright, was a peace officer and not a “custodial officer†as defined by
section 831, subdivision (a).
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] Respondent agrees, and we accept the
concession.
Knight
was charged in count 2 with a violation of section 243.1, which provides, in
relevant part:
“When a battery is committed against the person of a
custodial officer as defined in Section 831 of the Penal Code, and the person
committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a
custodial officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, the offense
shall be punished by imprisonment .…â€
By its
terms, section 243.1 is specifically limited in scope to batteries committed
against “custodial officers†as defined in section 831. Section 831, in turn, defines a “custodial
officer†as “[1] a public officer, not a
peace officer, [2] employed by a law enforcement agency of a city or county
[3] who has the authority and responsibility for maintaining custody of
prisoners and performs tasks related to the operation of a local detention
facility .…†(§ 831, subd.
(a), italics added; see also People v.
Garcia (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 887, 894.)
Only if Deputy Wright herself came under the specific definition of a
“custodial officer†as set forth in section 831 can the conviction under
section 243.1 be sustained.
Deputy
Wright testified that she was a detention deputy with the Kern County Sheriff’s
Department. Deputy Wright had been a
detention deputy for approximately 11 years, and her duties included
supervising and maintaining the safety and security of the inmates.
Deputy
Wright clearly satisfies the first part of the first element required under
section 831. Under the California
Constitution, the term “public officer†includes
“every officer and employee of the State, including the
University of California, every county, city, city and county, district, and
authority, including any department, division, bureau, board, commission,
agency, or instrumentality of any of the foregoing.†(Cal. Const., art. XX, § 3.)
Since Deputy Wright was an employee of the Kern County
Sheriff’s Office, she was a “public officer.â€
However,
Deputy Wright does not satisfy the second part of the first element required
under section 831, because she was also a “peace officer†within the definition
of section 830.1, subdivision (c), which provides in relevant part,
“[a]ny deputy sheriff of the County of … Kern … who is
employed to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to custodial
assignments with responsibilities for maintaining the operations of county
custodial facilities, including the custody, care, supervision, security,
movement, and transportation of inmates, is a peace officer .…†(§ 830.1, subd. (c).)
Looking at the specific statutes at issue, section 831 makes
clear that, although all custodial officers may be public officers, not all
public officers are custodial officers.
In
1212 (Rochelle B.)
the juvenile court sustained a wardship petition, finding true the allegation
that the minor committed battery on a custodial officer under section
243.1. (Rochelle B., supra, at p. 1215.)
The minor challenged the finding on appeal, contending that a juvenile
probation counselor was not a “custodial officer†within the meaning of
sections 243.1 and 831. (
The Court of Appeal agreed, explaining that, under sections 830 and
830.5, any juvenile hall counselor is a “peace officer.†Because section 831 expressly excludes peace
officers from the definition of a “custodial officer,†section 831 eliminated
the possibility that a juvenile hall counselor could be considered a custodial
officer. (Rochelle B., supra, at p. 1221.)
The court concluded that it was error to charge the juvenile with
battery on a custodial officer under section 243.1, and it was error for the
juvenile court to sustain the allegations of the wardship petition. (Rochelle
B., supra, at p. 1222.)
Here, too,
because Deputy Wright comes within the definition of “peace officer,†she is
precluded from being a “custodial officer†under section 831, and the section
243.1 conviction must be reversed. (
1129.)
II. WAS
KNIGHT IMPROPERLY CONVICTED OF BATTERY ON A PEACE OFFICER AND RESISTING A PEACE
OFFICER?
Knight
further argues that his convictions in counts 1 and 3 must also be reversed
because the verdicts in those counts allowed the jury to find that Deputy
Wright was a peace officer, while the verdict in count 2 relied on a finding
that Deputy Wright was a custodial officer – mutually exclusive officer
classifications which created inconsistent verdicts. Knight was convicted in count 1 of the lesser
misdemeanor offense of battery on a peace officer without injury (§ 243,
subd. (b)), and in count 3 of the lesser misdemeanor offense of resisting or
obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). Respondent disagrees, as do we.
A violation
of section 243, subdivision (b), as alleged in count 1, occurs when “a battery
is committed against the person of a peace officer, [or] custodial officer …
engaged in the performance of his or her duties .…†(§ 243, subd. (b).) The distinction between Deputy Wright’s
status as a peace officer or a custodial officer is immaterial for purposes of
a violation of section 243, subdivision (b).
Under that statute, the elements of the crime and the punishment that
may be imposed are the same, regardless of whether the victim is a peace
officer or a custodial officer. Be that
as it may, the jury was instructed that, in order to find Knight guilty of the
lesser included offense to count 2, the People had to prove, inter alia, that
Deputy Wright “was a peace officer performing the duties of a detention
deputy .…†In addition, the jury
was instructed that “[a] person employed by the Kern County Sheriff’s
Department is a peace officer if she is employed to perform duties exclusively
or initially relating to custodial assignments with responsibilities for
maintaining the operation of county custodial facilities.â€
A violation
of section 148, subdivision (a)(1), as alleged in count 3, occurs when a person
“willfully resists, delays or obstructs any public officer, peace officer … in
the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or
employment .…†(§ 148, subd.
(a)(1).) The jury was instructed that,
in order to find Knight guilty of the lesser included offense to count 3, the
People had to prove, inter alia, that Deputy Wright “was a peace officer
lawfully performing or attempting to perform her duties as a peace
officer .…†In addition, the jury
was instructed that “[a] person employed by the Kern County Sheriff’s Department
is a peace officer if she is employed to perform duties exclusively or
initially relating to custodial
assignments with responsibilities for maintaining the operation of county
custodial facilities.â€
As noted
earlier, Deputy Wright testified that she was a detention deputy with the Kern
County Sheriff’s Department. Deputy
Wright had been a detention deputy for approximately 11 years, and her duties
included supervising and maintaining the safety and security of the
inmates. Thus, the allegations in counts
1 and 3 were properly instructed and Knight’s convictions on those two counts
are amply supported by the evidence. In
addition, the convictions in counts 1 and 3, without the conviction in count 2
which we reverse, does not create an inconsistent verdict.
III. DOES
SECTION 654 PROHIBIT PUNISHMENT FOR BATTERY AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER AND
RESISTING A PEACE OFFICER?
Knight
contends section 654 prohibits against multiple punishments for both battery on
a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (b)) and resisting a peace officer
(§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), the lesser included offenses under counts 1 and 3,
respectively, of which Knight was convicted, because both crimes were committed
as part of “a single course of conduct.â€
Section 654
provides in pertinent part:
“(a) An act or omission that is punishable in different
ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that
provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall
the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.â€
“Whether a
course of conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act
within the meaning of section 654 depends on the ‘intent and objective’ of the
actor. [Citation.] If all of the offenses are incident to one
objective, the court may punish the defendant for any one of the offenses, but
not more than one. [Citation.] If, however, the defendant had multiple or
simultaneous objectives, independent of and not merely incidental to each
other, the defendant may be punished for each violation committed in pursuit of
each objective even though the violations share common acts or were parts of an
otherwise indivisible course of conduct.
[Citation.]†(
Cal.App.4th 263, 267-268; see also People
v. Martin (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 776, 781.)
“‘[A]
course of conduct divisible in time, although directed to one objective, may
give rise to multiple violations and punishment. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] This is particularly so where the offenses
are temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity
to reflect and to renew his or her intent before committing the next one,
thereby aggravating the violation of public security and policy already
undertaken. [Citation.]†(People
v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935.)
“Thus, a finding that multiple offenses were aimed at one intent and
objective does not necessarily mean that they constituted ‘one indivisible
course of conduct’ for purposes of section 654.
If the offenses were committed on different occasions, they may be
punished separately.†(
1236, 1253.)
We review
the trial court’s order imposing multiple sentences in the context of a section
654, subdivision (a) question for substantial
evidence. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730-731.) In conducting substantial evidence analysis,
we view the facts in the following fashion: “We must ‘view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the respondent and presume in support of the order the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. McGuire (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 687, 698.)
Knight
argues counts 1 and 3 involved a “single act.â€
Hence, he contends count 3 must be stayed. In count 1, Knight was convicted of battery
on a peace officer. Deputy Wright was
named the victim in count 1. In count 3,
Knight was convicted of resisting a peace officer. The named victim in count 3 was also Deputy
Wright. At trial, in closing, the
prosecutor argued that the act of head-butting Deputy Wright and resisting Deputy
Wright was a single course of conduct.
battery, and immediately thereafter resisting arrest were subject to section
654, subdivision (a). The sentence
imposed in count 3 for violating section 148 must therefore be stayed.
IV. DID
THE EXCLUSION OF KNIGHT’S GRANDMOTHER VIOLATE KNIGHT’S RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL?
Knight contends that his
constitutional right to a public trial was violated when the trial court
excluded his grandmother from the courtroom during his jury trial requiring
reversal. We disagree.
Procedural Background
During jury
selection in Knight’s first trial, it was brought to the court’s attention that
Knight’s grandmother, Mrs. Knight, who was present during jury selection, had
made some inappropriate comments as prospective jurors were being dismissed. According to a bailiff, a prospective juror
had approached him and said she overheard Mrs. Knight voice her approval when a
white juror was excused. In a procedure
agreed to by both parties, the prospective jurors were questioned, although
none stated they had heard the comment.
In light of
Mrs. Knight’s behavior during jury selection in Knight’s first trial, the trial
court addressed Mrs. Knight before bringing in the prospective jurors at the
start of Knight’s second jury trial and admonished her to sit in a particular
area of the courtroom and remain silent while there. But as jury selection proceeded, it was
brought to the court’s attention that one of the prospective jurors had spoken
with Mrs. Knight. The issue was
discussed with defense counsel, and the trial court suggested that Mrs. Knight
be cautioned and provided a place to wait during recesses, to keep her from
being in contact with the jury.
The
following morning, the trial court questioned the prospective juror, who stated
that he (the juror) struck up the conversation with the woman, thinking she was
a juror. The woman did not say anything,
other than to state that she was related to Knight. The prospective juror assured the court that
he could and would remain objective. The
trial court then addressed the rest of the prospective jurors and asked if
anyone else had had any contact with “anybody who appears to be watching the
trial or connected to the case who is not a potential juror.†No one indicated that they had and the jury
was impaneled without further incident.
After the
trial court gave its initial instructions to the second jury panel, the court
noticed Mrs. Knight, in the presence of the jury, attempting to speak to
Knight’s defense counsel as he was preparing to leave the courtroom for a
sidebar conference. Outside the presence
of the jury, the trial court decided to exclude Mrs. Knight and addressed her,
stating:
“Mrs.
Knight, yesterday we had a report that one of the jurors was conversing with
you and we asked him this morning and he said that he initiated a conversation
with you and you did the right thing and explained you couldn’t discuss the
case because you were related to the defendant.
“Now, this morning when counsel asked
to take a recess, I observed you attempting to talk to [Knight’s] attorney[,] …
attempting to hold him there as we were going to convene in the back outside
the jurors’ presence. After I walked
out, I was informed that you were attempting to converse with him and it was
perhaps loud enough or it was loud enough that the jury would hear.
“Mrs.
Knight, we cannot have anything interfere with this courtroom and the record
should also reflect at the first trial of this matter in November, I had
admonished you because there was a report that when you were sitting close to
the jury that jurors could hear you speaking and could hear you saying such
things as jurors were being excused by attorneys’ peremptory challenges. They could hear you say things as such,
‘Good, there goes another white one.’
This behavior is inappropriate.
“After
speaking with the one juror this morning, I was inclined to let you stay. After what I just observed at the break, Mrs.
Knight, I’m sorry. I am going to have to
ask that you not attend the trial and you will not be allowed inside and I will
ask that you leave the Court facility because it is too small for our jurors
not to have contact with you.â€
In response
to questioning by the trial court, no one on the jury indicated that Mrs.
Knight’s behavior or defense counsel’s response to her would have an effect on
their ability to remain fair and impartial.
Law and Analysis
As
explained in the recent case of People v.
Pena (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 944:
“‘[T]he United States Supreme
Court “has made clear that the right to an open trial may give way in certain
cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant’s right to a fair
trial .… Such circumstances will be
rare, however, and the balance of interests must be struck with special
care.†(Waller [ v. Georgia
(1984)] 467 U.S. [39,] 45.) Consequently
both the defendant’s and the public’s right may be subjected to reasonable
restrictions that are necessary or convenient to the orderly procedure of
trial, and the trial court retains broad discretion to control courtroom
proceedings in a manner directed toward promoting the safety of witnesses. (Alvarado
v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1121.)
[¶] … In the case of a partial closure [(where some, but not all,
spectators are asked to leave)], the Sixth Amendment public trial guarantee
creates a “‘presumption of openness’†that can be rebutted only by a showing
that exclusion of the public was necessary to protect some “‘higher value’â€
such as the defendant’s right to a fair trial .… (See Waller,
supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 44-45.) When
such a “higher value†is advanced, the trial court must balance the competing
interests and allow a form of exclusion no broader than needed to protect those
interests. (Ibid.) Specific findings are
required to enable a reviewing court to determine the propriety of the
exclusion. (Id. at p. 45.) … [¶] The
identity of the spectator sought to be excluded is highly relevant in a partial
closure situation.… The application of
the above principles and the issue whether an accused has been denied his
constitutional right to a public trial cannot be determined in the abstract,
but must be determined by reference to the facts of the particular case. [Citation.]’
[Citations.]†(
fn. omitted.)
Thus, to
justify complete closure of a trial or portion thereof, four criteria must be
met: (1) there must be an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced;
(2) the closure must be narrowly tailored, i.e., no broader than necessary to
protect that interest; (3) the trial court must consider reasonable
alternatives to closing the proceeding; and (4) the trial court must make
findings adequate to support the closure and allow a reviewing court to
determine whether the closure was proper.
(Waller v. Georgia, supra, 467
U.S. at p. 48; Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court (1984) 464 U.S. 501, 510; People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 383.)
The trial
court identified the interests that, in its opinion, required the exclusion of
Mrs. Knight: the right to a fair trial and an orderly trial process. The trial court had witnessed Mrs. Knight’s
disruptive behavior in Knight’s first trial, to the point that it suggested
that defense counsel provide Mrs. Knight with a place during recesses to keep
her from having any contact with the prospective jurors. When the second trial began, the trial court
specifically instructed Mrs. Knight on where to sit in the courtroom and how to
behave in the presence of the jury, admonishing her “not to make any comments
or even sounds disagreeing or agreeing with what the attorneys might say.†Despite the admonition, Mrs. Knight continued
to be disruptive by attempting to communicate loudly with defense counsel in
the jury’s presence.
The trial
court’s exclusion of Mrs. Knight from the courtroom under the circumstances was
a reasonable one and did not violate Knight’s right to a public trial.
DISPOSITION
Knight’s
conviction for felony battery against a custodial officer in count 2 violation
of section 243.1 is reversed and the sentence imposed in count 3 is
stayed. Because count 2 was selected as
the principal term, we remand for resentencing to permit the trial court to
reconsider the entire sentencing scheme.
(People v. Burns (1984) 158
Cal.App.3d 1178, 1183-1184; People v.
Savala (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 63, 70, overruled on other grounds in People v. Foley (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 1039, 1044, 1046-1047.) In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
_____________________
Franson, J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________
Levy, Acting P.J.
_____________________
Gomes, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All
further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
