Marriage of Castaneda
Filed 3/22/13 Marriage of Castaneda CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
In re the Marriage of
MANUEL and REBECCA CASTANEDA.
MANUEL CASTANEDA,
Appellant,
v.
REBECCA HANDAL,
Respondent.
C067676
(Super. Ct. No. 06FL07064)
Manuel
Castaneda (husband) appeals from a postjudgment order
directing him to produce documents responsive to a notice to produce documents
at trial and to pay $3,155 in monetary sanctions
in the form of attorney fees and costs to Rebecca Handal (wife) under ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 23 s DTNEPL000001 l "Family Code section 271" Family Code section
271.
Husband contends the trial court
abused its discretion and violated his federal and state constitutional
to due process of law by basing the sanctions award on his and
his counsel’s conduct at husband’s deposition, a ground not asserted by wife in
her motion to compel. He claims that
because he had no notice that sanctions might be imposed based on what happened
at his deposition, he was deprived of his statutory and constitutional right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard.
He also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in summarily
dismissing his request for attorney fees from wife. He does not appeal that portion of the order
directing him to produce documents.
We shall conclude, as husband
contends, that the sanctions award was based on husband and husband’s counsel’s
conduct at husband’s deposition and not on husband’s objections to the notice
to produce documents at trial. We shall
further conclude, however, that the lack of a reporter’s transcript for the
hearing on wife’s motion to compel requires us to assume that the trial court
complied with its statutory and constitutional obligations and informed the
parties that it was considering imposing sanctions based on husband and
husband’s counsel’s conduct at the deposition and provided husband an
opportunity to address whether sanctions were proper on that basis. Finally, we shall reject husband’s contention
that the trial court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing his request
for attorney fees from wife.
Accordingly, we shall affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Husband and wife were married for 16
years and have one minor child. The
parties marriage was dissolved by a judgment of dissolution entered in March
2007. At the end of 2009, husband filed
a postjudgment motion to modify child and spousal support based on his loss of
employment. A trial was initially set
for September 16, 2010, and later was continued to February 18, 2011.
On August 22, 2010, wife served on husband a notice of taking
husband’s deposition, which directed husband to bring with him to the ADDIN
BA xc <@rec> xl 13 s DTNEPL000023 l "deposition 33" deposition 33 categories of documents. The deposition was twice re-noticed and was
eventually set for February 3, 2011.
Each amended notice was accompanied by an order directing husband to
bring with him to the ADDIN
BA xc <@rec> xl 13 s DTNEPL000024 l "deposition 34" deposition 34 categories of documents. The categories of documents requested largely
pertained to husband’s financial condition and efforts to obtain employment.
On January 28, 2011, wife served on husband a notice to produce
documents at trial pursuant to ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 53 s DTNEPL000002 l "Code of Civil Procedure section 1987, subdivision (c)" Code of Civil
Procedure section 1987, subdivision (c), which requested husband bring with
him to trial 38 separate categories of documents. The categories of documents specified were
essentially the same as those set forth in the various deposition notices.
On February 2, 2011, husband served wife with his objections to
the notice to produce documents at trial.
The following day, February
3, 2011, husband
and his counsel appeared for husband’s deposition and brought with them
documents responsive to some of the document requests set forth in the notice
of deposition.
On February 9, 2011, wife provided notice to husband that she
would be seeking ex parte relief from the trial court the following day
relating to her notice to produce documents at trial. In her application, wife requested an ex
parte order that husband produce documents at trial pursuant to the notice to
produce documents at trial, or an order shortening time for a hearing on her
motion for such an order, and requested $2,592.50 in attorney fees and costs
“associated with responding to [husband’s] objections†to the notice to produce
documents at trial. No mention is made
of husband’s deposition in the application.
At the February 10, 2011, hearing on wife’s ex parte application,
the trial court heard argument from both sides.
The parties have not provided us with a copy of the reporter’s
transcript from that hearing. The
parties agree that the subject of husband’s deposition was raised at the
hearing, the trial court expressed an interest in reviewing the deposition
transcript, and the trial court was provided with a copy of the transcript
without any objection. According to the
trial court’s order, husband’s February 3, 2011, deposition was referenced
during the hearing, and a copy of the deposition transcript was provided to and
reviewed by the trial court. Because the
trial court “did not have the benefit of a referenced deposition, motion to
produce, and exhibits salient to the motion or response,†it “afforded each
party an opportunity . . . to provide . . . documents
relevant to each party’s arguments†and ordered counsel to return on February
14, 2011, “for further hearing and ruling.â€
In his written response, husband argued, among other things, that wife’s
motion was made “without substantial justification†and sought attorney fees
from wife pursuant to section 271 and ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 46 s DTNEPL000003 l "Code of Civil Procedure 1987.2 and section 271" Code of Civil
Procedure section 1987.2.
At the February 14, 2011, hearing,
the parties submitted the matter on the papers, and the trial court granted
wife’s ex parte application. In a written
“Order Following Ex Parte Application Re Discovery and Sanctions,†prepared in
advance of the hearing, the trial court overruled husband’s objections to the
notice to produce documents at trial, summarily dismissed his request for
attorney fees from wife, and ordered him “to produce four copies of each
document at trial per [wife’s] notice to produce documents pursuant to ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 39 s DTNEPL000004 l "Code of Civil Procedure section 1987(c)" Code of Civil
Procedure section 1987 [subdivision] (c)†and “to tender forthwith attorney
fees in the sum of $3,075 and costs in the sum of $80 to [wife] pursuant to ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 23 s DTNEPL000001 Family Code section 271.†In deciding to order husband to pay wife
attorney fees and costs, the court concluded:
“The deposition reveals a petitioner [husband] and counsel [Ms.
Katherine Codekas] who have demonstrated a clear effort to frustrate efforts to
reduce the cost of litigation with a lack of collaborative spirit or
cooperation.†In particular, the court
found that “[t]he deposition . . . reflects dialogues between and
among counsel and the deponent that indicate an evident obfuscation perpetrated
by [Ms. Codekas]. On the one hand, [Ms.
Codekas] refused to tender documents unmarked; and, conversely, objected to
having documents marked and copies thereafter furnished. Rather than effecting an accommodation
between professionals, it was evident that [wife’s] efforts to properly and
professionally prepare for trial would not occur. At 2:14 p.m., [husband] and [Ms.
Codekas] departed the deposition and removed documents purportedly marked by
the court ADDIN BA xc <@rec> xl 18 s
DTNEPL000026 l "reporter. At 2:35"
reporter.
At 2:35 they returned and the deposition resumed at 2:41 p.m. [¶]
. . . Upon resuming, it appeared to the court that the
deposition proceeded with less acrimony, although particular tensions arose. A deposition serves various professional
forensic functions: it permits, for
example, counsel to evaluate the witness, or avenues for further or less
discovery, or sets the stage for subsequent impeachment, or assists counsel
with an understanding of a particular area so that trial time is not
wasted. [Wife’s] counsel was evidently
engaged in this and more in the conduct of [husband’s] deposition. [Ms. Codekas] periodically interjected
clarifications and, at other times, interposed objections or comments. Some reserved issues for a court’s
consideration, others less so. And,
sadly, some of Ms. Codekas’ comments at counsel were clearly ad hominem (e.g.,
‘Newbie,’ ‘little associate,’ ‘big associate’).†The court further observed that while it
“comprehends an attorney’s efforts at posturing before his or her client, Ms. Codekas’
name calling (e.g., ‘witch’) of opposing counsel (Ms. Chavis) is hardly
conducive to the professionalism expected of an officer of the court.
. . . A reading of the
deposition reveals that neither [husband] nor his counsel were [
The trial court summarily dismissed
husband’s request for attorney fees from wife as “lacking good cause.â€
DISCUSSION
I
Husband Failed
to Meet His Burden of Demonstrating Error with Respect to the Award of Attorney
Fees and Costs to Wife
Husband’s primary contention of
appeal is that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion and violated [his]
constitutional right to due process of law by sanctioning [him] for his conduct
at his deposition without giving him the opportunity to be heard on whether
such sanctions were warranted.†According
to husband, “[w]ife’s ex parte motion for sanctions was based on husband’s
objections to her notice to produce documents and things at trial, not on what
happened at his deposition,†and that by sanctioning him for what happened at
his deposition, the trial court violated his statutory and constitutional
rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
“[A] motion for attorney fees and
costs in a dissolution proceeding is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court. [Citations.] In the absence of a clear showing of abuse,
its determination will not be disturbed on appeal. [Citations.] ‘[The] trial court’s order will be overturned
only if, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its
order, no judge could reasonably make the order made. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]†( ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 56 s DTNEPL000005 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "In re Marriage of Sullivan (1984)
BA xc <@cs> xl 48 s DTNEPL000006 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Marriage of Burgard (1999)
sanction pursuant to ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 11 s DTNEPL000001 xpl 2 section 271 is reviewed under abuse of
discretion standard].) “The burden is on
the complaining party to establish abuse of discretion. [Citations.]â€
(
ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 57 s DTNEPL000007 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "In re Marriage of Rosevear (1998)
“ ‘Perhaps the most fundamental
rule of appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed
correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate
error.’ [Citation.] ‘ “We must indulge in every presumption
to uphold a judgment, and it is [husband’s] burden on appeal to affirmatively
demonstrate error–it will not be presumed.
[Citation.]†[Citations.]’ [Citation.]â€
(
ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 50 s DTNEPL000008 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People v. Sullivan (2007)
DTNEPL000005 xpl 2 Sullivan).) Not only does husband bear the burden of
demonstrating that he did not receive notice that the trial court was
considering imposing sanctions based on what happened at his deposition or an
opportunity to be heard as to whether sanctions were appropriate on that basis,
but he further bears the burden of providing a record on appeal that
affirmatively shows there was an error below, and any uncertainty in the record
must be resolved against him. ( ADDIN BA xc <@$id> xl 5 s ID xpl
1 Ibid.) With these principles in mind, we turn to
husband’s contention.
ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 11 s DTNEPL000001 Section 271 provides in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this
code, the court may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to
which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy
of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce
the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and
attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees
and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction.†( ADDIN BA xc <@$id> xl 17 s ID
xhfl Rep xpl 1 Id., at
subd. (a).) “An award of attorney’s fees
and costs as a sanction pursuant to this section shall be imposed only after
notice to the party against whom the sanction is proposed to be imposed and
opportunity for that party to be heard.â€
(
ADDIN BA xc <@$id> xl 17 s ID xhfl Rep xpl 1 Id., at
subd. (b).) “Adequate notice prior to
imposition of sanctions is mandated not only by statute, but also by the due
process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. ( ADDIN BA xc <@con> xl 24 s
DTNEPL000009 xpl 1 l "Cal. Const., art. I, § 7"
Cal. Const., art. I, §
7; ADDIN BA xc <@con> xl 24 s
DTNEPL000010 xpl 1 l "U.S. Const., 14th Amend."
U.S. Const., 14th
Amend.)†( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 46 s
DTNEPL000011 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "
Cal.App.3d 957, 961" O’Brien
v. Cseh (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 957, 961.)
As a preliminary matter, we agree with
husband that the trial court based its sanctions award on what happened at
husband’s deposition as opposed to husband’s objections to wife’s notice of
motion to produce documents at trial. In
awarding wife her attorney fees and costs, the trial court specifically
referenced the husband’s and Ms. Codekas’s conduct at husband’s
deposition. The paragraph of the trial
court’s order which addresses wife’s request for attorney fees and costs
states: “The deposition reveals a
petitioner [husband] and counsel [Ms. Codekas] who have demonstrated a clear
effort to frustrate efforts to reduce the cost of litigation with lack of
collaborative spirit or cooperation.â€
That is the only conduct mentioned by the trial court as a basis for its
sanctions award.
Wife’s contention that the sanctions
award was based on husband’s and Ms. Codekas’s refusal to produce documents on
“multiple occasions and at Trial . . . , filing frivolous
objections, [and] forcing [an] ex parte hearing on a motion to compel†is at
odds with the court’s written order and is otherwise not supported in the
record. Moreover, the trial court could
not have properly based its sanctions award on husband’s objections to the
notice to produce documents at trial because, as husband argued, the notice lacked
the requisite specificity. Pursuant to ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 54 s DTNEPL000002 Code of Civil
Procedure section 1987, subdivision (c), “The notice shall state the
that the party or person has them in his or her possession or under his or her
control.†(Italics added; see also see also ADDIN
BA xc <@trt> xl 111 s DTNEPL000012 xpl 1 l "Wegner et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The
Rutter Group 2009) PP 1:115-1:115.1, p. 1-29" Wegner et al., Cal.
Practice Guide: Civil Trials and
Evidence (The Rutter Group 2012) ¶¶ 1:115 to 1:115.1, p. 1-29 (rev. # 1,
2012) [“For discovery purposes, a party may compel document production by
reasonably describing a category of documents . . . . [¶] But to obtain production at trial, the
description must be ‘exact’ ADDIN
BA xc <@rec> xl 146 s DTNEPL000028 xpl 2 l "(e.g., ‘letter dated June 21, 1990, written by Harry A. Jones to Paula
Smith, captioned “Re XYZ†and marked as Exhibit “A†in Smith’s deposition’)"
(e.g., ‘letter dated June 21, 1990,
written by Harry A. Jones to Paula Smith, captioned “Re XYZ†and marked as
Exhibit “A†in Smith’s deposition’). [¶] . . . This prevents parties from using a ‘notice to
produce’ for discovery purposes after discovery is closedâ€].) Contrary to the
language of ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 36 s DTNEPL000013 l "Code of Civil Procedure section 1987" Code of Civil Procedure section 1987, wife’s notice did not specify “exact†materials to be
brought to trial. Rather, in the manner
of a discovery request, it listed broad categories, instructing husband to
bring documents fitting those categories, should any exist. Thus, the trial court should have concluded
that the notice failed to satisfy the requirements of ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 12 s DTNEPL000013 section 1987 and
denied wife’s motion to compel. Because
we conclude the sanctions award was not based on husband’s objections to the
notice to produce documents at trial, and husband does not appeal the portion
of the trial court’s order directing him to produce documents responsive to the
notice to produce documents or things at trial, we shall not disturb that
portion of the trial court’s order.
Husband is also correct in his
assertion that wife’s ex parte motion to compel, which included her request for
sanctions in the form of attorney fees and costs, made no mention of husband’s
deposition. Rather, the motion was
directed at husband’s objections to the notice to produce documents at trial.
Turning, finally, to husband’s
contention that “[t]he trial court erred in sanctioning husband for what
happened at his deposition without giving him the requisite notice and
opportunity to be heard,†we find that our ability to address this contention
is precluded by the lack of a complete record in this case, particularly, the
lack of a reporter’s transcript of the ex parte hearing where the subject of
husband’s deposition was first raised.
(See ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 47 s
DTNEPL000008 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Sullivan, supra, 151
Cal.App.4th at pp. 548-550.) We know
from the trial court’s order that Ms. Codekas appeared at the hearing,
husband’s deposition was referenced at the hearing, the trial court was
provided with and reviewed a copy of the transcript of that deposition, and
that the trial court based its sanctions award on husband’s and Ms. Codekas’s
conduct at that deposition. Without the
reporter’s transcript of the hearing, we do not have before us the content of
what transpired at the hearing, including any notice given to husband that the
court was considering imposing sanctions based upon what happened at his
deposition, arguments made in relation thereto, or any inquiry made by the
trial court before imposing the sanctions.
Thus, no error affirmatively appears in the record before us, as it
would, for instance, if we could consult the transcript and determine that no
notice or opportunity to be heard was given.
(See ADDIN BA xc <@$id> xl 17 s ID xhfl
Rep xpl 1 id. at
p. 548 and fn. 7.) Even assuming, as
husband contends, that he was entitled to written notice under ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 11 s DTNEPL000001 section 271, we likewise must presume that
he waived the lack of written notice either expressly or by failing to object
to the lack thereof at the hearing. ( ADDIN BA xc <@$id> xl 13 s ID
xhfl Rep xpl 1 Sullivan,
supra, at p. 549.)
Also implicated here is the rule
articulated in ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 25 s
DTNEPL000014 l "Evidence Code section 664"
Evidence Code section
664 that “ ‘[c]ourt and counsel are presumed to have done their duty
in the absence of proof to the contrary.’
[Citations.] The general rule is
‘ “that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the
applicable law. [Citations.]†[Citations.]
This rule derives in part from the presumption of ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 25 s DTNEPL000014 Evidence Code section 664 “that official
duty has been regularly performed.†’
[Citation.] The effect of the
rebuttable presumption created by ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 11 s DTNEPL000014 section 664 is ‘ “to impose upon the
party against whom it operates the burden of proof as to the nonexistence of
the presumed fact.†[Citation.]’ [Citations.]â€
(
ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 47 s DTNEPL000008 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Sullivan,
supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 549-550.)
In the absence of a reporter’s transcript, we must assume the trial
court followed established law and informed the parties that it was considering
imposing sanctions based on what happened at husband’s deposition and provided
husband with an opportunity to address whether sanctions were appropriate on
that basis before the court imposed sanctions.
(See ADDIN BA xc <@$id> xl 13 s ID xhfl
Rep xpl 1 id.
at p. 550; see also ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 50 s DTNEPL000015 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People v. Carter (2003)
contrary indication in the record, a reviewing court must assume that the trial
court followed established law related to notice and an opportunity to be
heard].)
Because the record on appeal fails
to support husband’s claim that he never received notice that the court was
considering imposing sanctions on him for what happened at his deposition or an
opportunity to argue why it would be improper to sanction him on that basis, he
has failed to satisfy his burden on appeal.
(
ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 43 s DTNEPL000008 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Sullivan,
supra. 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 459.)
Having reviewed the deposition
transcript in its entirety, we find that the trial court acted well within its
discretion in awarding wife her attorney fees and costs based on husband’s and
Ms. Codekas’s conduct at husband’s deposition.
(
ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 59 s DTNEPL000005 xhfl Rep xpl 1 In re Marriage of Sullivan, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 768-769.) There is ample support for the trial court’s
conclusion that husband and his counsel “demonstrated a clear effort to
frustrate efforts to reduce the cost of litigation with a lack of collaborative
spirit or cooperation.†As the trial
court found, Ms. Codekas refused to provide documents responsive to the
documents requested in the notice of deposition to wife’s counsel as a group so
that she could quickly review them.
Rather, Ms. Codekas indicated she would give them to wife’s counsel
one-by-one during the deposition as each document was identified. Later, when wife’s counsel sought to have the
first document marked as an exhibit, Ms. Codekas insisted that wife’s counsel
first make a copy. When wife’s counsel
requested that Ms. Codekas provide her with all of the documents so that she
could copy them all at once, Ms. Codekas again refused, insisting instead that
that wife’s counsel copy the documents one at a time throughout the
deposition. When wife’s counsel
objected, Ms. Codekas accused her of being “lazy.†Ms. Codekas continued to insult wife’s
counsel throughout the deposition and engaged in other unprofessional and
obstreperous conduct too numerous to list here.
Although the trial court’s order does not set forth its calculations,
impliedly the court determined an award based on the extent to which husband’s
and Ms. Codekas’s conduct frustrated the policy set forth in ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 11 s DTNEPL000001 section 271.
(
ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 16 s DTNEPL000029 xpl 1 l "§ 271, subd. (a)" § 271, subd. (a);
see also ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 47 s
DTNEPL000008 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Sullivan, supra, 151
Cal.App.4th at pp. 549-550; ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 64 s DTNEPL000016 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "In re Marriage of Feldman (2007)
[
ADDIN BA xc <@$st> xl 11 s DTNEPL000001 xpl 2 section 271 does not set forth any
requirement of separate injury to the complaining spouse as a precondition to
the imposition of sanctions].)
II
The Trial
Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Summarily Dismissing Husband’s Request
for Attorney Fees from Wife
Finally, we reject husband’s
assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing
his request for attorney fees from wife.
Husband requested an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 271 and ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 54 s DTNEPL000017 l "Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 and section 271" Code of Civil
Procedure section 1987.2. As
relevant here, ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 55 s
DTNEPL000018 l "Code of Civil Procedure
section 1987.2, subdivision (a)" Code of Civil
Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a), vests trial courts with
discretion to award attorney fees incurred in opposing a motion to compel the
production of documents or things at trial if the court finds the motion was
made in bad faith or without substantial justification. As previously discussed, ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 28 s DTNEPL000030 l "section 271, subdivision (a)" section 271,
subdivision (a), provides that “the court may base an award of attorney’s
fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney
furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of
litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging
cooperation between the parties and attorneys.â€
The record does not support a finding
that the motion to compel was filed in bad faith or for any improper
purpose. Although, as set forth above,
the trial court should have denied the motion because the notice to produce
documents at trial lacked the requisite specificity, the motion’s lack of merit
alone does not mandate an award of attorney fees to the opposing party under
either ADDIN BA xc <@$st> xl 11 s
DTNEPL000001 section 271 or ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 38 s DTNEPL000019 l "Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2" Code of Civil
Procedure section 1987.2. Such an
award is discretionary. ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 35 s
DTNEPL000020 xpl 1 l "Code Civ. Proc, § 1987.2,
subd. (a)" Code Civ. Proc, §
1987.2, subd. (a); ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 5 s DTNEPL000001 xpl 1 § 271.) Husband’s and Ms. Codekas’s conduct in
thwarting wife’s “efforts to properly and professionally prepare for trial,†as
set forth in the trial court’s written order, provided the trial court with
sufficient grounds for denying husband’s request for attorney fees against
wife. Moreover, given the trial court’s
comments and its summary rejection of husband’s request for attorney fees from
wife, we are confident the trial court would have denied husband’s request even
if it had denied wife’s motion to compel.
DISPOSITION
The February 14, 2011, “Order
Following Ex Parte Application Re Discovery and Sanctions†is affirmed. Wife is awarded her costs on appeal. ( ADDIN BA xc <@ru> xl 40 s
DTNEPL000021 xpl 1 l "Cal. Rules of Ct, rule
8.278(a)(1) & (2)" Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)
& (2).)
BLEASE , Acting
P. J.
We concur:
HULL , J.
HOCH , J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Further unspecified section references are to
the ADDIN BA xc <@ost> xl 11 s
DTNEPL000022 l "Family
Code" Family Code.
