Vega v. Super. >Ct.>
Filed 2/21/13 Vega v. Super. Ct. CA4/3
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
VERONICA GERMINA VEGA,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF ORANGE
COUNTY,
Respondent;
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest.
G046742
(Super. Ct. No. 10WF2655)
O P I N I O N
Original proceedings; petition
for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange
County, Vickie L. Hix, Temporary Judge.
(Pursuant to Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 21.) Petition denied.
Frank Ospino, Public
Defender, Mark Brown, Assistant Public Defender, Matthew Missakian and Miles D.
Jessup, Deputy Public Defenders for Petitioner.
No appearance for
Respondent.
Tony Rackauckas,
District Attorney, and Brian Fitzpatrick, Deputy District Attorney, for Real
Party in Interest.
Veronica Germina Vega
filed a petition for writ of mandate
arguing the trial court erred in denying her additional conduct credits under
the amendment to Penal Code section 4019href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
that became operative October 1, 2011, pursuant to criminal justice
realignment. Vega relies primarily on
the equal protection clause, but she does, briefly, claim section 4019’s plain
language compels the same result. In his
informal response, the Orange County District Attorney concedes the error based
on equal protection principles.
In light of the
California Supreme Court’s decision in People
v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 (Brown),
we ordered the Orange County District Attorney to file a return and Vega to
reply limited to discussing the effect, if any, of Brown. In his return, the
District Attorney now asserts Vega is not entitled to additional conduct
credits based on Brown and its
progeny. In her reply, Vega maintains
she is entitled to additional conduct credits pursuant to Brown and equal protection principles. We agree with the District Attorney and deny
the petition.
FACTS
In November 2010, Vega
pled guilty to committing felony burglary (§§ 459, 460(b)) on October 22,
2010. The court placed Vega on three
years formal probation. On March 5,
2015, Vega admitted to violating probation.
The court reinstated probation on the condition Vega serve 90 days in
jail. The court awarded her six days of
actual credit and two days of conduct credit for a total of eight days. Four days later, Vega filed a motion
requesting additional conduct credits, an additional four days, pursuant to the
amendment to section 4019, which became operative October 1, 2011, arguing to
not do so would violate equal protection principles. At a hearing, the court denied Vega’s motion
and the motions of three other defendants.
DISCUSSION
In her petition, Vega
argues she is entitled to an additional four days of conduct credits for a
total of 12 days of credit (six actual and six conduct), for time she served >after October 1, 2011. We disagree as she committed her offense
before October 1, 2011.
As we explain in greater
detail in People v. Rajanayagam (2012)
211
Cal.App.4th 42 (Rajanayagam), Vega is
not entitled to additional conduct credits.
In Rajanayagam, we explained
principles of statutory construction compel the conclusion only those
defendants who commit an offense on or after October 1, 2011, are eligible for
enhanced conduct credits. (>Id. at pp. 48-52.) Additionally, although we concluded the two
groups are similarly situated, we found there was a rational basis for treating
the two groups differently. (>Id. at pp. 53-56.) Vega offers us no compelling or different
reason to depart from our holding in Rajanayagam.
DISPOSITION
The petition is
denied.
O’LEARY,
P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, J.
IKOLA, J.
id=ftn1>
href="#_ftnref1"
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
All further
statutory references are to the Penal Code.