Goble v. Fuller



















Filed 3/7/13 Goble v. Fuller CA4/3















NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS





California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.







IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT



DIVISION THREE




>

WILLIAM D. GOBLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BRENDA K. FULLER, Defendant and Respondent, ORANGE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Intervenor and Respondent.

G046403 (Super. Ct. No. 97P003581) O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of
the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Orange
County, Kim R. Hubbard, Judge.
Affirmed.

William D. Goble, in
pro. per., and Jeffrey Paul Lustman for Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance for
Defendant and Respondent Brenda K. Fuller.

Fesia A. Davenport,
Chief Attorney County of Los Angeles Child Support Services Department, Richard
Kim, Staff Attorney County of Los Angeles Child Support Services Department for
Intervenor and Respondent County of Orange Department of Child Support
Services.

*
* *

The County
of Orange (County) Department of
Child Support Services (DCSS) successfully moved to modify William D. Goble’s
guideline child support obligations for his now 16-year-old son, obtaining an
increase of $18 per month (increasing Goble’s support obligation from $290 to
$308 per month). Although he filed
nothing in opposition to the modification request, and did not argue the
nominal increase in child support was unwarranted, Goble subsequently moved to
vacate the modification order and all other orders issued in the action on the
grounds the entire Orange County Superior Court bench was disqualified from
considering child support proceedings to which the DCSS is a party as
intervenor because the judges receive “illegal” supplemental employment
benefits paid by the County. Goble also
asserted the modification order, which was issued by a court commissioner, was
void because he was not advised of his right to object to the commissioner
sitting as a temporary judge. Goble
appeals from the order denying his motion to vacate. We reject his contentions and affirm the
order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

In 1997, Goble filed a
petition to establish a parental relationship with his son, Zachary, who was
born in 1996. Apparently, child support
was ordered and at some point the right to support assigned to DCSS. The petition and original orders are not in
the record on this appeal.

In 2004, Goble and
Zachary’s mother, Brenda Fuller, stipulated to a custody and support order that
gave Fuller “primary physical custody” of Zachary, with Goble having “secondary
physical custody” and visitation. They
stipulated that Goble would pay guideline child support to Fuller, an amount
set at $290 a month.

In April 2010, Goble
moved to obtain primary physical custody of Zachary, an attempt that apparently
failed. In August 2010, Fuller obtained
a five-year restraining order prohibiting Goble from contacting her or
Zachary.

On January 19, 2011, DCSS (as intervenor) filed a
motion to modify Goble’s child support obligation, which was set for hearing on
May 11, 2011. The notice of motion served on Goble
included, in bold print at the top of page two, a “Notice” advising the parties
the case might be referred to a court commissioner who would act as a temporary
judge in the absence of an objection by either party prior to the hearing. Moreover, the notice advised that if a party
objected to the commissioner acting as temporary judge, the motion could still
be heard by the commissioner to make findings and a recommended order, which
would become the final order of the court if no objections were filed within 10
days. Fuller submitted an income and expense
declaration for the May 11 hearing; Goble did not.

The child support
modification matter was assigned to Commissioner Duane Neary for hearing. At the May 11, 2011, hearing, Goble appeared by telephone. The minute order states, “At the beginning of
calendar call, [Commissioner Neary] gave the advisement he is sitting as a
temporary [j]udge and will hear this matter unless objected to. No objections stated, the matter
proceeds. [¶] [Goble] advises the court he is
audio taping and videotaping the proceeding, although appearing
telephonically. [¶] [Goble]
requests the court observe all of his common law rights. [¶]
The [c]ourt states [it] will observe all of [Goble’s] common law rights
and rights under the Constitution.” The
court continued the hearing to October 18, 2011, to allow Goble to comply with
discovery orders, and ordered Goble to return on that date.

On October 13, 2011,
Goble, in propria persona, filed a document titled “notice of non stipulation”
stating he would not stipulate to any temporary judge and citing California
Constitution, article VI, section 21.

Goble did not appear at
the October 18, 2011, continued hearing on the motion to modify child support,
and he did not file opposition or an income and expense statement. Accordingly, the matter proceeded as an
uncontested matter. The court ordered
guideline child support increased to $308 a month based on its finding Goble
could earn at least $1,387 a month. The
minute order noted the court had ordered Goble to appear telephonically, but no
telephone calls had been received, and there was no appearance by Goble. The order stated the parties had been advised
prior to commencement of the hearing that the commissioner would be sitting as
a temporary judge unless there were objections, and no objections were
stated. The order also noted “for the
record” the court was in receipt of Goble’s October 13 “[n]otice of [n]on
[s]tipulation.”

On November 22, 2011,
Commissioner Neary issued an order to show cause (OSC) regarding contempt for
nonpayment of child support. The OSC was
set for hearing on January 27, 2012.
Apparently other OSCs were set as well, but there is nothing in this
record concerning their disposition.

On December 2, 2011,
Goble, in propria persona, filed a motion to “void all orders” that was set for
hearing on January 6, 2012. His moving
papers contained allegations that “‘extrinsic fraud,’” “‘obstruction of
justice,’” and “‘corruption’” on the part of the Orange County Superior Court
bench and DCSS rendered all orders in this action void for the following
reasons. First, Goble argued the judges
received “illegal” supplemental employment benefits paid by the County, which
was a party to the support modification proceedings, and accordingly all were
disqualified to hear the modification motion.
(Goble attached a November 7, 2011, letter from the County
Auditor-Controller responding to a Public Records Act request stating Superior
Court judges each receive supplemental payroll and benefits of about $9,500
annually from the County, plus reimbursement for health and dental premiums and
other health and dental costs, and an “[o]ptional [b]enefit [p]lan” of
$4,500.) Additionally, Goble asserted
DCSS had a financial incentive to obtain child support orders so as to qualify
for “Title IVD federal grants” to fund its operations and thus it too was
corrupt and biased in this matter.
Moreover, Goble asserted the judges’ failure to disclose they received
supplemental benefits, and DCSS’s failure to disclose it received federal funds
based on child support orders it obtained, constituted “‘extrinsic fraud’”
requiring all orders be vacated.

On December 20, 2011,
Goble filed another motion “to void all orders” set for hearing on January 20,
2012. The December 20 motion contained
many of the same allegations as the December 2 motion, but added additional
allegations as to orders issued by Commissioner Neary on October 18 (modifying
support) and November 22 (issuing an OSC regarding contempt for nonpayment of
support). In particular, Goble asserted
the statement contained in the October 18 minute order that the parties had
been advised prior to commencement of the hearing that the commissioner would
be sitting as a temporary judge unless there were objections, and no objections
were stated, was “fraudulent” because Commissioner Neary also stated he was
aware of Goble’s October 13 “[n]otice of [n]on [s]tipulation.”

The record on appeal
contains a minute order from a
January 6, 2012, hearing before Commissioner Neary that appears to encompass
one of Goble’s motions to void prior orders and additional support issues. The order notes Goble objected to
Commissioner Neary sitting as temporary judge, and Commissioner Neary would
hear support issues as a referee making findings and recommendations to which
Goble would have 10 days to file objections. The court noted the motions to void prior
orders would be heard by a trial judge and continued the hearing on the support
issues. There is nothing further in the
record about this particular support matter.

Goble’s motions to
vacate were heard and denied by Judge Kim R. Hubbard on January 20, 2012. (Although the record on appeal contains only
two motions, Judge Hubbard noted there were three motions to vacate filed, each
making the same basic claims, and all were being denied.)

Goble represented
himself at the hearing. Fuller was
represented by counsel, and there was no appearance for DCSS, but it filed
written opposition. Goble testified that
at the original hearing on May 11, 2011, he appeared by telephone and he never
heard Commissioner Neary say he was sitting as temporary judge unless there was
an objection. Goble claimed he had an
audiotape of the hearing and “there was no mention about
anything . . .” but he did not have the audiotape with him. Judge Hubbard concluded there was no basis
to contradict what was in the May 11 hearing minute order. With regard to Goble’s argument all Superior
Court judges were necessarily biased and had to recuse themselves because of
their receipt of supplemental benefits from the County, Judge Hubbard observed
the payment of supplemental benefits was determined to be legal and there was no evidence of any conspiracy
or bias against Goble. The court’s
minute order denying the motions stated that at the May 11, 2011, hearing,
Goble was advised of his right to object to Commissioner Neary as temporary
judge and he did not object. Therefore
Goble’s notice of non-stipulation filed before the continued October 18 hearing
date was not timely. Moreover because
Goble did not appear at the October 18 hearing, there was no fraud.

DISCUSSION

“A judgment or order of
a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and
presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness. [Citations.]”
(In re Marriage of Arceneaux
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) “The
burden of affirmatively demonstrating error is on the appellant. This is a general principle of appellate
practice as well as an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible
error. [Citations.]” (Fundamental
Investment Etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 966, 971.) These principles apply equally to appellant’s
representing themselves in propria persona.
(See Nelson v. Gaunt (1981)
125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638 [litigants representing themselves in propria persona
are to be held to same standards as lawyers].)

Goble did not appeal
from the order modifying his child support.
He appealed from the subsequent order denying his motions to vacate the
modification order (and all other orders in this paternity action). Goble styled his motion as one to set aside
“void” orders under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision
(d). Under that provision, “The
court . . . may, on motion of either party after notice to
the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd.
(d).) “‘A judgment or order is said to
be void on its face when the invalidity is apparent upon an inspection of the
judgment-roll.’ [Citation.]” (Dill
v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441.) We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a
claim a judgment is void on its face. (>Talley v. Valuation Counselors Group, Inc. (2010)
191 Cal.App.4th 132, 146.)

If the order or judgment
is not void on its face, a motion to set it aside is directed to either the
trial court’s statutory power to grant relief for mistake or excusable neglect
under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), if the relief
is sought within six months, and thereafter “‘“directed to the court’s inherent
equity power to grant relief from a default or default judgment procured by
extrinsic fraud or mistake.”
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] [¶]
‘“Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of the opportunity to
present his claim or defense to the court; where he was kept ignorant or, other
than from his own negligence, fraudulently prevented from fully participating
in the proceeding. [Citation.] Examples of extrinsic fraud are:
. . . failure to give notice of the action to the other
party, and convincing the other party not to obtain counsel because the matter
will not proceed (and then it does proceed).
[Citation.] The essence of
extrinsic fraud is one party’s preventing the other from having his day in
court.” [Citations.] Extrinsic fraud only arises when one party
has in some way fraudulently been prevented from presenting his or her claim or
defense. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
(Moghaddam v. Bone (2006) 142
Cal.App.4th 283, 290.) In that
case, we review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to set aside an order or
judgment for an abuse of discretion. (>In re Marriage of Brewer & Federici
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1346.) “The
test for abuse of discretion is ‘whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,
the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the
trial court.’ [Citation.]” (Gamet
v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1283.) Additionally, we presume the court found
every fact or inference essential to support the order. (Reid
v. Valley Restaurants, Inc. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 606, 609.)

We conclude Goble has
not shown the child support modification order, or any other order rendered in
this case, is void on its face, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding there was no fraud or mistake supporting Goble’s request
to set the order(s) aside.

>1.
County Paid Supplemental Judicial Benefits

Goble’s appellate brief
contains a litany of arguments as to why the order denying his motions to
“void” the child support modification order, and all other orders in this
action, should have been granted. Most
of his arguments are related to (or are intertwined with) his contention the
County’s payment of supplemental employment benefits to judges is “illegal,”
the judges’ receipt of such benefits renders them necessarily biased in child
support cases in which DCSS is a party disqualifying them from hearing any such
cases, and renders all orders issued by the judges in those cases void. Moreover, Goble asserts the judges’ failure
to disclose to litigants the receipt of supplemental
benefits from the County constitutes extrinsic fraud further requiring
their orders be vacated. The premise of
Goble’s arguments is wrong. The receipt
of supplemental benefits from the County is not “illegal” and does not
disqualify the bench in cases in which the County is a party.

The “legality” of
county-paid supplemental judicial benefits was addressed and resolved in >Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 630 (Sturgeon I)
and Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles
(2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 344 (Sturgeon
II) [rev. denied Mar. 26, 2011]. In >Sturgeon I, the court concluded the
County of Los Angeles’s payment of supplemental judicial benefits (totaling
about 27 percent of a judge’s total salary) did run afoul of article VI,
section 19 of the California Constitution, which requires the Legislature
“‘prescribe compensation for judges of record.’” (Sturgeon
I, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 635.) But Sturgeon
I, decidedly rejected contentions the supplemental benefits constituted an
illegal gift of public funds or violated the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court
Funding Act of 1997. (>Id. at p. 642.)

In response to >Sturgeon I, the Legislature passed
Senate Bill X2 11, which added section 68220 to the Government Code providing
in relevant part, “(a) Judges of a court whose judges received supplemental
judicial benefits provided by the county or court, or both, as of July 1, 2008,
shall continue to receive supplemental benefits from the county or court then
paying the benefits on the same terms and conditions as were in effect on that
date.” In Sturgeon II, 191 Cal.App.4th at page 352, the court held
SB X2 11 “satisfied the requirement of article VI, section 19 of the
California Constitution that the Legislature prescribe the compensation of
judges.” The supplemental benefit
payments “are clearly now ‘prescribed’ under even the strictest interpretation
of the term.” (Id. at p. 353.) “[T]he
Legislature has plainly articulated its desire that judges continue receiving
benefits from counties and courts . . . .” (Id.
at p. 354)

Goble complains that SB
X2 11 contains an unconstitutional “retroactivity” provision immunizing from
liability those public entities and public employees who authorized and paid
supplemental judicial benefits to judges before enactment of SB X2 11. Section 5 of SB X2 11 provides,
“Notwithstanding any other law, no governmental entity, or officer or employee
of a governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to
prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge
under the official action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date
of this act on the ground that those benefits were not authorized under
law.” We fail to see the relevance of
the argument given that there is no issue before us concerning any such
disciplinary proceeding against County officials who authorized and paid
supplemental judicial benefits.

Goble also complains the
payment of supplemental judicial benefits violates several international
treaties addressing corruption. He
refers to the Inter‑American Convention Against Corruption, the Agreement
Establishing the Group of States against Corruption, the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, but other than reciting a litany of provisions from the text
of those treaties, Goble engages in no reasoned legal analysis of >how the County’s payment of supplemental
benefits to its judges violates international treaties or international
law. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (>Badie) [when appellant raises issue “but
fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat
the point as waived”] see also Kim v.
Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979 (Kim) [same].)

Goble’s contention the
Superior Court judges’ receipt of supplemental benefits renders them
necessarily biased in child support cases in which DCSS is a party, requiring
recusal of the entire bench from such cases, and a judge’s failure to disclose
the receipt of such benefits constitutes extrinsic fraud is also without
merit. Silva v. County of Los Angeles (C.D. Cal. 2002) 215 F.Supp.2d 1079
(Silva), is instructive. That case involved a class action brought
against Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County Superior Court judges and
commissioners, and state appellate court justices, making similar
allegations—that payment of local judicial benefits to judges and the failure
to disclose those benefits violated due process and other constitutional rights
because it potentially biased judges in cases in which the county was a
party. (Silva, supra, 215 F.Supp.2d at p. 1086.) (The appellate court justices were sued on
the theory that because they once sat on the Superior Court, they knew about
and had received similar supplemental benefits, making them biased as
well. (Id. at p. 1082.))

The federal district
court in Silva, relying on a
California Supreme Court case, Lolley
v. Campbell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 367 (>Lolley), rejected the contention. Silva
explained that in “Lolley, an
employee represented himself during an administrative hearing before the Labor
Commissioner, after which the Labor Commissioner awarded him $27,216.14 in
unpaid overtime wages, penalties and interest.
The employer appealed the award to the superior court, and the Labor
Commissioner agreed to represent the employee on appeal (as authorized by state
law) so long as the employee agreed to assign him any attorneys’ fees he
received. The superior court held a
hearing de novo and again awarded damages to the employee. The employee then
sought attorneys’ fees. [¶] In the California Supreme Court, the employer
argued that awarding fees to the Labor Commissioner deprived him of due process
because it gave the commissioner ‘“a pecuniary interest in the case, thus
denying the employer an impartial and fair hearing before the Labor
Commissioner.”’ [Citation.] The California Supreme Court rejected the
employer’s due process challenge because he had not demonstrated that the
commissioner had ‘“a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest”’ in the
case. [Citation.] The Court contrasted the case with [the case
relied upon by the employer], ‘which found a violation of due process where the
defendant was tried by the mayor of a village for violating the Prohibition
Act, because the mayor’s fees for acting in this capacity were paid by fines
collected from the defendant. The mayor
would be paid for his services as a judge only if he found the defendant
guilty.’ [Citation.]” (Silva,
supra, 215 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1086-1087.)

Silva reasoned “[t]he facts alleged in [the current] complaint are
even less consistent with a due process violation than the facts in >Lolley.
There, the Labor Commissioner had an indirect incentive to award damages
to the employee, because the employer might appeal such a ruling, thereby
creating the possibility that he could later collect attorneys’ fees. Had the Labor Commissioner ruled in the
employer’s favor, he would have destroyed the possibility of his later
recovering attorneys’ fees. Nonetheless,
the California Supreme Court decided that the monetary incentive to rule in
favor of the employee was too indirect and insubstantial to raise the specter
of potential bias. [¶] Here, the County pays local judicial benefits
to Superior Court judges regardless of the outcome of any particular case, and
thus there is no incentive for a Superior Court judge to rule in the County’s
favor.” (Silva, supra, 215 F.Supp.2d at p. 1087.) Silva
additionally rejected the notion a judge must disclose the receipt of
county-paid employment benefits because it was already a matter of public
record. (Id. at p. 1086, fn. 6.)


We agree with the
reasoning in Silva. Here, as in Silva, Goble “simply has not demonstrated a realistic, immediate
possibility that the County will stop paying local judicial benefits to
Superior Court judges if they render decisions unfavorable to the County. [Citation.]”
(Id. at p. 1088; see also
Fine v. Sheriff of Los Angeles County (9th Cir.
Dec. 16, 2009, No 09-56073) 2009 WL 4874116 (Fine)href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"
title="">[1]
[judge’s receipt of supplemental employment benefits from county, a party in
the litigation, did not give judge “a ‘direct personal, substantial, pecuniary
interest’ in the matter. [Citation.]”].) Accordingly, Goble’s argument the judges
issuing orders in this child support case were all required to recuse
themselves, is unfounded.href="#_ftn2"
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]

2. Commissioner’s Advisement

We turn to Goble’s
second general argument regarding denial of his motion to set aside the October
18, 2011, order modifying child support.
He asserts the order must be set aside because he was not advised of his
right to object to the matter being heard by a commissioner when it was called
for calendar on May 11, 2011. And he
argues it was the product of “extrinsic fraud” because Commissioner Neary
“fraudulently” stated in the October 18, 2011, minute order there had been no
objections to his hearing the matter as temporary judge, when the court had
received his “notice of non stipulation” filed before the continued hearing
date.

“We begin with an
overview of the applicable statutory procedure.
Child support matters, such as this, are referred to a
commissioner. ([Fam. Code,] § 4251,
subd. (a); County of Sacramento v. Llanes
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1172 . . . .) Section 4251, subdivision (b), provides in
relevant part: ‘The commissioner >shall act as a temporary judge unless an
objection is made by the local child support agency or any other party.’ (Italics added.) If a party objects to the commissioner acting
as a temporary judge, the commissioner is still empowered to hear the matter,
make findings of fact and issue a recommended order. (§ 4251, subd. (c).) If there is no objection to the recommended
order within 10 court days, a judge shall ratify it as the order of the
court. If a timely objection is made to
the recommended order, then the party is entitled to a hearing de novo before a
judge. (Ibid.) As a result of the
statutory scheme, a party must object twice to earn a trial de novo before a judge—first,
to the commissioner acting as a temporary judge and, second, to the
commissioner’s recommendation. (>County of Orange v. Smith (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 955, 961 . . . .)” (Kern
County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
1028, 1035.)

Substantial evidence
supports Judge Hubbard’s finding Goble was properly advised of his right to
object to Commissioner Neary acting as temporary judge on the modification
motion. The minute order from the May
11, 2011, hearing specifically states Commissioner Neary gave the requisite
advisement at the beginning of calendar call and no objections were
stated. Goble provided no admissible
evidence to Judge Hubbard to alter the presumption that an official duty has
been regularly performed. (Evid. Code,
§ 664.) Moreover, the notice of the
May 11 hearing specifically advised Goble he had to object before the hearing.

On January 22, 2013,
after briefing on this appeal was completed, Goble moved to augment the record
with a reporter’s transcript from the May 11, 2011, hearing, which he asserts
demonstrates no advisement was given.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155 (a).) DCSS did not oppose the request. Goble’s motion was renewed on February 8,
2013. We grant the motions, but the
reporter’s transcript does not alter our conclusion. There is no conflict between the minute order
and the reporter’s transcript. (See >Arlena M. v. Superior Court (2004) 121
Cal.App.4th 566, 569-570 [where minute order conflicts with reporter’s
transcript, reporter’s transcript generally prevails as official record].) Although the transcript does not reflect an
advisement at the beginning of the hearing on the specific matter, it does not
negate the statement in the minute order that the advisement >was given at the beginning of the
court’s calendar call. Moreover, the
reporter’s transcript confirms that no objections were raised.

Goble offers no
authority that continuing the support modification hearing to October 18 gave
him a second chance to object to Commissioner Neary sitting as temporary judge,
having failed to object when the matter began on May 11. But even were that the case, Goble did not
appear at the continued hearing on October 18, and he filed no opposition to
the modification request, which allowed the matter to proceed as an uncontested
matter. Thus, Goble cannot complain
about the modification proceeding having been heard and decided on October 18
by a temporary judge. As observed in >Reisman v. Shahverdian (1984)
153 Cal.App.3d 1074, 1089-1090: “It
has repeatedly been held that the term ‘“parties litigant”’ means the parties
who are taking part in the litigation—those who have appeared therein.’ [Citation.]
A party who has notice of a proceeding but fails to appear or otherwise
take part loses the status of party litigant.
[Citation.] The parties who do
appear and take part may thus stipulate to the appointment of a temporary judge
without the consent of the absent, nonlitigating parties. [Citation.]
In Sarracino [>v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1,
6-8], a defendant failed to appear at a hearing on applications for temporary
support in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage and child support. The court held that the defendant’s action
was indistinguishable from default, and that the stipulation of the parties who
did appear at that proceeding was therefore sufficient to empower the
commissioner as a temporary judge.
[Citation.]” Accordingly, Goble
has not demonstrated he properly objected to Commissioner Neary proceeding as
temporary judge in the support modification matter, and Judge Hubbard did not
abuse her discretion by denying the motion to vacate the order modifying
support.

3. >Other Issues

Goble states because
DCSS did not appear at the January 20, 2012, hearing on his motion to vacate
prior orders, or file opposition, it has waived its right to defend the ruling
on appeal. The argument is unsupported
by citation to legal authority or analysis (see Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785 [waiver]; >Kim, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p.
979 [same]). Moreover, Goble himself
provided us with DCSS’s written opposition and his reply to that
opposition demonstrating the argument is frivolous.

Goble reiterates his
complaint made below that the DCSS has a financial incentive to seek support
orders on behalf of children because it receives some federal funding for its
operations based upon its rate of collection of such support. Goble has failed to offer any cogent
reasoning as to how this casts any doubt upon the very nominal modification of
child support ordered in this case and we decline to consider the point
further. (See Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785; Kim, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.)

DISPOSITION


The order is
affirmed. Respondent DCSS’s motion filed
January 2, 2013, to provide the court with a copy of the unpublished opinion in
Fine v. Sheriff of Los Angeles County (9th
Cir. Dec. 16, 2009, No 09-56073) 2009 WL 4874116 is GRANTED. Appellant’s request for judicial notice filed
November 20, 2012, is DENIED.
Appellant’s motion filed August 6, 2012, to disqualify this court is
DENIED. Appellant’s motions filed
January 22, 2013, and February 8, 2013, to augment the record on appeal to
include the reporter’s transcript from the May 11, 2011, hearing are GRANTED. Respondent DCSS is awarded its href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">costs on appeal.





O’LEARY,
P. J.



WE CONCUR:







BEDSWORTH, J.







ARONSON, J.