P. v. Stevenson
Filed 3/22/13 P. v. Stevenson CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
JEFFREY STEVENSON,
Defendant
and Appellant.
B237215
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA386366)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Ronald H. Rose, Judge. Affirmed.
David
R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and
David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Jeffrey Stevenson appeals
from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of selling,
furnishing, or giving away cocaine.
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd.
(a).) He contends the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the conviction and he is entitled to additional
presentence conduct credits. We find
both contentions to be without merit and affirm.
I. The Prosecution Case
On February 3, 2011, at approximately 3:45 p.m., Los Angeles Police Officers Bryan
Goland and Mike Hofmeyer were working as plain clothes narcotics officers at South
Park, a known location for drug
activity. As they sat in their vehicle,
monitoring the park for the sales of narcotics, the officers observed a White
male enter the park at a rapid pace and approach a bench at a picnic table,
where defendant was sitting. The officers
had a clear, unobstructed view of the table, which was 30 to 35 yards away from
their car. The male reached into his
pocket and removed an unknown denomination of paper currency. He handed the currency to defendant, who took
it and put it in his pants pocket. From
his waistband, defendant retrieved a small, brightly colored object and placed
it on the table. The male picked up the
object, appeared to examine it, dropped the object into his backpack, and
walked away.
The
officers followed the male in their vehicle.
They did not see anyone interact with the male, who entered a
bathroom. Goland and Hofmeyer went into
the bathroom and observed that no one other than the male was inside. Goland did not see anyone leave the
bathroom. The male was inside of a stall
and the door was ajar. The officers
identified themselves and the male dropped the backpack. After retrieving the backpack, Goland looked
inside and found a pink toy balloon, containing an off-white solid resembling
cocaine base.
title="">[2]
that Goland had seen the male place the object he had received from
defendant. The male was arrested.
As
the officers transported the male through the park, they noticed that defendant
was sitting at the same bench. Goland
stopped the vehicle and Hofmeyer got out.
Defendant looked at Hofmeyer, got on a bicycle, and rode away. Hofmeyer returned to the car and Goland drove
after defendant. Defendant got off his
bicycle and sat on a bench next to another male. Defendant was taken into custody and
searched. Goland found money totaling
$456 in three different locations on defendant’s person, his sock and each of
his pants pockets. Goland believed this
was significant because narcotics dealers often kept their money in different
areas, separating their personal funds from drug proceeds. No drugs were found on defendant.
II. The Defense Case
William
Jackson saw defendant frequently in the park and they occasionally engaged in
casual conversation. On the day defendant
was arrested, Jackson, defendant, and a male Jackson
knows as Slim were sitting on a bench. A
White male approached Slim, who is African-American, and they spoke
briefly. The male gave Slim money and
Slim placed it in his pocket. Jackson
did not see Slim give anything to the male, who walked away.
A
short time later, Jackson saw a
gray Nissan approach. Jackson
had seen the car around the park before and knew it was an undercover police
vehicle. The occupants of the Nissan
told defendant to put his hands on the table and spread his legs and they “took
[defendant] through the drill.â€
Defendant was handcuffed and
placed in the Nissan.
After
telling the prosecutor he could not recall if he had been previously convicted
of robbery and burglary, Jackson,
in response to the court’s question, acknowledged that he had been convicted of
both crimes. He also admitted he had
been convicted of petty theft with a prior.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant contends
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. He notes that no fingerprints were recovered
from the balloon in which the cocaine was discovered and no narcotics were
found on his person. He argues the
prosecution’s case was based on nothing more than speculation and unsupported
review.
In
assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether there
is substantial evidence from which a trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly
on circumstantial evidence. (People
v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.)
We “must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from
the circumstantial evidence.†(
396.) In a case where the circumstantial
evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, when the jury chooses that
interpretation pointing to the defendant’s guilt, we determine only whether the
evidence reasonably justifies the jury’s verdict, even if we conclude the
circumstantial evidence could also support a contrary finding. (People
v. Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 508.)
Defendant
chooses to focus on the circumstantial evidence that is in his favor. In doing so, he ignores the following
evidence that supports his conviction:
(1) he was in a park known for narcotics sales; (2) he was approached by
a male who appeared to be a stranger, as the two did not exchange greetings and
the male almost immediately handed defendant money; (3) in exchange, defendant
produced a small, brightly colored object; (4) the male examined the item and
placed it in his backpack; (5) the male was observed walking to a bathroom and
he had no contact with any other person; (6) the male was alone in the bathroom
when he was detained; (7) no one was seen leaving the bathroom; (8) in the
male’s backpack, the officers found a pink balloon containing rock cocaine;
(9) no other similar items were found in the backpack; and (10) defendant
had $456 located in three different areas on his person, which is consistent
with the practice of narcotics dealers.
Recognizing
that reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is “unwarranted unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [the jury verdict]’†(People
v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331, quoting People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755), we conclude
defendant’s conviction must stand.
II. The Award of Conduct
Credits
At
the time of sentencing, defendant was given credit for 273 days actually served
and 136 days of conduct credits pursuant to former Penal Code section 4019
(section 4019). The current version of
section 4019 provides that for every two days spent in custody, a term of four
days will be deemed to have been served.
(§ 4019, subd. (f), as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482.) The enhanced credits apply to time served for
a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011.
As
set forth above, defendant committed the crime for which he is serving time on
February 3, 2011. Nonetheless, relying
on language in section 4019, subdivision (h), he contends he is entitled to
one-for-one credits for the time he served from October 1, 2011 to the day he
was sentenced on November 2, 2011. The
second sentence of subdivision (h) states:
“Any days earned by a prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be
calculated at the rate required by the prior law.†(§ 4019, subd. (h).) Thus, defendant argues, it stands to reason
that for time served after October 1, 2011, credits must be calculated
according to current law.
The court in People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42 was confronted with
the same argument. The panel wrote: “[Section 4019,] [s]ubdivision (h)’s first
sentence states: ‘The changes to this
section enacted by the act that added this subdivision shall apply
prisoners who are confined to a county jail, city jail, industrial farm, or
road camp for a crime committed on or
after October 1, 2011.’ (Italics added.) After declaring itself to operate
‘prospectively,’ the first sentence explicitly states the conduct credit
amendment applies only to defendants whose crimes were committed ‘on or after
October 1, 2011.’ (Subd. (h).) By the first sentence’s
plain language, section 4019 would not apply to Rajanayagam because he
committed his crime prior to October 1, 2011. Thus, the first sentence leads unmistakably
to the conclusion Rajanayagam is not entitled to conduct credit at the enhanced
rate. Subdivision (h)’s second sentence,
however, confuses matters. But the
application of well-settled principles of statutory construction confirms our
conclusion Rajanayagam is not entitled to enhanced conduct credits for time
served on or after October 1, 2011, because he committed his crime before the
effective date.
“Subdivision (h)’s second
sentence provides: ‘Any days earned by a
prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by
the prior law.’ ([§ 4019,] [s]ubd.
(h).) Arguably the statement ‘[a]ny days
earned by a prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate
required by the prior law’ implies any days earned by a defendant after
October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by the current law, regardless
of when the offense was committed.
But to read the second sentence in this manner renders meaningless the
first sentence. This we cannot do.†(People
v. Rajanayagam, supra, 211
Cal.App.4th at p. 51.)
After
construing the statute as a whole and interpreting it so that none of its
provisions was rendered meaningless or superfluous, the court concluded: “To imply the enhanced conduct credit
provision applies to defendants who committed their crimes before the effective
date but served time in local custody after the effective date reads too much
into the statute and ignores the Legislature’s clear intent in subdivision
(h)’s first sentence.†(
We
agree with the analysis of the Rajanayagam
court. The statute states
unambiguously that the enhanced credits apply only to the sentences of inmates
who committed their crimes after October 1, 2011. Notwithstanding defendant’s claim that
construing the statute in that manner renders the second sentence superfluous,
we conclude, as did the Rajanayagam
court, that the language merely provides that conduct credits for crimes
committed prior to October 1, 2011, are to be calculated in accordance with the
prior law.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
SUZUKAWA,
J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P.
J.
WILLHITE,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes†law
(Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and eight prior
convictions within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision
(b). After the People informed the court
that it would not be seeking a third strike sentence, defendant was sentenced
to 11 years in state prison.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
cocaine in the base form.
